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International Relations theory has paid bare attention to the dynamics of results of 
crisis between powers operating in different regions. Existing literature shows that when a 
power is predominant in a region, major war is less likely to take place in that specific 
region. However, it is not clear whether the rule of predominant stability applies to 
situations where a major crisis arises between a local power and a geographically distant 
power.  
This project argues that two variables, Local Distribution of Power and Dyadic 
interregional Distribution of Power, determine the Result of Major interregional Crisis (war 
onset or peaceful resolution). Local Distribution of Power refers to distribution of power 
among local players and takes on two values: preponderance and non-preponderance. 
Dyadic interregional Distribution of Power refers to the power balance between the local 
power and the geographically outside power that confront each other in a major 
interregional crisis. It takes on three values: outside superiority, local-outside balance and 
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local superiority. A large N analysis is used to test the relationship between the independent 
variables and the dependent variable. And three longitudinal case studies are used to reveal 
the causal mechanism between the Dyadic interregional Distribution of Power and the 
Result of Major interregional Crisis.  
It is observed that when a major interregional crisis breaks out, a predominant local 
power distribution and power superiority of the outside power is more likely to end up in 
war, while a predominant local power distribution and a balanced dyadic interregional 
power distribution is more likely to lead to peaceful resolution of the crisis. In the former 
case, the complacent outside power tend to refuse to make concessions, while the local 
power, dominated by determination, opportunism and perceptions of local advantage, tends 
to opt for war. Other local players are also motivated to rely on the outside power to 
challenge the local power, which might entangle the outside power into war. In the latter 
case, the outside power, given its disadvantage of locality, tend to be cautious and refuse 
to be entangled by third parties into conflict, while the local power, being confident and 
aware of the high cost of a war, tend to be assertive but cautious, which contributes to 
peaceful resolution of the crisis. 
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With the relatively decline of the United States’ power and predominant position, and 
the collective rise regional powers, such as Russia, China, India, and to a lesser extent, Iran, 
the United States’ advantage in East Asia, Western Europe, or even Middle East is 
decreasing vis-à-vis these regional players. On their way to becoming new power centers, 
these rising powers will inevitably challenge the United States’ position in their respective 
regions and frictions between them and the United States will increase, which may generate 
major crises. There are concerns inside and outside academic circles over the eclipse of a 
stable era featured by United States primacy and the advent of a precarious multipolar 
system, which is likely to be followed by international turbulence. 
Specifically, the rise of China, the narrowing power gap between it and the United 
States, the United States’ shrinking advantage vis-a-vis China in its surrounding areas, and 
China’s challenge to U.S. primacy in East Asia raise concerns of a future struggle for 
supremacy between the two powers. East Asian states are particularly concerned with the 
clash of the two powers in the region. The clash of national interests of the two powers 
over the Taiwan issue has already triggered four crises since 1954, and that over North 
Korea triggered a war in 1950. Since the 2010’s, their disputes in the South China Sea has 
become a new flash point in the region. International relations theories, such as offensive 
realism, power transition, and preventive war and theories, do not bode well for the future 
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relations between China and the United States (Mearsheimer, 2006; Allison, 2017). These 
theories reason that with the power of China catching up with that of the United States, the 
likelihood of great power clash increases. This seems to be true in that the United States 
has been designing an off-shore balancing strategy against China since George W. Bush 
administration (Pang, 2019) and the bilateral relations has been severely strained since the 
Obama administration. Compared with a U.S. dominated Asia-Pacific, a more balanced 
U.S.-China power distribution in the region seems to generate instability. 
In addition, there is also the possibility that United States might get involved in armed 
conflict with a resurgent Russia. U.S.-Iran tensions have also been severed since early 2017. 
The United States considers the Anti-assess and Area denial (A2/AD) strategy of China 
and Iran as major threats to the national interests of the United States (National Defense 
Strategy of the United States, 2018). 
So, will the trend of a narrowing gap between the United States and China, the de-
concentration of world power, and the mounting crises taking place between the United 
States and regional powers in Eastern Europe, East Asia and Middle East destabilize the 
international system and eventually lead to military clashes? And will these crises escalate 
into militarized disputes or even war? How will the distribution of power between the 
United States and these rising powers in different regions affect the probability of crises 
escalating into militarized disputes and war?  
 
 3 
It seems that our analysis tools of the result of crises between two geographically 
distant major powers, especially major powers that are oceans apart, such as China and the 
United States, seem to be relatively limited. Although there is a huge literature on the 
causes of war, few studies attempt to theorize the results of major crisis and causes of wars 
between a local major power and a major power geographically located in another region, 
or, to use the terms of this project, causes of interregional wars. 
This absence is partially due to the fact that most wars took place between neighboring 
or proximate states as a result of territorial disputes or struggle of buffer zone or sphere of 
influence, and the opportunity for geographically distant states to get involved in major 
crisis is relatively rare. 
However, in the modern time, developments in power projection capabilities 
increased states’ ability to project power in geographically distant regions, which increased 
interactions between distant states, the area of “contested zones” (Posen, 2003), and thus 
the probability of a geographically distant power confronting a local power in major crisis, 
or, of interregional crisis.  
The results of interregional crisis varies substantially. At times these interregional 
crises escalated into war, for example, the Pacific War, and less violent but important 
interregional wars such as the Sino-British war in 1840, the U.S.-Spanish war over 
Philippines in 1898. the Korean War in 1950 and the Vietnam war also had great impact on 
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the direction of regional or even global politics. At other times, interregional crisis were 
settled in peaceful means. For example, The Anglo-American Rapprochement in late 
1890’s and early 1900’s is an example of peaceful settlement of serious conflict of national 
interests between two far away states. The peaceful settlement of Cold War crises such as 
the three Berlin Crises and Cuban Missile crisis is also illustrative. 
Notably, in the cases of interregional major power wars, the outside power was usually 
much more powerful than its local adversary, as in the case of the Pacific War and the 
Korean War. However, the local powers were not discouraged from resisting much more 
powerful outside powers. Relying on their own advantages as a local actor, they were 
determined to resist or even initiate war against the outside powers in many occasions. This 
seems to be counter-intuitive, since rational actors tend not to fight much more powerful 
adversaries.  
On the other hand, in the peaceful settlement cases, the power advantage of the outside 
powers seems to be less obvious than the war cases. These crises took place between 
declining established outside powers and rising local powers. But inter-region crises taking 
place in these transitions had the same result: they did not lead to major military 
confrontations. These results contradict the theory of power transition and Thucydides trap. 
So, is there a correlation, or causal relations, between the power distribution between 
the local powers and the outside power, and the likelihood of war when they are entangled 
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in a severe clash of national interests? If there is a correlation or causal relations, how and 
when does one type of power distribution contribute to peaceful settlement and others to 
war? How will the interregional power distribution affect the activities of third parties in 
these crises? How do other explanations of causes of war and peace, such as power 
transition, preventive war, democratic peace, interdependence and other theories, fit in 
explaining results of interregional crisis? 
In addition, in major interregional crises, it should be expected that geographical 
distance will be a potential factor affecting the results. By common sense, local powers 
should have many advantages over the strategic power, such as fighting morale and 
logistics, which might have an influence over the general local balances in interregional 
crisis. However, in the modern time, with the development of power projection and 
logistics capabilities, does geographical distance still have an essential role to play in 
deciding the course of such crisis? If geographical distance still has an impact, how does it 
intermediate the relationship between power distribution and the results of such crises?  
These are the questions into which this project tries to investigate. 
Structure of the Project 
The structure of this book: Chapter 1 lays out the theoretical framework, which 
reviews the existing literature and proposes new theories to account for the different results 
of interregional crisis. It will also generate hypotheses and alternative hypotheses to test. 
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Chapter 2 will use empirical data to test the hypotheses and alternative hypotheses. Chapter 
3 to Chapter 8 will use three pair of within-case longitudinal case studies probing into the 
causal chain between the IVs and the DV. Chapter 9 sums up the findings of this project 
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Chapter 1 Theory, Hypothesis and Method 
There is extensive literature on the causes of war; however, there is little literature on 
the causes of wars that have taken place between states operating in different geographical 
regions. 
War does not arise out of vacuum. Usually, states fight wars because of severe conflicts 
of national interests, and wars are usually preceded by major crises. The aim of this project 
is to investigate the factors contributing to war onset and peaceful resolution in major 
interregional crisis, which denotes one of the two outcomes captured by the dependent 
variable of this project (DV: War or Peaceful Resolution in major interregional crisis). 
There are two types of regions. One is geographical, and the other is strategical. The 
conventional definition of a region is overwhelmingly geographical. The word 
“interregional” in this project is also used in a geographical sense. Geographically defined 
regions are usually separated by mountains (such as the Himalayas, which separate East 
Asia and South Asia, the Hindu Kush Mountains, which separate Central Asia from South 
Asia, and the Caucasus Mountains, which separate Russia from the Middle East), deserts 
(such as the Gobi Desert, which separates China from Central Asia, and the Sahara Desert, 
which separates North Africa from Sub-Saharan Africa) and large bodies of water (usually 
oceans but also other types of water, for example, the Mediterranean, which separates 
Europe from North Africa and the Middle East, the Black Sea, which separates Russia from 
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the Middle East, and the Red Sea, which separates the Arabian Peninsula from Sub-Saharan 
Africa). Defining whether a state is a part of a geographical region is not too difficult a task. 
However, given the large landmass of some great powers, these countries could be regarded 
as geographically located in many regions. For example, the Roman could be regarded as 
both a European and a North African state, modern Russia could be regarded as both a 
European, East Asian and a Middle East Power, and modern China could be regarded as 
both an East Asian, Central Asian and Southeast Asian power. 
Geographical regions are still essential in making sense of international relations. The 
home region is still the most immediate concern of states, from which they cannot retreat 
or withdraw. As many countries lacked a power projection capability over distance and had 
no essential national interests in remote regions, most pre-modern crises and wars took 
place as regional conflicts. Usually, even large empires and great powers fought only in 
immediate proximity. 
However, with the development of modern naval power projection capability and with 
the Age of Discovery paving the way for globalization, because of strategic interests, major 
powers started to operate in geographically remote regions. Over time,  Great Britain 
became a South Asian and American power, and the United States became a Pacific power. 
These nations became powers “in” a remote geographical region because of extending 
national interests and strategic requirements. In this project, a state that is involved in a 
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geographically remote region because of strategic interests is termed a “strategic regional 
power” or an “outside power” in that region. South Asia and America could be regarded as 
Great Britain’s “strategic regions” in the 18th and 19th centuries. When an outside state is 
strategically “in” a geographically remote region, the outside state and the local states form 
an interregional international subsystem. 
Compared to a geographical region, a state’s strategic region is much more malleable. 
Whether a state is strategically “in” a region usually hinges on its relative power vis-a-vis 
the local powers in the region. Typically, a state is strategically “in” a geographically 
remote region when other local actors are much weaker in terms of material capability. 
Unlike the situation in its geographical region, in its strategic region, a state can opt for 
withdrawing or retreating. 
Having strategic regions provides the opportunity for a state to become entangled in 
an interregional crisis. In pursuing its national interests in its strategic regions, a strategic 
regional power might directly confront local powers, and a major crisis might break out. 
The results of these major crises vary substantially, as shown in the introductory chapter. 
What factors decide whether these major interregional crises lead to war or are 
resolved by peaceful means? 
If whether a state is strategically “in” a region hinges on its relative power vis-a-vis 
local powers, does the power distribution between strategic regional powers and local 
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powers also decide whether a major interregional crisis is ended by war or a peaceful 
resolution? 
According to the structural realism theory and the International Relations Theory (IRT), 
the distribution of power is one of the most important underlying factors affecting 
international stability; therefore, it is plausible to predict that the distribution of power can 
affect the results of major interregional crises. If power distribution does affect the result 
of major crises, what type of power distribution is more likely to lead to war or peaceful 
resolution? What is the mechanism leading to war onset or to a peaceful resolution? 
Existing Literature on Power Distribution and International Stability 
There are few studies touching upon the relationship between power distribution and 
crisis results. However, in realist IR theory, there has been a lengthy debate on whether the 
preponderance or balance of power is generally more likely to preserve stability. 
The word “stability” in international relations studies has many meanings: it can mean 
an international system devoid of war, the durability of major characteristics of an 
international system, or the independence of major actors (Deutsch and Singer, 1964; Jervis, 
1997: 94-98). However, the most important factor of stability is the want of wars, especially 
the want of major wars between major powers (Deutch and Singer, 1964: 390-1; Jervis, 
1997: 98). 1  In international politics, international crises are frequent phenomena, 
 
1  When used in this project, the term stability mainly refers to its primary meaning: to be devoid 
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especially among rival states, and the avoidance of war in international crises should also 
be an important indicator of the stability of international relations. 
Multipolar and bipolar stability theorists contend that a certain type of balance of 
power, or balanced material capability between powers, would contribute to preserving 
international stability and avoiding war. A balanced power distribution could ensure that 
“the tendency of one is not so strong as to overcome the tendency of the others, but strong 
enough to prevent the others from overcoming its own” (Morgenthau, 1948: 128). 
Balanced distribution provides a check and balance system that constrains the most 
powerful states, preventing them from expansion and invasion impulses. Balanced states 
also tend to avoid conflict with each other, as the cost will be prohibitively high, compelling 
them to make a “calculated response” and to be “wary, alert, cautious, flexible and 
forbearing” (Waltz, 1979: 173). 
Particularly, balanced power distribution in a multipolar system creates different 
alliance options and provides an opportunity to adjust coalitions among great powers, 
which ensures system flexibility. Balanced capability among the most powerful states also 
constrains their freedom of action (Morgenthau, 1973; Gulick, 1955). In addition, the 
uncertainty and complexity of the system plus the unreliability of alliances “made it 
 
of wars, especially wars by major powers. 
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imperative for all players to be cautious in their motives...and, since risks were hard to 
calculate, compelled them to take as small risks as possible” (Morgenthau, 1948: 271-272). 
Moreover, as a proportion of a coalition’s budget, the increase in a state’s military budget 
vis-a-vis that of another coalition member is less prominent in such a system than in a 
bipolar system. This means that escalation is slower and incentives for an arms race are 
dampened in a multipolar system (Deutch and Singer, 1964). 
Bipolar stability theorists contend that the pursuit of unipolarity is hard to achieve, 
while multipolarity encourages free riding and buck passing. The bipolar system, on the 
other hand, eliminates the opportunity for passing bucks (since there are no third party buck 
catchers strong enough to meet the challenge of the other superpower; see Mearsheimer, 
1990), and one of the superpowers takes a clear response to every threat imposed by the 
other superpower since there is no periphery in a bipolar world (Waltz, 1964). In addition, 
a bipolar system is flexible since the two superpowers enjoy freedom of action to adjust to 
new situations. The two superpowers in a bipolar world are so powerful that they do not 
need to rely upon a specific ally, avoiding thus the alliance entrapment effect in the 
multipolar system (Waltz, 1979: 168-169; Christensen and Snyder, 1990). John 
Mearsheimer argues that since a balance of power is easier to achieve and a miscalculation 
of relative power and of another power’s resolve are rarer under bipolarity, deterrence is 
easier to achieve than in a multipolar system, especially in an unbalanced multipolar world. 
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In a bipolar world, important dyads are reduced to one, decreasing the possibility of a clash 
between the major players (Mearsheimer, 1990). Because of the rough balance between the 
two superpowers, bipolarity minimizes fear and anxiety between them and between their 
friends because one side believes the other side has little incentive to provoke 
(Mearsheimer, 2001: 44-45). Moreover, the alliance systems in a bipolar world are rigid, 
making it simpler to manage than a multipolar system, since a bipolar system does not 
require sophisticated leadership to maintain and small mistakes are affordable by both 
superpowers and the whole system (Gaddis, 1987: 222). Kenneth Waltz also argues that 
international relations are relatively simple and less uncertain (uncertain about who is a 
danger to whom) in a bipolar world, in which, as the two superpowers are much more 
powerful than the other actors, the superpowers are less sensitive to small shifts in power 
between themselves and the other actors. In addition, in a bipolar world, “great pressures 
that are generated, and the constant possibility of catastrophe produce a conservatism on 
the part of the two greatest powers” (Waltz, 1964: (Waltz, 1964: 904). 
Most structural realist scholars doubt the viability of multipolar stability. They argue 
that multipolar systems are hard to manage. As it includes too many actors whose interest 
have to be considered, a multipolar system generates high chances of diplomatic faults 
(Gaddis, 1987: 222). In addition, in multipolar systems, collective action is hard to 
coordinate, and free riding and buck-passing are prevalent, reducing the efficiency of 
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meeting a common threat (Christensen and Snyder, 1990). On the other hand, in a 
multipolar world, the alliance dilemma, which means fear of abandonment on the one hand 
and entrapment on the other, is the most severe (Snyder, 1984). The chain-gang effect will 
magnify small disputes into great power struggles between two blocs in the whole regional 
or global system, especially when an offensive has gained an advantage (Christensen and 
Snyder, 1990). 
The opponents of bipolar stability theory, on the other hand, argue that in a bipolar 
system, one power frequently fails to play its necessary role and that both parties have an 
incentive to cheat. Like the unipolar system, a bipolar system is equally inefficient in 
accommodating the entry of new power poles in the system (Gilpin, 1981: 91). Moreover, 
“bipolarity created conditions conducive to a struggle for dominance”: each superpower 
has an incentive to defeat the other and seek dominance and expansion (Kegley and 
Raymond, 1992: 576; see also Pelz, 1991: 74-75). Bipolarity also intensifies reciprocal 
antagonism, arms races and security dilemmas. 
Scholars who support the argument that a power preponderance is positively 
associated with stability and contributes to avoiding war (hegemonic stability or unipolar 
stability theorists) generally contend that imbalance and hierarchy create order. A unipolar 
power system tends to provide a more stable and sound economic and financial base of the 
system (Kindleberger, 1986; Kapstein, 1999). An international system with a hierarchy of 
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power and prestige is governed by the order created by the unipole, or hegemon, and this 
order guarantees peace (Blainey, 1973, p. 55-6; Organski, 1967: 364; Organski and Kugler, 
1980: 19; Gilpin, 1981: 30-31). In addition, devoid of hegemonic rivalry and the balance 
of power mechanisms, a unipolar system provides a solid base for international stability 
(Wohlforth 1999; similar views can be found in Kupchan, 1998). Unipolarity also dampens 
status and prestige competition, thus “reducing or removing important preconditions for 
militarized rivalry and war” (Wohlforth, 2011: 60). In a system of unipolarity, it is almost 
impossible for other actors to “pursue with any success strategies that are at odds with its 
preferences or interests” (Kapstein, 1999: 465). An example of this is the system of U.S. 
unipolarity; China—the most likely challenger—can neither use internal balancing because 
of the large power gap between it and the United States nor external balancing because it 
can find no partner to balance against the United States. Therefore, arguably, it is wiser for 
China to cooperate rather than challenge the United States’ international position (Zhu, 
2008). China’s situation also applies to other secondary powers. In addition, in a unipolar 
system, the uncertainty over relative power and the potential result of a military conflict is 
reduced to the lowest level, which also favors international peace (Blainey, 1973: 114). 
Because of the large power gap between the unipole and other states, the unipole is also in 
a favorable position to setup international institutions (Ikenberry 2001; Finnemore, 2009), 




Many other scholars are aware of the weakness of the preponderance stability 
argument. With few constraints, a unipole can be induced into “excessive expansion”, 
which will invite the counter-balancing efforts of other actors (Layne, 1993; Waltz, 2000; 
Jervis: 2011). Unipolar systems have a major problem in accommodating rising rivalries. 
In addition, a unipole may be inclined to use force to prevent the emergence of a peer 
competitor (Copeland, 2000; Mearsheimer, 2001). Unipoles also tend to decline over time, 
creating periods of turbulence and conflicts (Organski, 1967; Organski and Kugler, 1980; 
Gilpin, 1981; Stein, 1984; Modelski, 1987; Goldstein, 1988). 
Apart from the system-level analysis, some scholars also argue that in interstate 
interactions, an imbalance of power is correlated with the absence of violent interactions. 
An imbalance of material capability tends to eliminate the disagreement over relative 
power, which is an essential cause of war (Blainey, 1973; Garnham, 1976; Bennett and 
Stam, 2004). Statistics show that bordering states with equal capabilities are more likely to 
go to war, since they both feel they are capable of gaining in such an enterprise (Most and 
Starr, 1983; O’Loughlin, 1986). A state with superior power would be more likely to deter 
a potential challenger (Diehl, 1985; Levy, 1988). When a defender has a power advantage 
over the attacker, the possibility of successful deterrence increases (Huth, 1988: 35-41). 
However, contrary to this logic, one might also argue that if the material capability of 
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the two parties of a major crisis is featured by a rough balance, a war between the two will 
be extremely costly. The perspective of a disastrous war would discourage the two parties 
from fighting each other. The two parties could also check each other’s expansionist 
motivations at a cost to the other (Claude, 1962). 
Scholars, such as T.V. Paul, also argue that small powers initiate war against much 
powerful ones on many occasions under the following conditions: “(1) the presence of a 
serious conflict of interests; (2) the weaker side more highly values the issue in dispute; (3) 
the weaker side is dissatisfied with the status quo; and (4) the weaker side fears a 
deterioration from or no change in the status quo in the future”. In addition, small powers 
may initiate wars against more powerful ones when they adopt a limited aim/fait accompli 
strategy, possess short-term offensive capabilities and have alliance support (Paul, 1994: 
16, 24-33). 
In summary, those who support balanced distribution stability contend that a balanced 
distribution creates checks and balances mechanisms that render the major players in the 
system cautious and forbearing and dampen the likelihood of war. However, those who 
support preponderance stability contend that the indisputable power preponderance of an 
actor eliminates any type of competition and any uncertainties of the results of potential 
conflicts, discouraging other actors from challenging the preponderant power and 
contributing to the want of war and the preservation of stability. 
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One problem with these theoretical arguments is that the historical records of the 
relation between power distribution and international stability do not seem to follow a 
single pattern. Characterized by imperial expansion and continuous war and conflicts 
outside Europe, the period from 1816 to 1914, the so-called “Britain’s Imperial Century” 
(Hyam, 2002), was actually not very stable. Similarly, the United States’ global 
preeminence immediately after WWII (1946 to late 1950) did not prevent Pyongyang’s 
attack on its protectorate—Republic of Korea (ROK)—and China’s entrance into the war, 
nor did it prevent Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV , or North Vietnam) from making 
efforts to topple another protectorate of the United States—Republic of Vietnam (ROV, or 
South Vietnam). While the roughly balanced bipolar system of the Cold War period is 
termed a period of “long peace” (Gaddis, 1987), the balanced rivalry of Athens-Spartan 
ultimately led to the Peloponnesian War. Michael Haas, using subsystem data, finds 
unipolarity to be the most stable and multipolarity the most unstable in international 
subsystems (Haas, 1970). Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s empirical study finds that in the 19th 
century, a balanced distribution of power was associated with international peace, while in 
the 20th century, a concentration of power was associated with international peace (Bueno 
de Mesquita, 1978). Jack Levy, using data from 1495 to 1975, finds the bipolar system to 
be more peaceful than both unipolarity and multipolar systems (Levy, 1985). William 
Thompson, using data from 1494-1983, finds unipolarity to be most stable, multipolarity 
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to be the least stable, and bipolarity, somewhere in between (Thompson, 1986, 1988). 
Manus Midlarsky, using both formal models and case studies, finds bipolarity to be more 
stable than multipolarity (Midlarsky, 1988, 1989). Using data from Europe for the period 
between 1495 and 1559, Ted Hopf finds no major difference in levels of stability in a 
bipolar and a multipolar regional system (Hopf, 1991). David Kang finds evidence of 
stability under China’s dominance and of multipolar instability in East Asia from 1300-
1900 (Kang, 2007). 
The contrasting theories and records seem to reflect a problem: scholars are not talking 
about the same concept. Supporters for preponderance stability usually have regional (in a 
geographical sense) systems in mind. Kupchan and Haas contend that regional power 
preponderance is beneficial for stability. Most of Thompson’s unipolar period data are also 
regional (see Thompson, 1986: 602-4). Most empirical evidence runs contrary to the 
multipolar stability arguments of Morgenthau, Deutsch and Singer and Gulick at the 
regional level. Waltz argues that smaller systems are better than small systems and that 
smaller systems are more stable (Waltz, 1979: 136). However, he believes that the smallest 
system is a bipolar one. Waltz is right that preponderance is hard to achieve on the global 
level; however, he fails to acknowledge that it is possible to achieve regional 
preponderance and that the smallest regional system is a unipolar or a preponderant system. 
Waltz, Mearsheimer and Gaddis’ bipolar stability model works well in the Cold War era. 
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However, the focus of their discussion is the global system rather than the regional system. 
Actually, their theory does not contradict the theory that power preponderance preserves 
regional stability, as both the Soviet Union and the United States were unipolar or 
preponderant powers in their own regions (Europe and America) during the Cold War. 
However, Cold War bipolarity did not last long. The United States enjoyed a 
considerable power advantage over the U.S.S.R. until the mid- or late 1950s, which was 
the reason that Thompson regards the period between 1945 and 1959 as a unipolar rather 
than bipolar system (Thompson, 1986: 603-4). With the revival of Europe and Japan and 
the rise of China, it was difficult to imagine the global system as bipolar by the early 1970s. 
Even if we regarded the period of Cold War bipolarity starting from 1945, the bipolar 
period lasted only approximately 25 years. A period of global unipolarity is also rare. The 
first decade after the end of WWII and the first decades after the end of the Cold War might 
be deemed a unipolar period. However, that does not make the time duration of unipolar 
periods more than three decades. According to the Comprehensive Index of National 
Capability (CINC) score of the Correlates of War (C.O.W) datasets, the largest share of a 
single states’ global material capability was 0.38 percent (the United States’ CINC score in 
1946), and within a decade, it fell to 0.27 (the United States’ CINC score in 1955). 
The simple fact is that most of the time, the global power distribution has been 
multipolar. This might be a reason why a number of scholars have suggested or argued that 
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while working well in explaining regional stability, power distribution, or the polarity 
theory, does not work in the international system as a whole. David Garnham suggests that 
while a strong relationship between power distribution and war occurrence may not be 
found “in the international system as a whole”, it might be found if scholars restrict their 
focus “to the major power subsystem” (Garnham, 1985: 18-19). Robert Jervis finds that 
“although the overall balance of a power system has never failed, local ones have”. Some 
countries succeeded in breaking the balance and dominating their isolated systems (Jervis, 
1997: 133). Barry Buzan argues that “(s)imple polarity theory generally works quite nicely 
in thinking about relatively compact geopolitical spaces, where states have few options for 
isolationist policies and regional powers and global ones are all crammed into the same 
small place”; however, “it does not work...when transferred to the wider global stage” 
(Buzan, 2004: 64-65; see also Buzan 2003). 
If the explanatory power of power distribution on a global system is relatively limited, 
can it account for the stability of systems above the regional level? 
Power Distribution, Geographical Proximity and Results of Interregional Crisis 
Consistent with the existing literature on power distribution, this project predicts that 
regional power distribution (IV1) and the dyadic power distribution between a strategic 
regional power and a local power (IV2) will have a significant impact on the results of an 
interregional major crisis between them (DV). It intends to investigate what type of 
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combination of power distributions (a regional and a dyadic) or of material capability 
distributions contributes to war onset following a major interregional crisis and what type 
of combination of power distributions contributes to a peaceful resolution of such a crisis. 
Specifically, it tries to explain the mechanism through which a certain type of combination 
of power distributions leads to a certain result of an interregional crisis. In so doing, it 
hopes to refine our understanding of the conditions favoring interregional stability by 
focusing on the interaction between the regional and dyadic interregional distribution of 
power. 
Above the regional level, the distribution of power’s impact on international relations 
could be different than that in regional settings. In a regional system, regional actors have 
few incentives to challenge a regional preponderant power, making a preponderant 
distribution of power in the regional system the most stable. However, in an interregional 
system, if a strategic regional power is the preponderant power, it might not be able to 
discourage local actors from challenging it, since local powers might perceive that they 
have many local advantages over an outside power, or a strategic regional power, and that 
these advantages might reduce the power advantage of the latter. Many of the local powers’ 




Advantage of Geographical Proximity 
Most structural realist scholars do not regard geographical location as an important 
explanatory factor. However, Morgenthau argues that “[t]he most stable factor upon which 
the power of a nation depends is obviously geography” (Morgenthau, 1948: 80). 
Geographical location sets the basic pattern of ordering among international actors and 
constitutes “a set of constraining conditions”, which are explained by Waltz as comprising 
one of the defining effects of a structure (Waltz, 1979: 73) on the behavior of states. 
First, geographical distance affects power projection and logistical capabilities. 
Scholars have proposed the “theory of viability” and the “loss of strength gradient” concept 
(Boulding, 1963), which negatively correlate state power with geographic distance. 
Modern methods and technologies of supplying war and power projection have overcome 
natural obstacles in dramatic ways, making it possible for great powers to intervene in 
faraway regions. However, the cost of projecting power overseas is still considerable. The 
cost of transport, prepaid supplies and other costs all put great economic burden on outside 
powers (Webb, 2007). Although when fighting conflicts and war, local powers also need 
to project power across spaces, the cost is non-proportional to that of outside powers. 
Although the absolute cost of transportation has declined over time, the relative costs of 
transportation are not affected at the same level by the technological revolution (Buhaug 
and Gleditsch, 2006: 196). Reinforcement and deployment can reduce the effect of 
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disproportionate costs but cannot eliminate it completely. There will always be doubt and 
debate on whether the crisis situation is worth the costs of power projection and 
intervention by strategic regional powers, especially in protracted conflicts and wars of 
attrition. 
In addition, given the proximity of the assets and logistic bases of the outside power 
to the local power, these resources can be quite vulnerable to the attack of the local power 
and thus can be held hostage in major crises. 
Of course, many scholars argue against this point. They argue that in the contemporary 
world, ballistic missiles, cyber and space technology have transcended the limits of space 
and effectively undermined the blocking power of geographical distance. Albert 
Wohlstetter, elaborating the “illusion of distance” (Wohlstetter, 1968), became perhaps the 
most prominent exponent of the theory that distance no longer matters. 
Second, the level of strategic concentration of a local power and an outside power 
differ. When a major crisis takes place in one’s region, in most cases, local powers tend to 
prioritize their local affairs and concentrate on that crisis despite their commitments in 
other parts of the world. They tend to mobilize all their material and spare no efforts in 
having their way in the home region. An outside power, on the other hand, if it does not 
have important interests in third regions, must at least concern itself with developments in 
its own region. Such powers are typically maritime powers whose interests spread globally. 
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Too many security concerns can distract the outside power and spread its energy thin, 
relatively limiting the material and effort that it could allot to a specific region. Before the 
two world wars, Britain intentionally reduced its global commitment to concentrate on 
European affairs. 
Third, local powers enjoy a short-term military advantage against an outside power. 
This is related to the first point. Proximity to the places where the crisis arises and a short-
term power balance advantage give the local major powers the opportunity to swiftly solve 
the crisis by force in their favor, to take the outside power by surprise, and to present the 
outside power with a fait accompli before it could respond. States “located on the same 
landmass are in a much better position to attack and conquer each other. This is especially 
true of states that share a common border” (Mearsheimer, 2014: 44). In addition, bordering 
states can use the ground forces to attack each other, allowing them to seize territory more 
easily, since the army, compared with air and naval force, is a better fit in occupation and 
conquest (Gray, 1977: 211; Mearsheimer, 2014, Chapter 4). 
Finally, geographical distance affects the willingness and the resolution of 
international players. Although the technical problem of transporting supplies and soldiers 
to faraway places is partly solved by modern science and technology, the willingness 
problem caused by geographical barriers is still not solved, despite the refinement of state 
propaganda techniques in the 20th century. The willingness to suffer, or cost tolerance 
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(Rosen, 1972), is still negatively affected by geographical distance. Andrew Mack calls 
such willingness “political capability” or “will” (Mack, 1975: 178).  Because of the 
advantage it had in terms of will, a weaker local power, such as Vietnam, exhausted and 
was able to defeat much larger outside powers, such as France and the United States, in 
wars of attrition. 
Many scholars have observed inverse relationships between resolve, concern, courage, 
and morale and distance. Patrick O’Sullivan creates the term “gradient of boldness” to 
denote “a loss of courage or of moral certainty at a distance” (O’Sullivan, 1986: 11). Robert 
Sack also argues that a society’s will to fight and to risk the loss of lives diminishes with 
distance or remoteness for home (Sack, 1986: 2). Benjamin Miller argues that local actors 
enjoy an advantage in terms of a “balance of interests and motivations” over outsider great 
powers, since “(e)ven if the great powers have important stakes in a certain region...these 
stakes will still be lower than those of the local participants directly involved” (Miller, 
2007:15). Huge White argues that in a future conflict in East Asia, being local, China will 
have an advantage in terms of a “balance of will” over the United States (White, 2013: 
102). 
Numerous scholars echoed such argument. Scholars argue that outside power and 
local power differ in willingness, determination and resolution because geographic 
proximity and distance create a structure of risks and opportunities (Starr and Most, 1978: 
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444). The salience of an issue “is highly associated with spatial aspects since the density 
of social interactions tends to decay with distance” (Gleditsch, 2002: 46). In general, the 
salience of a certain state to another state will decline with distance (O’Sullivan, 1986). 
Accordingly, proximate powers are also more sensitive to each other’s material capability 
(Walt, 1987). International actors usually have more at stake in what is happening in their 
immediate vicinity and their own region than what is happening in far-away areas, and they 
have more at stake in balancing against an immediate threat in their vicinity and their own 
region than in balancing against indirect threats in other regions. 
When an issue is salient and the stake the actor has in it is high, an actor tends to be 
more willing, determined and resolved to have its way, while when the stake an actor has 
in an issue is low, an actor tends to be less willing and resolved. “Actors and events existing 
or occurring in close proximity” carry “greater salience than those more distant”, and 
“more proximate issues are of greater relevance because they pose a graver threat to the 
state and/or offer greater potential benefits through interdependence” (Joyce and 
Braithwaite, 2013: 597). Proximity to a conflict increases the possibility that a state may 
be affected by the spillover effects from such a conflict. In addition, a proximate conflict 
provides a state the opportunity to take advantage of it, take pre-emptive action, and gain 
additional power in the situation, making the regional power balance more favorable to it 
(Haldi, 2003: 8-10). Conversely, in dealing with a faraway conflict, states are less likely to 
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be willing to absorb great costs to have their way. Government officials will have a hard 
time explaining to the public why great national interests are involved in a faraway conflict 
and why that conflict deserves the state’s efforts and costs. 
Ceteris paribus, then, security issues and crises arising in an area in a state’s direct 
proximity are more salient than those in faraway regions, and local powers are more willing, 
resolved and determined than are strategic regional powers to have their way on issues in 
their proximity. Peter Taylor argues that there are three levels of geopolitical codes, namely, 
local, regional and global, but “for all states their immediate neighbors are crucial 
components of their code either as friends or enemies” (Taylor, 1993: 37-8). Crises, 
especially crises concerning a state’s territory, buffer zones, the military balance and an 
alliance structure, that take place in a major power’s home region always have a significant 
impact on it. Negative developments to a major power in such crises are always regarded 
as a salient and direct threat to national security. For major powers, a failure to have their 
way in a major crisis in their home region may also endanger their status as a major power. 
When other major powers are involved in a crisis in a major power’s immediate 
neighborhood, even if the major power is not directly involved, it might calculate that the 
other powers’ actions are directed at it rather than at its neighbors. However, negative 
developments in other regions do not usually have the same immediate impact on national 
security and status that local negative developments have. It is also far easier to persuade 
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politicians and the population to escalate in a local or regional crisis when direct national 
security is threatened than to do the same in a crisis taking place in another region. In 
addition, a state’s economic interests are also usually affected by geographical distance. 
Although states could have global trade relations, their most important trade partners are 
usually their neighboring states. 
Projecting power in another region may also have a major impact on the morale of 
soldiers. Fighting in territories, which are in exotic settings and have an outlandish culture, 
for reasons that may be hard to justify, such as protecting against direct threats to the nation, 
is usually frustrating, especially when the geographical and climate conditions are harsh. 
In contrast, the morale of a military force is usually high when it is fighting in its own 
region against direct national threats. When morale is low, more general tolerance of cost, 
loss and suffering are usually also low, and vice versa. “The problem of maintaining 
morale—convincing the people at home that the war is important enough for them to 
supply the money and expertise to mount a war effort and convincing the soldiers fighting 
far from home, unsure of the purpose for which they are risking their lives, that the war is 
worth it” (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981: 44) is not significantly affected by modern technology. 
In short, the balance of will or resolve is no less important than the balance of power. 
Scholars argue that the uncertainty over the balance of will is as likely—or more likely—
as the uncertainty of relative material power to cause miscalculation and, consequently, 
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major conflicts (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2002). Even a main critic of Boulding, such as Colin 
Gray, while claiming that the “loss of strength gradient” is “sheer nonsense in the content 
of the communications/transport technology of the second half of the 20th century”, argues 
as follows: 
“human perceptions lend relevance to that (technically) flawed hypothesis. Barring special 
ties of an ethnic-religious, or even semi-sentimental historical connection variety, it is not 
misleading to claim that concern, interest, and knowledge do vary roughly inversely with distance. 
Our minds carry psychological maps, not ton-mile cost-analysis maps. The ability to project power 
and the will to project power are not at all synonymous” (Gray, 1977: 59). 
Gray’s argument is insightful in two ways. First, he recognizes the local powers’ 
advantage in terms of concern, willingness and salience of interests. Second, he might also 
be partially right that although local powers enjoy some advantage of logistics, 
concentration and short-term military balance because of their geographical proximity to 
the locus of crisis, it might exaggerate the “loss of strength gradient” to consider that these 
would still be advantages when the local power confronts strategic regional powers in a 
major crisis. 
Power distribution, Geographical Distance, and International Stability 
While geographical distance might not significantly mediate the relations between 
power distribution and the results of a major crisis in a regional context, it is plausible that 
it might mediate the relations between power distribution and the results of a major crisis 
in an interregional context. 
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The advantages of locality usually do not apply to regional systems. Major regional 
powers usually have prominent security concerns in their own region. Major crises in home 
regions are considered salient security issues for all regional actors. Major local powers are 
usually willing and even resolved to become involved in such crises, even if such a crisis 
does not affect them directly at the very beginning. In WWI, Britain willingly became 
involved, since all of the other three outcomes——German dominance of continental 
Europe, French-Russian dominance of Europe (thus endangering the British position in 
India and the Mediterranean), or a negotiated settlement (could be at Britain’s expense)—
—was too threatening for Britain to accept (Jervis, 1997: 115). It is more acceptable to the 
public to have their state involved in a crisis that takes place in their own region than in 
one that takes place in a faraway region. Logistics and power projection in a geographical 
region are also relatively easier in a state’s own region than in a location overseas. When 
regional crises break out, local powers tend to give more priority to such crises than to their 
overseas commitments. As a result, the distribution of power becomes the defining 
underlying factor determining regional stability when actors enjoy no major advantage in 
terms of willingness, logistics and short-term military balance. Logically, in such a context, 
when a state enjoys the preponderance of power in a region, other powers tend to avoid 




Nevertheless, the advantages of locality clearly make the “pure power model” 
(Wolfers’ critics of structural realism, see Arnold Wolfers, 1951) a bad fit for analyzing the 
relationships between a strategic regional power and local powers in interregional crises. 
When a strategic regional power with superior material capability is involved in a 
major crisis with a much weaker local power, being arrogant and complacent regarding its 
material power advantage over the local powers, the strategic regional power might assert 
its national interests and refuse to make concessions. It is out of the same logic that Frederic 
Pearson argues that “interventions at great distances are more likely if prospective 
intervener has considerable power advantage over target than if states are relatively equal 
or if the target has an advantage” (Pearson, 1974: 441, also 450). The local power, on the 
other hand, diffident because of its material capability vis-a-vis the strategic regional power, 
would be desperate in protecting its salient and immediate national interests in such a crisis. 
They would tend to perceive that they have the advantages of willingness, morale, logistics, 
concentration and short-term military balance and to believe that these advantages might 
to some extent offset the material capability advantages of the strategic regional power. 
Particularly, if the strategic regional power is also engaged in other parts of the world, 
which is a normal situation for strategic regional powers, it might not be able concentrate 
on the crisis to confront the local power. In this context, the local power would have an 
opportunity to present a fait accompli and to force the superior strategic regional power to 
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make a concession. In addition, if it could the fight the strategic power in a attrition war, 
the willingness of the outside power might gradually wear thin, and the strategic power 
might be willing to make concessions to end the crisis. 
The local power’s perception of the advantage of locality can either be well justified 
or be delusive. However, ordinarily, the local power tends to exaggerate the extent to which 
its advantage of locality can offset the material capability advantage of the strategic 
regional power, especially when the local power is in a desperate situation. It might 
exaggerate its advantages of logistics, concentration and military balance and 
underestimate the willingness and persistence of its strategic regional adversary to fight. 
When the arrogance and complacency of the strategic regional power meets the diffidence, 
perceived local advantage (can be delusive) and the opportunism of the local power in a 
major crisis, each side tends to vigorously resist the other side, and the result can be an 
escalation of the crisis into war. The local power might even initiate an offensive. 
When the material capability between the strategic regional power and the local power 
is roughly balanced, the result of a major interregional crisis can be different. In such a 
situation, the strategic regional power does not have an advantage over a local power in 
terms of material capability and is inferior to the local power in not only willingness, 
concern, morale and interests but also logistics, strategic concentration and regional 
military balance. As a result, the strategic regional power might avoid military showdowns 
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with the local power. It might either gradually withdraw from the region or cautiously insist 
on its national interests without overly provoking the local power. Feeling no desperation, 
the local power, confident of its material capability and its local advantage, might be patient 
in dealing with the strategic regional power. It also has little incentive to provoke the 
strategic regional power into a fighting war. In this situation, both the strategic regional 
power and the local power have little incentive to push the other party into a corner, and 
war might be avoided. 
The situation in which a major crisis breaks out between a superior local power and a 
much weaker strategic regional power should be quite rare. In most cases, the strategic 
regional power should have already withdrawn from the region, and such a crisis might not 
take place. The logical result of such a situation might also be mixed. Arrogant and 
complacent of its advantage in both material capability and local advantage, the local 
power might vigorously push the strategic regional power out. In this situation, the strategic 
regional power might opt for retreat, and war might be avoided. However, expecting 
limited costs in a military conflict with the strategic regional power, the local power might 
directly initiate a war to drive the strategic regional power out. In this situation, war cannot 
be avoided. 
Hypotheses, Definitions and Operationalization 
To summarize the above discussions, this project concerns the relationship between 
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power distribution and international stability. More specifically, it investigates the 
relationship between an interregional system’s power distribution (IVs, including the local 
power distribution, IV1, and the dyadic interregional power distribution, i.e., the power 
distribution between the strategic regional power and the local power, both of which 
confront each other in a major interregional crisis, IV2) and its impact on the result of a 
major interregional crisis, i.e., whether it escalates to war or is peacefully resolved (DV). 
This study will also investigate how geographical distance mediates the relationship 
between the IVs and the DV. Particularly, it will investigate in detail the mechanism 
through which the variation in IV2 leads to the variation in the DV. 
Consistent with the traditions of structural realism, this project assumes that the 
international system is an anarchical one, in which international players ultimately rely on 
self-help in defending themselves. It also regards sovereign states as the main international 
players in the international system. However, this project does not regard sovereign states 
as completely unitary actors or billiard balls. The behaviors of sovereign states are decided 
by decision makers. The decision makers may differ in their analysis of the international 
environment and in policy making. In this sense, the sovereign states are not completely 
unitary actors. However, this project also assumes that decision makers are rational or are 
at least bounded rational (Simon, 1957). Their decisions are constrained and conditioned 




The project proposes four hypotheses to investigate the relationship between the local 
power distribution of an interregional system (IV1), the dyadic interregional power 
distribution between the strategic regional power and the local preponderant power in a 
major interregional crisis (IV2), and the result of a major interregional crisis (DV: war or 
peaceful resolution). IV1 takes on two values: local power preponderance and 
nonpreponderance, while IV2 takes on three values: outside superiority, local-outside 
balance and local superiority. The second hypothesis addresses how the variation of IV2 is 
correlated with the variation of DV when IV1 takes on the preponderance value. The third 
and fourth hypotheses concern the mechanism through which the variation in IV2 causes a 
variation in DV when IV1 takes on the preponderance value. 
Hypothesis1: When a major interregional crisis takes place in a situation featuring a 
balanced power distribution between a strategic regional power and a local preponderant 
power (IV1=power preponderance, IV2=local-outside balance), it is more likely to be 
peacefully resolved; in interregional crises, other types of power distributions are more 
likely to end up in war. 
Hypothesis2: When a major crisis arises between a local preponderant power and a 
strategic regional power and the latter enjoys superiority over the former in terms of 
material capability (Situation I), the possibility of war is high. If there is a rough balance 
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in the material capability of the two powers in a major crisis (Situation II), the chances for 
war are relatively low. 
Hypothesis3: In Situation I, an arrogant, complacent but distracted strategic regional 
power, boasting of its material capability, meets a diffident, determined and opportunistic 
local power that perceives that it has a local advantage (such perception of a local 
advantage tends to be exaggerated or even delusive). The former, complacent of its power 
superiority, tends to refuse to make major concessions, while the latter, facing an immediate 
and salient threat, feeling desperate and being more willing to fight, viewing an opportunity 
presented by the fact that the outside power is entangled in affairs in other regions, 
believing the outside power is unwilling to fight an attrition war, and perceiving its has 
local advantages of logistics and short term local military balance given its proximity to 
the locality where the crisis breaks out, might also opt for war. The local adversaries of the 
local power (who might also be allies of the strategic regional power), encouraged by the 
outside powers’ assistance, are also willing to challenge the local power. They might maker 
efforts to entangle the outside power in a confrontation with the local power. The outside 
power, calculating that its  entanglement might deter the local major power, or the cost of 
war is affordable given the large power gap between itself and the local major power, is 
also willing to come to the assistance of its local allies. Relying on their respective 
(perceived) advantages, each side is reluctant to make a major compromise, and the result 
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can be the escalation of the crisis into war. Out of desperation and opportunism, the local 
power might even initiate a conflict. 
Hypothesis4. In Situation II, both the strategic regional power and the local power 
have the incentive to be cautious in dealing with the other. Lacking a clear power advantage, 
inferior to the local power in terms of local advantage, distracted by other affairs in other 
regions, and unwilling to take great risks in a distant region, the strategic regional power 
has an incentive to be cautious. On the other hand, the local power, confident of its position, 
tends to be unwilling to take risks to confront a still powerful outside power. Calculating 
that confronting a strategic regional power will be highly costly, the local power also tends 
to be circumspect in dealing with the crisis. The local adversaries of each side might rely 
on one power to challenge the other. However, the two powers tend to be reluctant to pull 
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As Table 1 shows, Hypothesis1 concerns the whole table, while the other three 
hypotheses mainly focus on the bottom left and bottom middle boxes of the table. This 
project does not give equal emphasis to all hypotheses. The mechanism through which IV2 
impacts the DV is the most essential part of this project, which prioritizes Hypothesis3 and 
Hypothesis4. 
The extension of the bottom left and bottom middle boxes are not completely 
congruent with that of Situation I and Situation II, respectively, since there are situations 
where the outside power confronts one of the secondary local actors in a major regional 
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crisis and the local preponderant power is not involved. However, it is highly likely that in 
major interregional crises under Situation I and Situation II, the strategic regional power 
and the preponderant local power are likely to be involved, as the examples in the 
parentheses show. This is usually a result of concerns of credibility, alliances and other 
commitments. Accordingly, this project approximates the two boxes with Situation I and 
Situation II. 
Notably, for the whole interregional system, Situation I denotes a unipolar power 
distribution situation in which the strategic regional power is the unipole; Situation II 
denotes a bipolar situation in which the strategic regional power and the local preponderant 
power are the two poles; the bottom right box denotes a unipolar power distribution in 
which the regional preponderant power is the unipole; the top left box can be either unipolar 
(when the material capability of the strategic regional power is more powerful than the sum 
of all other local powers) or multipolar (other situations); the top middle box denotes a 
multipolar situation; and depending on the local power distribution, the top right box 
denotes either a multipolar situation or a bipolar situation. 
Alternative Hypothesis: 
Hypothesis1’. When a major interregional crisis takes place in a bipolar balanced 
interregional system in which a strategic regional power and a local preponderant power 
are the two poles (IV1=power preponderance, IV2=local-outside balance), it is likely to end 
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up in war; one of the other types of power distribution in the interregional crisis is more 
likely to be resolved peacefully. 
Hypothesis2’. When a major crisis arises between a preponderant local major power 
and a strategic regional power, the superiority in terms of material capability in favor of 
the latter over the former (Situation I) ensures a peaceful resolution of the crisis, while 
balanced power between the two (Situation II) is likely to lead to war. 
Hypothesis3’. In Situation I, the local power, discouraged by a large power gap 
between itself and the outside power, will be deterred from challenging the outside power 
and will back off, and the crisis will be resolved in peaceful means. In this situation, 
uncertainties in the outcome of a war and the struggles for dominance and prestige are 
eliminated. Given the development of modern power projection capability, a weaker local 
power will not perceive that it has a local advantage over a strategic regional power. Given 
the strategic regional power’s concern over credibility and strategic interests, the local 
power will also not perceive that it has an advantage in terms of willingness and morale. 
Thus, it will not be dominated by opportunism to take risks to challenge the strategic 
regional power. 
Hypothesis4’. In Situation II, a local power, encouraged by its power balance with 
and local advantage over the outside power, will ruthlessly assert its own national interests. 
On the other hand, to fulfill its commitment to its strategic regional allies and fearing a loss 
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of credibility, the strategic regional power will refuse to back off. The local advantage of 
the rivalry will not be a major concern for the outside power given the development of 
modern power projection capabilities. Balanced power generates uncertainties on the result 
of a potential conflict, and the two sides might struggle for dominance and prestige, 
miscalculate, or refuse to make concessions, increasing the likelihood of a clash. In 
addition, the local adversaries of each side (might also be the allies of the other), taking 
advantage of the crisis, will rely on one side to challenge the other, which might entangle 
the two powers in a conflict. Conflict and war is likely to follow. 
If any of these scenarios provide a more persuasive explanation of the dynamics that 
this project investigates than do the three hypotheses that the project raises, the three 
hypotheses should be considered compromised. 
Additional Explanations 
There are many alternative explanations for a war’s onset. 
As discussed earlier, many scholars argue that in hierarchical systems, the imbalanced 
distribution of power, or the preponderance of power, is negatively associated with war 
onset (E1’). The international system that best embodies the power preponderance of one 
state is the unipolar international system. Many scholars argue that such a system, 
characterized by a hierarchy of power and prestige, helps to preserve peace and avoid war 
(Blainey, 1973, p. 55-6; Organski, 1967: 364; Organski and Kugler, 1980: 19; Gilpin, 1981: 
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30-31). In addition, devoid of prestige competition, a hegemonic rivalry and balance of 
power mechanisms, a unipolar system provides a solid base of international stability 
(Wohlforth 1999; Kupchan, 1998). Unipolarity also “dampen(s) status competition, 
reducing or removing important preconditions for militarized rivalry and war” (Wohlforth, 
2011: 60). In a system with a unipole, it is almost impossible for other actors to “pursue 
with any success strategies that are at odds with its preferences or interests” (Kapstein, 
1999: 465). In addition, in a hierarchical system, the uncertainty of relative power and the 
potential result in the form of a military conflict is reduced to the least level, which also 
favors international peace (Blainey, 1973: 114). 
Power transition theorists and other related theories argue that power transitions are 
usually associated with wars between rising and declining powers (Organski, 1958; 
Organski and Kugler, 1980; Gilpin, 1982). Such wars tend to be violent (E2’). 
A school of scholars, including the power transition theorists, argues that it is far easier 
for dyads of status quo (SQ) states than it is for dyads of a SQ state and a revisionist state 
to preserve peace among themselves (E3’). Revisionist states often try to take advantage of 
power shifts in favor of themselves to challenge and revise the status quo international 
arrangement that the established powers have created, which increases the odds of conflict 
and war among these two types of states. 
Other scholars argue that the mutual interdependence of the economy and trade 
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(liberal school and capitalist peace scholars) can dampen the chances of war (E4’). They 
argue that specialization makes liberal trading states interdependent and that military 
conflict cannot help to solve their national problems (Rosecrance, 1986). For these states, 
conquest is becoming too costly and unprofitable since the use of force will cause a decline 
in investment and the outflow of capital. In addition, with economics increasingly based 
on intellectual and financial capital, they are becoming less dependent on occupying 
territory (Gartzke, 2005, 2007). 
Another school of scholars argues that expectations of worsening trade and economic 
situations will drive interdependent states into conflicts (Copeland, 2015) (E5'). In this 
context, independent states are even more likely to wage wars with each other than are 
states that are not financially and economically independent. 
The case studies of this project will try to compare the explanatory power of these 
alternative explanations with that of the hypotheses this project puts forward. 
Definitions and Operationalizations 
Region and Strategic Regional Power 
Without special notes, the word “region” refers to a geographical region. Regions are 
areas bounded by geographical barriers, such as oceans and high mountains. The security 
of states in a region is closely linked together. 
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Barry Buzan and Ole Waever divide the world into eight regional security complexes 
(RSCs) or security regions: East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
North America, South America, EU-Europe and post-Soviet space. Security regions or 
RSCs are defined as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together 
sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from 
one another” (Buzan, 1983: 106). These RSCs are divided by natural barriers, such as the 
Himalayas and oceans, and by so-called “insulators”, such as Myanmar, Afghanistan, 
Turkey, Mongolia and Panama (Buzan and Waever, 2003). Bernard Cohen, on the other 
hand, divides the world into nine geostrategic regions: the East Asia Realm (including 
Southeast Asia), South Asia, the Middle East Shatterbelt, the sub-Saharan Africa 
Shatterbelt, Maritime Europe and the Maghreb, the Eurasian Continental Realm, North and 
Middle America, South America and the Maritime Realm (Cohen, 2015: 67). Based on 
physical (natural) and human (social) yardsticks, H. de Blij and Peter Muller divide the 
world into twelve geographic realms: Europe, Russia, North America, Middle America, 
South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa/Southwest Asia, South Asia, East Asia, 
Southeast Asia, the Austral Realm and Pacific Realm (de Blij and Muller, 2004: 3-5). 
Building on the existing literature, this project divides the world into several regions 
according to natural yardsticks, as well as to the traditional sphere of activity of major 
powers. Given Russia’s constant war and alliance relations with Western and Central 
 
 47 
Europe, this project includes Russia in the European system, while Russia will also be 
regarded as a partial Asian power. Given China’s historical involvement in Southeast Asia, 
this project regards Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia as one region. Given the United 
States’ constant involvement and intervention in Central Caribbean America and the 
northern tip of South America, this project treats Northern, Central Caribbean America, 
and the northern tip of South America (including Colombia, Venezuela, Guiana and French 
Guiana) as one region. Accordingly, this project divides the world into eight regions: East 
Asia (including Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia), South Asia, Southern Pacific, Middle 
East/North Africa, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, North America (including the Caribbean, 
Central America and Northern tip of South America) and South America (south of 
Columbia, Venezuela and Guyana). Different regions may overlap. States geographically 
located in a region will be regarded as a local power. 
According to such divisions, except for the “insulators”, most states, even major 
powers, only have one home region. The home region is defined as the region in which the 
state is located and includes the surrounding contiguous areas that military planners believe 
are vital, indeed indispensable, to its own security. Usually, the home region of a state does 
not change. A state could not retreat or withdraw from its home region. For example, the 
home region of Great Britain is Europe. While Britain has far-flung strategic interests, 
when push comes to shove, one can see that their priorities are set by geographical realities. 
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In WWII, Britain could and did allow the Japanese in East Asia and the Germans in North 
Africa to make considerable gains, while they prioritized defending the North Atlantic. 
After WWII, the British proved willing to abandon their Empire “east of the Suez”, while 
they remained deeply involved in NATO. Some states, however, given their extensive 
landmass, have more than one home region. Russia is a good example; it is both a European 
and Northeastern Asian power. However, even states such as Russia have prioritized 
regions. Russia’s concern over Northeastern Asia has been far less than its concern over 
Europe. In most cases, a state’s home region is quite stable. The shift of home regions with 
territorial expansion and strategic shifts, such as the shift in modern Russia, is quite rare. 
Apart from geographical home regions, because of modern power projection 
technologies and globalization, major powers and maritime major powers in particular 
usually have non-contiguous strategic regions. Strategic regions are non-contiguous 
regions where a state has important economic, colonial, diplomatic and security interests 
(for example, alliances and balance of power considerations; see Pearson, 1974: 441). In 
this project, such a state is termed a “strategic regional power” or an “outside power” in its 
strategic regions. Great Britain used to have strategic regions in East and South Asia, North 
America, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Southern Pacific. Apart from being a North American 
power, the United States is technically a strategic regional power in all regions of the world, 
except for Sub-Saharan Africa. However, unlike geographical regions, strategic regions are 
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areas from which powers could technically opt for retreating or withdrawing because of 
strategic requirements, as the example of Britain illustrates. A state’s strategic region 
changes with the shifting power balance between it and the local states. 
The linkage of security and national interest concerns between a state and states in 
one of its strategic regions locks both into an interregional system. 
Major Powers and Major Power Rivalries 
This project defines power in accordance with the realist tradition, which emphasizes 
economic, military capability and resources (including population and natural resources), 
or the material capability of states. Major powers acquire their status because of their 
immense material capability. The following table lists the states counted as major powers 
in a certain time period. 
Table 2: List of Major Powers, 1805-2016 
Major Powers Years (Starts from 1805) 
The United States Since 1805 
The United Kingdom Since 1805 
Russia(U.S.S.R.) Since 1805 
France Since 1805 
Germany (Prussia) Since 1805 
Italy (Sardinia) 1860’s-1945 
Austria(Austria-Hungary) 1805-1918 
China Since 1805 
Japan Since 1880’s 
Turkey 1805-1918 
It might be argued that the United States was not a world-class power until the 1890s. 
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However, as the dominant power in the Americas since the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, 
with a vast landmass, abundant resources, the expansion of its population and economy, a 
prowess in ship building, and the taking off of the textile industry, the United States could 
still be regarded as having been an emerging major power since 1805. Although China had 
been in decline since the 1840s, it was never a negligible power in Asia, given its vast 
landmass and large population. 
The reason that we added the scope condition that the concerned parties must be rivals 
is that this scope condition is similar to that of a severe crisis: in most occasions, only rivals 
have a reason to fight each other. Rival major powers usually have clashes of critical 
national interests, and a rivalry, or a “militarized relationship”, is “a relationship between 
two states in which both use, with some regularity, military threats and force as well as one 
in which both sides formulate foreign policy in military terms” (Diehl and Goertz, 2000: 
4). With this definition, we define the status of rivalries between these major powers in 
different periods as follows. 
Table 3: List of Major Power Rivalries, 1805-2016 
Rivalries Time period Geographic 
location 
U.S.-Britain 1805-1905 Interregional 
U.S.-Russia 1917-1933, 1945-1991, 1999-2016 Interregional 
U.S.-Germany 1914-1918; 1939-1945 Interregional 
U.S.-China 1949-1972, 1995-2016 Interregional 
U.S.-Japan 1907-1945 Interregional 
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Anglo-Russia 1830’s-1923, 1945-1991 Regional 
Anglo-France 1805-1816, 1890’s-1904 Regional 
Anglo-Germany 1887-1918, 1933-1945 Regional 
Anglo-China 1840-1860 Interregional 
Anglo-Japan 1940-1945 Interregional 
Russia-France 1805-1816, 1917-1922, 1945-1991 Regional 
Russia-Germany 1887-1918, 1941-1945, 1945-1989 Regional 
Russia-Austria/Austria-
Hungary 1856-1918 Regional 
Russia-China 1855-1905, 1960-1988 Regional 
Russia-Japan 1895-1945 Regional 
Russia-Turkey 1805-1918 Regional 
France-Germany 1871-1945 Regional 
France-China 1856-1900, 1949-1964 Interregional 
France-Japan 1940-1945 Interregional 
Germany-Austria 1864-1866 Regional 
Italy-Austria/Austria-Hungary 1848-1918 Regional 
China-Japan 1874-1945, 2010-2016 Regional 
Major crisis and Major Interregional Crisis 
No dyad power fights with another dyad power unless there is a reason. The clash of 
national interests is common; however, only a major crisis tends to lead to war. One can 
tell whether an international system is stable by whether major crises are resolved through 
peaceful means or escalate into war. 
Richard Ned Lebow lists a number of defining elements of a crisis: “1. Policy-makers 
perceive that the action or threatened action of another international actor seriously impairs 
concrete national interests, the country’s bargaining reputation, or their own ability to 
remain in power; 2. Policy-makers perceive that actions on their part designed to counter 
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this threat (capitulation aside) will raise a significant prospect of war; 3. Policy-makers 
perceive themselves to be acting under time constraints” (Lebow, 1981: 10-12). This is a 
good starting point. In this project, by major crisis, I refer to the following situations: one 
power is directly attacked or openly threatened with the use of force by the other power; 
one’s allies or proteges are attacked or openly threatened with the use of force by the other; 
the sphere of influence of one power is undermined by the other’s actions; or there is an 
attempt to revise the status quo significantly by a power in areas where the other power has 
important national interests. 
To operationalize “major crises”, this project uses the Militarized Interstate Disputes 
(M.I.Ds) datasets to distinguish major crises from other crises. All the MIDs under the 4th 
“hostility level” (or of the highest action level 1-12) in that dataset will be treated as major 
crises, which are denoted as situations featuring threats, displays and uses of force between 
two or more states (Gibler, 2018: 1). Crises in which at least a party employs blockade 
activities, the occupation of territory, seizures, and attacks (in the MID datasets, these 
activities are of the highest action level 13-16) are regarded as severe crises. In addition, 
since this project is confined to the study of major power relations, it only regards crises 
with at least a major power on each side as major crises. 
A major interregional crisis refers to major crises taking place between states 
geographically located in different regions. However, there are some exceptions. For 
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example, according to the definition of this project, China and India belong to different 
geographical regions. They are also not strategic regional powers in the other’s region. 
However, since they share a common border, a crisis between them (such as the crisis 
leading up to the 1962 war or the Ladakh crisis in 2020) is regarded as regional rather than 
interregional. The two parties of an interregional crisis are usually a local power and a 
strategic regional power. 
This project mainly focuses on the results of major interregional crises between major 
power rivalries since 1805. In these crises, militarized means were employed, and the 
situation was hanging in the balance between escalation (and the high likelihood of war) 
and peace. 
Power Distribution, Power Preponderance, Power Superiority and Balanced Power 
In this project, state power refers to the material capability of a state, including mainly 
economic and military capability. This project uses the Comprehensive Index of National 
Capability (CINC) score of the Correlates of War (C.O.W) dataset to approximate the 
material capability of a state. 
The CINC score has many limitations. For example, it exaggerates the material 
capability of states that have large landmasses but that are technologically backward. It 
also ignores whether a state is politically divided or has a high mobilization capability. 
Qing China was technologically backward, and the Manchurian court was reluctant to 
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mobilize the Han population. After the collapse of the Qing Empire in 1912, China was 
politically divided by warlords until the establishment of the PRC in 1949. However, the 
CINC score of China barely fell lower than 0.10 and was much higher than that of Japan, 
which barely exceeded 0.05. The CINC score does not reflect how the material capability 
of a state is boosted by acquiring nuclear capabilities. However,  this score has been the 
most systemic longitudinal measurement of the material capability of states since the early 
1880s. Apart from the situations mentioned in this paragraph, the score does reflect the 
material capability of most states. 
Scholars have made efforts to define polarity: “In a unipolar system one state holds 
more than 50% of available military power; in a bipolar system, two states combined hold 
at least 50% of available military power, and each holds at least 25%; in multipolar systems, 
military power is concentrated in three or more states, with each possessing at least 5% of 
available military power but no more than 25%, and all together holding at least 50%” 
(Rapkin, Thompson and Christopherson, 1979). 
Rapkin et al.’s overreliance on military power to define polarity is problematic. Their 
definition fails to take into account the potential power of a state, which can be measured 
on an economic basis and by the size of the population. 
Though not without problems, the CINC score of the C.O.W data still serves as the 
best available relevant gauge of the comprehensive powers of a state. 
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If the CINC score is to be used to measure polarity, the threshold for unipolarity by 
Rapkin et al.’s is too high. According to the C.O.W data, the highest share of world material 
power ever taken by a single country is 38 percent (the United States in 1945). Only two 
states have ever possessed over 25 percent of the aggregate CINC score of the world. On 
the other hand, the threshold for bipolarity in the Rapkin et al. measurement is too low. 
What if the third most powerful state possesses a CINC score of 24 percent of available 
military power? 
Before defining interregional power distribution, one should begin with the definition 
of local power distribution (IV1), as it is easier to define. Local power distribution refers to 
how material capability is distributed among the major powers in a geographical region 
(without taking into account the material capabilities of any strategic regional powers). In 
interregional systems, apart from the strategic regional power, all other main actors are 
located in the local system, and almost all interregional crises take place at this locus. To 
operationalize IV1, a regional system is defined as a preponderant system (or to use 
conventional terms, as unipolar) when the CINC score of the leading country exceeds 90 
percent of that of the following four most powerful countries combined. The leading 
country is termed a “preponderant state” in this project. This definition is reasonable since 
the number of major actors in a specific region seldom exceeds five. Even in a region where 
power is diffused, such as 19th Century Europe and the Middle East after WWI, the power 
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disparity between each of the top five powers and the rest of the countries is usually quite 
large. If the leading state possesses as much as 90 percent material power of the combined 
power of the next four, it will have the capability of confronting a coalition of all the other 
major powers in the region. Such power can obviously be regarded as regionally 
preponderant. 
The structure of a local system is defined as a bipolar balanced system when the 
material capability of the two leading regional countries comprises at least 75 percent of 
the CINC score of the top five most powerful countries combined and each of the poles 
holds at least 25 percent of that figure. In addition, the score of both poles should be at least 
double the CINC score of the third most powerful state. I use such standards to ensure that 
there is enough power disparity between the second and third most powerful states in a 
regional system, since an important characteristic of the bipolar world is the power gap 
between the second- and the third-ranking power (Morgenthau, 1954: 324; Tunsjo, 2018: 
7-8). 
All other types of local power distributions are regarded as multipolar. Both bipolar 
and multipolar regional distributions are defined as “nonpreponderance” local power 
distributions. 
A dyadic interregional power balance or power distribution (IV2) refers to the 
comparison of the material capability (measured by CINC scores) of the strategic regional 
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power and the local power that confront each other in a major interregional crisis. In such 
a crisis, when the CINC score of the strategic regional power exceeds that of the local 
power by 100 percent (i.e., twice the CINC score of the latter), the situation will be regarded 
as outside superiority, and the opposite situation will be regarded as local superiority. For 
the term “balance”, this project regards the material capability of two powers to be more 
balanced when the ratio of their CINC score is closer to 1; the farther the ratio from 1 is, 
the larger the power gap, and the more advantage one actor enjoys over the other. When 
the ratio of the CINC score of the local power and strategic outside power is between 80 
and 120 percent, this project will regard the dyadic power distribution as an outside-local 
balance. 
This project will not combine the aggregated CINC scores of the two regions to 
calculate interregional polarity because interregional interactions are usually unidirectional. 
For example, after WWII, the United States had major interests in East Asia and had an 
incentive to have its way when these interests were threatened; therefore, it is reasonable 
to include it in an interregional polarity analysis in East Asian affairs. However, it would 
be strange to include other American states in an interregional polarity analysis in East 
Asian affairs since they do not have essential interests in East Asia. Even if they have 
important economic interests in East Asia and acquired some power projection capability, 
it is still improper to do so. 
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Both IV1 and IV2 will be measured every ten years from 1805 to 2016 to ensure their 
variation. Each state’s ten-year CINC score is measured by its average CINC score in the 
ten years. 
Regarding the situations mentioned in the hypotheses, Situation I takes place when 
the interregional power distribution is an outside preponderance one (1(O)); Situation II 
takes place when the interregional power distribution is a local-outside balance (Balance) 
one; it might also take place in a multipolar interregional system when the material 
capability of the strategic regional power is balanced with that of the local poles. 
War 
By “war”, I refer to militarized interstate conflicts of a Highest Action Level of 20 
(begin interstate war) or 21 (join interstate war) in the M.I.Ds datasets. 
This project regards war and clashes (Highest Action Level 17) as conflict. Apart from 
war, clashes are the most severe type of international dispute. Although a clash is not 
regarded as a third value, i.e., a major international crisis outcome other than peaceful 
resolution or war, in the test of Hypothesis1 and Hypothesis2 in the next chapter, in revealing 
how the variations of IV1 and IV2 are associated with variations of the DV, the clash/major 
crisis ratio is auxiliary to the war/major crisis ratio. 
Research Design 
This project adopts a mixed methodology. It uses large-N descriptive data to test 
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Hypothesis1 and Hypothesis2. To investigate the causal mechanism (Hypothesis3 and 
Hypothesis4), a controlled within-case longitudinal process tracing analysis method is 
adopted. 
Consistent with the structural realist tradition, this project only focuses on the crises 
involving major power rivalries. For the operationalization of major powers and major 
power rivalries, see Tables 2 and 3. 
The universe of cases in this project comprises all interregional major crises between 
major powers rivalries between 1805-2016, as reflected in the M.I.Ds data.2 The dyads of 
major powers having close interregional relations are listed before. All the major 
interregional crises between major powers are listed in the interregional crisis column of 
the dataset of this project. 
The scope conditions of this project are as follows: all cases investigated in this project 
need to be major interregional crises between major power rivalries in the period of 1805-
2016. The definition of an interregional situation, a major crisis, and a major power rivalry 
can be found in the previous sections. 
Based on the rules used to define regions of this project, 535 cases of major 
interregional crises are identified in the M.I.Ds dataset. Applying this project’s rules for 
 
2 The M.I.Ds datasets start from 1816; however, this project adds the crisis between the United 
States and Great Britain between 1805 to 1812 in the analysis. It also adds some other crisis not 
listed in the datasets, such as Japan’s invasion of Shanghai and Great Britain’s and the United States’ 
response in 1932. 
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defining the major powers, 188 cases of major interregional crises between major powers 
are identified. To ensure randomization and avoid selection bias, a large N descriptive data 
will be used to test Hypothesis1 and Hypothesis2 (Gerring, 2012: 258-273). If these two 
analyses pass the test, the external validity of these hypotheses will be confirmed. 
In the large-N test of Hypothesis1 and Hypothesis2, this project will investigate which 
types of power distributions (local and dyadic interregional distributions) are correlated 
with major interregional crises between 1805 and 2016. The universe of major interregional 
crises is listed in the interregional crisis sheet of the datasets of this project. The project 
selects the period of 1805-2016 to investigate because there are more available data in this 
time period and industrialization had also started in this period (which has a major impact 
on power projection). On each continent, major powers also emerged before this period. 
To provide descriptive statistics to test Hypothesis2,  this project also lists all cases of 
Situation I and Situation II involving major power dyads. It will investigate the relationship 
between IV2 and the DV of all major interregional crises between major powers between 
1805 and 2016 and in which the local distribution is featured by the preponderance of a 
state. 
Large-N tests usually do not reveal causal mechanisms and do not ensure internal 
validity. However, the causal mechanism between IV2 and the DV is the focus of this 
project. As a result, to test Hypothesis3 and Hypothesis4, this project adopts a longitudinal 
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within-case process tracing analysis method to investigate the mechanism through which 
the variation in IV2 causes a variation in DV, which is the main focus of this project. 
A within-case analysis can hold many intervening variables in control, while a 
longitudinal analysis can allow IV2 to vary in a stretch of time period. However, ensuring 
that other major intervening variables do not vary largely calls for a careful selection of 
cases. Abundant historical documents and records, on the other hand, make process-tracing 
research possible, enabling the tracing of the potential causal chain between the IV2 and 
the DV of this project. Abundant historical documents, records and archives also reduce 
the necessity of a large-N analysis (Van Evera, 1997). To maximize internal validity, 
process tracing through detailed case studies is needed to explore the causal chain, or 
pathway, between IV2 and DV (Benett and Checkle, 2015: 103-104). Process tracing 
through a detailed case study can test Hypotheses 3 and 4 against the alternative hypotheses. 
In selecting appropriate cases for within-case longitudinal process-tracing studies, to 
ensure the quality of the within-case studies, some conditions need to be controlled to 
reduce the impact of variables other than IV2 . 
To test these two hypotheses, IV1 needs to be controlled. Only major interregional 
crises in which the regional system is featured by a preponderance are selected to test these 
two hypotheses. Among the 21 dyads of major power rivalries listed in Table 3, 9 are 
interregional dyads, which include the following:  the U.S.-Britain rivalry from 1805-
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1905; the Russia-America rivalry from 1917-1933, 1945-1991, and 1999-2016; the 
Germany-America rivalry from 1914-1918 and 1939-1945; the China-America rivalry 
from 1949-1971 and 1995-2016; the Japan-America rivalry from 1907-1945; the China-
Britain rivalry from 1840-1860; the Japan-Britain rivalry from 1940-1945; the China-
France rivalry from 1856-1900 and 1949-1964; and the Japan-France rivalry from 1940-
1945. All the major crises in these 9 dyads in which the local power distribution is featured 
by a preponderance will be investigated. Consequently, only the following rivalries fit this 
condition:  the America-Britain rivalry in North America from 1805 to 1905; the Russia 
(U.S.S.R.)-America rivalry in Europe from 1949 to 1991; the China-America rivalry in 
Asia from 1995 to 2016; the Japan-America rivalry from 1914 to 1945; the China-Britain 
rivalry from 1840 to 1860; and the Japan-Britain and Japan-France rivalry from 1940-1945 
fit this condition. Given the Soviet support provided, the China-America rivalry in Asia 
from 1950 to 1961 could also be regarded as a case meeting these conditions. 
Similarly to the test of Hypothesis2, to test Hypothesis3 and Hypothesis4, to control 
regional power distribution, this project selects only cases of interregional crises in which 
the local power distribution is featured by a preponderance. 
In addition, among these potential cases of dyads of interregional rivalries, the period 
of rivalry should be long enough to allow a strategic rivalry and to allow IV2 to vary over 
time. The Germany-America rivalry, the China-Britain rivalry, the Japan-Britain rivalry 
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and the Japan-France rivalry did not last long enough to allow IV2 to vary. In addition, a 
short-term rivalry might reflect the fact that these rivalries took place because of short-term 
international convulsion rather than long-term strategic conflicts. In the Russia-America 
rivalry, the power gap between the two powers was never too large in the first two periods, 
while in the last period, their rivalry was not as intensive. During the China-French rivalry, 
France never had an extremely large power edge vis-a-vis China, and IV2 did not vary 
considerably. In the period of 1856-1900, it was only because France took advantage of 
China’s decline and other powers encroaching upon China that France was able to expand 
into Indochina. 
Moreover, to ensure the comparability of the cases, states in the cases under study 
need to be modern nation states. Cases that include states such as China’s Qing Empire, in 
which a small group of ethnic minorities ruled the state and feared the mobilization of the 
ethnic majority, are not ideal cases to investigate. 
To satisfy all of the above conditions, to test Hypothesis3 and Hypothesis4, this project 
selects rivalries between the United States and Great Britain in North America between 
1805 and 1905, the crises between Japanese and the United States in East Asia from 1914 
to 1941, and the crises between China and the United States in East Asia from 1949 to 1971 
and from 1995 to 2016. 
These cases are chosen because they involve major powers that have a huge influence 
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in international politics. In addition, these major powers are separated by geographical 
distance, and crises taking place between them can be regarded as interregional crises, 
which are the focus of this project. These specific time periods are chosen because in these 
time periods, these dyads were major powers and were also rivals; thus, only during these 
periods were these dyads “relevant dyads” for the study of conflict and war onset (Diehl 
and Goertz, 2000). 
The dyadic power distributions in the three cases change during the respective period, 
though in different directions. In the U.S.-Japanese dyads between 1914 and 1941, the 
material capability gap between the two powers was widening and constantly shifting in 
favor of the outside power—the United States. In the case of the U.S.-Britain dyads 
between 1805 and 1905 and the China-U.S. dyads from 1949 to 1971 and from 1995 to 
2016, the outside power enjoyed a large edge of material capability advantage over the 
local power at the beginning of their rivalry period. Nevertheless, the material power gap 
narrowed with the passing of time, although the material power gap was still essential even 
at the end year of analysis. 
This project will concentrate on the crisis taking place between these dyads in the 
respective periods to investigate the potential causal mechanisms between the IV2 and the 
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Chapter 2 Empirical Evidence 
This chapter uses a large N analysis to test Hypothesis1 and Hypothesis2. The large N 
analysis in this chapter is descriptive rather than quantitative. By revealing how regional 
power distribution (IV1) affects regional stability and thus interregional stability, this 
chapter explains why it is essential to focus on Hypothesis3 and Hypothesis4. It also further 
explains the cases selected to test these two hypotheses. 
In this chapter, Correlates of War (C.O.W.) datasets, especially the Comprehensive 
Index of National Capability (CINC) and Militarized Interstate Disputes (M.I.D.s) datasets, 
are used to check Hypothesis1 and Hypothesis2. For Hypothesis3 and Hypothesis4, which 
are hypotheses regarding causal mechanisms and causal chains, this project mainly uses 
case studies to test them, which is the task of the next six chapters. 
According to the operationalization rules of the first chapter, Table 4 uses a 2 * 3 table 
to show how the results of major interregional crises (DVs) vary as the local distribution 




Table 4: Power Distribution and Results of Major Crisis, 1805-2010 
 















N of Major Crisis: 224 
N of War: 17 
N of Conflict: 61 
Ratio of War: 0.08 
Ratio of Conflict3: 0.27 
N of Major Crisis: 15 
N of War: 3  
N of Conflict: 3 
Ratio of War: 0.2 
Ratio of Conflict: 0.2 
N of Major Crisis: 32 
N of War: 4 
N of Conflict: 4 
Ratio of War: 0.125 





N of Major Crisis: 98 
N of War: 13 
N of Conflict: 26 
Ratio of War: 0.13 
Ratio of Conflict: 0.27 
Situation II 
N of Major Crisis: 94 
N of War: 1  
N of Conflict: 4 
Ratio of War: 0.011 
Ratio of Conflict: 
0.043 
N of Major Crisis: 72 
N of War: 5 
N of Conflict: 14 
Ratio of War: 0.069 
Ratio of Conflict: 
0.19 
Table 4 shows that when a major crisis breaks out between a local major power and a 
strategic regional major power in interregional systems, Situation II is the least likely 
situation where a major crisis leads to war or conflict (conflict refers to clash or war). The 
second least likely war situation (the bottom right box) is similarly unlikely to escalate into 
war but much more likely than Situation II. On the other hand, Situation I is the second 
most likely situation where a major crisis escalates into war and the most likely situation 
where a major crisis escalates into conflict. It is more than ten times more likely to escalate 
into war than Situation II and almost six times more likely to escalate into conflict than 
 
3 Ratio of war refers to the ratio between number of war and number of major crises, while ratio 
of conflict refers to the ratio between number of conflicts and number of major crises. 
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Situation II. The number of wars in the top left boxes (17) is larger than the sum of numbers 
of wars of all other situations (13, which equals the number of wars in Situation I) except 
for that of Situation I. However, since the number of major crises in this situation is also 
very large, the war-major crisis ratio in this situation is not very high. 
If only major power dyad interregional crises are counted, as Table 5 does, the results 
are slightly different. In Situation II and the top cases, the likelihood of war was zero. The 
likelihood of war of the bottom right situation is also low. However, in the other three boxes, 
the probability of a major crisis leading to war is larger than 13 percent. Except for the 
bottom right box (22 percent) and top right box (0 percent, perhaps because major crisis in 
this situation is too few), in other boxes, the probability of major crisis resulting in conflict 
(clash or war) is between 33 and 44 percent, while in Situation II, the probability is only 
4.3 percent. Situation I is the second most likely situation where a major crisis may escalate 




Table 5: Power Distribution and Results of Major Crises, 1805-2010 (Major Powers) 
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N of Major Crisis: 45 
N of War: 6 
N of Conflict: 20 
Ratio of War: 0.13 
Ratio of Conflict: 0.44 
N of Major Crisis: 10 
N of War: 3  
N of Conflict: 3 
Ratio of War: 0.33 
Ratio of Conflict: 0.33 
N of Major Crisis: 1 
N of War: 0 
N of Conflict: 0 
Ratio of War: 0 




N of Major Crisis: 39 
N of War: 7 
N of Conflict: 14 
Ratio of War: 0.18 
Ratio of Conflict: 0.36 
Situation II 
N of Major Crisis: 70 
N of War: 0 
N of Conflict: 3 
Ratio of War: 0 
Ratio of Conflict: 
0.043 
N of Major Crisis: 23 
N of War: 1 
N of Conflict: 5 
Ratio of War: 0.043 
Ratio of Conflict: 0.22 
The findings of Table 4 and Table 5 only partially confirm Hypothesis1 and partially 
disprove Hypothesis1’ since, for the major powers, the situations of the top and bottom 
right boxes are also not quite likely to end up in war. They confirm Hypothesis2 and 
disprove Hypothesis2’, 
The low ratios of war and ratios of conflict of top right and bottom right boxes of 
Tables 4 and 5 are not surprising. When local power was superior to strategic regional 
power, the latter had little incentive to challenge the former to the point of military conflict 
in a major crisis. In these situations, only when the local power is entangled in severe wars 
with other major powers, or a powerful ally (perhaps much more powerful than the local 
power) lead a war against the local power does a weaker strategic regional power have 
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incentives to extract some interests to risk a war with local power. For example, Britain, 
Australia, and Turkey participated in the Korean War. Even though such wars take place, 
the weaker strategic regional power still needs to risk the revenge of the local power after 
the end of the local powers’ war with other major powers. 
On the other hand, the superior local major power might have incentives to initiate 
war to drive the outside power out of its home region, as the Spanish-American war shows. 
However, such cases are rare, perhaps because most weaker strategic regional powers opted 
for withdrawal before the interregional dyadic power balance turned too unfavorable to 
them. In fact, such wars never took place between major powers between 1805 and 2016. 
A clue can be found to explain why the top left and top middle boxes are war-prone 
when a major interregional crisis breaks out if a test of the relationship between IV1 and 
the results of major regional crisis is conducted. 
According to the definitions and operationalization rules of the last chapter, the values 
of IV1 (local distribution of power) in different periods in different regions are listed in 
Table 6. Both bipolar and multipolar periods are periods of nonpreponderance. Additionally, 









 North America  
 1805-1815  
 1816-1825 1818 Seminole war(*); 
 1826-1835  
 1836-1845  
 1846-1855 Mexican-American war; 
 1856-1865  
 1866-1875  
 1876-1885  
 1886-1895  
 1896-1905 US-Spanish War 
 1906-1915  
 1926-1935  
 1936-1945  
 1946-1955  
 1956-1965  
 1966-1975  
 1976-1985  
 1986-1995  
 1996-2005  
 2006-2015  
 Latin America  
 1826-1835  
 1836-1845  
 1866-1875  
 1876-1885 War of the Pacific 
 1886-1895  
 1896-1905  
 
4 The list of wars is from COW datasets. Those with “*” are conflicts that cost over 500 per year 
or conflicts labeled as “wars” in the COW MID (Militarized Interstate Conflict dataset), all the rest 




 1916-1925  
 1966-1975  
 1976-1985  
 1986-1995  
 1996-2005  
 2006-2015  
 Europe  
 1946-1955  
 1956-1965 Soviet Invasion of Hungary 
 1966-1975  
 1976-1985  
 Asia  
 1816-1825  
 1826-1835  
 1836-1845  
 1846-1855  
 1866-1875  
 1876-1885  
 1996-2005  
 2006-2015  
 Middle East  
 1816-1825  
 1826-1835  
 1836-1845  
 1846-1855  
 1856-1865  
 1866-1875  
 1876-1885  
 1886-1895  
 1896-1905  
 1906-1915  
 1916-1925  
 Oceania  
 1926-1935  
 1936-1945  
 1946-1955  
 
 80 
 1956-1965  
 1966-1975  
 1976-1985  
 1986-1995  
 1996-2005  
 2006-2015  
Bipolar Periods   
 Latin America  
 1926-1935 Chaco War; 
 1936-1945 Ecuador-Peru War 1941; 
 Asia  
 1856-1865  
 1896-1905 Boxer war; Sino-Russian War; Russo-Japanese War 
 1906-1915  
 1916-1925 Japan's intervention in Russian Civil War; 
 1926-1935 1929 Manchurian War; 2nd Sino-Japanese War 
 1936-1945 
1938-9 Mongolia-Japanese War; 3rd Sino-Japanese War; 
Changkufeng War; Nomonhan War; WWII; Franco-Thai 
War 
 1946-1955 
1st Kashmir War; Korean War; offshore Island War; TW-
Myanmar War; 
 1956-1965 





 Latin America  
 1846-1855 La Plata war; 
 1856-1865 Ecuadorian-Columbian War; Lopez War 
 1916-1925  
 1946-1955  
 1956-1965  
 Europe  
 1816-1825 Greek Independence War, 1921-1932 
 1826-1835 
1828 Western intervention in the Greek Independence 
War; 1827 Russo-Turkish War 




First Schleswig-Holstein war; Roman Republic War; 1848 
Austro-Piedmontese War; 
 1856-1865 
Neapolitan War; Crimean War; Italian Unification War; 
Italian-Roman War; 1864 2nd Schleswig-Holstein War 
 1866-1875 Seven Weeks War; Franco-Prussian War 
 1876-1885 1876 Russo-Turkish War; 
 1886-1895  
 1896-1905 Greco-Turkish War; 
 1906-1915 
Italian-Turkish War; 1st Balkan War; 2nd Balkan War; 
WWI 
 1916-1925 
Estonian War; Latvian War; Russo-Polish War; Intervention 
in Russian Civil War; Hungarian Adversaries; 2nd Greco-
Turkish War; Lithuanian-Polish War; Franco-Turkish War 
 1926-1935  
 1936-1945 WWII; Russo-Finnish War 
 1986-1995 Bosnian War 
 1996-2005 1998 Kosovo intervention; 
 2006-2015 Georgia War; Ukraine crisis 
 Asia  
 1886-1895 1st Sino-Japanese War 
 1966-1975 
Damansky Island 1969(*); 2nd Laotian War; War of 
Attrition; War of Communist Coalition; War of 
Bangladesh; Vietnamese-Cambodian War; 
 1976-1985 Sino-Vietnamese War 
 1986-1995 
Azeri-Armenian War; 1986-7 China-Vietnamese border 
conflict 
 1996-2005 Kargil War 
 Middle East  
 1926-1935 Saudi-Yemeni War 
 1936-1945  
 1946-1955 Arb-Israeli War 
 1956-1965 Sinai War; Yemen War 1962 
 1966-1975 Six-Day War; Yom Kippur War; Turkish-Cypriot War; 
 1976-1985 Iran-Iraq War; War over Lebanon 
 1986-1995 Gulf War 
 1996-2005 Afghanistan War 
 2006-2015 Syrian War 
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Using MID datasets, Table 7 displays the numbers of major crises, clashes, wars, and 
the ratio of regional clashes and wars when major regional crises took place in different 
types of regional power distributions (IV1). 
Table 7: Distribution of Power, Crisis, Major Crisis and War on the Regional Level 
 Unipolarity Bipolarity Multipolarity 
N of Major Crises 566 201 1269 
N of Clashes 84 47 291 
N of Wars 10 10 76 
Ratio of War/Crises 0.018 0.050 0.060 
N of Conflicts 94 57 367 
Ratio of Conflicts/Crises 0.17 0.28 0.29 
Table 6 and Table 7 show that the regional power distribution has a significant impact 
on regional stability. Table 6 shows that when crises break out, bipolar and multipolar 
regional systems (nonpreponderance regional systems) are laden with wars, and the most 
violent wars all take place under such distribution. In contrast, unipolar or preponderant 
regional systems are associated with very few wars when major crises occur. Table 7 shows 
that at the regional level, multipolar regional systems and bipolar regional systems are 
similarly war- and conflict-prone when major crises break out, and the war/major crisis 
ratios are 6 percent and 5 percent, respectively. The preponderant regional system is the 
least war and conflict-prone system in the context of major crises. Under preponderant 
regional systems, only 1.8 percent war. 
This is understandable. On the regional level, when local advantage is relatively 
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limited, other states are reluctant to challenge a preponderant power to the point of military 
conflict due to the agreed result of such conflict (Blainey, 1973). In such situations, the 
balance of power politics and struggle for prestige is eliminated, which favors peaceful 
resolution of major crises (Wohlforth, 1999, 2011). These conditions are reversed in 
nonpreponderant regions, and the result of a major crisis is likely an escalation to war. Such 
findings are in accordance with unipolar stability theories and dyadic imbalance stability 
theories of the Realist IR school. 
With these findings, it is not surprising that when local power distribution is featured 
by nonpreponderance, the ratio of war and the ratio of conflict when a major interregional 
crisis breaks out is high, especially when major powers are the two sides of the major crisis. 
Tables 6 and 7 show that regions featuring nonpreponderance are more war- and conflict-
prone than regions featuring preponderance. Regional wars and hostility among major local 
powers provide strategic regional power opportunities to loot a burning house. Allured by 
such opportunities, strategic regional power might join the fight or attack one local target 
with the help of its local adversaries, and an interregional war thus breaks out. 
Despite the fact that the results of all other four boxes are logical, the mechanism of 
Situation I and Situation II is not intuitive, especially given the facts that Situation I is more 
war-prone than the situation of the top left box, and Situation II is the least war-prone 
situation in the two 2*3 tables. 
 
 84 
It is also interesting to note that in Table 1 (p. 40), major power wars in the top right 
box tend to be initiated by much stronger outside power, while many of the major power 
wars in Situation I were initiated by much weaker local power. In the top right box 
situations, stronger outside power might take advantage of local wars or local hostilities 
between main actors, but what transpired in the Situation II situations? Such a mechanism 
needs to be revealed through case studies. 
Descriptive data are provided in Table 8 to test Hypothesis2. All the cases of Situation 
I and Situation II where severe crisis (as Chapter 1 defines, severe crisis refers to crisis 
where the highest action level is between 13 and 16 in the MIDs datasets) took place 
between major power rivalries in the period of 1805-2010 are listed in Table 8, so that one 
can have a glance over the results of these severe crises (whether they were featured by no 
major escalation, by clashes, or by an outbreak of war) in these two situations. In the list, 
IV1 is controlled to see the association between IV2 and the DV. 
Table 8: Severe Interregional Crisis (Major Powers) and the Results (Situations I and II) 
Crises between Japan and the U.S. and their Results, 1905-1941 
Time Crisis Result Situation 
1931-
1932 
Invasion of Manchuria, Shanghai 
and War Scare 
No major escalation, Stimson Doctrine 




Japan’s Occupation of French 
Indochina 
War: Outbreak of Pacific War I 
Crises between U.S. and Britain and their Results, 1805-1905 
Time Crisis Result Situation 





Borland Incident and Graytown 
Crisis 
No major escalation, U.S. 
Bombardment of the British 
protectorate 
I 
1856 Nicaragua Crisis 
No major escalation, Short Naval 
Confrontation 
I 
1858 Disputes over Slave Trade 
No major escalation, Britain disclaimed 
rights to search during peacetime 
I 
1895 Venezuela Crisis No major escalation, British concession II 
Early 
1900's 
Isthmus, and northwest border 
crisis 
No major escalation, Rapprochement II 
Crisis between China and the U.S. and their Results, 1950-1972, 1995-2010 
Time Crisis Result  
1950 Truman’s Jun. 27 Announcement 
No major escalation, but Mao Decided 
to Confront the U.S. 
I 






U.S.-Chiang Defense Treaty and 
Mainland launched offshore 
island offensive 
No major escalation, U.S. aiding 
Taiwan authorities in retreating. Dulles 
threatened using nuclear weapons 
I 
1954 
China accidentally shot down 
British airliner 
Clash, engagements between Chinese 




China claimed that the American 
force flew over Chinese islands 
Clash, Yellow Sea Air battle I 
Aug. 
1956 
US Navy patrol plane flew off the 
Chinese coast 
No major escalation, Chinese fighters 




Chinese Damaged U.S. fighter jet 
from USS Hornet 







3rd Taiwan Strait Crisis, 
mainland bombing of Quemoy 
and Matsu 
U.S. quickly moved the 7th Fleet into 




U.S. intervention of Laotian Civil 
War 





U.S. intervention of Laotian Civil 
War 






U.S. intervention of Vietnam 
Civil War 
No major escalation, Client war I 
1969 U.S. violated Cambodian border No major escalation, Client war I 
1995-
1996 
5th Taiwan Strait Crisis 
No major escalation, The U.S. sent an 
aircraft carrier into the Straits on 
December 19, 1995; by Mar. 1996 it 
announced support of one-China policy 
II 
2001 EP-3E Crisis 
No major escalation, China accepted 
the U.S. statement of regret and 
released the crew members 
II 
2009 
USNS Impeccable did 
hydrographic surveys wrt China’s 
Yulin ballistic submarine base, 75 
miles south of Hainan Island in 
the South China Sea 
No major escalation, Five Chinese 
vessels surrounded Impeccable, and the 
U.S. deployed destroyer Chung-Hoon 
to the South China Sea later 
II 
Major British-China Crisis, 1839-1900 
Time Crisis Result Situation 
1839-
1840 
Disputes on Opium Trade War, Opium War I 
1856-
1860 
Chinese Seizure of Arrow War, Second Opium War I 
Major US-Russian Crisis, 1945-1990 




No major escalation, Concession on 
both sides 
II 
1953 Elbe River Valley Crisis No major escalation, U.S. Protest II 
1958-
1959 
Russia shot down U.S. planes and 
detained U.S. army convoys 
No major escalation, Geneva talks II 
Jun. 
1958 
USSR shot down US planes No major escalation II 
1960 
U-2 Crisis, USSR shot down 
Gary Powers’ flight and 
imprisoned him 
No major escalation, U.S. ended 
overflight 
II 
1961 Berlin Wall Crisis 
No major escalation led up to 
negotiations 
II 
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis 





1963 USSR shot down British jet No major escalation, U.S. protest II 
Mar. 
1963 
USSA violated Alaska border No major escalation, U.S. protest II 
1964 U.S. jets shot down No major escalation, U.S. protest II 
1964 
Soviet fired warning shot on U.S. 
vessel 
No major escalation II 
1966 
USSR violated West German 
airspace; a U.S. helicopter forced 
to land 
No major escalation II 
1967 
U.S. seized USSR fishing vessel, 
captain arraigned and fined 
No major escalation II 
1968 
USSR forced down and seized 
Pentagon chartered civilian 
aircraft near Kuril Islands 
No major escalation, U.S. apologized 
for violation of violating USSR airspace 
and the aircraft released 
II 
1970 USSR seized USAF plane 
No major escalation, release after 
negotiation 
II 
1977 U.S. seized USSR trawler 




USSR seized U.S. torpedo near 
Guam 
No major escalation, U.S. protest II 
May 
1981 
U.S. detained a Soviet plane at 
Dulles International 
No major escalation, released later II 
1984 
Reagan’s Cold War and Soviet 
threat of deploying missiles 
against U.S. and its allies 
No major escalation, shows of forces II 
1985 
Soviet countermeasures against 
U.S. reconnaissance efforts in 
East Germany 
No major escalation II 
In Table 8, 45 cases of severe interregional crises are listed. Among these cases, 19 
were Situation I cases, and 26 were Situation II cases. All six wars took place in Situation 
I, and 14 out of the 15 clashes took place in Situation I. For Situation I cases, only five 
cases featured no major escalation of the crisis. In contrast, 25 out of 26 cases in Situation 
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II featured no major escalation of the crisis. 
Table 4, Table 5, and Table 8 all undisputedly confirm Hypothesis2 and disprove 
Hypothesis2’. 
However, the data from Table 4, Table 5, and Table 8 do not reveal the mechanism 
through which the variation of IV1 causes the variations of DV. Testing the causal 
mechanism hypothesis (Hypothesis3 and Hypothesis4) and thus revealing the causal 
mechanism is the task of controlled longitudinal within-case studies in the next six chapters. 
The case selection strategy is explained in the first chapter. According to the 
controlling method of the controlled longitudinal within-case study method, only the cases 
of the first three dyads in Table 8 are analyzed in the next six chapters. 
As the last chapter explains, this project uses six cases of periods laden with major 
interregional crises for a detailed case study. According to Table 8, the time frame of these 
periods is further refined. Three of the cases were associated with war onset, and three were 
not. These cases are Case 1: when Great Britain and the U.S. confronted each other from 
1805 to 1812; Case 2: when Great Britain and the U.S. confronted each other in a series of 
crises (Venezuela crisis, Panama Isthmus, and Alaska border crisis) in the Americas from 
1895 to 1905; Case 3: When the U.S. and Japan confronted each other in the Sino-Japanese 
crisis in East Asia in 1931-1937; Case 4: When the U.S. and Japan confronted each other 
in the Sino-Japanese crisis in East Asia during mid-1937 to 1941; Case 5: when the U.S. 
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and China confronted each other in the Korean Peninsula crisis in the summer of 1950; 
Case 6: when the U.S. and China confronted each other in the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-
2016. 
Case 1 and Case 2 are a pair of cases in which IV2 varied over time. So as Case 3 and 
Case 4, and Case 5 and Case 6. The results of Case 1, Case 4, and Case 5 are the same 
(war), and the results of the other three cases are the same (peaceful resolution). However, 
their background and conditions are quite different, the investigation of which allows one 
to see how the causal mechanisms play out in different conditions (Seawright and Gerring, 
2008: 300-1). 
As the table below shows, in the detailed case studies, not only the IV2 that this project 
proposes but also other variables that the alternative hypothesis proposes are identifiable. 
In addition, some scholars argue that rivalry between dominant maritime power and 
challenging continent power is more likely to generate intense war (Rapkin and Thompson, 
2013). This belongs to the earlier section on additional (not alternative) explanations of 
war. In the six case studies, the Anglo-American dyads are maritime, while the other two 
dyads are maritime-continental dyads. By applying controlled longitudinal process-tracing 
analysis by archival research to elaborate causal mechanisms and causal chains, this project 
can examine whether Hypothesis 2 to 4 are sustainable and whether they have more 
explanatory power than these additional explanations. In each case, the four hypotheses are 
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The structure of the next six chapters is as follows: at the beginning of each chapter 
is a short introduction. Each introduction is followed by a section of major crisis courses 
(background, outbreak, developments, and results) at study. The next section provides 
explanations of the results of the crisis at study and a statement of the causal mechanism 
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that this project proposes. The next section is a dyadic power distribution comparison 
(including the comparison of CINC scores and detailed economic and military capabilities). 
The next section is the main part of the case studies, which is about the decision-making 
process of the two sides of the major crisis and whether the decision-making process 
reflected Hypothesis3 and Hypothesis4 or Hypothesis3’ and Hypothesis4’. The last section 
is a short conclusion of the findings of each chapter, including a comparison of the 
explanatory power of Hypothesis3 and Hypothesis4 vis-a-vis the alternative hypotheses and 
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U.S.-British Relations, 1805-1905 
The next two chapters will capture Anglo-American relations 1805-1812 and 1895-
1905. Anglo-American relations during these two periods changed from extreme power 
superiority of Great Britain over the United States to more balanced power distribution 
between the two nations (IV2 changing gradually from outside superiority to local-outside 
balance). In the Anglo-American dyads in the period under study, the local power, the 
United States had power preponderance in its own region (IV1 being local preponderance). 
During the respective time period under study, severe clash of national interests 
existed between the local and the strategic regional power, with local power constantly 
attempting to push the influence of the outside power out of its region. Great Britain, as a 
strategic regional power, had colonial interests in Canada, Caribbeans and northern tip of 
South America. Presence in these colonies not only stakes economic interests and power 
projection capability of Great Britain, but also its credibility as a world class great power. 
Despite their clash of strategic interests, they were mutually dependent regarding to 
commerce and business interests. They were also both liberal states in the period of study. 
According to the hypotheses proposed in the first chapter, one would expect that with 
power imbalance between the two powers, in the period of 1805-1812, major crisis would 
be more likely to end up in war; while in the later period, such likelihood would be 
relatively low. While the 1812 war and the Great Rapprochement between the United States 
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and Great Britain in the turn of century did live up to the expectation of Hypothesis1 and 
Hypothesis2, did the causal mechanism (Hypothesis3 and Hypothesis4) proposed in the first 
chapter stand in these two cases? How did other factors (additional explanations), such as 
commercial mutual dependence and liberal tradition affect the course and the final result? 
The next two chapters will try to address these questions. 
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Chapter 3 The Years Leading up to 1812 War 
Between 1805 and 1812, the Anglo-American relations were strained by several major 
crisis, including Great Britain’s increasingly frequent impressment of U.S.-based sailors as 
required by the renewed war with Napoleon’s France since 1803, Britain’s pass of Orders 
in Council and the infringement upon U.S. neutral rights and commercial and export 
interests, maritime clash such as the Chesapeake affair and the Belt-President affair, and 
conflict such as the Tippecanoe war fought between the U.S. and Indians, which were 
allegedly encouraged and supported by British Canadian authorities. 
In this period, Britain had undoubted power superiority against the United States. 
After Trafalgar, Britain established itself as the sole maritime superpower in the world. The 
United States, however, was economically and militarily weak. United States’ 
Nonimportation Act backfired, putting itself in a more dire economic situation. In addition, 
severe domestic division tore the United States between Federalists and Republicans.  
However, in spite of all these disadvantages, the United States declared war on Great 
Britain in June 1812, which makes the 1812 war a valuable case to test the hypothesis in 
the First Chapter of this project. This chapter finds that Great Britain, relying on its material 
superiority over the United States, was arrogant and refused to make major concessions 
regarding to impressment, Orders in Council, and instigated Indian tribes to unite against 
the United States. British decision makers believed that the United States would not take 
 
 96 
risks to wage war against Great Britain, and if a war took place, Britain could win easily. 
The decision makers of the United States, on the other hand, perceiving British policies as 
direct and salient violation of American sovereignty, were humiliated, and willing to 
revenge. Aware of their material inferiority vis-a-vis Great Britain, they were diffident and 
adopted opportunism policies. They seized the opportunity offered by the Peninsular War 
and Napoleon’s coming invasion of Russia, which tied Britain’s hands, and declared war 
against Britain to force it to make concessions regarding the aforementioned issues. The 
perception of local advantage and thus possibility of obtaining American war aims also 
contributed to Washington’s declaration of war. 
Course of Escalation between 1805 and 1812 
The most sever crisis in this period took place in 1807 (Chesapeake Incident) and 
1811 (President-Little Belt Incident and Indian Affairs), and these crises gradually led to 
the outbreak of hostility. However, despite United States’ feeling of resentment of Britain 
since the War of Independence, in the late 1790’s and early 1800’s there was no certainty 
of a Anglo-American clash. After the naval clash with the French in 1798 and the renewal 
of Anglo-French war in 1803, the policy makers of the United States, especially President 
Jefferson, had even thought an Anglo-U.S. alliance against the French. Jefferson had 
endorsed such a strategic option in the fall of 1805 (Horseman, 1962: 48). However, with 
the escalation of bilateral relations in the mid 1800’s, such strategic option was dampened. 
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Because of the renewal of Napoleon War in 1803, Britain was in great need of seamen. 
However, many British seamen, to avoid service in the Royal Navy, deserted and fled to 
the United States. The United States, wanting of experienced seamen for its maritime 
expansion, welcome deserters from other nations. In April 1802, a new Naturalization Act 
was passed in place of the 1798 Naturalization Act, reducing the residency requirement 
from 14 years to 5 years (1 Stat. 7th Cong., 1st Sess., U.S. Statutes at Large, hereinafter cites 
as SAL, Vol. 2: 153-5), which encouraged deserters from other nations. Among the newly 
naturalized American citizens, an overwhelming majority came from Britain. And 
thousands of former Englishmen were claimed as citizens by both Britain and the United 
States (Perkins, 1961: 89-90). British, on the other hand, refused to admit that American 
naturalization could relieve former British citizens from their obligations to the Empire. As 
a result, British had started to impress naturalized British American citizens ever since 
American Independence, which generated major American hatred from all walks of life. 
However, after 1803, British impressment had been taken new momentum since the 
demand of experienced seamen increased sharply as the war with Napoleon renewed, while 
a large number of British seamen deserted to the United States. Before 1803, the total 
number of British impressment of Americans was 2410, while between 1803 and 1806, 
2798 Americans were captured (Zimmerman, 1925: 260-3). In the summer and fall of 1804, 
British ships started to stop and search American ships for British deserters around the ports 
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of the United States, such as New York (Madison to Mr. Merry, Sept. 3, 1804, Letters and 
Other Writings of James Madison, hereinafter cited as LOWJM, Vol. II: 206-7). American 
encouragement of British deserters and British impressment of American citizens severely 
embittered the bilateral relations.  
Despite the British escalation of impressment starting from 1803, the real downturn 
of bilateral relations had taken place since 1805. To block France and its allies from trading 
with other nations, the British started to establish limitations to neutral commerce and 
reexport business, which had enormously benefited the United States while hurt British 
commercial interested since the outbreak of Napoleon war in 1793. In May 1805, Sir 
William Grant handed down the Essex Decision, condemning Essex’s reexport cargo of 
wine from Barcelona to Havana through the United States as a violation of the Rule of 
1756, which was passed during the Seven Years War, ruling that Britain could not trade 
with neutral nations that were aiding the enemy by trading with it. The decision ruled that 
when the intended final destination was another enemy port, a brief stop at an American 
port would be considered as a deceive and would not neutralize an enemy cargo from the 
original enemy port (Perkins, 1961: 79-81), thus putting an end of the period moderate 
British interference of neutral commerce inaugurated by the decision of Polly case in 1800. 
After Trafalgar in October of the same year, British established naval supremacy against 
Napoleon, making it feasible to enforce the decision. Since then, alongside the impressment 
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of American seamen, British seizure of American cargoes also ran rampant. Secretary 
James Monroe reported later that from 1805 to 1808, the British captured one American 
ship every two days, and many U.S. ports was practically blocked by British naval forces 
(Setser, 1937: 161-2). 
In late October 1805, James Stephen published his War in Disguise or, the Frauds of 
the Neutral Flags, in which he argued that Britain would lose the war against Napoleon 
and naval supremacy, and concede Britain’s maritime commercial dominance to the United 
States if it continued to allow neutral powers, especially the United States, to trade with 
France and its allies, such as Spain. Britain should take advantage of its preponderant 
maritime power to block trade between neutral powers and France to resolve these “grand 
evils” (Stephen, 1805: 39-47, 135-6). This reflected the thinking of British elites. U.S. 
Minister to Britain, James Monroe deemed that Stephen’s pamphlet was under the auspices 
of British government (Monroe to James Bowdoin, Nov. 13 1805, the Writings of James 
Monroe, hereinafter cites as WJMO, Vol. IV: 366). 
Regarding the new developments, from late 1805, some U.S. decision makers started 
to recommend getting tough with Britain. Monroe, for example, recommended “strong and 
decisive measures...within suitable limits” against Britain to vindicate U.S. rights and 
interests (Monroe to Madison, Jan. 10, 1806, WJMO: 392). Many Congressmen were also 
advocating retaliation against aggressive British actions of impressment and seizure of 
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American ships. William Gregg called for resolve against British hostility and introduced 
a resolution for a total non-importation of British goods on January 29, 1806 (Annals of 
Congress, hereinafter cites as AC, 9th Congress, 1st Session, H. of R.: 537-8). Of course, 
Gregg’s resolution was the most extreme one and most Congressmen would not go such 
far. However, at this point, many Congressmen, especially the Republicans, agreed to 
impose pressures on Britain. Many Jefferson’s confidants, on the other hand, propose a 
selective nonimportation plan, which was to ban importations of only those goods that 
could neither be obtained from countries other than Britain nor be produced in the United 
States, so as to reduce the loss of the United States. With the support of the Republicans, 
Nicholson’s resolution was passed (Taggart to John Taylor, Letters of Samuel Taggart, Mar. 
7 and Mar. 31: 187-188, 195-197).  
However, the Madison Administration was still not ready to support severe pressure 
on Britain. Barely any decision makers had thought of war with Britain at this point. Even 
Gregg clearly remarked that he had no apprehension whatever of a war (AC, 9th Cong., 1st 
sess. H. of R.: 539). Without administrative leadership and with generally conciliatory 
attitude, when the Nonimportation Bill of 1806 was passed on March 25, in spite of the 
recommendations of Nicholson’s supporters, its contents were much watered down, losing 
its effective coercive effect to Britain. In addition, there was no effective implementation 
of the Bill until two years later. 
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At the same time, British also showed restraint at about the same time. With the 
Ministry of All Talents assuming office in Britain in February 1806. The new ministry, 
headed by Prime Minster Charles Fox, sought to moderate the bilateral relations by limiting 
the practice of impressment in turn for United States’ return of British deserters in spite of 
strong voices of opposition. In July, American Intercourse Bill was passed in the Parliament, 
which regulated the trade between British West Indies and the United States without adding 
many obstacles. Jefferson wrote, while Pitt’s ministry was hostile to the United States, he 
considered the new ministry insured “just settlement of our differences” (Jefferson to 
Monroe, May 4, 1806, the Writings of Thomas Jefferson, H.A. Washington edited, cited as 
WTJW hereinafter, Vol.V: XI). The moderation of Nicholson’s resolution and the Ministry 
of All Talents’ moderate policy brought a relatively stable time period between the two 
nations in 1806. Encouraged by this new development, Jefferson ordered Monroe and 
William Pinkney to negotiate and resolve the current difficulties with the British. 
However, this trend did not last long. By the end of 1806, bilateral relations turned for 
the worse. On May 16, while unofficially announced partial blockade of European coast to 
soothe the political opponents by an Order in Council, Fox intentionally left a big opening 
for the United States by allowing neutral ships carrying noncontraband goods from neutral 
ports to an extensive part of the coast. Nevertheless, without recognizing the large opening, 
the Americans was embittered by this policy (Heidler and Heidler, 2002: 22).  
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Naval skirmish also poisoned the warming relationship. On April 25, H.M.S. Leander, 
trying to stop the U.S. coasting sloop Richard to for French products, fired a warning shot 
into New York Harbor, decapitating the helmsman of Richard, John Piece. This event 
enraged the U.S. public. Some U.S. press started to call for declaration of war (Perkins, 
1961: 107). Jefferson drafted a proclamation concerning this clash, requiring Leander and 
other two British vessels to depart U.S. harbors and waters (May 3, 1806, the Works of 
Thomas Jefferson, hereinafter cites as WSTJ, Vol. X: 258).  
The failure of Monroe-Pinkney treaty was another major drawback in the bilateral 
relations. The two sine qua nons that Jefferson instructed Monroe and Pinkney were 
requirement of Britain to limit its impressment practice and give more liberal treatment of 
U.S. reexport trade. With these sine qua nons met, the United States would repeal the Non-
importation Act in return. However, the British negotiators were reluctant to make major 
concessions. Adding to the complexity was Fox’s death during the negotiation in 
September. Although the British negotiators made some concessions, such as allowing 
U.S.’s trade between enemy colonies in the West Indies and unblocked ports of France and 
Spain on the condition of payment of duties, and recognizing American request of 
extending its territorial waters, they were reluctant in compromising regarding to the 
impressment issue. They tried to evade the issue by stating that they would take care not to 
impress American citizens and pay redress to American citizens injured when impressing 
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deserted British seamen (for the content of the treaty, see American State Paper, hereinafter 
cites as ASP, Foreign Relations, Vol. III: 147-151). Pinkney did not insist on the 
impressment issue and signed the treaty on the last day of 1806. Jefferson, disappointed at 
the concessions that Monroe and Pinkney made, refused even to submit the treaty to Senate 
to ratify. The British was much depressed by Jefferson’s decision. 
In 1807, the bilateral relations further deteriorated. In March, the moderate Ministry 
of all Talents fell because of Irish issue. In place of it was a ministry more dedicated to 
wage war with Napoleon through more rigorous blockade of France and its allies and 
recruiting seamen by impressment. 
Naval clash escalated between Britain and the United States, culminating with the 
Chesapeake affair. On June 22, British vessel Leopard demanded U.S. frigate Chesapeake 
to hand over British deserters off the coast of Norfolk. When the U.S frigate refused, 
Leopard fired on Chesapeake, killing three and wounded eighteen. After Chesapeake 
surrendered, the British took off four deserters and finally hung one of them, with the other 
three receiving five hundred lashes each (for a detailed account of this affair, see Adams, 
1890: Chapter 1). Since British navy fired on U.S. Navy, this event was far severe than the 
previous British fire on U.S. commercial vessels. Technically, the actions of Leopard 
amounted to an action of war. The Chesapeake affair thus signaled the first peak of bilateral 
naval clash as a result of British impressment policy. Madison regarded the affair as an 
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“extraordinary hostility and insult” (Madison to Armstrong and Bowdwin, Jul. 15, 1807, 
the Writings of James Madison, hereinafter cites as WJMA, Vol. VII: 460). The Chesapeake 
affair drove the whole America into wild fury. “The whole country cried for war with a 
revolutionary fervor” (Horseman, 1962: 103). Riots broke out in Norfolk and the States 
were called upon to muster militia in readiness. Jefferson requested British armed ships to 
keep off American ports, cut certain British ships out of supply, and even talked about a 
winter expedition to Canada (Adams, 1890: 31-2; Heidler and Heidler, 2002: 25). The 
indignation did not subside for several months. In the fall of the same year, British 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, George Canning, decided to resolve the Chesapeake affair 
with the United States without connecting to the issue of impressment, further outraged 
U.S. decision makers (Monroe to Madison, Oct. 10, 1807, ASP, F.R., Vol. III: 191-2). A 
proclamation was made to reassert British policy regarding to impressment on October 17. 
Britain also tightened its blockade of France and its allies by issuing two Orders in 
the Council5 in January and November 1807, forbidding neutral vessels from trading 
between ports of France and its allies’ possession, or ports under their control which did 
not allow British vessels trade freely. Unlike the Orders in Council of 1806, the Orders in 
Council of 1807 severely undermined the commercial interests of neutral nations. More 
 
5 British Orders in Council refers to legislation in the Parliament made formally in the name of 




Americans were impressed and more U.S. ships were captured since the issue of the 1807 
Orders in Council. Senator John Quincy Adams considered that these orders brought the 
United States “back to the stamp act and the tea tax”, and “strike at the root of our 
independence”, implying that determined retaliations, even in the form of war, of the 
United States were unavoidable (Adams to Otis, Mar. 31, 1808, Writings of John Quincy 
Adams, hereinafter cites as WJQA, Vol. III: 200-1).  
 Despite the talks of war and harsh retaliation of the administration, the Congressmen 
and the general public, it still seemed that no one really wanted a war against Britain in 
1807. The Jefferson administration and the Congress finally opted for a economic and 
commercial warfare as retaliation, aiming at coercing the British into concessions 
regarding to the issue of impressment and neutral rights. On December 14, the long delayed 
Non-importation Act was passed. At about the same time, the Congress passed the Embargo 
Act, which was signed by Jefferson on 22. The Embargo Bill confined U.S. vessels to ports 
and harbors of the United States, and permitted foreign vessels to leave only in ballast or 
with goods they had already on board when notified of the act (SAL, 10th Cong., 1st Sess.: 
451-3). These acts were clearly directed at Britain, although no such contents were 
mentioned. 
After U.S.-British relations reached its nadir in 1807, there was a period of relative 




Since late 1806, the international environment of the United States had been steadily 
worsening as a result both of British and French violation of neutral rights (French Berlin 
Decree of 1806 and Milan Decree of 1807, as efforts to blockade Britain, had similar 
contents with British Orders in Council of 1807, though with less implementation 
efficiency given France’s limited maritime capability) and of its own implementation of 
the Embargo Act. Decision makers in the United States realized that the Embargo Act hurt 
the United States more than anyone else before long (Perkins, 1969: 165-73). As a result, 
in January 1809, U.S. Congress replaced the Embargo Act with the Non-intercourse Act, 
which excluded British and France armed vessels from American ports, and commercial 
vessels of these countries were added into this restriction later. The U.S. decision makers 
also attempted to pit the two European powers against one another and lure them to make 
concessions to the United States regarding to neutral commercial and maritime rights by 
proclaiming  that the United States would lift the limitations to the party that ceased 
violating U.S. maritime rights (SAL, 10th Congress, Sess. II: 528-33). 
The British did try to reach certain type of settlement with the United States, the result 
was the negotiation between David Erskine, the British Minister in the United States and 
the new Madison administration in late 1808. Canning, however, did not intend to make 
major concessions to the United States. He instructed Erskine that the repeal of Orders in 
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Council of 1807 was conditioned on three sine qua nons: free trade with Britain while trade 
with France being ended, ceasing opposition to British 1796 Rule, and U.S. permission of 
the Royal Navy to seize U.S. vessels violating British ban regarding trade with France 
(Canning to Erskine, Jan. 23, 1809, Instructions to the British Ministers in the United States, 
hereinafter cites as IBMUS: 264-5). Erskine, however, eager to reach agreement with the 
United States, made compromise to all the sine qua nons, including the exclusion of French 
trade, and exchanged note with U.S. Secretary of State, Robert Smith in April 1809. 
Encouraged by the breakthrough regarding to its neutral commerce right, the United States 
gave especial celebration to the conclusion of Erskine-Smith agreement. Canning, on the 
other hand, enraged by Erskine’s violation of his instructions, repudiated the agreement 
(for the negotiation and disavowal of the agreement, see Canning to Erskine, Jan. 23, May 
22, May 23 and May 30, 1809, Mayo eds., 1941: 264-267, 270-277). With the failure of 
the first major executive agreement in American history disavowed, Madison 
administration felt enormous humiliation.  
The Non-Intercourse Act again failed in coercing either Britain or France. And before 
long it was dawned on U.S. decision makers that the Act was non-enforceable as well as 
ineffective. U.S. foreign policy was driven into confusion. In May 1810, it was further 
replaced by Macon’s Bill Number 2, which lifted embargoes on Britain and France for 
three months, and stated that if either one of the two warring parties ceased violating 
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American neutral commerce interests, the United States would end trade with the other 
party, unless the latter would also recognize American’s neutral commerce rights (SAL, 11h 
Congress, Sess. II: 605-7). The temporary suspension of Non-intercourse was reciprocated 
by Britain’s relaxation of naval surveillance of principle American ports. These policies 
helped to bring a short-term relaxation in the bilateral relations. 
However, the United States was discontent on British reaction to United States’ 
peaceful occupation of West Florida. John Morier, British chargé d’affaire taking charge of 
daily business after Jackson’s dismissal, wrote to Smith to protest America attack to 
Spanish interests (Hamilton to Madison, September 9, 1811, cited from Buel, 2005: 126), 
which was now regarded as British ally after Napoleon’s invasion of Spain in 1808. 
In 1810, Napoleon, attempted at widening the Anglo-U.S. frictions, deceitfully 
informed the United States his intention of settling the bilateral maritime disputes. The 
result was the Cadore letter, a note that French Minister of Foreign Affairs Duc de Cadore 
sent to U.S. Minister in France, John Armstrong in August 1810, in which France promised 
to end Berlin and Milan decree if the United States would do its part regarding to its trade 
with Britain (Armstrong to Smith, Aug. 5, 1810, Despatches to France, Vol. XI, cited from 
Perkins, 1961: 246).  
Although almost nothing was changed for better in French violation of U.S. neutral 
commerce after the Cadore letter, the Madison administration decided to take the French 
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promise at face value so as to wring concessions from the British. However, the British 
was impervious to U.S. demands. Madison decided to live up to Macon’s Bill and proclaim 
non-importation to Britain in November 1810. In addition, The Eppes’ Non-intercourse 
Bill with Britain, which ruled that no U.S. vessels was allowed to trade with Britain, its 
colonies and dependencies unless the Britain revoke or modify its edicts, was approved by 
the Congress on March 2 (SAL, 11th Congress, Sess. III: 651-2). This was the first time 
since the resume of the European war in 1803 that the United States singled out one of the 
two belligerents and directed its hostility towards it, which signaled a major escalation of 
its hostility to Britain. The renewal of Non-intercourse Act coincided with economic 
depression of Britain, which dealt a considerable blow to it (Horsman, 1962: 196-7). The 
British, however, still showed no intention to compromise to U.S. demands. British Foreign 
Secretary Richard Wellesley instructed the next Minister to the United States, Augustus 
Foster, that Britain considered U.S. conditions unwarranted and would not repeal the 
Orders in Council only after France had effectively repealed the Decrees of Berlin and 
Milan and restored neutral commerce, which was not in place then (Wellesley to Foster, 
Apr. 10, 1811, IBMUS: 311-8). And the following negotiation regarding to the Orders in 
council was anything but fruitful. 
Apart from the new Non-Intercourse Act, the Year 1811 saw other major escalations 
of the Anglo-American relations. Britain increased naval surveillance of principle 
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American ports as a retaliation against the United States’ reimposition of the Non-
Intercourse in March 1811. Madison also suspected that the British activity might aim at 
protection of East Florida (Buel, 2005: 123-6).  
As a result, U.S. decision makers decided to escalate the situation by initiating naval 
clashes with British vessels conducting harassment and impressment operations near 
American water. By this time, U.S. public opinion had already grown less tolerant to British 
impressment of American seamen, and the long unsettled Chesapeake affair. On May 6, 
U.S. Secretary of Navy, Paul Hamilton, ordered frigate President to patrol coast areas from 
the Carolinas to New York to protect U.S. shipping from British harassment and 
impressment practice. Ten days later, it chased and encountered a much smaller sloop HMS 
Little Belt off the coast of North Carolina. The two armed ships requested each other to 
identify itself but refused to answer until the other identified. Finally, armed clash broke 
out, 11 British sailors were killed and 21 wounded, the sloop severely damaged, while on 
the American side only one sailor was wounded and the frigate slightly damaged (for a 
detailed account of the incident, see Adams, 1890, Vol. VI, Chapter 2). 
The two parties both fixed blame on the other for the naval clash, which stirred public 
hostility on both sides. The British was enraged by the clash, considered the event as an 
unprovoked attack. Many British press called for reparation, revenge or even for 
commence of war. The American public, on the other hand, was wildly exhilarated by the 
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event, regarding it as a revenge for Chesapeake affair and a vindication of American 
sovereign and commercial rights. Madison and Monroe’s attitude was also determined, 
blaming the Little Belt for the commence of hostility, and refused the admit guilty and any 
type of reparation (Foster to Wellesley, Sept. 17, 1811, cited from Perkins, 1961: 282). This 
attitude further enraged the British. The Little Belt-President clash “breed the 
psychological setting for war” (Ibid: 273). 
In addition to the disputes regarding British Councils In Order, impressment activities 
and the naval clashes it caused, in 1811, another severe dispute between the two powers 
erupted. This time the disputes took place in the Indian borders.  
There was little doubt that the Indian tribes in the Northwest had received assistance 
and encouragement from British authorities against the American encroachment and 
expansion in this area. The American settlers had been steadily expanding into Ohio and 
Mississippi, depriving Indian settlers of lands and causing clashes with the Indian tribes. 
The British governors in Canada, with regard to the deterioration of the Anglo-American 
relations, especially the war scares in 1807 and the probability of U.S. invasion of Canada, 
thought that it would be rewarding to encourage and assist Indian tribes to confront the 
United States. If a war with the United States broke out in the future, securing the assistance 
from the Indian tribes would be helpful. As a result, since late 1807 and early 1808, British 
Canadian Governor-General Sir James Craig, had decided to woo the Indians and started 
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to communicate and assemble the Indian chiefs, inform them the expansionist aims of the 
Americans and promise them that they would provide them with supplies to resist the U.S. 
encroachment. Although these officials did not necessary intended to precipitate war with 
the United States, in the process of courting the Indians, officials sometimes exceeded the 
necessity in implementation, which was regarded as provocative to the United States. 
British Canadian officials were interested in the anti-American activities of Shawnee 
Prophet Tenskwatawa and his brother Tecumseh, and managed to establish channels of 
contact with them. With the help with Canadian authorities, the two Shawnee leaders 
established an Indian confederation to resist American expansion. In the summer of 1808, 
5000 Indians visited Amherstburg. Craig also participated in the gathering, expressing 
sympathies to the Indians their loss of land to the American liars and urging them to unite 
against the United States while refrain from hostility (Cleaves, 2000: 59-60). The British 
also supplied the Indians with arms and ammunition, such as rifles, fusils with powder and 
lead (ASP, Indian Affairs, Vol. 1, Fort Wayne, Aug. 7, 1810: 799). The Canadian fur 
companies were also willing to provide Indian tribes with financial support against 
American infiltration and trading expansion. These activities was undoubtedly threatening 
to the Americans. 
From late 1810 to 1811, the Indians got more and more ready for war with the 
Americans. Tecumseh visited Amherstburg in November 1810, informing the colonial 
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authorities that the Indians were “ripe for war”. The colonial authorities, however, not 
ready to fight a war with the United States, were much disturbed and nervous of the Indians’ 
eagerness to wage war against the United States, and were more nervous of being entangled 
in such a conflict. They tried to dissuade the Indians from initiating such a war. However, 
it seemed that it was already to late in 1811. Craig opted for warning the United States 
about the coming danger of Indian attack.  
In November 1811, battle of Tippecanoe broke out, with U.S. Governor of Indiana 
Territory, William Harrison marching towards the headquarters of Shawnee Indians, 
Prophetstown and the two Shawnee chiefs surprised the U.S. army. After defeating the 
Indians and burnt Indian settlements, the United States charged Britain of interference in 
American affairs by aiding Indians with ammunition and financial support. Andrew 
Jackson, for example, then commander of Tennessee militia, claimed that the Indians was 
“excited to war by the secrete agents of Great Britain”, that a war with Britain was 
unavoidable and implied that the conquest of Canada was final resolution of ending the 
British threat (Jackson to Harrison, Nov. 30, 1811; Division Orders, Mar. 1812, 
Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, hereinafter cites as CAJ, Vol.I: 210, 220-3). 
Britain’s stubborn attitude regarding to the Orders in Council, the Little-Belt affair 
and British rigidity in the negotiation regarding to this affair, its assistance to Indians and 
alleged instigation of Indians before the Tippecanoe war triggered a wildly shared anti-
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British feeling in the United State, both among officials and the general public, despite 
President Madison’s relatively calm reactions to these affairs. They felt that the honor, 
independence and security of the United States were at stake. Hostility to Britain was so 
severe that many officials or press believe that to secure United States’ national interests, 
security and honor, it must be prepared and show willingness to fight for them (Perkins, 
1961: 295). And this feeling lasted well into 1812. 
This is the background of the 12th Congress which held the first session in November 
1811. In the first session, the War Hawks, such as Henry Clay and George Campbell, and 
some scarecrows, had already been crying for war. However, the Madison administration 
had not been finally determined for war. Without clear executive leadership, the opinion of 
the Republican Party was also divided. With Federalist opposition to war, no decision for 
war was made in late 1811 or early 1812. Nevertheless, the drum for war has been steadily 
beaten, with the pass of Giles’s bill of army expansion and financial expansion bills, such 
as increase in tax and import charges. 
In spite of the worsening of U.S.-France relations, the weakness of the United States 
vis-a-vis Britain and oppositions of the Federalists, the President finally decided to join 
with the War Hawks and further speeding up the pace for war. He gave a final try to 
economic warfare to coerce the British into concession by recommending a general 
embargo against Britain on April 1, 1812. An Embargo Bill of ninety days was passed in 
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Senate then and signed by the President on April 4, still offering three months for 
negotiation (AC, 12th Cong, 1st Sess., Senate: 186-9). The British, long hurt by American 
economic warfare and with amounting oppositions of the Orders in Council, finally 
repealed the Orders on June 16 , two days before the United States formally declared war, 
just late enough in failing to prevent the war. Before the final repeal, in the negotiation with 
the United States, Foster still followed the instructions and stubbornly insisted that the 
France had not in fact repealed the Berlin and Milan decrees. It was increasingly believed 
by the supporters of war that Britain had already started an undeclared war against the 
United States since mid 1800’s, and “no choice remained but between war and degradation, 
a degradation inviting fresh provocation and rendering war sooner or later inevitable” 
(Madison’s recalling, Madison to Henry Wheaton, Feb. 26-7, 1827, WJMA, Vol. IX: 273). 
On June 1, Madison sent his war message to the Congress. An act of Declaration of War 
against Britain was passed in the House at rate of 79:49, and approved in the Senate on 17 
at a rate of 19:13 (AC, 12th Cong, 1st Sess., H. of R: 1637; Senate: 297). 
Existing Explanation of the Outbreak of the 1812 Anglo-American War 
The 1812 war seemed to be a unlikely war. At the outbreak of the war, the British was 
preoccupied by the long lasting war with Napoleon, while the United States, much weaker 
than both powers, were further weakened by the maritime policy of both power and its own 
Embargo Act. As a result, there are a lot of explanations of the outbreak of the war. 
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However, unlike most of the modern wars, most existing explanations of the outbreak 
of the 1812 war were explanations of the direct cause of the war, written by diplomatic 
historians. There was barely any explanations of the permissive causes of 1812 war. Most 
of the existing explanations are arguing that to what extent that the War Hawks or President 
Madison was accountable for the outbreak of the war, or whether the maritime disputes or 
the Indian affair was the most important cause of war. Other scholars studied the voting for 
war, and contended with each other whether the votes were divided by a regional line or a 
partisan line (for an overview of the existing literature of origins of the war, see Goodman, 
1941 and Trautsch, 2013).  
Early historians tended to contend that it was the maritime disputes, such as British 
impressment policy and Orders in Council which undermined the neutral commerce rights, 
that finally led to the outbreak of war (Mahan, 1905, Vol. I, Chapter 1). Recent scholarship 
also contend that maritime disputes, rather than Indian disputes and Western expansionism, 
was the major driver of the war. In Madison’s war message, not much was talked about the 
Indian clash, nor was it a major part in the Congressional debates (Perkins, 1961:427). 
Invasion of Canada was the means rather than the end of the war. The United States opted 
to invade Canada not out of the conquering ambition, but because Canada was vulnerable 
and a feasible target upon to attack and a means to bring Britain to concessions (Horsman, 
1962: 23, 171, 175-6). Even the Western War Hawks clamored for war not because of 
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Britain’s aid to the Indian tribes but because the economic pressure brought upon them by 
British maritime policies (Ibid: 222-3; Taylor, 1931). 
Other scholar, however, could not agree. Henry Adams, for example, while recognize 
the maritime cause of the War, argued that the war Republicans’ eagerness to conquer 
Canada and carried the flag to the Key West in the Congress war debates did play a 
important part in the outbreak of the war. Felix Grundy of Tennessee, for example, argued 
that the war with Britain had already begun with the battle of Tippecanoe (Adams, 
1890:123, 139-140). Unlike Federalist defense policy, which emphasized maritime security, 
Republican security policy emphasized imperial expansion across the continent, and 
Canada and Florida were unavoidable targets (Lambert, 2012: 29-30). Howard Lewis and 
Dice Anderson, on the other hand, argued that the Western expansionists’ coveting of 
territories of Canada and concern of Indian issue were the main causes of the war (Lewis, 
1911; Anderson, 1913). 
Other scholars further argued that, the Westerners and Southerners, concerned with 
British support of the Indians and coveting for territories of Canada and Florida, formed a 
sectional bases for war (Hacker, 1924: 365-6). The Southerners, specifically, wanted to 
annex Florida as a balance for acquisition of Canadian territories (Pratt, 1925: 12-3). That’s 
the reason why in the Congressional voting for war, most supporters of war came from the 
west and the south. Other scholars, however, argue that the vote for war with Britain was a 
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partisan, rather than sectional affair. They argue that, the North and Middle states’ votes 
were also essential for the declaration of war. The Southern and Western provided less than 
a third of the affirmative votes. On the other hand, despite severe divisions in the 
Republican power, ninety percent of the available Republicans cast affirmative votes in the 
House. Despite many Republican Senators concerns or even opposition to war, only two 
out of nineteen Republican senators voted negatively for war in the Senate vote, while all 
Federalist Senators cast the negative vote (Brown, 1964: 45; Perkins, 1961: 408-14; AC, 
12th Cong, 1st Sess., Senate: 257). This was due to Republicans’ fear that they would lose 
popular confidence and the control of government if they did not show solidarity in defense 
of the national interests at such an important juncture (Brown, 1964). 
It seemed that the partisan explanation was more accurate than the sectional one. Apart 
from the party politics explanation, there existed other explanations of why the Republicans 
voted for war. For example, there are scholars contending whether President Madison or 
the War Hawks were the main driver for war within the Republican Party. Most scholars 
argue that Madison was a President wanting of leadership regarding to unifying the 
Republican party, exerting influence in the Congress and slow in making up his mind for 
war (see for example, Smith, 1942: 238-42; Perkins, 1961: passim). However, there were 
opponents of such opinion, arguing that Madison was determined on waging war much 
earlier, he delayed action of recommending war only to coordinate opinions in the 
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Republican parties so as to gather more support in the voting for war, for he was well aware 
that the real power to decide war lay in the legislator rather than in the executive (Irving 
Brant, 1956: 479-82; Ketcham, 1990: 530-2). 
Many scholars contended that the so-called War Hawks, represented by Clay, were 
essential in the legislative process of the declaration of war. Reginald Horsman, for 
example, identified twenty-one War Hawks in the Twelfth Congress (Horsman, 1964). 
Most of those War Hawks came from the west and south, ready for expansion on the 
continent. Opponents, on the other hand, argued that there were only few real War Hawkers, 
which were a minority even in the Republican Party. Popular support for war was limited 
and most Republicans were not determined for war (Perkins, 1961: 392, 415; Brown, 1964: 
145-161). 
Other explanations of the outbreak of war focused on the social forces, such as how 
American nationalism pushed the country to war (Trautsch, 2012). 
Notably, International Relations Theory and Origin of War literature have barely touch 
upon the origins of the 1812 war. 1812 war had little to do with power transition, balance 
of power stability, and was contrary to the expectations of liberal peace, imbalance stability 
and interdependent stability. Only one liberal peace piece argued that liberal United States 
declared war against Britain in 1812 because it perceived Britain to be imperial and illiberal 
(Owen, 1994). Even the asymmetric conflict theorists, who were curious about why the 
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weaker power initiated war, have barely studied the case. 
This chapter argued that in severe interregional crises, when power imbalance existed 
between the weak local major power and much stronger outside major power, the 
likelihood of outbreak of war would be high. In such situations, the much stronger outside 
power tends to refuse to make major concessions to the weaker local powers due to their 
contempt of the material capability of the latter, which steadily generated major resentment 
on the local powers and thus steady escalations. The local power, the United States, despite 
the cultural, economic, value and kinship connections, and despite the fact that a 
considerable part of the United States, for example, nearly all the Federalists, was pro-
Britain and had limited willingness to wage war against it, finally opted for war against its 
former motherland. Given the expansionists’ determination to wage war, the local power 
advantage against British Canadian colony, and Britain’s distraction in the renewed war 
against Napoleon since 1803, decision makers finally determined that a war is a reasonable 
choice. In the end, these factors trumped over the economic interdependence, cultural and 
kinship connections, and shared liberal values, and pushed the United States towards war. 
The cultural and kinship connections was special to the Anglo-American relations, 
given the fact that the United States had only been separated from Britain for a quarter of 
a century. In other cases of the similar situation, it could be expected that the much weaker 
local major power would be much more determined and willing to fight the outside major 
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power than the United States in this period. In addition, the determination and willingness 
to fight on the part of Westerners and Southerners, and the Madison administration in the 
later dates were still essential in determining the outbreak of the war. The main factors 
driving war was still the power imbalance, the contempt of the outside power, the 
willingness to fight of the local power, the local advantage and the distraction of the outside 
power. 
Power Distributions before the 1812 War 
There was little doubt that the power gap between Great Britain and the United States 
before War of 1812 was quite large. Great Britain was the then dominant maritime power 
in the world, especially after its defeat of Napoleon at Trafalgar in October 1805, while the 
United States was only a newly established regional power in the North American with 
limited landmass and negligible economic and military capability in the eyes of the British 
decision makers and the public. 
In the Americas, after Louisiana Purchase of 1803, the United States had assumed 
power preponderance in North America. The material capability of British Canada was 
quite limited and that of the Indian tribes was negligible. The material capability of Spanish 
and Portuguese empires in the Americas were in constant decline with the decline of the 
two mother countries, especially after Napoleon’s conquest of the two countries in 1807 
and 1808. They posed no threat to the United States. Moreover, British Canada, Indian 
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territories and Spanish colonies in North America, especially West Florida, being weak in 
terms of material capability, were the targets for United States expansionists and infiltration 
in this period. 
After Chesapeake affair, U.S. Congress sporadically raised the strength of regular U.S. 
army to 10000, and this figure was further increased to 25000 (in five years) in 1812. 
However, it was daunting task to reach such number, given the financial difficulty of the 
United States. In the fall of 1812, the U.S. army was consisted of only 12000 regulars, and 
during the war between 1812-1814 the peak number was only about 45000 (Heidler and 
Heidler, 2002: 45-6). Apart from the regular army, state militia were also an important part 
of U.S. armed forces. There were also para-militia before the war. However, there was no 
formal forms of coordination between regulars and state militia, making it difficult to 
coordinate their actions during the war (Mahon, 1983: 67-77).  
At the outbreak of war, the U.S. Navy was still quite small despite Jefferson and 
Madison administrations’ gunboat constructions efforts. It consisted of seven frigates, three 
out of which were heavy frigates which were larger and nimbler than their European 
counterparts, and 62 gunboats, which were much smaller. Another 114 gunboats were built 
between 1802 and 1812 but not yet in service (Heidler and Heidler, 2002: 63-4). The 
Congress was against large scale build-up of naval force even after the outbreak of the war. 
The economic condition of the United States was not quite sound upon the outbreak 
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of the war, given the blockade policy of Britain and France, and the self-blockade brought 
by the Embargo Act in 1807. Amounts of imports and exports sharply declined. In a single 
year of 1808, the imports fell from $138,500,000 to $56,990,000 and the exports from 
$108,343,000 to $22,430,000 (Hannay, 1905: 11). Government revenue had been in decline 
since it peaked in mid 1800’s. And by 1812, the economic and fiscal situation was at its 
worst time. 
Table 9: State Revenue, 1805-1812 (in millions of dollars) 




From Direct Tax 
1805 12.94 0.22 0.22 
1806 14.67 0.20 0.56 
1807 15.85 0.13 0.35 
1808 16.36 0.082 0.19 
1809 7.30 0.040 0.075 
1810 8.58 0.074 0.12 
1811 13.31 0.023 0.077 
1812 8.96 0.049 0.0086 
From Annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the state of the finances, 1867, p. 356. 
 
Worse still, the Republican administrations were advocates for limited federal 
government. There was no exception for the centralization of financial power, which was 
essential during war times. In 1811, the First Bank of the United States expired after the 
twenty-years charter ended. There was no central financing institute until the establishment 
of the Second Bank in 1816. As a result, the financing of the war was in much confusing, 
since it relied on states’ banks which had little coordination as they could not operate across 
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state lines (Studenski and Krooss, 1952: 72-4). 
Despite these difficulties, the military expenditure of the United States in the period 
of 1805-1812 had been relatively high, compared with the past (except for the period 
between 1798-1801, because of the quasi-war with France). 
Table 10: Military Expenditures of the United States, 1802-1812 (in millions of dollars) 
 Expenditure of Navy Department Expenditure of War Department 
1802 0.92 1.18 
1803 1.22 0.82 
1804 1.19 0.88 
1805 1.60 0.71 
1806 1.65 1.22 
1807 1.72 1.29 
1808 1.88 2.90 
1809 2.43 3.35 
1810 1.65 2.29 
1811 1.97 2.03 
1812 3.96 11.82 
From Annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the state of the finances, 1867, p. 358. 
By 1812, the United States was still at a very early stage of industrialization, partly 
due to British efforts in prohibiting export of new industrial machine and limitations of 
technological transfer (Walton and Rockoff, 2013: 175). As a result, the industrial 
revolution started in Britain in the mid 18th Century did not help to boost American national 
strength by the outbreak of the war. The rapid industrialization of the United States was to 
wait until the mid of the new century. Before the mid-century, the steel and iron production 
of the United States, although increased steadily, did not witness growth spurt. 
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All these figures were dwarfed by the British ones. 
After Trafalgar in 1805, Britain had assumed command of the Atlantic Ocean. 
However, it built more ships to obtain absolute dominance of the sea. As a result, by 1809, 
the British navy consisted of 113 ships of the line and 596 cruisers. The total number of 
British warships exceeded 900, and the crews numbered at 13000 to 14000. A Navy 
possessed half of the world’s all warships “for the first time and the last time in history” 
(Rodger, 2006, Chapter 31; Stagg, 2012: 28). The Royal Navy was simply not of the same 
scale with the American one, which had no ships of the line and numbered frigate, making 
it impossible for fleet action. The standing army of Britain was between 250,000 to 300,000, 
more than 20 times of that of the United States (Hannay, 1905: 21; Stagg, 2012: 49). The 
total population of the Great Britain (including England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland) was 
about 18 million (Mitchell, 1962: 8), tripled that of the United States, which was about 6 
million.  
The economic and financial strength of Great Britain and the United States was also 
not of the same scale. In spite of the economic crisis in 1810, British GDP and national 
revenue was maintained at a relative stable level in the period of 1805 to 1812. The GDP 
of Great Britain in 1800’s was around 0.3 billion pounds. That of the United States, 
according to Thomas Weiss’s estimations, was 0.35 billion dollars in 1800, 0.47 billion 
dollars in 1807 and 0.50 billion dollars in 1810 (Weiss’s estimation was higher than other 
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scholars, see Weiss, 1992: 32; also see Gellman, 1961; David, 1967). The pounds value 
was 3.5 to 5 times of that of dollar around 1800’s, rendering British GDP double or triple 
that of the United States before the outbreak of war. This figure did not account for products 
of British colonies and structural difference between the two economies. Agriculture 
products accounted for a much larger part in the United States than in Britain, and industrial 
products much fewer, making the real gap of economic strength between the two powers 
much larger.  
Apart from the advantage of gross national products, Britain also enjoyed the 
advantage of a stronger government and a stronger central bank compared with the United 
States. By the outbreak of war (in the year of 1811), the British direct revenue was about 
70 million pounds (see Table 12), while that of the United States was about 13 million 
dollars (see Table 9). The gap was more than 20 times. The Bank of England played an 
important role in British economic life. With a stronger central bank and vibrant local banks, 
Britain was much more capable in war financing than the United States. In the 1812 fiscal 
year, the military expenditure of Britain was about 54 million pounds (see Table 12), while 
that of the United States being about 17 million dollars (see Table 10). The gap was also 













Broadberry et al., 2015, British Economic Growth, pp. 242-243 
Table 12: British Military Expenditure and Direct Revenue, 1805-1812 
Year Military Expenditure (in millions of 
pounds) 
Direct Revenue (in billions of 
pounds) 
1805 35.6 0.05 
1806 41.4 0.06 
1807 41.4 0.06 
1808 43.0 0.06 
1809 45.2 0.07 
1810 48.8 0.07 
1811 48.5 0.07 
1812 53.8 0.07 
Mitchell, 1988, British Historical Statistics, pp. 580-587. 
 
In a nutshell, the national strength of Great Britain and United States was not on the 
same scale on all the aspects. To use John Lowell analysis “Great Britain has twice our 
population and at least four times our opulence—She has fifty times our land force, and 
above one hundred times our naval force—She has a much greater capacity to endure 
sufferings and losses from the above causes—She has been inured to war for several 
centuries...”(Lowell, 1812: 42). Lowell’s analysis was roughly correct. 
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However, the United States enjoyed local advantage to Britain. 
British Canadian military force was much smaller. At the outbreak of war, the regular 
army in British Canada was a little more than 5600, and a militia of 86000 as a supplement 
(Stagg, 2012: 49). Reinforcement and mobilization was difficult, given the limited 
population in Canada. The population of Canada was less than 400,000, that of East Canada 
around 300,000, that of Upper Canada barely reached one hundred thousand. In Eastern 
Canada, most population were French inhabitants, whose loyalty was doubtful (Hannay, 
1905: 20; Heidler and Heidler, 2002: 57). In contrast to its small population and military 
force, British Canada had large landmass. With a small population and armed force to guard 
a vast landmass, the self-defense of British Canada was a formidable task, even with British 
reinforcement. The revenue and military expenditure of British Canada was also meagre. 
The total revenue of British Canada in 1812 was only £75,000 (approximately 271500 U.S. 
dollars at the then exchange rate), among which £62,000 (224440 U.S. dollars) was granted 
for defense and military expenditure (Hannay, 1905: 25). 
In addition, in its own region, Britain faced threat. Britain’s regional rival-Napoleon’s 
France-was also powerful. Though its dominance was in decline before the outbreak of 
1812 War, France was still the dominant power on the European continent, with the Grande 
Armée, consisting of both Frenchmen (about 300 thousands to 400 thousands) and soldiers 
of its allies, numbered at 1 million before its invasion of Russia in 1812 (Popkin, 1998: 
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134). The French population stood at about 30 million in early 1800’s (see Maddison, 2018; 
Chesnais, 1992: ), approximately 1.7 times of that of the Britain populations.  
The economic and financial strength of France was relatively inferior to Britain. 
However, the gap was not extremely large. France relied war financing mainly on taxation 
in the early time. However, after mid 1800’s, French financial credibility turned for the 
better as a result of its taxation of conquered territories and allies (Bordo and White, 1991: 
315). Although the real GDP of France was less than Britain during this period, the gap 
was not quite large. French annual GDP in this period was about 43 billion dollars, while 
that of Great Britain was about 47 billion (in 2011 U.S. dollars, Maddison, 2018). However, 
given Britain’s industrial mobilization and financial efficiency, it was more efficient in war 
financing than France. French military expenditure was 462 million francs in 1807, 
approximately 20.86 British pounds, about half that of Britain in the same year. That figure 
soared to 817 million francs in 1813, approximately 41.90 British pounds, or over 70 
percent of that of Britain (Kennedy, 1989: 132). Despite the existence of the gap, it was 
narrowing in the period of 1805 to 1812. 
French naval strength was inferior to Britain. In 1805, France had 41 ships in line and 
35 cruisers, in 1810, these figures were 46 and 31. The figures of Britain, on the other hand, 
was 136 and 160 in 1805, and 152 and 183 in 1810, respectively (Rodger, 2004: 608). 
Despite France’s inferior naval strength, French Navy was still the most threatening rival 
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to the Royal Navy. 
The Decision Making of Great Britain: An Arrogant Power Refusing Concessions 
In the period of 1805 to 1812, the main focus of British decision makers was to defeat 
Napoleon. Among the four major issues between the United States and Britain that finally 
led to war, including impressment, naval clashes, Orders in Council and Indian issues, the 
first three were closely related to Anglo-Franco relations. That’s why some scholars argue 
that the Anglo-American War of 1812 was actually determined in 1803, when the Anglo-
Franco war resumed, or even earlier in 1793, when the first Anti-France alliance formed 
(Horseman, 1962: 17). 
This project finds that the main structural cause of the 1812 war was the power 
imbalance between the weaker local power, the United States, and the stronger outside 
power, Great Britain. This section focus on the decision making of Great Britain. Great 
Britain was responsible for the steadily deterioration of Anglo-American relations. Relying 
on its power superiority over the United States, Great Britain had been constantly 
disdaining the opposition of the United States regarding to the four issues (impressment, 
naval clashes, Orders in Council and Indian issues) and refused to make any substantial 
concessions until it was too late to prevent the war. Most of the British decision makers, 
arrogant of its superior material capability and contempt that of the United States’ , did not 
believe that the latter would opt for war with a much more powerful Great Britain. 
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Britain’s impressment and Orders in Council policy were required by its war with 
France. The large scale of British navy required by Britain’s maritime dominance called 
for large number of experienced seamen, which Britain could not afford with its own. 
Deserters and experienced American seamen became the first targets for British navy, given 
both the maritime experience of theses seamen and the shared culture and language of the 
two nations. The Orders in Council, on the other hand, was British efforts to counter 
Napoleon’s continental system, to impose blockade on France so as to wear down its 
economic basis. As Earl of Westmoreland reasoned: “we cannot carry on war allowing our 
enemy advantages of commerce as in peace, and that if we only do what is right we must 
take our chance for the consequences” (Adams, 1890, Vol. IV: 89). Impressment and Orders 
in Council inevitably led to seizure of American seamen and vessels, and then bilateral 
naval clashes. Impressment and Orders in Council were necessary measures to fighting 
Britain’s regional adversary. As a result, British decision makers were determined to 
impose them. 
The British were extremely confident of its own power superiority over the United 
States, and in maritime terms, the superiority in the world. One popular British press, 
Courier, despised American demand of Britain’s declaration of state of blockade, claiming 
that “the sea is ours, and we must maintain the doctrine-that on nation, no fleet, not cock-
boat shall sail upon it without our permission”, and “we will not talk of this port and that 
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port-There is but one Navy in the world, the British Navy. The whole Continent we 
consider but as one port...”. And since America is suspected to have secret understanding 
with France, it shall not have any intercourse with the Continent (Courier, Jan. 21, 1811: 
3). The Morning Post also claimed that “The sovereignty of the seas in the hands of Great 
Britain is an established, legitimate sovereignty” (Morning Post, Oct. 28, 1807, cited from 
Adams, 1890, Vol. IV: 53). On the other hand, they showed contempt to the material 
capability of the United States, claiming that the assembled U.S. navies could not “lay siege 
to an English sloop of war”, that the United States was “peaceful as well as weak...is placed 
at so bast a distance as to be perfectly harmless” (Lord Brougham’s speech, June 16, 1812, 
Campbell, 1869: 271). Given the statistics of Anglo-American power comparison in the 
last section, we could reach the same conclusion. 
In addition, in this period, many British observers believed that the United States 
depended on its trade with Britain for its economic and industrial development. Others 
believed that the United States depended on Britain not only on its economy, but also 
security, for British Navy protected the United States from French imperial expansion, 
which might have imposed their “despotic system” on the United States if Britain was 
subjugated (see, for example, Stephen, 1805: 185-7). 
Moreover, the domestic division between anti-British Republicans and pro-British 
Federalists also made British policy makers and public to believe that a Britain was safe 
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from coordinated hostility against Britain on the part of the United States and major 
escalation between the two nations.   
As a result, British decision makers felt few incentives in making major concessions 
to the United States with the issues of impressment and Orders in Council, expecting the 
United States to back down when Britain refused to compromise. Royal Navy always 
showed arrogance in exercising impressment and seizure tasks. And so was the situation 
before the Chesapeake affair. It was out of this calculation that Admiral Cranfield Berkeley 
ordered that “The captains and commanders of his Majesty’s ships and vessels under my 
command are therefore hereby required and directed, in case of meeting with the American 
frigate Chesapeake at sea, and without the limits of the United States, to show to the captain 
of her this order, and to require to search his ship for the deserters from the before-
mentioned ships, and to proceed and search for the same” (Adams, 1890, Vol. IV: 3).  
British policies of dealing with the aftermath also smacked of arrogance. After 
Jefferson’s reactions to Chesapeake, Admiral Berkeley believed that it could force the 
United States into subjugation with a show of British naval force. He wrote to Henry 
Bathurst, then President of the Board of Trade: “If I had a few more ships, I certainly should 
be tempted to run up to New York with the squadron before the harbour is secured and wait 
there for the issue of the negotiations, as having that city under the terror of destruction 
would insure a favourable issue to any terms you might propose” (Berkeley to Earl Bathurst, 
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Aug. 13, 1807, Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst: 63).  
British Minister Erskine’s report implied that, despite the war fervor of the policy 
makers and public, a mere apology from Britain would “have the most powerful effect” in 
reversing the American public opinion and preventing a war that the United States was 
reluctant to fight (Erskin to Canning, July 27, 1807, Adams, 1890, Vol. IV: 37-8). Diffident 
of U.S. military capability, Jefferson even asked French Ambassador Louis Turreau about 
how to defend the American harbors and coast in a war against Britain. Turreau could 
certainly feel the reluctance of Jefferson and Madison to live up to their clamor for a war 
against Britain (Ibid: 36-7). Most British press, relying on British power supremacy over 
the United States as well as the belief of justification of British behavior, were also in 
stubborn opposition to concessions to the United States regarding the Chesapeake affair 
and in contempt to American capability of waging war with Britain. Some press even 
shared Berkeley’s opinion that “Three weeks blockade of the Delaware, the Chesapeake, 
and Boston Harbor would make our presumptuous rivals repent of their puerile conduct” 
(Ibid: 44), that “A few short months of war...would convince these desperate politicians of 
the folly of measuring the strength of a rising, but still infant and puny, nation with the 
colossal power of the British empire” (Morning Post, Oct. 24, 1807, Ibid: 54). A war 
between the Britain and the United States would be a punishing war that the former would 
easily win over the latter. 
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Absence of further and fervor reaction on the part of the United States seemed to 
confirm the belief of the United States’ weakness and that it dare not provoke Great Britain, 
nor dare they start a war with Britain. Accordingly, British policy makers, in spite of United 
States’ protections and demands, stubbornly stuck to its policy of not linking of the 
Chesapeake affair to the impressment policy and justification of British right of 
impressment of British deserters. They considered that the Chesapeake affair should be 
settled by British disavowal of the attack, recall of Berkeley and payment of reparation to 
the victims. And they requested that Jefferson’s proclamations be dropped, or that would 
be considered with “Spirit of Hostility” and “Acts of Aggression” (Canning’s instruction 
to Henry Rose, Oct. 24, 1807, IBMUS: 237-40). This was the main tune of Henry Rose’s 
mission to the United States in early 1808, aiming at the settlement of Chesapeake affair. 
To use Henry Adams’s word, the aim of Rose mission was “not to conciliate, but to terrify. 
His apology was a menace” (Adams, 1890, Vol. IV: 182). 
The basic logic that Britain entertained in dealing with the United States after the 
Chesapeake and its stubborn adherence to the practice of impressment was that given the 
weakness of the United States, there was no reason for Britain to make major concessions 
to the United States regarding to the impressment issue, that Britain could terrify the United 
States into obedience by a mere show of force. And even war broke out, it would be a 
punishing war that Britain could win shortly and easily. With such a logic, Britain made 
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little adjustment of its practice of impressment until the end of the 1812 War in 1814. In 
addition, impressment was required by the war against Napoleon, which was a life-death 
struggle. 
It was out of the similar contempt for American military capability that British policy 
makers escalate the economic pressure on the United States by upgrading Orders in Council 
in November 1809. Since then, Britain had been adhered to the Orders strictly until the eve 
of the 1812 war in June 1812. The upgrade of The Orders in Council further embittered the 
bilateral relations. On the other hand, as the war fervor against Britain faded away in the 
United States in late 1807, the Jefferson administration opted for economic retaliation 
against Britain as a measure of passive war.  
British decision makers were also contemptuous of United States’ economic strength. 
They despised America’s warfare against Britain, assuming that such warfare was a trifle 
concern to Britain and would bring more harm to themselves than to Britain.  
From the very start of the issue of the 1807 Orders in Council, British policy makers 
regarded it as a means to monopolize trade and maintain the British Navigation System by 
checking the neutral trade benefits and commercial competitiveness of the United States, 
as well as a retaliation of Napoleon’s Berlin Decree (Adams, 1890, Vol. IV: 101; Perkins, 
1961: 21-2; Horsman, 1962: 97). In spite of some oppositions from moderate decision 
makers, such as Perceval, who spoke for neutral rights, Britain further encroached upon 
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the neutral commercial rights of the United States by upgrading the Orders in Council again 
in November.  
Canning was much tougher than Perceval regarding to the Orders in Council and the 
neutral right of the United States. He was also more contemptuous of the national strength 
of the United States. He instructed Erskine with a condescending tone that the Orders in 
Council was actually favorable to the United States, since it opened a loophole the United 
States by permitting it to trade with Enemies’ colonies, to do re-export business via British 
ports, to trade certain via through ports of British Dominions to the Enemies with license. 
Ample time was also allowed to the United States to become “acquainted with the New 
Regulations and conforming to them”. On the other hand, a state of war with Britain would 
deprive the United States of these “very great Advantages” (Canning to Erskine, Dec. 1, 
1807, IBMUS: 244-45). Perceval himself was persuaded by his friend Stephen (Horsman, 
1962: 120), who insisted on assertive policies against the commercial competition from the 
United States in his published pamphlet in 1805. He stuck to the Orders in Council until 
his assassination in May 1812. 
Public opinion also favored the November 1807 Orders in Council. A piece of 
pamphlet, titled Concession to America: the Bane to Britain, which was written by an 
anonymous writer represented such an opinion. It complained about Britain’s yielding to 
the United States the maritime rights and trade advantages that the British forefathers 
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fought and bled to establish and maintain. Such concession was absurd given the 
supremacy of British naval strength over the United States, whose strength was negligible 
and had “no means whatever of enforcing her lofty demands” (Concession to America: the 
Bane to Britain, 1807: 23, 36-7). Britain must interrupt U.S. trade with enemies even 
though such policies would lead to rupture and then a war with the United States. Such a 
war would cost the United States more than nine-tenth of its revenue and the intestine 
division, which would be enough to deter the United States from waging war with Britain 
(Ibid: 46). Even the worst-a Anglo-American war- came about, it would only hurt Britain 
slightly (Ibid: 47-49).  
The United States retaliated against British Orders in Council and Chesapeake by the 
Embargo Act of November 1807. The British decision makers, however, showed defiance 
against American retaliation efforts and continued their implementation of Orders in 
Council and practice of impressment.  
After the United States imposed the Embargo Act, the price of grain and cotton soared 
in Britain (Frankel, 1982: 305). Manufacturers and financial houses connecting with 
American trade, especially the textile manufacturers, due to the decline of imports of cotton, 
did felt the blow. These groups were also the main critics of British Orders in Council. 
However, even they considered that the overall damage that the Embargo and Non-
Intercourse Act inflicted on Britain would be limited, especially compared with Napoleon’s 
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continental system. The embargo would have slight negative effect on every state else but 
the United States. During the Rose mission, Rose reported to Canning that even the 
negotiation failed, the United States would not commence war against Britain. The United 
States would attack Canada only if Britain initiated war against it. However, they would 
continue the Embargo. Nevertheless, the effect of Embargo would be trifling to Britain, it 
would hurt the United States most. Such calculations were shared by other British officials, 
such as Erskine (Perkins: 1961: 166-7).  
Although Perceval and Lord Bathurst showed concerns for the negative impact of U.S. 
embargo on Britain and proposed to loosen the Orders in Council, other decision makers 
in Britain, such as Castlereagh and Canning, shared the view with Rose and Erskine and 
opposed any concessions on the part of Britain. Lord Castlereagh argued that the 
difficulties that the United States imposed upon themselves by implementing the Embargo 
Act would low and degrade the Republican party in the estimation of the American people 
and offered “the best chance of their being destroyed as a party” (Papers of Perceval, 
Adams, 1890, Vol. IV: 325). The British Parliament also showed little hints of loosening of 
Orders in Council in return for relaxing of Embargo when it was raised in July 1808. 
Canning even wrote Pinkney an insulting reply that “if it were possible to make any 
sacrifice for the repeal of the embargo, without appearing to deprecate it as a measure of 
hostility,” Britain “would gladly have facilitated its removal, as a measure of inconvenient 
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restriction upon the American people”. With regard to the issue of impressment, Canning 
commanded that “nothing is said in Mr. Pinkney's letter of any intention to repeal the 
proclamation by which the ships of war of Great Britain are interdicted from all those rights 
of hospitality in the ports of the United States which are freely allowed to the ships of His 
Majesty's enemies” (Canning to Pinkney, Sept. 23, 1808, ASP, F.R., Vol. III: 232). 
The judgments of the British policy makers were confirmed by the developments 
between 1808 and 1809. British trade with the United States was only a relatively small 
part in its overall trade volume. While trade with Britain was a much larger part in overall 
American trade. In 1808, American export declined 79.30 percent, and import 59.86 
percent (North, 1960: 590-2). However, British imports of merchandise from foreign 
countries and colonies increased slightly from 1807 to 1808, while exports of merchandise 
only declined only by 24.23 percent (Porter, 1838, Vol. II: 98). In addition, the Embargo 
lost more coercive effect with Napoleon’s military invasion on the Iberian peninsula and 
the consequently soar of British trade with Iberian colonies in South American and West 
Indies, which made up for British trade with the United States in the Americans. From 1807 
to 1809, the overall British foreign trade soared from 40.48 million pounds to 50.24 million 
pounds (see Hecksher, 1922: 174-6). Specifically, the United States was more important as 
a destination of British export than import. The share of United States in total British 
exports amounted to one third in 1807 (11,846,531 out of 35,412,867 pounds). This figure 
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dropped half to 5,241,739 in 1808. However, British export to other part of American 
increased from 10,439,423 to 16,591,871 pounds in 1808, right enough to cover the loss of 
its export to the United States (figures from Porter, 1838, Vol. II: 102). Moreover, with 
Britain’s policy of encouraging violation of embargo, smuggle did take place, although not 
necessary in an extremely large amount, in the Anglo-American trade (Adams, 1890, Vol. 
IV: 326-7; Frankel, 1982: 295-301). The U.S. re-export trade through West Indies also 
made the place a transit port of illegal trade with Britain. Because of these factors, the 
British became more contemptuous of the United States’ embargo policy and showed little 
interests in U.S. proposal in the spring of 1808 of withdrawal of Orders in Council in 
exchange for withdrawal of the Embargo Act. These factors finally led to the collapse of 
embargo in late 1808 and its replacement with the Non-Intercourse Act in early 1809. 
British policy makers were not moved by the Non-Intercourse Act either. Actually, the 
Non-intercourse Act of 1809 was widely regarded as the United States’ face-saving tricks 
after the failure of embargo and signified the success of Orders in Council. Marquis of 
Buckingham, for example, had merely commented that the Non-Intercourse act was 
“insufficient as a measure of offense to us”, and that “England can do without that branch 
of commerce” (Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville, Feb. 12, 1809, Report on 
Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue, Esq., Vol. IX: 277). Erskine observed that the Act as “a 
mere subterfuge to extricate themselves from the embarrassments of the embargo system, 
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and is never intended to be enforced” (Erskine to Canning, Feb. 13, 1809, Adams, 1809, 
Vol. IV: 446). In addition, many British officials observed that the Non-Intercourse Act 
could not last long as it would cause severe division in the United States. The Act would 
deal heavy blow to Western and Southern States, which were heavily dependent on foreign 
exchanges. 
It was the confidence of British material capability superiority over the United States 
regarding the economic confrontation between the two and the ineffectiveness of U.S. 
economic pressure upon Britain that drove Canning to instruct Erskine the three assertive 
conditions upon which to conduct negotiation with the United States in the spring of 1809. 
Canning was drove into fury and recalled Erksine when the latter made concessions on 
these three conditions. Arguments that the United States was militarily weak, that it was 
highly dependent on Britain in every respect, that its war warnings were merely bluff, that 
American economic warfare was inefficient and there was little need for the repeal of 
Orders in Council still held considerable support through 1811 when the war scare between 
the two nations struck again, and until the spring of 1812 (Perkins, 1961: 317-320).  
Stephen, for example, expressed his support for the Orders vigorously in February 
1812. He argued that before the Orders, the state of British commerce was “prostrate”, 
while after the Orders it became “prosperous”(speech of Stephen, Feb. 13, 1812, Hansard, 
Vol. XXI: 773). More moderate cold-minded M.P.s such as William Wilberforth, also 
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argued that a bilateral war would be more injurious to the United States than to Britain, and 
although conciliatory policies should be adopted towards the United States, that could not 
come at the sacrifice of the commerce, the supply of marine force, or to the prosperity of 
the nation (Ibid: 790). It seemed that he agreed with Butterworth that Britain did not need 
to heed American war cry, which was merely intimidation and nine times out of ten “a 
game of brag” (Wilberforth diary, Jan. 29, 1812, Wilberforth and Wilberforth, 1838, Vol. 
IV: 5). It was against such a backdrop that Witbread’s motion of correspondence of Anglo-
American relations, which included repeal of Orders, was rejected by a large margin of 113 
(23: 136, Hansard, Vol. XXI: 801). 
British decision makers were aware of disadvantage in a war with the United States. 
If war broke out between the two nations, it was inevitably that the United States would 
invade Canada. However, British had limited military presence in North America and the 
defense of Canada was vulnerable to American attack (see Baby to Gore, Dec. 18, 1807, 
Report on Canadian Archives, hereinafter cites as RCA, 1896, Note B: 33). To make up for 
such disadvantage, the British decision makers and British authorities in Canada gave 
support to the Indian tribes, especially to the Shawnee chiefs in the aim of recruiting the 
assistance of the Indian tribes should a future war with the United states break out. However, 
they had little incentive of instigate the Indian chiefs to initiate a war against the United 
States. Most British policy makers believed that if a war broke out between the two states, 
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it must be provoked by the United States rather than Britain. British decision makers were 
wary that Indians might be recruited on the side of American in a future war: “if they are 
not on our side they will be against us”. After the Chesapeake affair, several militia drills 
were held around Detroit, which stroke the nerve of Britain policy makers and made them 
to believe that they must lose no time to “employ them if they can be brought to act with 
us” (Craig to Gore, RCA, 1896, Note B: 31-2). However, while British decision makers 
ordered cautions with regard to the Indian affairs, the local Canadian authorities tended to 
cross the line of necessity.  
Notably, British commitment on the implementation on Orders in Council and 
assistance of Indians were relatively weak compared to its commitment on the practice of 
impressment. This could be attributed to the fact that while impressment was essential in 
maintaining its naval preponderance and its life-or-death struggle against Napoleon, Orders 
in Council and assistance of Indians were not as essential. Trade was not the main source 
of French economic and military power (see, for example, Lord Bathurst’s remarks against 
Perceval’s proposals of Orders in Council, Papers if Perceval, Adams, 1890, Vol. IV: 94) 
and assistance to the Indians was a prudent defensive policy against a potential far away 
adversary. The final chance of defeating Napoleon finally relied on assisting other powers 
on the European continent, such as Russia, Prussia and Austria, to fight against Napoleon, 
rather than naval blockade of him. In addition, many policy makers considered it not 
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reasonable to provoke the neutral states by applying the Orders in Council. As a result, 
while the practice of impressment had few opponents, different voice regarding to Orders 
in Council had been sounded from the very start and even the most assertive decision 
makers were relative cautious in supporting the Indians. That’s also why while most British 
decision makers adhered to the practice of impressment until the end of war, they tried to 
restrain the Indians by standing a mutual ground between the United States and the Indian 
tribes in 1811 and decided to repeal the Orders in Council in June 1812 and, though that 
was too late to prevent the fatal escalation and the final U.S. declaration of war. 
Britain’s different policies regarding the practice of implementation on one hand, an 
Orders in Council and assistance to Indians on the other, was a proof that nations were 
more committed to policies that were required to fight regional rivals and adversaries than 
to those were only necessary to confront rivalries and adversaries in other regions. 
U.S. Decision Making: Willingness, Opportunism and Perception of Local 
Advantage 
In general, the United States, as a local power, annoyed by aggressive British policy 
of impressment, the implementation of Orders in Council and its assistance of Indian tribes, 
was more willing to fight. However, not until late 1811 and early 1812 did decision makers 
became determined to push for war against Britain. For example, they let pass the war scare 
of 1807, caused by national fervor over the Chesapeake. At this juncture, American popular 
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indignation against Britain was in the height, but the policy makers were circumspect and 
avoided escalation. Between 1805 and mid 1812, the United States mainly used economic 
and military coercion to force London into changing course. However, with the failure of 
these less dramatic measures, together with the new developments (increasing naval 
clashes and Indian affairs) in 1811, increasing numbers of decision makers start to opt for 
war. Top decision makers finally decided to wage war upon Britain to coerce Britain to 
give up its aggressive policies after Britain became actively engaged in the Peninsula War 
and Napoleon was to march to Russia. With the British concentration in Europe, they 
considered that Britain would be unwilling to spare their energy in confronting the United 
States and would cave into the demands of the United States. Apart from these opportunism 
considerations, they also calculated that given United States’ local advantage, such as 
willingness to fight, morale, and local military advantage against the Britain in Canada, 
and the American coercion would be effective. 
Willingness to Fight 
The American decision makers were willing to fight Great Britain as they felt 
humiliation and believed America’s sovereignty was severely violated because of British 
policies of Orders in Council, Impressment and instigation of the Indian tribes against the 
United States. These policies were immediate threat to the well-being and security of the 
United States and counter-measure must be adopted. 
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Compared with other cases resulting in war in this study (crises leading up to the 
Pacific War and the Korean War), in the current case, it seemed that the United States as a 
local power showed less determination and willingness to wage war against the Britain, the 
superior outside power, given the deep division between Republicans and Federalists 
regarding to their policy towards Britain. While the Republicans were generally more 
inclined to adopt an assertive policy, the Federalists were more conciliatory. This situation 
was a result of a colonial legacy of special commercial, cultural and kinship relations 
between the two nations. However, the main feeling of the two states towards one another 
was still featured by prevailing hostility (Horseman, 1962: 15-6), and as indignity and 
grievance against Britain accrue, numerous policy makers and a large part of the American 
public grew increasingly willing to wage war. 
Such hostility grew steadily with British policy of Orders in Council, British practice 
of impressment and Britain’s assistance and alleged instigation of Indian tribes to attack 
U.S. forces. And these disputes finally generated U.S. determination to wage war against 
Britain.  
After the Chesapeake affair in 1807, with the national fervor against British 
aggression, the partisan divide over policy regarding Britain was shortly abridged and both 
parties called for a more tough policy against Britain. Despite some advocates for war 
preparation such as Macon, few policy makers had determined to wage a real war against 
 
 148 
Britain. Jefferson ordered that “we should avoid every act which may precipitate immediate 
& general war” (Jefferson to Cabell, Jul. 24, 1807, the Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 
Andrew Lipscomb edited, cited as WTJL hereinafter, Vol. X: 436). After the Congress was 
called for in late October, Gallatin observed that the Congress “is certainly peaceably 
disposed” (Gallatin to his wife, Oct. 30, 1807, Adams, 1879: 364). As a result, the Jefferson 
administration took caution and avoided unnecessary escalations. It decided to employ 
economic pressures (Non-importation Act and later the Embargo Act) to coerce Great 
Britain into concessions. 
However, Britain’s resumption and increase of surveillance of America’s principle 
ports as a revenge to the reimposition of Non-intercourse in March 1811 and the 
consequently the President-Little Belt clash on May 16, together with British assistance 
and alleged instigation of the Indian tribes to attack Harrison’s forces in early November 
convinced numerous American policy makers that Britain had further escalated of the 
bilateral relations and further threatened the security of the nation. Britain’s insistence on 
Orders in Council while Napoleon at least offered lip service to compromise on the Decrees 
was another development that invited American grievance against Britain. As a result, by 
the end of 1811, the anti-British fervor surged again. This time, however, the situation was 
different from 1807 and the tipping point was reached. More and more policy makers had 
turned for war and their determination of war had considerably mounted. This was a result 
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of the continuance of Orders and impressment, which led to President-Belt clash, the failure 
of economic coercion through the Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts and a new 
development of British assistance of the Indian tribes and its alleged instigation of them to 
attack the United States. In late 1811, military preparation for the coming war was already 
in place, with the pass of bill of the increase of regular army and the bill requesting the 
vessels not in service of the Navy being put into commission (AC, 12th Cong. 1st Sess., H. 
of R.: 548). The war preparation of late 1811 and early 1812 was the antecedent of the 
outbreak of war in June 1812. Many Congressmen had already determined to wage war, 
though some of the later war supporter thought the United States need more time to be 
better prepared for that. 
Among the three disputes, the Orders threatened the right of commerce of the United 
States, while impressment and assistance to Indian tribes posed immediate and direct 
threats to the security of local residents of the United States. The fact that the blockade and 
seizure of ship and seamen normally took place in the coastal area rendered the willingness 
to fight surge partially from local apprehension of an immediate and direct threat, which 
was predicted by the Hypothesis3 in the first Chapter (that the local powers tend to be more 
willing to fight because they face immediate threat to their security). 
American hatred towards British Orders of Council of November 1807 grew steadily 
before the outbreak of War. American indignation of the British violation and deprivation 
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of its lawful neutral commerce and the right of doing business was fervid. With the failure 
of economic coercion by the Embargo Act and Non-Intercourse Acts, and with British 
refusal of any type of budging towards the repeal of the Orders after Napoleon’s titular 
removal of French decrees, more and more policy makers contended that the United States 
could not sacrifice national honor and the right of a normal nation for a submissive peace 
with Britain (see, for example, remarks of Felix Grundy of Tennessee and Robert Wright 
of Maryland, AC, 12th Cong. 1st Sess., H. of R.: 424-5, 467). To them, acceptance of British 
Orders amounted to “a virtual abandonment of the rights of an independent nation” (Ibid: 
679). Grievance was further raised when ships of the United States were “seized on our 
own coasts, at the very mouths of our harbors, condemned and confiscated”. In late 1811, 
it had already been the unanimous opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House that the Orders “ought to be resisted by war” (Porter Report, Ibid: 375, 414). The 
Orders was the dominant issue in Madison’s war message. It was described as virtually a 
“sweeping system of blockade”, and a clear demonstration that Britain was already in a 
state of war with the United States (Special Message to Congress, Jun. 1, 1812, WJMA, 
Vol. VIII: 194, 199). 
The practice of impressment, on the other hand, was not only a violation of neutral 
rights of the United States, but also an immediate threat to the life and security of American 
citizens. Frank Updyke observed that impressment was the “most aggravating and most 
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persistent” cause of the friction in the bilateral relations that culminating in the 1812 war 
(Updyke, 1915: 3). In January 1812, Monroe claimed that over six thousand American 
seamen had been impressed by Britain since 1803 (Zimmerman, 1925: 256, 267). 
Impressment of American seamen constituted a direct violation of the right of jurisdiction 
and thus sovereignty. Impressment was also the direct cause of face-offs such as the 
Chesapeake Affair and Belt-President Affair. In the war debates in late 1811 and 1812, 
numerous Congressmen spoke of the practice as unforgivable insult and a direct stroke on 
the very liberty of the nation, that the United States need to make a choice between 
repelling the insults of “the nation of pirates” or surrendering the very independence of the 
nation (see, for example, remarks of John Dawson, Samuel McKee and John Rhea, AC, 
12th Cong. 1st Sess., H. of R.: 501, 513, 520, 638). One of the reasons that American 
decision makers decided to continued war after they were informed of Britain’s repeal of 
Orders was that Britain refused their proposal of an armistice conditioning on Britain’s 
relinquishment of the practice of impressment in exchange to America’s pass of a law 
forbidding employment of British seamen (Russel to Castlereagh, Aug. 24, 1812; 
Castlereagh to Russel, Aug. 29, ASP, F.R., Vol.III: 58-90). 
The critics of Orders and impressment dominated the war debates since the commence 
of 12th Congress in late 1811, however, the Indian issue, though not as frequently debated, 
was no less consequential in leading up to war than many scholars have observed. Many 
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diplomatic historians deprecated the Indian threat as a major cause to the war of 1812. They 
argued that the strength of Indians was negligible and they were inefficient in fighting, 
posing no real threat to the United States; that the Indian issue was not the focus of the war 
debates in Congress and Madison’s war message. This is hardly true. The Indian issue was 
hotly discussed during the war debates and a committee was established to investigate 
British involvement in the war of Tippecanoe/Wabash. Although Orders dominated 
Madison’s war message, the Indian issue was also mentioned, while impressment was not. 
If impressment was a direct threat to maritime security of the United States, British 
assistance and alleged instigation of the Indian tribes was a direct threat to the security of 
the United States on the land. 
American policy makers had been apprehended of British and Canadian-Indian 
alliance as a major threat to the United States ever since the time of George Washington. 
Washington considered Canadian intercourse and connections with the Indian tribes 
rendered it a “at least troublesome if not dangerous neighbor” (Writings of George 
Washington, Vol. VII: 38). Hamilton was also concerned that the United States could not 
feel “excess of confidence or security” from European threat given British and Spanish 
alliance with the Indians, which were “natural enemies” of the United States (The 
Federalists, 2005: 130-1). Concerns over Canadian assistance to Indians came to a head 
during the 1793-1794 war scare between Britain and the United States and after the 
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Chesapeake affair in 1807.  
The 1811 battle of Tippecanoe became the tipping point and afterwards many 
Westerner generals and officials had already become determined for war against Britain. 
By this time, apart from the issue of clash with the Indians, all other issues had been in 
existence for years. The battle of Tippecanoe in late 1811 did play an essential part in 
turning the Westerners into a war-prone attitude. The Indian issue was hotly debated before 
the outbreak of war. Grundy and Dawson of Virginia contended that war had already 
commenced due to impressment and seizure on the sea and British assistance and 
instigation of Indians to attack the Americans on the land (AC, 12th Cong. 1st Sess., H. of 
R.: 425-6, 502). Richard Johnson of Kentucky reflected the fallen heroes of Wabash, many 
of whom were his acquaintances and friends, were murdered by the “silent instruments of 
death, the war club, the scalping knife, the tomahawk and the bow and arrow” of Indian 
“savages”, under the influence and assistance of British agents (Ibid: 456, 465). The impact 
of battle of Wabash was not limited to the frontier states. This grievance was shared by 
many Eastern Congressmen such as Wright and Dawson. Wright recalled the sacrifice of 
American inhabitants of the frontiers “of all ages, sexes and conditions” at the tomahawk 
and scalping-knife of the Indians, who were instigated to murder Americans by British 
officials such as Lord Dorchester, and Dawson contended that “we never could be secure 
against Indian war till we had possession of Canada, and by that means have it in our power 
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to cut off the communication between foreign nations and the Indians on our frontiers and 
in our own territory” (Ibid: 470, 501). 
It is true that the threat of Indians tribes was limited. However, the intermittent 
incursions had been nightmare for Western American frontier men. Western grievance 
against Britain, already existed because of the Orders, did accrue with British assistance 
and alleged instigation of the Indian tribe. Numerous Americans were still concerned about 
threat imposed by British presence in Americas. Many American decision makers still 
believed that it was required by the national security of the United States to drive British 
influence out of America all together and hold control of the whole continent completely 
(Horsman, 1987: 4). Canada was “worth conquering, if it was only to get clear of a 
meddling an bad neighbor, who is always willing to make a strife in our family” (Macon’s 
remark, Jan. 12, 1813, AC, 12th Cong. 2st Sess., H. of R.: 768). The Indian issue became an 
easy excuse for the Western expansionist. 
Seizure of American citizens and ships, especially along American coast, the 
assistance and alleged instigation of Indians were immediate threat to American security 
and sovereignty. Compared with these threat, French threat was much less immediate. Thus, 
while Jefferson perceived both states as threats to the United States’ nation security, 
America would “resist the enterprises of England first, because they first come vitally home 
to us” (Jefferson to James Maury, Apr. 25, 1812, WSTJ, Vol. XI: 241).  
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Because of these factors, by the end of 1812, despite the opposition of Federalists and 
a considerable amount of New England residents, many policy makers observed that the 
nation was filled with ardent patriotism and willing to sacrifice to right the wrongs through 
war. Between a fight for national independence, national honor and submission, numerous 
decision makers were determined to choose the former. John Harper of New Hampshire 
observed that the public spirit was aroused and turned to war with the feeling of indignity 
(AC, 12th Cong. 1st Sess., H. of R.: 657). Apart from security of local residents, the 
Westerner and Southerners also fought for territorial expansion. The war spirit in the west 
states was particular high. Jackson "the blood of our murdered countrymen must be 
revenged” (Jackson to Harrison, Nov. 28, 1811, Manuscripts from the Burton Collection: 
263) sold well to Western soldiers. 
On the other hand, some decision makers calculated that British willingness to fight a 
war in North America to be limited. Dawson, for example, believed that while the 
importance of Canada was increasing to the United States, its importance to Britain was 
questionable (AC, 12th Cong. 1st Sess., H. of R.: 506). 
Despite the war fervor of numerous decision makers, before the 1812 war, a 
considerable amount of American population, especially those of the New England States, 
opposed war or were not determined to wage war (see Adams, 1890, Vol. VI: 210-1; 
Perkins, 1961: 392-6). This was a result of their wariness of the expansionist aims of War 
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Hawks, of the feasibility and cost of fighting a much powerful enemy. They were also 
suspicious of the decision to wage war against Britain because they thought France was as 
threatening an enemy as Britain.  
The relative lack of willingness to fight might also be attributed to the nature of Anglo-
American disputes. After all, the military presence of Britain was limited in the Americas, 
the United States also enjoyed power dominance in the Americas, and the United States 
was not as dependent on Britain for resources required for national defense. This factor 
made British threat to the United States security not as enormous as that of the United 
States to Japan in late 1930’s or to China in 1950. In the U.S.-Japanese case, Japan’s local 
adversaries, Russia and China, were much more threatening to it than the threat of Canada 
and Indians to the United States in 1800’s, and U.S. assistance to China and Russia was 
much threatening to Japan in 1930’s than British support to the Indians. Japan was also too 
dependent on the United States for resources required for its national defense then, which 
made U.S. embargo much more fateful for Japan in the 1930’s than British Orders to the 
United States in 1800’s. In 1950, U.S. military presence in East Asia was large and its 
coming conquest of a potentially friendly neighbor to China much more threatening to the 
newborn Communist regime in China, which had not accomplished national unification. 
The Orders and Impressment, though undermined U.S. rights of commerce, sovereignty 
and threatened life and liberty of some American seamen (since a large part American 
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seamen impressed by Britain was former British deserters, the real threat to American 
seamen had been exaggerated), was not as threatening than assistance to powerful regional 
adversaries and embargo against a much demanding buyer in the case of U.S.-Japanese 
disputes in late 1930’s, or than large military presence of an adversarial power, which was 
conquering a potentially friendly neighbor in the case of U.S.-China relationship in 1950. 
Policy of Opportunism: Taking Advantage of Distraction of Great Britain 
If the willingness to fight provided the emotional drive to American declaration of 
war, the Peninsula War and Napoleon’s coming invasion of Russia provided a good 
opportunity. American policy makers’ declaration of war was partly driven by opportunism. 
They were well aware of America’s material inferiority vis-a-vis Great Britain, which was 
also the reason why they were anxious and felt humiliated over British violation of their 
commercial and sovereign rights. However, despite of their diffidence of material 
capability, they still considered that the war against a much more powerful British Empire 
was winnable because of Britain’s preoccupation with the Napoleon War while the United 
States could concentrate its power in North America. This was one of the considerations 
for a war against Britain from June 1807 to late 1911. However, the power balance of 
Europe was the most fragile in mid 1812 given Napoleon’s clash with Portuguese-Spanish-
British allied force in Iberian and his coming invasion of Russia. As a result, Britain’s 
energy was more drawn to its home region in June 1812 than it was in June 1807, and the 
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U.S. decision makers calculated that June 1812 was a well-chosen time to wage war against 
Britain in terms of international settings. 
The tension between the Great Britain and Napoleon’s France had been steadily 
escalating since Britain declared war on France again in 1803. Since then, the war against 
Napoleon had been the priority of British security policy since then. However, not until 
1808, Britain had been waging the war against Napoleon mainly by supporting its 
continental allies in the backstage and had barely confronted Napoleon head-on by sending 
expedition forces to the European continent.  
During the War of the Fourth Coalition, apart from battle of Maida in southern Italy 
in July 1806, British forces had never confronted Napoleon on the European continent. Fox 
cabinet even tried to commence peace negotiations with Napoleon in early 1806. To break 
off Napoleon’s Continental System, Britain naval forces bombarded Copenhagen in August 
1807. However, these peripheral clashes with Napoleon and Denmark did not constitute 
major drain of Britain’s energy. 
Taking advantage of the developments in Europe, many American political elites had 
already recommended harsher policy against Britain. During the Pinkney negotiation, 
political observers commented that Britain rather than the United States should be in a 
supplicant position because Prussia defeat at Jena in October 1806 left Britain with no allies 
to “render her the least service” (Aurora, Feb. 21, 1807, Perkins, 1961: 135). This was at 
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least a source of confidence with which Jefferson rejected the Pinkney treaty in April. 
Britain’s position vis-à-vis France was further worsened with Russian’s defeat at Friedland 
in mid-June. Jefferson had once considered that it “can never be in a better time” for the 
United States to revenge the Chesapeake Affair and right the wrongs that the British had 
perpetrated to the right of flag of the United States by bringing on a war on it (Jefferson to 
Crowninshield, Sept. 3, 1807, WTJL, Vol. XI: 357). However, due to American 
unpreparedness and Congressional inclination to peace, Jefferson finally relied on 
economic coercion in 1807. 
Since 1808, with the outbreak of Peninsula War, Britain had been engaged in direct 
conflict with Napoleon through sending large amount of expedition army to assist Portugal 
and Spain against France on the European continent. The number of British forces on the 
European continent reached nearly 50,000 in 1808, and 96,000 later (North British Review, 
1863: 141). Napoleon’s force enjoyed advantage to the allies in the first place, but was 
gradually fought into a stalemate on the Iberian Peninsula around late 1810. British 
Commander Arthur Wellesley launched offensive in 1812. The Peninsula War was fought 
until 1814, which drained British energy enormously. 
In late 1811 and the first half of 1812, the Peninsula War was in one of the most 
essential periods, major battles such as battle of Tarragona, battle of Tanfa, battle of Cadiz, 
battle of Ciudad Rodrigo and battle of Badajoz was fought between the allies and Napoleon. 
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In this period, the British prioritized the Peninsula War in its national security strategy. This 
was considered as an extraordinary opportunity for the United States to coerce Britain, 
especially at a time when U.S. decision makers considered that Britain had escalated 
bilateral disputes in 1811. Apart from peninsula war, which “requires strong armies to 
support it”, Britain also “maintains an army in Sicily; another in Inida, and a strong force 
in Ireland, and along her own coast and In the West Indies”. The National Intelligencer 
asserted: “Can anyone believe that under such circumstances, the British government could 
be so infatuated, or rather mad, as to send troops here for the purpose of invasion?” 
(National Intelligencer, Apr. 14, 1812, Kaplan, 1964: 662). 
Although official and popular indignation against France was still widespread in late 
1811 and early 1812, American interests and Napoleon’s interests “coincided with the 
views of the Enemy of G.B.”, the United States was “favored by his operations against her” 
(Madison to Wheaton, Feb. 26 & 27, 1827, WJMA, Vol. IX: 273). France ability of causing 
misery to the United States could be “the instrument of the United States in redressing the 
score in wartime”. American decision makers even thought that France could compensate 
for U.S. military deficiencies when war with Britain broke out. As a result, the enmity 
against France was shelved or deprecated among the Republican decision makers (see 
Kaplan, 1964: 661-3). 
In the late 1811 war debates, multiple Congressmen, especially those who clamored 
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for war against Britain, had remarked on British engagements in Europe and other parts of 
the world, their want of concentration in the Americas and U.S. advantage of concentration 
against British in fighting a local war. Porter observed that Britain was “at war with most 
of the civilized world” (AC, 12th Cong. 1st Sess., H. of R.: 415). Cheves contended that for 
the British, “notwithstanding the greatness of the force, the points to which it must be 
destined are so numerous and dispersed as to put it all in requisition” (Ibid: 816), with 
limited seamen and non-inexhaustible pecuniary resources, the amount of naval power that 
could be stationed in American seas was limited. Wright argued that with the France 
building a immense navy to be ready in 1813, the United States would no longer fear 
Britain sending her line of battle here while leaving herself exposed “to so awful and 
powerful an enemy at home” (Ibid: 944).  
In addition, Britain’s war with Napoleon, Napoleon’s Continental System and 
Britain’s efforts in maintaining a world-dominant navy put severe press on Britain’s 
financial basis. Many war advocates believed that as Britain waged war against Napoleon 
and plundering against the world with its navy, it was bankrupting with citizens “groaning 
under a national debt of eight hundred millions of pounds sterling, more than all the nations 
of the universe could pay” (remark of Johnson, Jan. 21, 1812, Ibid: 879. Such view was 
prevalent among those decision makers who opposed United States’ naval expansion. See 
the debates on Naval Establishment of the 12th Congress in early 1812) and could no longer 
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afford to wage a large scale war against the United States.   
Politicians did not fail to observe the distractions of the British Empire. Former 
President Jefferson overestimated the peril that Britain faced in its direct confrontation with 
Napoleon on the Iberian Peninsula. He wrote: “The fate of England...is nearly decided...and 
the present form of her existence is drawing to a close”, he prayed that “powers of Europe 
may be so poised and counterpoised among themselves, that their own safety may require 
the presence of all their force at home, leaving the other quarters of the globe in undisturbed 
tranquility” and looked to a future that the strength of the United States would permit it to 
“give the law of our hemisphere” and keep the peace in it (Jefferson to Crawford, Jan. 2, 
1812, WTJW, Vol. VI: 33). Monroe wrote that a prolonged war was less likely since Britain 
would “find its way to hungry months” to provide enough provisions to its expedition 
armies in America while it need to feed its own population, as well as its forces in Spain 
and Portugal (Monroe to Taylor, Jun. 13, 1812, WJMO, Vol. V: 212). 
Nevertheless, to American decision makers, the best timing of a war against Britain 
to coerce it into concession regarding to Orders in Council and impressment came in mid 
1812. Russia’s constant violation of the Continent System invited Napoleon’s preparation 
for an invasion of Russia in mid 1812, which brought a new change to the situation of 
Europe. President Madison considered the new development in Europe as an opportunity 
for the United States. He recalled in 1827 that although the war preparation “the moment 
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chosen for the war...have been well chosen if chosen with a reference to the French 
expedition agst. Russia”. To declare war against Britain against the backdrop of French-
Russia war, according to Madison, “was a fair calculation, indeed, when war became 
unavoidable, or rather after it had commenced, that Napoleon whether successful or not 
agst. Russia, would find full employment for her and her associates, G. B. included; and 
that it would be required of G. B. by all the powers with whom she was leagued, that she 
should not divert any part of her resources from the common defence to a war with the U.S. 
having no adequate object... Had the French Emperor not been broken down as he was, to 
a degree at variance with all human probability, and which no human sagacity could 
anticipate, can it be doubted that G. B. would have been constrained by her own situation 
and the demands of her allies, to listen to our reasonable terms of reconciliation?” (Madison 
to Wheaton, Feb. 26 & 27, 1827, WJMA, Vol. IX: 274) Had Napoleon proceeded smoothly 
in his invasion of Russia, it would be a completion of Napoleon’s Continental System 
against Britain, which “must inevitably work the destruction of G.B.” (John Connelly to 
Jonathan Roberts, May 21, 1812, Jonathan Roberts Papers, cited from Kaplan, 1964: 663).  
Many scholars had argued that the Chesapeake Affair in 1807 offered a better 
opportunity for the United States to wage war against Britain, with more well-founded 
justification, severer popular indignation, and a more sound economic footing. However, 
from the 1811 war debates and Madison’s recollections, it could be referred that U.S. 
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decision makers considered 1812 a better opportunity at least partially because they 
considered that Britain was more distracted in June 1812, when it was engaging in a head-
on conflict against Napoleon on Iberian conflict and kept an wary eye on Napoleon’s 
coming invasion of Russia, than in June 1807, when Britain was only engaged in a short 
small-scaled peripheral clash with Napoleon in southern Italy, some naval clashes and a 
short bombardment against Denmark. 
America’s Local Advantage vis-a-vis Britain 
Apart from the willingness to fight and the opportunity offered by Peninsula War and 
Napoleon’s coming invasion of Russia, American decision makers calculated that in a war 
against Britain, United States also enjoyed local power balance advantage against Britain 
and logistics advantage. 
Given the small size of military force and sparsely distributed population against vast 
landmass of Canada, many U.S. policy makers calculated that it would not be an arduous 
undertaking for the United States to defeat or even occupy Canada in a short time and 
before Britain could react, especially taking into consideration geographical distance of 
Britain and its preoccupation with European affairs. And Britain would be finally coerced 
into compromise in the major disputes. 
Invasion or conquest of Canada had been a desire for many Americans since the very 
day of independence. After Chesapeake, Jefferson and his cabinet talked about the invasion 
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of Canada to coerce Britain into concessions on many occasions during the July meetings. 
In 1808, John Howe reported to Governor of Canada that no officials in either party 
considered that to take Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick a difficult undertaking 
(Howe to Sir George Prevost, Nov. 27, 1808, Secrets Reports of John Howe, 1808: 341-
343). However, an annexation of Canada was thought “only as a matter for an indefinite 
future” in the United States by 1810 (Pratt, 1925: 12), when British Canadian officials 
started to assist the Indian tribes out of fears of American invasion (Adams, 1890, Vol. IV: 
243-4). 
By the time of war debates in 1811, invasion of Canada was discussed much more 
vigorously by advocates of war. Multiple Congressmen expressed their belief that the 
United States could take Canada in a short time given America’s military advantage over 
Canada. Canada was the easiest target for America’s military coercion against Britain. 
Porters remarked that the United States should retaliate the injuries inflicted upon by 
Britain by invading the Canadian provinces since the later was “the only quarter in which 
she is vulnerable”. Although Porter made rational calculations that it called for more forces 
to launch an effective offensive against Canada, given his experience of living next to the 
British provinces (AC, 12th Cong. 1st Sess., H. of R.: 793), he still considered that the 
American army could overrun other part of Canada except Quebec in a few weeks. This 
was because that the regular army of Canada was only five thousand, and almost half of 
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these forces were around Quebec. And Canadian militia was “greatly inferior” to America’s. 
Reinforcement to Upper Canada could be reached until early July (Ibid: 1060-2).  
Many other Congressmen were uplifted by Porter’s analysis, and confident of U.S. 
military advantage over Canada. Calhoun, for example, believed that “in four weeks from 
the time that a declaration of war is heard on our frontier, the whole of Upper and a part of 
lower Canada will be in our possession” (Ibid: 1397). Randolph expressed his concern over 
United States’ capability of capturing Canada in a short time after the commence of war. 
He calculated that it would take no less than five years for the United States to occupy 
Canada. His pessimism was attacked by multiple Congressmen. David Williams from 
South Carolina remarked that Randolph “may depreciate the physical forces of an 
American army as much as he pleases; but rely upon it, whenever the storms of war is 
poured on Canada and Halifax, it will sweep with the resistless impetuosity of Niagara” 
(Ibid: 690). It seemed to be a shared feeling among the War Hawks that the “Canadian 
plum lay waiting to fall into the lap of American invaders” (Perkins, 1961: 357).  
Similar calculations prevailed in the administrative branch. One and half months after 
the United States declared war, Former President Jefferson calculated that “The acquisition 
of Canada this year, as far as the neighborhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of 
marching, and will give us experience for the attack of Halifax the next, and the final 
expulsion of England from the American continent” (Jefferson to Colonel Duane, Aug. 4, 
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1812, WTJW, Vol. VI: 75-6). Monroe wrote that the administration thought 20,000 regulars 
would be “adequate to every object” of invading Canada, and his candid opinion is that 
“we shall succeed in obtaining what it is important to obtain, and that we shall experience 
little annoyance or embarrassment in the effort”. The United States would succeed in 
coercing the British to get rid of the current British ministry and bilateral accommodation 
would soon follow (Monroe to Taylor, Jun. 13, 1812, WJMO, Vol. V: 211). 
A few decision makers still believed that many Canadians would like to join the 
United States and get rid of British control, which would make conquest of Canada easier. 
Of course, history has proved that these calculations of local advantage were delusive 
calculations, the United States did not even succeed in conquering Upper Canada. However, 
it made much sense when the decision makers were analyzing the war operations with their 
mental maps, especially with the power of geographical distance and logistics conditions 
at that time.   
Multiple American decision makers also calculated that Great Britain would face 
difficulties in projecting power in American, given its geographical distance from the 
continent. If the United States could take Canada, especially Halifax in a short time, which 
was considered most probably by these policy makers, the British forces would suffer from 
logistics difficulties, which rendered an attack to the United States a even more grueling 
undertaking. Because of these factors, a small army and navy, together with the militia 
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could be enough to protect the United States in a war against Britain. 
The Naval Minister, Cheves had put forward such argument systemically during the 
war debate of late 1811 and early 1812 in the House. For Britain to wage an oversea war 
with the United States, it must support an equal force on American coast at any given time, 
and “this force cannot be fitted out, unless with great disadvantage to the service in point 
of expense, and in respect to the health of the crew, for much more than three months’ 
service”. In regard of this factor, an equal second force need to be put in requisition for 
replacement of those in station. Moreover, an equal third force need to be put in requisition 
to replace the second, since the first force could not replace the second in time if it were to 
sail back to Europe, get equipped and return on the American coast. Thus, to wage war 
effectively against the United States, Britain need to employ a triple force of the size of 
American force. History proves that “neither Great Britain, nor any other nation, has ever 
been able to station, for any length of time, in distant seas, a force equal to that which...is 
sufficient to accomplish the objects”. In addition, Britain had no port fit for naval 
equipment or repair, apart from Halifax, in the regions from the North to the Isthmus of 
Darien. If the United States were to take Halifax shortly after the commence of war, it 
would become impractical for Britain to maintain regular operations in America (AC, 12th 
Cong. 1st Sess., H. of R.: 814-5). 
Porter, on the other hand, implied that the United States could take advantage of 
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locality to harass British possessions interests in Americas. Apart from attacking Canada, 
it was also able to destroy its northern fisheries, deprecate its commerce to the West India, 
“which is passing by our doors” and harass its trade with South America (Ibid: 416). 
With accruing indignity towards Britain as a result of impressment, Orders in Council 
(and the virtual blockade of American coast) and the Indian Affairs, a large amount of U.S. 
decision makers become determined to wage war against Britain since 1811. The 
opportunity offered by British entanglement in the Peninsula War, the vulnerable power 
balance in Europe in mid 1812, the advantage of local military balance and advantage of 
logistics vis-a-vis the British convince them that a war against Britain was feasible in the 
summer of 1812. Willingness to fight, opportunism, and delusive perception of local 
advantage together contributed to America’s ultimate declaration of war against Great 
Britain in the summer of 1812. 
Conclusions 
The period of 1805 to 1812 marks large power gap between the United States, the 
local power on American continent, and the superior British Empire, a strategic regional 
power, or a geographically outsider power with essential interests on the continent, 
including colonies in Canada and West Indians, as well as critical commercial interest. 
However, Great Britain was entangled in the European affair. With Napoleon’s France 
seeking dominance over the European continent, Britain confront it on the Iberian 
 
 170 
Peninsula, and kept a wary eye on its coming invasion of Russia. 
This period was featured by major crisis between the United States and Great Britain 
with two seething points in 1807 and 1811, respectively. The bilateral crisis were pushing 
by mainly three disputes, Britain’s impressment of American seamen to fill the position of 
its sailors required by its maritime dominance, Britain’s imposition of Orders in Council to 
block trade between neutral nations and France, which imposed a virtual blockade to 
American coast, and British assistance to Indian tribes, which finally attacked American 
forces in November 1811 and was allegedly instigated by British Canadian authorities. The 
seizure of American ships and citizens, especially along American coast, and the virtual 
blockade, were direct threats to American sovereignty and national security, which made 
American grievance and indignation smolder. 
During the whole course, except the short period of Cabinet of Saints, British policy 
makers were arrogant and complacent of its material capability superiority over the United 
States and were reluctant in making major compromises to the United States on the issues 
of impressment and Orders. With the willingness to fight rather than tolerance of violation 
of rights of sovereignty and independence, the opportunity offered by new development on 
the European continent, and the perception of local advantage, the United States ultimately 
decided to initiate war to force Great Britain to back off. Britain, on the other hand, 
contempt of America’s material capability, decided to teach the United States a lesson. The 
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result of the 1812 War. 
In the early days of the crisis, the policy makers of the United States, aware of their 
power inferiority, had adopted cautious policies, such as economic and maritime coercion 
until late 1811. After Chesapeake Affair in June 1807, despite popular fervor against Britain 
and calls for war, Jefferson opted for economic coercion, despite his initial thought of 
military coercion.  
However, America’s hostility against Great Britain was accruing. With Britain 
increasing its surveillance of principle American ports, the consequent President-Little Belt 
naval clash, and the Battle of Tippecanoe, in which the British supported Indians, allegedly 
instigated by British agents, attacked Harrison’s force, the war fever against Britain had 
reached another tipping point by the end of 1811. These new developments were regarded 
as new escalations on the part of Britain by many U.S. decision makers. British assistance 
to the Indian “savages” and the allegedly Britain-instigated Indian war was another direct 
threat to the national security of the United States, and brought further fear of the 
Westerners and an excuse for their expansionist goals. 
By the end of 1811, more and more policy makers became determinant and willing of 
waging war rather than submission of sovereign rights and compromise of national security. 
Johnson observed on December 11, 1811 that for the first time since his entrance to the 
House that “there now seems to be but one opinion with a great majority-that with Great 
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Britain war is inevitable...that her infernal system has driven us to the brink of a second 
revolution, as important as the first” (AC, 12th Cong. 1st Sess., H. of R.: 456). War 
preparation, such as increase of standing army and taxes, had been started in late 1811. 
With Britain preoccupied in confronting Napoleon’s forces on the Iberian Peninsula in 
1812, and Napoleon’s coming invasion of Russia, which put European power balance in 
further fragility, and with calculations of American advantage vis-a-vis Britain in terms of 
local military power balance and logistics, the policy makers of the United States finally 
decided to declare war upon Great Britain in June 1812.   
These facts confirmed Hypothesis3 that during a major interregional crisis, when the 
strategic regional power enjoys material capability superiority over the local preponderant 
power, the arrogance of the former will meet the willingness to fight, opportunism and 
perception of local advantage of the latter. In this situation, the outside power is reluctant 
in making concession, and the local preponderant power will take opportunities to resist 
the strategic power, making the probability of war high. 
However, compared with the other similar cases (U.S.-Japanese relations in the 1937-
1941 and U.S.-China relations in 1950), the willingness and determination of U.S. 
population and decision makers were relatively weak. This was a result of the nature of 
U.S.-British disputes, as explained in this Chapter. Cultural and colonial connections may 
also partially accountable for the relative tepid determination, however, given popular 
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indignity to Great Britain, how such connections mattered was disputable. 
The courses of escalation in this period disproved Hypothesis3’. Despite the large 
power gap between the two powers and Britain’s world dominant naval capability and 
power projection capability, the American decision makers was not deterred by the large 
material capability gap. They perceived that the development on the European continent, 
and America’s local advantage over Britain could offset British advantage and ultimately 
decided to declare war upon Great Britain.  
The additional explanations also do not fare well in accounting for the development 
in this period. 
IR theorist seldom touched upon the cause of the 1812 war, leaving it the task for 
diplomatic historians. Unsurprisingly, there have not been account of permissive or 
structural cause of this war. 
The imbalance/preponderance peace argument of E1’ clearly fails in accounting for 
the war. Britain’s power preponderance over the United States did not coerce the later into 
submission. 
In this case, it was difficult to use the status quo-non status quo dichotomy to describe 
the two nations. In terms of the free and open trade system, Britain was a violator while 
the United States was a status quo power. However, in terms of the status quo on American 
continent, the United States was the revisionist power while Britain tried to maintain the 
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status quo. This fact made it difficult to analyze the applicability of H3’. Nevertheless, this 
can also be attributed to the fact that the status quo-non status quo dichotomy was a fuzzy 
concept that could not be relied upon for analysis. 
Economic interdependence obviously did not help to dampen the crisis in this period. 
British policy makers, assured of the United States’ economic dependence on trade with 
Britain, decided that there was no need to make major concessions to the United States 
regarding the disputes of impressment and Orders in Council. Some political elites even 
believe that the United States relied upon Britain to its national security against French 
expansionism. Courier, one of Britain’s nationalistic newspaper, claimed that “It is British 
capital, which directly or indirectly, sets half the industry of America in motion: it is the 
British fleets that give it protection and security” (Courier, Jul. 29, 1811, Perkins, 1961: 7). 
The United States, on the other hand, taking advantage of Britain’s conflict with 
Napoleon, estimated that the United States could coerce Britain into concessions by 
economic means such as embargo or non-intercourse. When economic coercion failed, 
policy makers finally decided to declare war, despite Federalist opposition of war out of 
trade and economic concern. For example, observers reasoned that it did not make sense 
to declare war with Britain for commercial interests, for war with it would deprive the 
United States of the remaining commercial interests (Jan. 26, 1812, New York Evening 
Post). However, the Westerners, who were equally dependent on Britain for the export 
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trade, were more war-prone. Such facts demonstrated that commercial and economic 
interdependence could not bring peace as H4’ claims. 
H5' is not relevant in this case. The United States was a rising power that had sanguine 
future. From Jefferson’s writings, one could feel the confidence of American decision 
makers of the nation’s future. British decision makers, though did not expect the Napoleon 
Wars to end in three years, had not been concerned with a dramatic decline of the nation’s 
power in 1812. Neither nation expected that their trading volume would further decline in 
the future, and neither of them went to war out of desperate of the nation’s future.  
Liberal Peace theory would have a hard time in accounting for the current case. Britain 
and the United States both had liberal political system, though not necessarily democratic 
system. Although aristocrats still had enormous influence in Britain, and Britain followed 
a imperial policy regarding to its overseas colonies and maritime policy, Britain remained 
a liberal political system, compared with other European powers. Stephen believed that the 
United States would correlate Britain with liberty and Napoleon with despot. British policy 
makers also considered that United States’ political system would incapable of offensive 
warfare (Perkins, 1961: 9), much to the Democratic Peace theorists’ argument (see Russett 
and Maoz, 1993). However, this did not bring about negotiation, but British stubborn 
insistence to the policy of impressment and Orders in Council, which finally led to war. 
Although it was not the focus of this structural study to explain which was the most 
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essential immediate cause of the 1812 war, and it admit the importance of maritime disputes, 
such as impressment, Orders in Council, British seizure of American ships and citizens, the 
virtual blockade of principle American ports and the consequently maritime clashes were 
the main causes of the war. However, British assistance of the Indians in late 1810’s and 
the alleged British instigation of Indian attack upon Harrison’s marching forces also had 
significant effects on American decision makers’ assessments of British threat. The 
Westerners felt immediate threat to their life and assets from Britain. They also got an easily 
available excuse to their expansionist aims. Those scholars who deprecate the effects of the 
Indian Affairs was wrong in this point. 
The Anglo-American relations in the period of 1805 to 1812 demonstrate that the 
validity of the Hypothesis2 that likelihood of war will increase in a serious interregional 
crisis between a weaker local major power and a much more powerful outside power. The 
causal chain proposed in Hypothesis3 is also valid. This Chapter might be a meaningful 
attempt to explain the permissive cause of the 1812 war from a structural perspective, 
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Chapter 4 Anglo-American Relations, 1895-1905 
After the 1812 war, the rivalry between the United States and Great Britain in 
Americas has not terminated. Actually, such rivalry lasted about another century, until the 
eve of WWI. The period of 1895-1912 marked the last period of Anglo-America rivalry 
relations. Several crises, relating to United States’ effort to pushing British influence out of 
the region and border disputes, took place in this period. However, most of these crises 
were quite mild. Even in the most severe crisis, the Venezuela Crisis of 1895, the option of 
war were not seriously considered by both parties. 
In general, this chapter finds that, in major crises of this period, the British policy 
makers no longer thought they could protect their colonial interests in North America, 
given United States’ growing power and local advantage. They calculated that a war with 
the United States would be prohibitively costly. As a result, they opted for concession in 
such crisis. On the other hand, despite the fact it was always the United States that provoked 
the crises of this period, aware of the high cost of a war with Great Britain, and confident 
of their advantageous position vis-à-vis Great Britain in the Americas. As a result, decision 
makers of the United States also tended to be wary of pushing Great Britain too hard.  
In the century after the Treaty of Ghent, the material capability of the United States 
was in steady growth, with its constant expansion on the continent. With the fortification 
of major cities and large amount of military expenditure, the Civil War enormously boosted 
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the military capability of the United States. The end of the Civil War ushered a new era of 
peaceful development and industrialization. With the closure of continental expansion, the 
United States started to cast an eye into the Pacific. By the turn of the century, the United 
States had been surpassing Great Britain in population, industrial outputs and economic 
strength. Although American military strength was still far behind that of Great Britain, 
given the United States’ industrial and economic strength, it could develop a formidable 
army and navy in a short time, powerful enough to rival that of Great Britain if American 
decision makers deemed it necessary. 
Great Britain was also steadily withdrawing from America-a continuous course ever 
since the end of American Civil War. What distinguishes this period from previous years, 
however, was the fact that during the crises in this period, Great Britain had not even put 
up serious resistance to American expansion. It tended to seek for major concessions in 
most occasions, sacrificing the interests of its North American colonies. The United States, 
on the other side, given its newly acquired capabilities, became more confident in asserting 
the Monroe Doctrine against the European powers, not only Britain, but also Germany. 
However, it was also becoming less sensitive to foreign activities in Americas, also a result 
of its newly acquired capabilities and confidence. As a result, it no longer perceived British 
activities in the Americas as immediate threat to its national security. With expectation of 
British concessions, it also tended not to rely on military method to coerce Britain into 
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concession. One result of these development was that the two parties made it a rule of 
settling disputes, especially American-Canadian territorial disputes, by arbitration. 
After the period of 1895-1912, Britain had practically completely disentangled itself 
from main commitment from North America, and had acquiesced to United States’ 
dominance of the Western Hemisphere. The two powers ceased to be rivals on this 
continent. So were other major powers. Germany, despite close economic relations with 
Latin America and the United States’ suspicions, had not sought substantial influence in 
Latin Americas. On the other hand, with the United States enlarging its power gaps over 
European powers, it started to get involved in the European affairs. 
Anglo-American Crises in the Americas and their Settlements, 1895-1905 
In the century after the Treaty of Ghent, Anglo-American relations had seen several 
major crises, and the bilateral relations was still antagonistic, despite some period of 
tranquility, such as the period of 1842-1853, the 1870’s and the 1880’s.  
In this century, there were mainly two sources of bilateral disputes, which were apt to 
flare up into major crises. These two sources were land and maritime territorial disputes 
between Canada and the United States, and their contest for influence in the Americas. The 
first sort of disputes generated crises such as Caroline and McLeod Crisis in late 1830’s 
and early 1840’s, the Aroostook Crisis of 1838 and the Fenian raids in late 1860’s. The 
Northeastern border, the Oregon border, the Newfoundland fishery and Seal rights in 
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Bering Sea, though much less explosive, also poisoned bilateral relations at times. The 
second sort of disputes generated crises as Britain stood in the way of American expansion. 
These crises included 1818 Florida Crisis, Texas Crisis in 1840’s, Greytown Crisis of 1854. 
U.S. annexation of California, its attempt to acquire Cuba in 1850’s and attempt of control 
of Isthmus also generated bilateral tensions. During American Civil War, Great Britain’s 
relations with the Confederate also generated crises, such as the Trent Affair and the 
Alabama incident. 
Most of the severe crises took place before or during the Civil War. In most crises 
after the Civil War, there was no serious consideration of use of military force as an option. 
Bilateral Crises during the period of 1815-1894 
During the First War of Seminole of 1817-1818, the Andrew Jackson captured and 
executed Robert Ambrister, a former member of British Colonial Marines and Alexander 
Arbuthnot, a British trader in Florida, accusing them of agitating Seminole Indians against 
the United States. The executions, perceived as violation of conventions of warfare, 
triggered indignation in Britain. American decision makers were concerned with 
escalations and a new war with Britain. Fortunately, British decision makers, valuing the 
commercial relations with the United States and having no taste for another inconclusive 
war with it, avoid escalation (Missall and Missall, 2004, 40-45). 
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During the Canada Rebellion against Britain of 1837-1838, American filibusters sent 
the ship Caroline to supply the rebels on Navy Island. The British forces, considering the 
activity as an act of hostility, crossed the boundary and seized Caroline in Schlosser, New 
York, set the ship on fire,  killed an American crew, Amos Durfee, and injured several 
others in the melee. Caroline latter sunk in Niagara river. Militia of Erie County, Lockport 
and Rochester was ordered to assemble in defense of possible Canadian attack (Corey, 
1941: 36-8). American filibusters also made several attempts to invade Canada. In May 
1838, American raiders retaliated Caroline by capturing and setting afire British steamer 
Sir Robert Peel when it was sailing in American water. Border clashes between American 
raiders and British forces broke out many times in the same year. Population on  American 
frontier were highly anti-Britain, and many Americans considered a war with the Britain 
was possible, or even inevitable (Ibid: 87-8). British, on the other hand, enhanced their 
defense of American colonies to deal with not only American filibusters but also the 
military forces of the United States. In 1841, a Canadian sheriff, Alexander McLeod was 
arrested for trial in New York for his boasting about killing an American crew. British 
public opinion was inflamed, and Foreign Secretary Viscount Palmerston wrote to British 
minister in the United States, H. S. Fox, that President van Buren must understand that 
“McLeod execution would produce war immediate and frightful character because would 
war retaliation and vengeance”. He also intimated U.S. minister in London, Andrew 
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Stevenson, in private that “if McLeod is executed there must be war” (Palmerston to Fox, 
Feb. 9, 1841, Bulwer, 1874: 49-50).  
However, thanks to the circumspect of both government, further escalation was 
avoided in the late 1830’s and early 1840’s. The federal government of the United States 
tried to restrain the with the filibusters’ involvement in the Canadian affair, and in one of 
the most severe border clash, the Battle of Windmill of November 1838, the U.S. Navy 
assisted the Royal Navy in defeating the American filibusters. And with McLeod absolved, 
the 1841 crisis gradually died away. The Treaty of Ashburton-Webster was signed in 1842 
to settle a set of bilateral disputes.  
Anglo-American disputes over Central America came to a head in the 1850’s. With 
the United States’ intention of impose Monroe Doctrine in Central America, it attempted 
to get control of the interoceanic route by building a canal in the Isthmus. However, after 
the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, Great Britain was gaining influence in Central America, 
especially in Guatemala, and also in Costa Rica and Salvada (Williams, 1916: 168). Great 
Britain protected Greytown stood in the way of one potential route of the interoceanic canal. 
The disputes between American Accessory Transit Company, established to monopoly the 
transit line of the isthmus, and Greytown municipal authorities gave the United States an 
excuse to send the warship Cayne to Greytown to protect American interests. With the 
disputes escalated in the summer, Cayne was ordered by Captain George Hollins to bomb 
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Greytown and U.S. Marines set fire on the harbor, which technically destroyed the whole 
town on July 13, 1854. The British were outraged by this act of direct aggression. However, 
thanks to Britain’s preoccupation with the Crimean War and United States’ disavowal of 
official authorization of the attack, there was no further escalation. 
During American Civil War, Federal blockade of Confederacy, Great Britain’s 
recognition of Confederacy’s status as belligerent, and its sale of warships to the 
Confederate all severely strained the bilateral relations, words of war were talked on many 
occasions. After the American Civil War broke out in 1861, the prevalent belief of British 
view that the secession of the South was inevitable. The Federal government’s blockade of 
the Confederacy made Great Britain considered that a state of belligerency had formed 
between the two war parties. The Federal government was outraged by British policy. U.S. 
Secretary of States, William Seward, took hostile attitude to Great Britain in his dispatches 
to U.S. Minister in London, Charles Francis Adams. Seward wrote that war might ensue 
between the United States and Britain, or Britain and France together. Though these 
dispatches were not delivered to Britain upon President Lincoln’s order, some of the 
content had leaked out to the British, and Adams found the situation desperate (Bancroft, 
1900, Vol. II: 171-173; Mowat, 1925: 172-3; Adams, 1919: 116). After the United States 
seized Trent, on which Confederacy representative to Britain and France were abroad, 
British were enraged, and the question of war or peace hanging in balance (Mowat, 1925: 
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176). After warship Florida, Alabama and several others were built and sent to 
Confederacy, which the British government failed to stop, the issue of British assistance to 
the Confederacy in building “rams” (commerce destroyers) and British contraband material 
to the Confederacy, such as coals, was raised by the Federal government, which considered 
that these warships would not only threaten the federal blockade of the Confederacy, but 
also have an impact on the course of the war. The Federal government thought that the 
issue was one of war or peace  and the bilateral relations was on the brink of war (Bancroft, 
1900: 382-394). 
Thanks to the European complications, such as the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis, and the 
United States’ growing national capability, British expectation of a prolonged war between 
the two belligerents, and the expertise of the diplomats on both states, Great Britain had 
maintained neutral and the crises during American Civil War did not escalate into open war 
between the two powers. 
Before the end of Civil War, apart from the above crises, disputes over Oregon, 
Newfoundland fishery, Bering Sea Seal, America’s annexation of Texas and California also 
raised high tensions, though not as severe as the above ones.  
After the Civil War, the two powers went through three peaceful and uneventful 
decades. In these decades, small incidents such as the Fenian raids, quarrels over the 
Isthmus, Newfoundland fisheries and tariff did cause troubles in the bilateral relations. 
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However, none of these quarrels reached crisis level.  
Bilateral Crisis in the 1895-1905 Period 
The major bilateral Crisis in this period included the two Venezuela Crisis of 1895, 
the Alaska Boundary disputes, and the Isthmian Canal disputes. 
The background of the period was one of new imperialism, rampant imperialist 
expansion in Africa and Asia and imperial contests among major powers, including Britain, 
France, Russia, Germany, Japan and the United States (for new imperialism, see Langer, 
1968: 67-68). Britain was involved in imperial contests with France in Africa, with Russia 
in central Asia and Near East, and its tensions with Germany increased as the latter started 
naval expansion which rivaled the British naval supremacy. The United States, on the other 
hand, was fervently asserting Monroe Doctrine and pushing the influence of other colonial 
powers out of the Americas. In addition, it also attempted to acquiring colonies and 
outposts in East Asia and the Pacific. These policies led to conflicts of interests with Great 
Britain, Spain, Germany and Japan. Given Britain’s considerable presence in the Americas 
compared to other great imperial powers, many Americans still regarded Britain as the 
United States’ most ancient and natural enemy, which imposed “her chain of fortresses 
across the world” (Kipling, 1899: 52; Strout, 1963: 134), despite the fact that bilateral 




Venezuela Crisis of 1895 
The Venezuela Crisis of 1895 was the most severe crisis between the United States 
and Great Britain in this period. Public opinion for punishment of the other side was fervid 
on both side, although such feeling did not last long. The American policy makers adopted 
a risky tactic to score diplomatic victory over Great Britain, which could have led to a 
military clash with it. 
The Venezuela Crisis arouse out of the territorial disputes between Venezuela and 
British Guiana regarding to Essequibo River and Caroni area. The territorial disputes had 
been troubling bilateral relations for half a century. The United States and other states 
proposed to mediate the dispute on several occasions but was declined (James, 1923: 100). 
Venezuela broke off diplomatic relations with Great Britain in 1887. 
The Venezuela government had been seeking for the United States to apply pressure 
on Great Britain, so as to force the latter to agree to arbitrate the territorial disputes. The 
United States, with its growing power, was more willing to assert the Monroe Doctrine and 
was positive in accepting Caracas’ beseeching. By early 1895, the U.S. policy makers’ 
attitude towards the dispute has been increasingly anxious. Britain’s seizure of Nicaragua’s 
Corinto customs in April 1895, which was regarded as a direct violation of the Monroe 
Doctrine, had further convinced American policy makers that “only words the equivalent 
of blows would be really effective” (Ibid: 140). 
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Caracas approached London once again by sending a special envoy to London when 
President Grover Cleveland returned to office in March 1893. And the British again 
declined any arbitration of  territory to the east of the Schomburgk line. The envoy 
registered a solemn protest against London, and Venezuelan chargé d'affaires at 
Washington besought for the United States’ assistance again (Perkins, 1937: 138-9). 
American minister at Caracas advised that Washington should “take some steps in the 
matter” to secure national interests. However, there was a major delay in dealing with the 
matter at Washington before President Cleveland delivered his annual message, when he 
claimed that he should renew the effort of mediating an arbitration between London and 
Caracas (Richardson, 1897, Vol.XIII: 5958). In late February, 1895, Congress passed a joint 
resolution which recommended arbitration on both disputants. U.S. Ambassador at London, 
Thomas Bayard, under the instruction of Secretary of State Walter Gresham, had started to 
discuss the Venezuela dispute with British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Lord Kimberley 
since December 1894. However, Great Britain stuck to their established policy of the 
Schomburgk line (Parl. Papers, vol. xcvil, Cnd. 7926: 5, cited from James, 1923: 102) and 
little progress was made. 
Britain’s forceful seizure of the Corinto customs of Nicaragua in late April roused 
public agitation in the United States. The press and many Congressmen were highly critical 
of Cleveland’s inactive policy in dealing with British aggression (see Public Opinion, Vol. 
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XVIII: 468-9). On June 10, Richard Olney succeeded Gresham as Secretary of State after 
the death of Gresham in May 1895. With the two new developments, a “new stage had 
been reached in the progress of our intervention” (Cleveland, 1904: 252). Olney took a 
much harsher attitude than Gresham regarding the British-Venezuelan disputes. He 
intended to solve the issue promptly. The result was the Olney’s dispatch to Bayard of July 
20, 1895, which pronounced the famous “Olney Corollary of Monroe Doctrine”, and was 
christened “Olney’s twenty-inch gun” by Cleveland. 
 In this dispatch, Olney proclaimed that the United States to be the protector of 
American states against European colonization. He also pronounced that:  
“That America is in no part open to colonization, though the proposition was not 
universally admitted at the time of its first enunciation, has long been universally conceded. 
We are now concerned, therefore, only with that other practical application of the Monroe 
Doctrine the disregard of which by an European power is to be deemed an act of 
unfriendliness toward the United States...the rule thus defined has been the accepted public 
law of this country ever since its promulgation cannot fairly be denied...To-day the United 
States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to 
which it confines its interposition. 
“There is then, a doctrine of American public law, well founded in principle and 
abundantly sanctioned by precedent, which entitles and requires the United States to treat 
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as an injury to itself the forcible assumption by an European power of political control over 
an American state. The application of the doctrine to the boundary dispute between Great 
Britain and Venezuela remains to be made and presents no real difficulty. Though the 
dispute relates to a boundary line, yet, as it is between states, it necessarily imports political 
control to be lost by one party and gained by the other...it being clear, therefore, that the 
United States may legitimately insist upon the merits of the boundary question being 
determined, it is equally clear that there is but one feasible mode of determining them, viz., 
peaceful arbitration...if, however, it were not condemnable as a relic of barbarism and a 
crime in itself, so one-sided a contest could not be invited nor even accepted by Great 
Britain without distinct disparagement to her character as a civilized state.” 
In the final paragraph of the dispatch, Olney threatened that if the requests of the 
United States were not met, Great Britain would expect “a result not to be anticipated and 
in his judgment calculated to greatly embarrass the future relations between this country 
and Great Britain”(Olney to Bayard, Jul. 20, 1895, FRUS, 1895, Vol. I: 545-65). This 
diplomatic usage means that Britain would be at liberty to take the note as an ultimatum. 
Olney’s first draft was written on July 2, after reading the draft, Cleveland gave his 
full agreement to the draft and wrote to Olney five days later that “It’s the best thing of the 
kind I have ever read”, except for some verbiage which Cleveland deemed in need of 
softening (McElroy, 1923, Vol. II: 180-1). However, the dispatch on July 20 seemed to 
 
 196 
have negligible difference from the July 2 draft (James, 1923: Vol.II: 111), and still smack 
of an ultimatum. 
Nonetheless, Lord Salisbury was not impressed by Olney’s “twenty-inch gun”. His 
reply to Olney’s dispatch was no less abrupt than Olney’s dispatch. It could be regarded as 
a direct repudiation of Olney’s requests and a refusal of the United States’ role of mediator 
in the Venezuelan frontier dispute. Salisbury put it straightforwardly that for the Monroe 
Doctrine, “the aspect which it now presents in the hands of Mr. Olney differs widely from 
its character when it first issued from the pen of its author”. That the disputes between 
Venezuela and Great Britain concerned only the determination of a disputed frontier, and 
it had nothing to do with colonization, fresh acquisition or imposition of a political system. 
Thus, it “has nothing to do with any of the questions dealt with by President Monroe”. 
Although Salisbury perceived “on the theory that the Monroe Doctrine in itself is sound”, 
he did not regard the doctrine to have a legal force as an international law, and he must not 
“be understood as expressing any acceptance of it on the part of Her Majesty's 
Government”. Salisbury asserted that Great Britain was not prepared to admit the legal 
force of Monroe Doctrine, nor that the United States is concerned with any frontier disputes 
between states “who possess dominion in the West Hemisphere”, still less can Britain 
accept the claim that the United States was entitled to apply arbitration process to demand 
the surrender of territory of one party against another (Salisbury to Pauncefort, Nov. 26, 
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FRUS, 1895, Vol. I: 564-7). 
Salisbury’s reply was received on December 7. Cleveland administration was startled 
and depressed by Salisbury’s reply, and was determined of intervention of the disputes 
rather than “supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national 
self-respect honor”. In Cleveland’s December 17 message to Congress, he rebuffed 
Salisbury’s reply, and asserted that Monroe Doctrine had “its place in the code of 
international law”. He made it clear to the public that “the duty of the United States to resist 
by every means in its power” to Britain’s appropriation of the land which United States had 
determined to be Venezuela’s, which was “a willful upon its rights and interests”. He also 
asked for Congress authorization to appoint a commission to make the necessary 
investigation of the dispute (Richardson, 1897, Vol. XIV: 6087-90). It was quite clear that 
by this message, Cleveland adopted the strategy of “going public” and conveyed his 
determination to opt for war rather than concession if London declined to arbitrate the 
dispute (including the territory east of the Schomburgk line) and to accept Olney’s 
Corollary of Monroe Doctrine. Cleveland’s message to Congress stepped up further than 
Olney’s dispatch in ringing the tone of ultimatum. 
Both houses of the Congress were enthusiastic to Cleveland’s message, which 
transcended party affiliations. Cleveland’s demands for authorization was met immediately 
(McElroy, 1923, Vol.II: 190). On January 4, 1896, Cleveland authorized a commission to 
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investigate the Anglo-Venezuelan boundary disputes. Despite notable exceptions, the 
public was generally supportive to Cleveland message, although they were aware that “war 
was possible, even probable, as a result of the President’s ultimatum to England” (Rhode, 
1919: 448). Bayard, who strove for conciliation in the bilateral relations, was concerned 
that in the United States, “Jingoes shrieked for war; American yelling journals fan the 
flames”, public emotion was fanned against the “ancient enemy” (McElroy, 1923, Vol.II: 
197). 
On the British side, the public opinion and policy making circles were more divided. 
Some imperialist opinion leaders were no less bellicose than that of the United States, and 
a large part of the policy making elites clung to their hardline policy until January 12, 1896 
(Marder, 1940: 254-255), while others were more amicable. Bayard reported British public 
opposition to Cleveland’s message on December 18 (McElroy, 1923, Vol.II: 190-1). 
Salisbury detected that there was no timetable laid out in Cleveland’s message, and he 
dismissed his message as “pale and washy”. He decided to stick to his policy and wait out 
the public clamour of the United States (Grenville, 1964: 67-8). 
Military plans were made by both sides in late 1895 and the opening of 1896. On the 
American side, plans were made to attack Montreal through Lake Champlain, to attack St. 
Lawrence canals, intercolonial railway and Canadian Pacific Railway to cut British 
communication. Commanders on foreign stations got their warning orders to be ready for 
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service on January 29, 1896 (Bourne, 1967: 319-20). Canadian authorities also started to 
plan defense of major areas, such as Quebec, Prescott, Halifax, Kingston, Montreal and 
Toronto in early 1896 (Ibid: 324). The British authorities confirmed Canadian plan to 
defense the major cities. The Royal Navy was also to assist Canada to defend against 
possible U.S. invasions by sending vessels to Lake Ontario and Erie. The Carnarvon 
Committee, which was formed in 1879 to inquire the comprehensive defense of imperial 
possession, went further by suggesting that to ensure the successful defense of Canada, a 
British force was needed to land on American territory and make an offensive. This 
suggestion “went further than almost anyone since 1815” (Ibid: 329). 
The Anglo-American relations in late December 1895 and early January 1896 was 
quite gloomy. The risk for war was quite real, and many observers considered Cleveland’s 
message “made straight for war” (Reid, 1899: 416). However, even during the most gloomy 
period, there were amicable and conciliatory voices on both sides, especially on the British 
side, for avoiding war both in policy making circle and the public. Many public opinion 
leaders deemed that a war with the United States to be unthinkable (Peck, 1920: 426-7). 
The first conciliatory measure taken by London was Lord Playfair’s feeling-out call 
at U.S. Embassy on January 12, 1896, at the request of British Colonial Secretary, Joseph 
Chamberlain. During his call, he expressed Britain’s interests in getting more knowledge 
of Monroe Doctrine by convening an conference between the United States and European 
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powers which had a stake in the Americas, and in bona fide settlement of the Venezuelan 
frontier disputes through a court consisting of British, Venezuelan and American 
commissioners, as long as British settlements were not concerned (Reid, 1899: 417; also 
see Bayard to Olney, Jan. 13, 1896, James, 1932: 227-8). This meant that Britain made at 
least three concessions from their previous position: conditional acceptance of Monroe 
doctrine, acceptance of the United States’ intervention in the Venezuelan frontier disputes 
and the abandonment of the Schomburgk line. Olney’s reply two days later, while declined 
British suggestion regarding to Monroe Doctrine with an excuse that the United States “is 
content with existing status of Monroe Doctrine”, implied that Washington was interested 
in continuing the discussion of Venezuelan frontier disputes (Jan.14, Ibid: 229).  
London seemed to be satisfied with Olney’s reply and proceeded to discuss on the 
Venezuelan disputes. And British policy makers became more confident of peaceful 
settlement of the disputes. However, due to Olney’s insist of “open and unconditional 
arbitration” until February 23, Chamberlain considered that the informal discussion 
through the Playfair channel had failed in bringing a complete understanding (Chamberlain 
to Playfair, Feb. 25, 1896, Reid, 1899: 423-5).  
Nevertheless, formal negotiation soon started, and the Salisbury cabinet was ready to 
make further concession. During the Parliamentary debate on February 27, Salisbury 
compared American concerns of Venezuela in the Caribbean Sea to British concern of 
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Holland and Belgium, and the exchange of views during the last few weeks convinced him 
that “we shall—it may be, indeed, after long negotiation—find some settlement of the 
question which we shall think satisfactory, and that all danger of any conflict between two 
nations”. Although no agreement had been arrived as yet, and London could not accept 
United States’ proposal of unrestricted use of arbitration, he deemed that middle course 
could be found to “diminish the chance of conflict or difference of opinion between two 
nations” (Hansard, Series 4, Vol. XXXVII: 52-3). It was out of such considerations that 
Salisbury accepted Bayard’s proposal to discuss Venezuelan frontier disputes in 
Washington on February 27 by authorizing Pauncefote to discuss the disputes with either 
Venezuelan or American representatives five days later (Peck, 1906: 433-4). 
The height of the crisis had thus passed, although the disputes was not finally settled. 
The main obstacle of the resolution of the disputes was to give a specific and justifiable 
definition of “settlement”. The final accord between the United States and Great Britain 
was not reached until November 1896, with an arbitral tribunal established to ascertain all 
disputed territories, while gave special considerations of “settled district”. Three rules were 
established to judge whether a certain place was a “settled district” (FRUS, 1896: 254-5). 
And the final treaty between Venezuela and Great Britain was signed on February 1897. 
However, the talks and negotiations between late January and early November were only 
procedural. With Lord Playfair broaching for talk, the risk of military confrontation had 
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already been substantially reduced. 
The Disputes of Alaska and Isthmian Canal 
After the final settlement of Venezuela Crisis, Anglo-American relations had 
improved, especially during the Spanish-American War in 1898. When most European 
powers were sympathetic to Spain, Britain, and to a lesser extent, Germany, gave the United 
States their support by remaining neutral and indifference. In fact, Britain stepped further 
than remaining neutral. It helped the United States by allowing the United States to use 
Mirs Bay in Hong Kong during Spanish-American war in the Manila Bay. Bradford Perkins 
claimed that Great Britain assisted the United States out of a policy of welcoming “an 
imperial partner” (Perkins, 1968: Chapter 3). After the Spanish-American War, most of 
bilateral crisis were short-living, and both parties were inclined to solve them in peaceful 
ways, war were seldom talked about. 
However, with the imperial expansion of the United States, it was inevitable that the 
national interests of the two power clashed again in the Americas. By the end of 1898, the 
Isthmian disputes emerged again, and the Alaska boundary disputes followed. Adding up 
to these tensions was American public aversion of British policy regarding to South Africa. 
Disputes over the Isthmian Canal 
The Anglo-American 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, in which the two powers agree to 
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the neutrality and non-fortification of the isthmus, as well as to the other party’s content 
and cooperation if one is to build a isthmian canal, had been the obstacle to America’s 
imposing Monroe Doctrine in the America. The American policy makers had been aspired 
to alter the status quo of the Isthmus ever since 1850. However, not until they were 
galvanized by the Oregon travel in 1898 had they been determined to alter it.  
In early 1898, as Spanish-American tension over Cuba grew because of the Maine 
Incident, U.S.S. Oregon was ordered to reinforce the North Atlantic Squadron from its 
Pacific squadron base at San Francisco. Without a isthmus canal, Oregon had to make a 
detour as far as the Strait of Magellan, and took fresh load of coal several times along the 
journey. As a result, it took Oregon 66 days before it arrived at the destiny on May 26, at a 
time when the war had already been waging on for more than a month (for the trip, see 
Gannon, 1958: 11-12).  
The Oregon trip brought the need of an isthmian canal for the United States to a head. 
Alfred Mahan’s doctrine of a united inter-oceanic battle fleet was only a pipe dream without 
an isthmian canal. And the policy makers of the United States were ready and determined 
to get rid of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. After the end of the war, in the annual message to 
the Congress, President McKinley addressed: “All these circumstances suggest the urgency 
of some definite action by the Congress at this session if...the linking of the Atlantic and 
Pacific oceans by a practical waterway is to be realized. That the construction of such a 
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maritime highway is now more than ever indispensable to that intimate and ready 
intercommunication between our eastern and western seaboards demanded by...the 
prospective expansion of our influence and commerce in the Pacific, and that our national 
policy now more imperatively than ever calls for its control by this Government...” 
(Richardson, 1897, Vol. XIV: 6327). John Hay, the Secretary of State, instructed Henry 
White, U.S. chargé d'affaires in London, to discuss with Salisbury about the revision of the 
1850 Treaty. 
Salisbury was ready to make concessions to the United States. Pauncefote 
immediately drafted a convention in January 1899. The main aim of the convention was to 
concede to the United States the rights of constructing and regulating the isthmian canal, 
while maintaining the neutralization and non-fortification principles of the Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty. Britain also attempted to prevent itself from disadvantaged by other European 
powers regarding the use of canal by inviting other European powers to adhere to the 
convention (British and Foreign State Papers, citing as BFSP hereinafter, Vol. XCIV: 468-
470). Hay, the Anglophile Secretary of State, was ready to accept Britain’s concessions. 
However, the Congress was discontent about British concessions and acted 
independently of the administrative branch. The Congress opted for a unilateral change 
policy by passing a bill of constructing and defending the canal on May 2, 1899. As of 
Pauncefote’s proposed convention, on December 20, 1900, the Congress decided to ratify 
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it upon three conditions: 1. superseding the 1850 treaty by the current convention; 2. the 
United States would not be constrained by the neutralization principles in times of necessity, 
and 3. the invitation to other powers were to be omitted (Compilation of Treaties Between 
the United States and Certain Foreign Powers, 1921, citing as CTUSFP hereinafter: 76-8). 
These amendments were pulling all the teeth out of Pauncefote’s proposal and amounted 
to complete abrogation of the 1850 treaty. 
British policy makers were repugnant to the amendments and U.S. Congress’s attempt 
to abrogate the 1850 treaty without inquiring British attitude. At this time, the outbreak of 
Boer War had raised new tension between the two states, given American public’s 
sympathy towards the Boer people (see, for example, Ferguson, 1939, 134-40). The 
Congress took further actions upon the knowledge of British reluctance in accepting the 
amended convention. This time the Senate produced a resolution in early March 1901 to 
abrogate the 1850 treaty unilaterally (Mar. 6-7, 1901, Cong. Record, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 
Vol. 35, Pt. 1: 13-28). To avoid escalation, Hay proposed a new draft convention in late 
April, 1901, which attempted to included the congressional amendments, while saved face 
of the British in language at the same time. The proposal omitted the non-fortification 
article, while maintained the five articles of neutralization proposed by Pauncefote, except 
for omission of the condition “in time of war as well in time of peace” of the opening of 
the canal to vessels of commerce and war. It also included an article that the United States 
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should be at liberty to maintain military police to protect the canal (for the text of the draft, 
see CTUSFP: 92-4). 
Although Hay’s proposal seemed to be conciliatory, at least in language, it technically 
reversed all the principles of neutralization and non-fortification, not to mention British 
attempt to invite other European powers to press the United States to acknowledge these 
principles. Although the British policy makers objected the proposal, they gave in when 
Hay promised that territorial sovereignty of the concerned parties would not be changed 
because of the construction of the canal (Lansdowne to Pauncefote, Oct. 23, 1901, Ibid: 
96). The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was finally signed in November, 1901, and ratified by the 
Senate on December 16. By acquiring the rights of independent construction of the canal 
and maintaining military police along the canal, the omission of non-fortification clause, 
the United States had practically evaded all the principles of the 1850 treaty. 
During the whole course of the negotiation of the revision of 1850 treaty, British 
Admiralty was insisting that it would be enormously harmful for British interests in the 
West Hemisphere if the neutralization and non-fortification principles of the 1850 treaty 
was compromised. Under such condition, the United States would have a vital strategic 
advantage over Great Britain, given the fact that it could unite their naval forces at will if 
a future war between the two powers took place (Bourne, 1967: 346-8). However, British 
policy makers made little efforts to prevent the dreadful results. Salisbury and Marquess 
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Lansdowne, who succeeded Salisbury as the Foreign Secretary in November 1900 when 
Salisbury became Prime Minister, only made attempt to get better but non-essential terms 
for Great Britain to save face during the negotiation (for a short review of negotiation of 
the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, see Williams, 1916: 302-8). 
Alaska Boundary disputes 
The Alaska boundary dispute took place earlier than the new round of disputes over 
the isthmian canal. However, it reached crisis level only after the collapse of the fruitless 
talk of Canadian-American commission in February 1899. 
 The United States inherited the Alaska boundary dispute from Russia as a result of 
the Alaska purchase in October, 1867. Canadian government had been acquiescing to 
American interpretations of the boundary treaty regarding the Alaska panhandle between 
Russia and Canadian authorities in 1825 until the summer of 1896, when gold was 
discovered in Klondike and immigration surged for gold rush. Canadian government, 
attempt to get access to the gold fields through sea ports, canal and inlets along the 
panhandle and prevent the penetration of mounting American immigrants due to the gold 
rush, demanded revision of the territorial division of the panhandle by arbitration. A 
bilateral joint commission was established in May 1898, with the Alaska boundary the 
central issue. However, with Canada relying on British support and United States believing 
their legal justification of their claims, the two parties both refused to concede much, and 
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the discussion foundered in February 1899 after Hay’s proposal of a tribunal of six jurists 
was rejected by Ottawa and the death of Lord Herschell, British lawyer who was obdurate 
in the bilateral negotiation. British insisted in particular that if Britain were to give 
concessions regarding to the isthmian canal, the United States should reciprocate by 
making concessions regarding the Alaska boundary (Nevins, 1930: 146). 
The bilateral hatred was high since Canadian authorities thought the United States 
attempted to prevent Canada from using the seaports on the panhandle, while the United 
States considered that Canada attempted to cut the communication line from Alaska to the 
southern American territory (Allen, 1955: 599), for American had strong legal justification 
of the claim to the territory. Conflict was also arising on the frontier after the collapse of 
the joint commission. Governor of Alaska reported the danger of likelihood of dangerous 
conflict between the two people in the frontier in March, when American miners operated 
in area where Canadian authorities claimed as Canadian territory (Campbell, 1960: 92-3). 
However, both the United States and Great Britain regret the breakdown of the 
commissions, and both sides loathed the stiff attitude of the Canadian authorities. The close 
miss of border clash convinced Hay that a modus vivendi of the frontier must be established 
to avoid escalation. Hay proposed a modus vivendi in late March for establishing a 
provisional boundary line. By the proposal, Hay attempted to get the British to recognize 
of the status quo of the frontier. He also implied that if both sides were consent to the line, 
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there was no need for arbitration (for Hay’s proposal, see Hay to Pauncefote, Mar. 20, 
FRUS, 1899: 321-2; for Hay’s attempts, see Campbell, 1960: 93-4). Canadian authorities, 
insisting on international arbitration of the matter, rejected Hay’s proposal. They 
communicated Hay a minutes of Canadian privy council on April 29. 
However, before long Ottawa realized that time was not on their side. American 
miners had been increasingly penetrating into Canada controlled areas, and the British was 
not extending their helping hand. The status quo was altering in the disadvantage of Ottawa 
and it would bring about further loss if the current status quo was not nailed down. It 
accepted with slight modifications Hay’s proposal of late July with revision of the boundary 
line and hope of protection of the rights and privileges of citizens and subjects of both 
parties (Department of States Memorandum, July 24, FRUS, 1899: 323-4). By then, Ottawa 
thought possible to settle the provisional boundary question, and it no longer insisted an 
arbitrary of the frontier (Tower to Hay, Aug. 27, Ibid: 324-5). After further modifications 
of the frontier, a modus vivendi agreement of the provisional boundary was signed on 
October 20 and the height of the crisis thus passed. 
However, the boundary issue was still far from settled, since the permanent boundary 
line had not been drawn. Due to complications such as bilateral disputes over whether the 
solution should follow the line of Venezuelan frontier disputes, Ottawa’s discontent over 
the structure of the commission, the assassination of President McKinley and the death of 
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Lord Pauncefote, the Joint High Commission was not established until January 1903. The 
commission consisted of six members-three from the United States, two from Canada and 
one from Britain, which made sure that the United States would not lose. The acceptance 
of the structure of the commission and the exclusion of any neutral member were major 
concessions of Ottawa. As a result, after the establishment of the commission, Ottawa 
endeavored to postpone the meeting of the commission, given its objection to American 
members in the commission (for these complications, see Dennis, 1928: 141-6). 
However, the new President, Theodore Roosevelt, a much more vigorous man, took a 
much harsher line than his cautious predecessor regarding the dispute. He showed little 
respect to the judicial process. In a letter he wrote to Justice Holmes, an American member 
of the commission, in which he intimated him to show Chamberlain in unofficial way, he 
wrote that “if there is a disagreement...not only that there will be no arbitration of the matter, 
but that in my message to Congress I shall take a position...which will render it necessary 
for Congress to give me the authority to run the line as we claim by our own people, without 
any further regard the attitude England and Canada” (Roosevelt to Holmes, July 25, 1903, 
Bishop, 1920, Vol. I: 259-61; also Thayer, 1915, Vol. II: 209-10). This meant that he would 
force the dispute in favor of the United States unilaterally if its demands were not met. 
The British reacted to Roosevelt’s threat promptly. They were eager to make 
concessions to the United States at the cost of Canada. The negotiation started on 
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September 3, and it only took one and half months before the the commission decided in 
favor of the United States by a majority of four to two on October 20, with the British judge 
Baron Alverstone voting for the United States. Although the United States made some 
concessions during the negotiation, it practically obtained all its main objectives, which 
stated that lisière “goes round the inlets and not across them” (Choate to Hay, Oct. 20, 
1903, Dennis, 1928: 154). 
Although the Canadians did have a weak claim, given their failure to dispute the 
frontier before the gold rush, and it would be likely that the result would not be different if 
the commission had been involved judges from neutral states, Canadians still felt that they 
were mistreated by the Roosevelt and sold by the British (Keenlyside and Brown, 1952: 
178-9). As a result, Ottawa was reluctant to accept the result and refused to sign the award. 
And an anti-British feeling brewed in Canada. Despite Canadian reluctance, the United 
States and Great Britain signed a treaty of survey and demarcation of the boundary, and the 
task was finished in 1912. 
After the resolution of the Alaska boundary disputes, the last major obstacle in Anglo-
American relations was removed. 
Other disputes in this period 
Apart from the above major crisis and disputes, there were other small scale or passing 
crisis or in the bilateral relations, such as the Venezuela Crisis of 1902-3, North Atlantic 
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fishery disputes, and the Mexican Crisis of 1913. 
Amid the Alaska boundary disputes, the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902 occurred as a result 
of Venezuelan President Cipriano Castro’s policy of suspension of paying of debts of 
foreign powers and seizure their properties on the ground that they were relating to 
smuggling and assisting of the revolutionaries. The top two victims were Great Britain and 
Germany, with the former suffered much more than the latter (Allen, 1955: 603-4). 
However, it was Germany who took the first step. As early as late 1901, German 
ambassador to the United States, Herr von Holleben, had reported that measures of 
coercion was necessary (Perkins, 1937: 325). In July 1902, Germany and Britain had 
discussed to cooperate to coerce Venezuela. Getting assurance from the United States that 
it “could not object to their taking steps to obtain redress for injuries suffered by their 
subjects, provided that no acquisition of territory was contemplated” (Sir Michael Herbert 
to Lansdowne, Nov. 13, BFSP, Vol. XCV: 1084), Great Britain agreed to Germany’s offer 
to deliver a joint ultimatum. Similar message was received again in early December (Hay 
to Dodge, Dec. 5, FRUS, 1902: 418). The notes from the two powers were presented 
simultaneously on December 7, 1902 to request the payment of their dues. With confidence 
of the United States’ support as required Monroe Doctrine, Caracas immediately rejected 
the simultaneous notes. As a result, the two powers withdrew their Ministers and sent 
warships (Italy also joined the operation by sending one warship) to impose “pacific 
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blockade” of Venezuelan ports the next day (Thayer, 1915, Vol. II: 285-6). 
Caracas had been calling for American assistance to arrange an arbitration since mid-
December. The attitude of the United States gradually changed from one of unperturbed to 
one of uneasiness, as shown by reports of U.S. newspapers in mid-December. United States’ 
public opinion surge and critics from the opposition party as well as the public forced the 
British cabinet to change course (Beale, 1956: 413-5). On December 15, the United States 
proposed arbitration, British cabinet agreed immediately the next day and offered President 
Roosevelt to act as the Arbitrator (Lansdowne to Herbert, Dec. 18, BFSP, Vol. 95: 1123). 
This happened before Hay’s dispatch of an urgent proposal of arbitration to London on 
December 17, which marked British recognition of Monroe Doctrine and that the United 
States’ should have the final say of the West Hemisphere affairs. German policy makers 
had also decided to accept American mediation at about the same time, after Roosevelt 
threatened to send fleet to protect Venezuela (Bishop, 1920: 223-5). The two powers made 
similar decision partly because of their being grateful for the United States protection of 
their citizens and assets during the attacks of Venezuela mobs before the crisis. However, 
neither powers had decided to retreat completely, nor did they abandon the coercive 
strategy (Perkins, 1937: 344-6). As a result, the blockade lasted two months. With the two 
powers’ acceptance of American arbitration and Monroe Doctrine in principle, the United 
States also restrained from abrupt intervention.  
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On February 13, the arbitration commenced in Washington. However, the Washington 
protocol failed to settle all the disputes. Before long, the ten powers which suffered from 
default from Venezuela signed a new protocol and referred the issue to the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration in Hague. It seemed that the United States did not consider an arbitration 
held in Europe on matters related to an American state as a violation of Monroe Doctrine. 
Apart from these crises, there were other disputes in the bilateral relations, for 
example, the Newfoundland fishery disputes. And right on the eve of WWI, Woodrow 
Wilson administration adopted a different policy towards Mexican dictator Victoriano 
Huerta from most powers, including Britain. However, these were small disputes that 
generated no severe crisis. With the sign and ratification of the General Arbitration Treaty 
between the United States and Great Britain in 1908, the chronic disputes over the 
Newfoundland fishery was referred to Hague and settled in 1910. Great Britain recalled its 
military agent in Mexico, Sir Lionel Carden, who opposed President Wilson’s Mexican 
policy in 1913 (New York Times, Oct. 25, 1913: 5), and deferred to Washington’s policy of 
occupation of Veracruz and toppling the Huerta regime. Wilson reciprocated British 
cooperation by waiving differential tolls in favor of American shipping of Panama Canal.  
Thus, the slate was wiped clean in the Anglo-American relations by the eve of WWI. 
Existing Explanations of the Absence of War in this Period 
“For every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page 
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directly on the causes of peace” (Blainey, 1973: 3). The Anglo-American relations in this 
period has been a clear exception of this rule. The reason is that the two powers were under 
clear power transition in this period, while according to Power Transition theorists, 
likelihood of war is always high between the declining power and the rising power in the 
transition or overtaking period. From the last session, it is clear that crisis and severe 
disputes had never been wanting between the two powers in this period. Thus, the Anglo-
American relations in this period has been an aberration of this theory, and many efforts 
had been made to explain for the deviation. 
A.F.K. Organski and Jecek Kugler, the two founders of power transition theory, 
together with other power transition theorists, argued that the reason that Great Britain and 
the United States avoided war during the power transition was that the United States shared 
similar culture, liberal institution and support of free trade international order with Great 
Britain. That the United States was a status quo power, it had not severely challenged the 
world order that Great Britain molded through the 19th Century during the transition and 
had not attempted to overthrow the order by force. For these reasons, Great Britain also 
accepted the United States as the new ruler keeper in place of itself with no major 
apprehension (Tammen et al., 2000: 49-50).   
Democratic peace theorists might argue that its was because of the share of common 
normal, and the institution which made sudden attack impossible that made two democratic 
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states (Russett 1993), Britain and the United States in this case, that prevented the two 
states from military clash in crises and disputes in this period. Or that democracies are 
selective in their targets when they go for war. The two powers in this case knew well that 
a war against the other side was extremely costly, and as a result they would strive to solve 
their disputes with peaceful means rather than by force (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999). 
Britain’s Reform Bill of 1884 further promoted British democratization, which improved 
feelings of the Americans towards Britain and Prime Minister William Gladstone (Allen, 
1955: 522-3). 
There are also scholars argue that its was common cultural, language, religion, race, 
historical memories, social ties and common course of colonialism and imperialism that 
reduced the bilateral apprehension. As the United States entering the cause of imperialism, 
it became less averse to Britain’s colonialist behavior. In addition, many people in the two 
states also shared the racist belief that Anglo-Saxon people were the chosen people and 
should bear the “white men’s burden” to civilize the people in the less developed states. 
The feeling of Anglo-Saxonism also enhanced the bilateral relations (Perkins, 1968: 8-9, 
Chapter 3). Trans-Atlantic network of influential people, including writers and tourists, 
also contributed to the amicable bilateral relations (Hall and Goldstein, 2011). Scholars 
also argue that since the Alabama Claims (1869-1872), in which the United States 
demanded Britain to compensate for the damages that Britain-built “rams” inflicted upon 
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Federal merchant ships during the Civil War, the two states had become interested in 
“arbitration” as a solution to disputes. 
Interdependence theorists argued, on the other hand, that the close commercial 
relations between the two powers kept the two from military clash. Business circles in both 
states will work strenuously to prevent the escalation of bilateral disputes and crises. Many 
diplomatic historians, however, argued that the Anglo-American rapprochement was a long 
process. The peaceful resolution of crises and disputes after the Ghent Peace, especially 
the peaceful years of more than two decades before the Venezuelan Crisis of 1895, during 
which the bilateral bellicosity had become a hollow habit, had pave the way for the “Great 
Rapprochement” of the period under study (Allen, 1955: 518-9, 524-5).  
Realist scholars, however, concentrated on the distribution of power in Europe and 
Britain’s position in Europe as well as in the world. Faced with the challenge of rising 
powers, such as France, Russia, Germany and the United States, Great Britain was in 
decline both relatively and absolutely. Worse still, having been adopting a policy of 
isolationism and non-entanglement in the affairs of the European continent, Great Britain 
was quite isolated in international relations, as shown by the lack of international support 
during the Boer War. During most the time of this period (before the 1904 Anglo-Franco 
entente), Russia and France posed the most dangerous threat to Great Britain, with the 
former contested with Britain for influence in Afghanistan, as shown by the 1885 Panjdeh 
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Crisis, and the latter in Africa, as shown by the 1898 Fashoda Crisis. The initial target of 
Russo-Franco alliance in 1894 was Great Britain.  
Great Britain had tried to court the friendship with other powers that had relative 
limited clash of national interests with it. It tried to cultivate German friendship in early 
1900’s. But most German policy makers shown bland interests, for they believed that the 
clash between Britain and the Franco-Russo alliance as inevitable, and the only thing 
Germany need to do was just wait (Bartlett, 1990: 41). It tried to court the friendship of 
Japan, the result was the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902. It also tried to court the United 
States’ friendship, so it made concessions to the United States in order to avoid a major 
clash. 
Kenneth Bourne argued that it was because of the shift of balance of power in the 
Americas inevitable in favor of the United States and the impossibility of defense of 
Canada, as well as the complication of European affairs that made the British policy makers 
to withdraw from Americas and recognize the superiority of the United States in the West 
Hemisphere (Bourne, 1967: 363-4, 391-9). 
The argument of this chapter had more overlapping with the Realists explanation. 
However, it incorporated geopolitical factors. It hypothesized that in interregional crises 
between the United States and Great Britain, the United States, as a American power, was 
more concerned to the developments in the Americas and was more willing to fight in the 
 
 219 
Americas compared to Great Britain. When the material capability between the two powers 
were more balanced, the less determined party-Great Britain-tended to make concessions 
to a more determined power in the Americas. This was especially true when Britain was 
preoccupied with the precarious and complicated situations in Europe and its misdeeds in 
South Africa. 
Anglo-American Power Balance in the Period of 1895-1905 
The period marked a power transition between Great Britain and the United States, 
with the latter overtaking the former in the field of population, technology and industrial 
output. Although the United States lagged far behind Great Britain regarding military 
power, relying on its powerful economic and technological capability, it could catch up 
rapidly if it was thus aspired. In addition, although American was still not able to launch 
an offensive against other major powers, its defense capability had increased enormously 
ever since the Civil War. 
On the regional level, the power gap between the United States and other local states 
was ever more wide. The United States’ position as the unipole in the West Hemisphere 
was well established. On the other hand, Great Britain, losing its power advantage vis-a-
vis Germany, Russia and France, was faced with challenge from these three powers, 
especially the former two powers in Europe.  
According to the Maddison data of world economy in Table 13, the overall GDP of 
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the United States had been surpassing that of Great Britain in the early 1850’s, as a result 
of the growth of American population, which overtook that of Britain in the late 1850’s. 
The gap had been widening since the 1880’s, as a result of both America’s continuing 
growing population and the increase of GDP per capita with industrialization. In the 
beginning of the period in study, the GDP of the United States was already 1.8 times of 
Great Britain’s and by the end of the period, it has been already 2.5 times. As of total 
population, in 1895, the population of the United States was near 1.8 times of that of Great 
Britain (70 million VS 39 million), in 1905 the ratio was almost two to one (84 million VS 
43 million, for the data, see Maddison, 2018) 
Table 13: GDP of Four Powers, 1894-1906 (in billion of dollars, 2011 value) 
    State 
 
Year 
Great Britain The United States Germany Russia 
1894 192 347 193  
1895 199 389 203  
1896 208 381 212  
1897 211 418 219  
1898 222 426 229  
1899 232 465 239  
1900 231 478 250 297 
1901 231 531 245  
1902 238 537 252  
1903 236 563 267  
1904 238 556 279  
1905 246 597 287  
1906 255 666 296  
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The industrial capability of the United States also surpassed that of Britain, as shown 
by Table 14. In late 1880’s and early 1890’s, the United States had shortly surpassed Britain 
in iron and steel production. And it overtook Britain again in this area in mid 1890’s. This 
time the trend had never been reversed. By the end of this period, the United States had 
already overtaken Great Britain in the iron and steel production by nearly 3.5 times (datas 
from Project of Correlates of War, citing as COW hereinafter.). In 1900, the industrial 
potential of the United States was 1.27 times of that of Great Britain, the relative share of 
world manufacturing output of the former was 23.6, compared with 18.5 of the latter 
(Bairoch, 1982: 292-304; Kennedy, 1989: 201-2).  




Great Britain The United States Germany Russia 
1894 7546 6764 4700 1333 
1895 7827 9598 4770 1455 
1896 8799 8762 5564 1624 
1897 8937 9808 6009 1883 
1898 8748 11963 6367 2244 
1899 9572 13839 7160 2713 
1900 4980 10352 6461 2216 
1901 4983 13690 6137 2228 
1902 4988 15187 7466 2184 
1903 5115 14768 8430 2434 
1904 5108 14082 8564 2766 
1905 5905 20345 9669 2266 
1906 6566 23774 10700 2496 
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In terms of military power, the United States lagged behind of other major powers, 
perhaps a result of its geographical isolation from other major powers, its predominant 
position in the Americas, and the consequently unperturbedness given by these conditions. 
However, from the data of the year 1898, the year of Spanish-American War, it could be 
found that the United States was capable of rapid military development and mobilization. 
In addition, in this period, apart from the war years (1898, 1900-1902), the military 
expenditure of the United States had already exceeded 80 percent of that of Great Britain 
for nearly half of the rest years (data of Table 3 from COW). The gap of military capability 
between the two powers had also been shrinking. 
Table 15: Military Expenditure (in thousands of pounds, 2010) & Personnel of Four 
Powers, 1894-1906 
   State 
 
Year 




















1894 33168 302000 16001 42000 33328 601000 35039 921000 
1895 35743 309000 15187 42000 30885 602000 36019 928000 
1896 35253 315000 16382 42000 30902 602000 36679 928000 
1897 35187 319000 30249 44000 39222 604000 39486 928000 
1898 38741 331000 60011 236000 35428 606000 38697 928000 
1899 63547 331000 38588 100000 37508 619000 43240 938000 
1900 119587 487000 41481 126000 39681 624000 43104 1142000 
1901 116896 521000 36087 112000 42008 630000 44270 1142000 
1902 93419 489000 39722 111000 42770 638000 46085 1160000 
1903 66400 416000 43814 106000 42263 636000 48301 1160000 
1904 59715 409000 47918 110000 42420 642000 50305 1160000 
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1905 55604 394000 45098 108000 46167 648000 170006 2365000 
1906 53899 384000 43602 112000 48721 653000 90733 1236000 
 
Table 16 reveals that although the naval power of the United States lagged far behind 
major European powers in the beginning of this period. By the end of this period, however, 
the U.S. Navy had ranked among the first four most powerful navies in the world with 
considerable naval strength. And just like the case of Germany, the naval development of 
the United States was much more rapid than traditional naval powers such as Great Britain 
and France. And with America’s industrial and economic development, it could build up 
more battleships when its policy makers deemed necessary. 
Table 16: Naval Strength of Four Powers, 1895 and 1907 
                State 
 
Vessel 
Britain United States Germany France 
Year 1895 1907 1895 1907 1895 1907 1895 1907 
Battle ships 50 52 3 22 13 22 25 19 
Armored cruisers 25 32 1 10 --- 8 6 19 
Cruisers 52 90 13 41 4 38 19 28 
Destroyers 88 142 20 16 13 60 29 35 
Torpedo boats 189 47 2 32 121 48 218 257 
Submarines  39  12  1  41 
Data from Annual Report of Secretary of Navy, 1895 and 1907 
In addition, during the Civil War, the fortification of major ports and cities in the 
United States had been considerably enhanced (Bourne, 1967: 276-7), which increased 
defensive power of the United States dramatically. America’s defense capability and newly 
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acquired military rendered if costly if other major powers, even Great Britain, to confront 
the United States in the Americas. 
Overall, in the period of 1895-1905, the material capability between the United States 
and Great Britain became more balanced, as the former rapidly catching up with the latter. 
Regarding to the local power distribution, however, the United States had much more 
advantage than Great Britain. While the United States assumed predominance in the West 
Hemisphere, Great Britain was in “absolute decline” vis-a-vis its main rivals, France, 
Russia and Germany. 
In the West Hemisphere, the United States enjoyed absolute predominance over other 
players. The military expenditure and the GDP of the United States exceeded the sum of 
that of all other American states (COW; Maddison, 2018). The British policy makers had 
made it a consensus by the end of the 19th Century that Canada was indefensible in a war 
with the United States. The remaining Spanish colonies was also vulnerable to the United 
States’ material capability. As a result, the resist of Spanish was quite weak in Cuba and 
Puerto Rico during the Spanish-American war. The United States was more willing to give 
Monroe Doctrine some substance. And it advocated for Pan-Americanism by convening 
International Convention of American States in 1889. No American state was able to 
challenge the United States without the assistance of other strategic regional powers, and 
American states usually appealed to the United States for mediation when they had disputes 
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with other major powers. 
Decision Makings during Crises in the Period of 1895-1905 
 During this period, apart from a handful exceptions such as the Anglophile Hay, most 
of the American decision makers had been generally assertive in exerting the Monroe 
Doctrine and pushing the influence of European powers out of the West Hemisphere. The 
United States was quite tough when dealing with Great Britain regarding the American 
affairs, a result of the shifting power balance between the states and Great Britain’s 
entanglements in Europe and other part of the world. However, at the same time, they were 
also quite cautious in dealing with Great Britain, as shown in the Venezuela crisis of 1895 
and its relative indifferent response towards the Venezuela Crisis of 1902-1903, as a result 
of its newly acquired power and unchallengeable position in the West Hemisphere. Such 
cautiousness was a striking contrast to its diffidence and opportunist policies in the period 
of 1805-1812. 
On the other hand, decision makers of Great Britain had been becoming more and 
more conciliatory and cautious when dealing with the United States in Americas, with the 
same reason of America’s assertiveness. British policy makers gradually became 
acquiesced to the Monroe Doctrine in this period. By the end of this period, Britain had 
become attentive to Monroe Doctrine when it was involved in American affairs. In the 
Venezuela Crisis of 1902-1903, Britain invited America to mediate, so as to terminate the 
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blockade of Venezuela, although the United States had not even issued serious protests. 
Decision making of the United States: Assertiveness and Circumspection 
Confident of its newly acquired economic and industrial power, and taking advantage 
of British hardship in other part of the world, the United States had been asserting the 
Monroe Doctrine against Great Britain in this period. 
It is reviewed in the last Chapter that for quite a long time, the United States had been 
relatively quiet to Britain’s impressment and seizure activities until the Chesapeake 
Incident of 1807. Although the Monroe Doctrine was put forward for the first time in 1823, 
the United States did not give it teeth for most time of the Century. In this period, however, 
the Monroe Doctrine had been proactively pronounced and upheld by the United States. 
The United States was much more outspoken to Great Britain of the latter’s activities in 
the Americas, even though these activities did not involve immediate American interests. 
The United States had become much more concerned with its own sphere of influence in 
the Americas, which it considered essential to its security given the immediate proximity 
between itself and other American states. 
Proximity, Issue Salience and Determination 
Given America’s geographical proximity to central America, the northern tip of South 
America, crisis in these places were considered salient by American decision makers. And 
they were determined to have their way in these crises. They considered Monroe doctrine 
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as essential to its security especially in these places. 
However, in the mid-1890’s, European powers seemed to encroach upon Latin 
American states. In December 1894, British Guiana authorities decided to construct a road 
to the heart of the disputed territory. Britain also landed forces in Nicaragua and captured 
Port Corinto on April 27, 1895. France, on the other hand, landed forces on it former colony 
Santo Domingo to retaliate the murder of a Frenchman. Brazil also became a target of 
French imperial expansion. In May 1895, French Guiana attempted to send soldiers to 
settlement of Counani, which was expelled by Brazilians. France retaliated by landing 
force four month later. At about the same time, Britain captured several islands miles off 
the Brazilian coast in August (see LaFeber, 1963: 246-8). 
 The United States was not extremely concerned with the development of Brazil 
affairs. However, it was quite concerned with the development in central America and 
northern part of South America. The Venezuelan territorial disputes had intrigued the 
interests of Washington long before 1895. 
The disputed territory between Venezuela and British Guiana included the month of 
Orinoco, which was of great strategical importance. British move in this area raised severe 
concerns of experts of the affair in Washington. Former U.S. Minister to Caracas, William 
Scruggs had particularly warned of the severity of Britain’s encroachment on the mouth of 
Orinoco and the Patos Island. He published a pamphlet in October 1894, in which he argued 
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that the British encroachment on Venezuela territory would give it the commanding 
position of the whole Orinoco area. And since the three main rivers of South America, 
Orinoco, Amazon and Plata, were connected by distinct bifurcations, “the dominion of the 
mouth of either by such a power as England, would, in the course of time, and almost as a 
natural consequence, open the way to pretensions over the others” (Scruggs, 1894: 25). 
Similar warnings were delivered by Venezuelan Foreign Minister Ezequiel Rojas, who 
considered that British control of the mouth of Orinoco would be “the cause of permanent 
danger to industry and commerce throughout a large portion of the New World” (Rajos to 
Haselton, Dec. 7, FRUS, 1894: 845-6).  
As early as late 1894, Cleveland felt that Venezuela border disputes could not drag on 
any longer. In his address to the Congress on December 3, he promised to renew efforts to 
settle the disputes so as to “remove from this hemisphere all causes of difference with 
powers beyond the sea” (Richardson, 1897, XIII: 5958). Cleveland’s stand on Monroe 
Doctrine was “strong and sound”, since he considered the enforcement of which “is 
important to our peace and safety as a nation, and is essential to the integrity of our free 
institutions and the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government”. A 
violation of the Doctrine in one neighboring American states might lead to violation to 
other portions of the continent, which would finally endangered the United States. The 
Monroe Doctrine, which meant American supremacy and tutelage in the West Hemisphere, 
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was regarded by Cleveland as sacred, and was of “vital concern” to the United States just 
as the principle of Balance of Power to the European states (Ibid, Vol. XIV: 6088; 
Cleveland, 1904: 269). Cleveland had further learned of the importance of the territorial 
disputes by April 1985 through Bayard’s and wrote “(a)ffairs in Venezuela are liable to 
assume a position calling on our part for the greatest care and good management” (Nevins, 
1964: 631-2). 
Many Congressmen shared the same view with Cleveland. Leonidas Livingston from 
Georgia argued that the political autonomy of at least three United States’ “transcaribbean 
neighbors” were menaced in the dispute, since if Great Britain’s claim was justified, it 
would make Britain capable of control of the commerce of the Orinoco river area. If the 
United States kept indifferent towards the dispute, it would amount to the abandonment of 
Monroe Doctrine, which would be a “surrender of national prestige”. He claimed: “come 
what may, we have no choice but to resolutely maintain our self-respect and our honor and 
prestige as a nation”. There was few opponents of Livingston’s Resolution, except for some 
doubts on whether the Resolution would set a precedence of intervention. Livingston and 
others considered such intervention justifiable as long as it “relates to a matter on our 
continent” (Feb. 6, 1895, Congressional Record, 53rd Congress, House, Vol. 27, Pt. 1: 1832-
3).  
 It turned out that the public were no less supportive of the vigorous policy of 
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Cleveland regarding the Venezuela disputes. A good amount of press, filled with 
nationalism, applauded Cleveland’s insistence on Monroe Doctrine (Perkins, 1937: 145-6). 
North American Review published an article by Senator Henry Lodge, in which he claimed 
that British actions “are all directed to securing the control of the Orinoco...and also of the 
rich mining district of the Yuruari”. He bombastically claimed that these actions, together 
with Britain’s recent seizure of Nicaragua ports demonstrated that “she is now turning the 
attention to South America”. He urged that United States must stand firm, or France and 
Germany would follow suite (Perkins, 1937: 150-1). 
There were also immediate reasons that made the Americas essential to the United 
States. Struck by economic depression since 1893 and the consequent social and political 
unrest, the United States needed an outlet. With the closure of American frontier, policy 
makers looked to underindustrialized Latin American nations as a destiny for trade and 
market expansion (LaFeber, 1961: 948-53).  
In the dispatch, Olney emphasized that distance of Great Britain from this continent 
rendered its concerns in the hemisphere “unnatural”, while proximity between the United 
States and other American states made it naturally for the United States to intervene on 
their behalf when they were mistreated by European powers on this hemisphere. He wrote 
that “that distance and three thousand miles of intervening ocean make any permanent 
political union between a European and an American state unnatural and inexpedient will 
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hardly be denied”, on the other hand, “(t)he states of America, South as well as North, by 
geographical proximity, by natural sympathy, by similarity of governmental constitutions, 
are friends and allies, commercially and politically, of the United States. To allow the 
subjugation of any of them by a European power is of course, to completely reverse that 
situation and signifies the loss of all the advantages incident to their natural relations to us” 
(Olney to Bayard, Jul. 20, 1895, FRUS, 1895, Vol. I: 556-7).  
When Salisbury delayed reply to Olney’s dispatch and finally declined Olney’s 
requests, the reaction of the United States was fervent. In the Congress, Livingston 
introduced a resolution, proposing the creation of a committee to study the Venezuela 
boundary issue. When asked whether the Congress would declare war against Britain if the 
latter was found encroaching upon the territory of Venezuela and refused to renounce the 
territory, Livingston answered: “Congress will. I believe that two-thirds of the Republicans 
in the House would favor such a course and I know that all the Democrats will. And I am 
satisfied that the same sentiment exists in the Senate” (New York Daily Tribune, Dec. 4, 
1895: 2). Senator Shelby Cullom from Illinois, expressed his concern over vast extent of 
British dominions in the Americas, its control over the Caribbeans and Gulf of Mexico, 
and asserted that the Monroe Doctrine, “(i)nstead of remaining as an edict of the Executive, 
it should bear the definite approval of Congress and become a fixed and permanent 
ordinance, giving notice to all the world that the United States will not view with favor...any 
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European interposition in the affairs of the Spanish-American Republics”. Cullom’s motion 
met no major objection (Dec. 10, 1895, Cong. Record, 54th Congress, Senate, Vol. 28, Pt.1: 
108-112). The fact that Cullom was a Republican demonstrated that bipartisan agreement 
was reached regarding the Venezuela disputes. One week later, Cleveland threatened Great 
Britain that the United States was to “resist by any means in power” (Richardson, 1897, 
Vol. XIV: 6089) regarding British attitude to the Venezuela crisis in his December 17 
message to Congress, which further escalated the crisis. 
The United States’ resolution and nationalism in its disputes with Britain regarding 
the American affairs was also demonstrated in other disputes during this period, such as 
the the disputes over the Isthmian Canal and the Alaska boundary crisis.  
When Hay adopted conciliatory policy in dealing with Great British on the Isthmian 
dispute by consenting to Pauncefote’s initial draft of the convention, the Congress and the 
press was annoyed, and the Congress unilaterally pushed matters on the opposite direction 
of Hay. The public was enraged by the content of the original draft of Hay-Pauncefote 
Treaty. Many press accused that Hay’s moderate policy regarding the Isthmian Canal 
compromised Monroe Doctrine. Washington Post, for example, considered that Hay’s 
policy would furnish Britain the right of interference in American affair, which “will mark 
the beginning of our downfall as a free republic” (Literary Digest, Dec. 15, 1900, Vol. XXI, 
No. 24: 723). When British refused the Congress amended treaty, Senator John Morgan 
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from Alabama proposed a resolution, which recommended that since Britain had frown 
down the treaty, the only option left to the United States was to put the 1850 Clayton-
Bulwer treaty to death, and “(w)e will make no compromise with Britain on that subject” 
(Mar. 6, 1901, Cong. Record, 57th Cong., Senate, Vol. 35, Pt. 1: 18). 
Similar things happened to the Alaska boundary crisis. However, in this dispute, Hay 
not only faced with oppositions in the Congress and the press, but also from pressure of 
President Roosevelt, who was nationalistic in thoughts and vigorous in personality. In 
Senator Henry Davis from West Virginia and Democrats of Iowa was highly critical to 
Hay’s proposal modus vivendi. Davis warned Hay that the agreement could not pass the 
Senate (Hay to McKinley, Aug. 19, 1899, cited from Dennis, 1928: 150-1). Roosevelt was 
also dissatisfied with Hay’s conciliatory policy, he threatened British cabinet without 
consulting Hay that if the commission failed, he would “request Congress to make an 
appropriation which will enable me to run the boundary on my own hook” (Roosevelt to 
Holmes, July 25, 1903, Bishop, 1920, Vol. I: 259-61; also Thayer, 1915, Vol. II: 209). After 
that, he sent troops to Alaska to maintain order. 
Confidence of Material Capability, Local Concentration and Assertiveness 
Confidence of the United States’ newly acquired material capability also drove 
assertive policy against London. Senator Anthony Higgins from Delaware remarked that: 
“the people of this country do not feel any longer like permitting themselves to ignore the 
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proper position of the United States among the nations of the earth. We are one of the six 
first-class powers; we are as strong as any” (Feb. 16, 1895, Cong. Record, 53rd Cong., 
Senate, Vol. 27, Pt. 4: 3109). Although the naval power of the United States was not 
commensurate with the United States’ strength, and it would wait for another two decades 
before United States was capable of an offensive war against Great Britain, a defensive war 
against it was within United States’ capability. In such a war, “A million of men and 
muskets will overrun Canada, and England’s commercial ships will be swept from the 
ocean”. Such a war “ought to begin if it is necessary to save to Venezuela the mouth of the 
Orinoco” (Article of Senator W. E. Chandler from Vermont, excerpts from Public Opinion, 
Nov. 21, Vol. XIX: 648).   
With confidence of the United States capability, Cleveland considered that “we had 
been talking Monroe Doctrine for more than three quarters of a century, the time had come 
to act it for at least one representation” (Parker, 1909: 196). Olney also considered that by 
this time United States’ “infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it 
master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers” 
(Olney to Bayard, July 20, FRUS, 1895, Pt. 1: 558). As a result, Olney regarded that it was 
time to use the “mature power” to “harvest... the ‘practical benefits’ of the Monroe Doctrine” 
(LaFebar, 1961: 966-7). 
Although the British still had superior military power than the United States, its 
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involvement in other parts of the world (see the next section) largely dispersed its power 
thin, which rendered it difficult for Britain to focus on American affairs. The Russo-Franco 
alliance of 1894 combined the forces of two Britain’s most powerful imperial rivalries, 
which alerted Great Britain. Kruger’s policy of constructing roads so as to bypass British-
controlled ports to avoid tariff had complicated British position in South Africa (this policy 
finally led to the Jameson Raid on December 29, 1895, which further embarrassed London). 
These distractions of Britain lightened the burden of the United States in confronting 
Britain in Americas.   
It was against such backdrop that Olney, just upon his assumption of office, dispatched 
his “twenty inch gun”, which was written in an assertive way regarding to Monroe Doctrine 
and threatened Great Britain of United States’ willingness of unilateral action if its demands 
were not met.  
By the turn of the centuries, the United States seemed to feel that they have more 
confidence in dealing with Great Britain in the Americas, not only because of its proximity 
to the region, or the shifting power balance in favor of itself, but also because Britain’s 
preoccupations with affairs in other parts of the world, while the United States was relative 
concentration in the America, despite the new trend of expansion towards the Pacific. Apart 
from the United States, the isolated Great Britain confronted an array of newly rising 
expansionist imperial powers. It confronted France in Africa, Russia in central Asia and 
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Germany in the ocean. Worse still, its adversaries were combining their forces, as 
demonstrated by the Franco-Russo alliance formed in 1894, while Britain was further 
entangled in another frontier: South Africa. “Germany, Russia, and France were all 
combining against England, and the Boer War helped them” (Adams, 1918: 374). 
As a result, by the end of this period, the United States had become much more 
confident and less sensitive to outside powers’ activity on the Western hemisphere. In the 
1902 Venezuela Crisis, Roosevelt considered that Britain would retreat since it was only 
an accomplice of Germany. He was also confident that Germany would retreat not only 
because Germany was concentrated in European affairs, but also because the United States 
enjoyed absolute naval superiority to Germany in its proximity: “(o)ur navy was in very 
efficient condition, being superior to the German navy”, that “there was no spot in the 
world where Germany in the event of a conflict with the United States would be at a greater 
disadvantage than in the Caribbean Sea” (Bishop, 1920: 223). During the height of the 
crisis, he met with German ambassador Herr von Holleben and told him that Admiral 
Dewey, whose fleet was operation near Porto Rico, would be given instructions to “proceed 
to the Venezuelan coast and prevent any taking possession of Venezuelan territory” 
(actually the Admiral had only been instructed to get ready to sail at one hour’s notice, see 
ibid: 223-4). He showed scarce concern for Holleben’s protests and told him that he “was 
not arguing the question”, that “he was simply giving information which the Ambassador 
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might think it important to transmit to Berlin” (Thayer, 1915: 287).  
In addition to the fact that the United States itself was a victim party of Venezuela’s 
default, the relative easiness of the United States during the 1902 crisis may also due to the 
boost of United States’ confidence, and to the fact that the Monroe Doctrine had already 
been accepted by outside powers. After all, the material power of the United States had 
been increased to the extent that it was capable enough of resisting the incursion of remote 
powers such as Britain and Germany on the West hemisphere, especially given that its 
major rivals were preoccupied by the European affairs. 
Circumspection: Confidence and Respect of Britain’s Residual Power 
In contrast to its opportunist policies of the period of 1807 to 1812 towards Great 
Britain, the United States’ policy towards Great Britain was circumspect as well as assertive 
in the period of 1895-1905. This was a result of its increasing confidence in dealing with 
Great Britain in the Americas, as well as the respect of Great Britain’s residual power. With 
confidence and respect, it also adopted a policy of patience, avoiding taking risks which 
might lead to a costly clash with Great Britain  
 Despite of the United States’ determination in pushing the Monroe Doctrine and 
increasing material capability, it did show respect to Great Britain, given its superior, 
thought dispersed and relatively declining military capability, especially its naval strength. 
When American decision makers found that coercion and threat short of potential of 
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military clash could successfully force the British into concessions, they were reluctant to 
push Britain too hard. 
 Although decision makers tended to believe that Great Britain was most likely to 
cave in in crisis against the United States, given its worldwide commitments and declining 
relative power vis-à-vis the United States, and risks were worth taking, they were also 
attentive to leave loopholes of their assertive demands and leave rooms to maneuver. 
In the height of the Venezuela Crisis, American decision makers took cautions in 
avoiding war with a still powerful Great Britain. Apart from the small size of it overall 
naval strength, American South Atlantic Squadron was thousands of miles away in 
Montevideo, Uruguay. It did not have sufficient battleships on the lakes to organize a 
fighting force, either. Actually, only wooden ships were available. Its Atlantic coasts and 
cities around the Lake was open to attack (Greville and Young, 1966: 717-2). Decision 
makers were also well aware that in a real war against Great Britain, its coast would be 
hard hit and foreign commerce ruined (Whates, 1990: 85). Although the United States 
could wear out the morale of Britain in an attrition war given its industrial power and 
advantage of locality, the immediate costs in a war against Britain could be high. 
Thus, despite the assertive language of Cleveland in his message of December 17, 
1895, Cleveland and Olney might have intentionally devised the tactics of creating an 
American commission to investigate into the disputes to delay and “gain time and allow 
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tempers to cool” (LaFeber, 1963: 270). In addition, Cleveland “bound himself to no 
timetable and to no definite course of action” (Grenville, 1964: 66-7), since the 
investigation could take years and no actions after the investigation was specified in the 
address. There was no wonder that Salisbury took Cleveland message as a “safe valve” out 
of the deadlock. He believed that the United States was bluffing on the dispute and refused 
to give in until the new developments in South African and his cabinet’s opposition. 
Having its main aim of getting Britain’s implicit recognition of Monroe Doctrine and 
acceptance of unlimited arbitration secured through a strategy of brinksmanship, the United 
States also no longer had interests of taking further steps. American negotiators made 
concessions to their British counterparts with regard to the principle of deciding rights of 
sovereignty upon length of settlement, that Olney considered that “(a)dverse holding or 
prescription during a period of fifty years shall make a good title” (Olney to Pauncefote, 
Jul. 13, FRUS, 1896: 253-5). During the negotiation starting from February 1896, 
Washington also supported most British territorial claims at the cost of Venezuela.  
Although the American public was generally fervidly supportive of Cleveland’s 
hardliner policy, the moderate voices was far from absent during the crisis. Bayard, now 
Ambassador to London and Secretary of State of Cleveland’s first administration, took a 
conciliatory line towards Britain (Schoultz, 1998: 117-9). The business circle was divided 
in opinion, but the part of business and financial sectors that opposed Cleveland’s message 
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was strong enough to exert influence. These opponents of Cleveland’s policy, alongside 
with English holders, had partially contributed to the financial panic of a break of stock 
market on December 20, together with other factors. 
Even after the power balance further shifted in favor of the United States during the 
Isthmian Crisis, after all substantial demands, such as rights of sole construction, actual 
repealing principle of neutralization, the repealing of principle of fortification (the word 
“no fortification” had been deleted all together), and exclusion of third party participation, 
American policy makers, especially Hay, still strove for saving face for London. These 
face-saving methods basically concerned only wording, such as absence of using the word 
“abrogate” regarding to the 1850 treaty (the new treaty would “supersede” the previous 
one), adherence to the principle of neutralization in principle, maintaining “military police” 
to protect against “lawlessness and disorder” (see FRUS, 1901: 241-46). Although these 
changes of wording had little substances, it did make the final convention more acceptable 
to Britain. 
The American decision makers did not take full advantage of the Boer War to push 
hard on Great Britain on the Isthmian issue, nor did it led an opportunist policy regarding 
the Alaska boundary disputes in the background of Boer War. 
In this period, although British made major part of significant concessions, the United 
States still had reasonable respect for Britain’s residual power and was willing to make 
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non-substantial concessions to Britain. This was quite different from its policies towards 
remaining Spanish presence in Caribbean. Despising on the debility of Spain, the United 
States forcibly swept the remaining Spanish influence out of the Americas in the Spanish-
America War of 1898. The different result of Situation II and the bottom right box in the 
2*3 tables in the first and second chapter might be glimpsed in the United States’ policy 
against Great Britain and Spain in this period. 
British Policy Making: Concessions of a Declining Distracted Strategic Regional 
Power 
Despite the United States’ assertive and aggressive policy in the West Hemisphere in 
the period, and its hard push on Great Britain, British policy makers were eager to settle 
the disputes and crises peacefully. This was largely a consequence of the fact that Britain’s 
sprawling interests over the globe overstretched its resources. It can also be attributed to 
the fact that Great Britain was not willing to confront a rising United States, whose material 
capability was rapidly catching up, in the latter’s home region, where Britain’s strategic 
interests were not quite essential. 
Overstretched Resources 
The British Empire was on the way of reaching of its climax of imperial expansion in 
this period with its imperial adventures in South Africa. Its tentacles sprawled to Africa, 
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Near East, South, Central and Southeastern Asia, North America, Caribbeans and Australia. 
With the advent of the age of imperialism, it confronted with France, Russia, Germany and 
the United States in different frontiers. 
Despite of the countless imperial tentacles and frontiers, the first priority of Great 
Britain had always been the Balance of Power on the European continent, which was 
increasingly volatile with the unraveling of the Bismarck system. Worse still, until the end 
of this period, two out of the three major powers on the European continent, France and 
Russia, confronted Great Britain with their combined forces. On the other hand, Germany 
was on the watch, waiting for their showdown while increasing its own naval power. Great 
Britain was in an embarrassing position in Europe in this period. In history, Great Britain 
could influence European affairs only when it had ally or allies on the continent. For the 
large chunk of this period, however, such an ally was absent. 
Great Britain’s next priority was to keep the route to India secure for sail, which was 
threatened by Russian expansion. India was the trademark of the greatness of Great Britain. 
The occupation of India had made Great Britain a first class power rather than a third class 
one (Hyam, 2002: 35). Indian could also supply Britain with land forces which Britain 
lacked in wars in Near East, East Asia and Central Asia, which was important in the contest 
against Russia. To keep the route secure, Britain had to secure the access to Mediterranean, 
Red Sea and the Arabic Sea, which called for naval presence in these areas and possession 
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of Egypt and Aden, which further called for possession of Kenya and Sudan (Nye, 2007: 
131). Presence in these areas was also essential in its contests against France. In late 19th 
Century, Russia’s thrust into Afghanistan and French expansion in Middle East and Africa 
posed direct threat to this route. In the sense that the power of France and Russia was 
concerned, this route was also related to the Balance of Power of Europe, which added up 
to the importance of this route.  
Thus, in this period, Great Britain was preoccupied by reducing French and Russian 
threat to the Indian route, and preparing for the uncertainties in Europe. Britain’s bungling 
and entanglement in South Africa further drained the resources of the Empire. The new 
development of the Far East, to wit, the faltering of Qing Empire and imperialist powers’ 
scrabble for their own sphere of influence in China further distracted British diplomatic 
attentions. Britain was interested in East Asia because of its potential market as well as a 
distraction of the Russian Empire from European affairs. 
Although Great Britain had strategic stakes in the Americas in terms of colonial 
control and credibility of a major power, these interests were less essential than that of 
Middle East, and less essential even that that of Northern Africa due to their lack of impact 
to the Balance of Power of Europe. As long as it did not become a new target of colonization 
of other European powers (for example, Germany) and thus became a new factor of 
European Balance of Power, Great Britain had limited concern over this area, so as to the 
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United States self-assertion of Monroe Doctrine. 
During the first Venezuela Crisis of 1895, Salisbury did not regard the Venezuela 
border disputes as an important diplomatic issue. Actually, to Salisbury, all questions 
unrelated to European balance or the Near East were “not very momentous” (Campbell, 
1960: 35). However, assuming that the United States was merely bluffing regarding the 
question of Venezuela, Salisbury tried to maintain a firm stand against American 
intervention in 1895 and 1896 (Grenville, 1964: 66). Nonetheless, in January 1896, the 
cabinet, disturbed by the Kruger telegram by the Kaiser (Kaiser’s famous Kruger Telegram 
was sent on January 3, 1896, congratulating the Boer republic of successfully repelling the 
Jameson Raid-a raid carried out by British colonial administrator Leander Starr Jameson, 
intending to trigger an insurrection against Transvaal President Paul Kruger) and Turkish 
crackdown on the Armenians starting in late 1895 (Hamidian massacres), which unraveled 
British traditional Eastern policy of supporting Ottoman Empire together with Austria 
against Russian expansion (Grenville, 1964: 44-5; also Bourne, 1970: 155-8), had little 
taste to take risks with the United States regarding a remote dispute of minor concern. 
James Bryce shared the feeling of the cabinet, he wrote to Roosevelt, telling him that as 
per the notion “that we want to interfere with American rights or with the balance of power 
in the New World”, the fact was that “(n)othing further from people’s minds here. Our 
hands are more than sufficiently full elsewhere” (Bryce to Roosevelt, Jan. 1, 1896, Fisher, 
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1927, Vol. I: 319).  
The racial kinship and the amicable feeling did help to mitigate the crisis. Sir William 
Harcourt, the Americanophile opposition leader in the Parliament and the husband of an 
American, who regarded an Anglo-American war as a “civil war”, expressed on many 
occasions that it was intolerable to him for a “prospect of a war with America on such a 
disputable subject” like the Venezuelan boundary and that arbitration was the only way out 
(Gardiner, 1923: 397-8). He even threatened to indict Salisbury cabinet. Chamberlain, 
fearing of the fate of Lord Frederick North fell on Salisbury, warned him of Harcourt’s 
inclination for “unlimited concession” (Garvin, 1934: 160). Harcourt was certainly not 
alone in such feeling. Many felt a war with the United States would be a fratricidal war. 
During the January 11 cabinet meeting Salisbury gave in to the majority of cabinet 
members’ inclination to “any honourable settlement” despite his threat of resign (Ibid: 161). 
And from then on, Great Britain had acquiesced to American intervention on the 
Venezuelan disputes (Grenville, 1964: 68). British public and the Parliament was no more 
concerned on the disputes. The Parliament and the press (for example, the Times) also 
showed scant interests in the Venezuelan boundary disputes and how the cabinet was 
dealing with it (Campbell, 1960: 37). The Parliament had not formally inquired the 
progress of the matter until early March, 1896. Another inquiry was held on March 13, 




With the gradual escalation of the South Africa affair and the uprising of Boxers in 
China, British cabinet was no more interested to stand against the United States regarding 
the Isthmian disputes starting from 1898 and the Alaska boundary crisis starting in 1899. 
The waging on of Boer War starting from October 1899 to May 1902 and concerns over 
Russian expansion in Asia became major factors of British concessions in 1900 
negotiations (Grenville, 1955: 60). The similar indifference prevailed among British public 
and Parliament. Lansdowne’s concessions to the United States in the Isthmian Canal 
negotiation raised barely any discontent from the Parliament and the press, even though 
the Cabinet merely gave up all the contents of the 1850 treaty with hardly any 
compensation. No warning of menace and threat posed by the United States was sounded 
out even though these concessions meant the combination of American naval powers of 
both oceans in future contingencies (Campbell, 1960: 74-7).   
British public and the Parliament also had little concern for the Alaska boundary 
dispute, and showed little sympathy to the Canadians, who had fervent feelings over the 
territorial disputes which they had little legal base (Ibid: 118-9). When the disputes was 
settled, the Canadians felt betrayed by London and anti-British feelings surged. Lansdowne, 
however, remarked in the Parliament that “I am inclined to find some consolation in the 
fact that our military and naval advisers tell us confidently that the two islands in the 
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Portland Channel which, under this award were given to the United States, are of no 
strategical value whatever” (Feb. 2, 1904, Hansard, Series 4, Vol. CXXIX: 39). 
Declining Relative Material Capability and Inferiority in Local Military Balance 
It is fair to say that back in the period of 1805 to 1812, the British also did not have 
essential strategic interests in North America, and it was no less preoccupied and distracted 
by the development of other parts of the world, especially the Napoleon War. However, in 
that period, Britain showed little willingness to make concessions to the United States, 
which finally brought about the War of 1812. So that the mere lack of essential strategic 
interests and distraction could not sufficiently explained for British concessions to the 
United States in this period. The lack of essential interests and distraction could only 
explain for the peaceful resolution of the severe crises with the help of the shifting power 
balance between the United States and Great Britain. The fact that material capability of 
the two powers were increasingly balanced had dissuade Great Britain from offending an 
increasingly powerful United States in a remote region that Great Britain had limited 
strategic interests. 
From the third section of this chapter, one could see that in 1895 and 1896, although 
the United States had surpassed Great Britain in terms of economic and industrial 
capabilities, its military strength was still close to negligible to Great Britain, especially 
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with regard to battle ships. Although the military strength of the United States had been 
boosting since the Civil War, it was far from being of the same legion to that of Great 
Britain. However, “(t)he weakness of the United States became less important in face of 
the fact that Britain was unable to strengthen her squadrons in American waters” (Campbell, 
1960: 30), since it was largely distracted in other parts of the world. During the crisis, 
British First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Goschen, reported to Salisbury that “(t)he outlook 
seems to me very bad in many directions, not the least in that of Germany who now seems 
inclined to protect the Boers, as the Americans protect Venezuela” (Elliot, 1911, Vol. II: 
204-5). 
Besides, although American military strength was still relatively weak, it was not 
comparable to its strength in the 1810’s. The fortification of major cities had been enhanced 
during the Civil War, which made foreign attack much more difficult. American railway 
system was rapidly expanding, which enormously boosted the effectiveness and efficiency 
of army mobilization. Although American navy was still a small force, with 20 armored 
war ships and 42 unarmored in 1895, the United States Navy was still the seventh most 
powerful navy in the world (Annual Reports of the Secretary of Navy, cited as ARSN 
hereinafter, 1895: XXVI), with fair capability of self-defense. With the expansion of the 
United States for nearly a century, it had become a state facing sea in three directions, 
American coastline was much longer than it was in 1812, when it only faced the sea in one 
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direction. Blockade of so long a coastline would stretch available British naval power in 
the Hemisphere too thinly, and thus make it a formidable task even for Great Britain. 
Besides, with its industrial and economic power, the United States had been rapidly 
building up its naval power. In 1895 alone, there were 10 armored warships and 9 
unarmored warships under construction (Ibid). The naval power of the United States was 
further boosted during the Spanish-American war. In 1899, British North American and 
West Indian Squadron reported that the squadron “which in 1889 was superior to that of 
the United States, is now in 1899 completely outclassed by them” (St Aldwyn Papers, 
PC/PP/74, cited from Campbell, 1960: 31). By 1906, U.S. Navy had become the second 
most power navy in the world, only after that of Great Britain (Davis, 1940: 170-1). The 
shift of local naval balance between the two powers in a single decade reflected how rapidly 
could the United States boost its military power if its policy makers decided it necessary. 
It also reflected British did not attach great importance to this area, given the fact that it 
did not increase naval presence in this area despite the general increase of the number of 
British warships this period.  
What rendered Britain’s position despondent in a confrontation with the United States 
in Americas was the fact that Great Britain, a distracted remote outside power, also had 
disadvantage in local military balance, due to British strategic overextension and 
disadvantage of logistic, compared with the concentrated local army and “home fleet” of 
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the United States. Such advantage was further dramatized by America’s growing industrial 
capability. With enormous industrial and economic power, the United States could 
persevere in an attrition war in its own theater, while wear out the morale of a distracted 
remote enemy. If certain American coastal ports were blocked by enemy forces, incessant 
attacks would certainly wear out them. United States’ local military advantage also came 
with its concentration of power in the Americas, when Great Britain had global 
commitment and its military presence in the Americas was relatively limited.  
In addition, Royal Navy’s supply line was vulnerable to United States’ attack. With 
the large power gap between the United States and Canada (much larger than it was in 
1812), the United States army could sweep out Canada, and cut Britain off of its supply 
line. Alfred Mahan calculated that “if for six months, we can overrun Nova Scotia, and 
hold the enemy’s only Atlantic coalfield”, in such situation Britain had to supply its fleet 
with coal thousands of miles away under constant harassment by American raider (Bourne, 
1967: 321). Due to the proximity between the United States and Canada and the 
increasingly large power gap, Canada became a permanent hostage of Washington (Taylor, 
1920: 220), of which Britain must take account before making any war plans against the 
United States. 
Apart from the relative indifference to the West Hemisphere, Britain’s overstretched 
resources, its declining power vis-a-vis the United States and the local disadvantage 
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gradually convinced British policy makers that it was inevitable that Great Britain would 
have to leave the West Hemisphere to the United States and accept the Monroe Doctrine. 
The declining relative material capability and local disadvantage was an important 
factor in British decision making of this period. In a report of October 1894, British naval 
attaché in Washington, Captain R. Custance reported that a war with United States was 
gloomy, since “their far superior local resources in shipping and shipbuilding would soon 
allow them to outclass British, particularly as the Canadian vessels and almost all the 
torpedo boats mentioned were poorly armed, old, and virtually useless” (Bourne, 1967: 
327). Canada could not secure the defense of communication of the canals and St. 
Lawrence, thus the transportation of reinforcement would also be a problem. The War 
Office calculated that in a defensive war against the United States, Canada could not defend 
itself and would be lost (Ibid, 329). However, in an offensive war against a much more 
powerful United States with much larger landmass than 1812, the land war might be an 
indecisive attrition for years which would further exhaust British already overstretched 
resources, while ruin could be brought upon Canada.  
These considerations might have prevailed in the decision making process among 
British policy makers in late December 1895 and early January 1896, apart from their 
concern over imperial overextension. British policy makers became more acceptant of the 
Monroe doctrine, or the United States’ dominance on the West Hemisphere. And they 
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started to assume a conciliatory attitude in solving the Venezuelan Crisis. First Lord of the 
Treasury (also leader of the House of Commons), Arthur Balfour’s remarks before the 
Parliament regarding the Venezuela crisis might be representative of this trend: “disputes 
between successive English Governments and Venezuela there never has been, and there 
is not now, the slightest intention on the part of this country to violate what is the substance 
and the essence of the Monroe doctrine...a principle of policy which both they [Americans] 
and we cherish” (Feb. 11, 1896, Hansard, Series 4, Vol. 37: 109-110).   
The consideration of declining relative power and local disadvantage had been 
haunting the British policy makers until they decided to withdraw from the West 
Hemisphere totally. In 1897, director of military intelligence Sir John Ardagh calculated 
that in a war with the United States, even British forces gained temporary success by 
landing on Marine and Massachusetts, they would be “swept out of the country by mere 
superiority of numbers”, and Canada would be overrun by American forces. He concluded 
that: “a land war on the American Continent would be perhaps the most hazardous military 
enterprise that we could possibly be driven to engage in” (Ardagh memo, Dec. 12, 1897, 
cited from Grenville and Young, 1966: 173). 
During the Isthmian and Alaska boundary Crisis, an important justification for the 
Salisbury cabinet’s decision to concede in early 1901 was the shifting power balance in the 
Americas. Since the settlement of Venezuela Crisis in 1896, the power balance in Americas 
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had been further worsened for Britain. In a report from Colonial Defence Committee (CDC) 
in October 1896, it was calculated that in a bilateral war, Britain could reassert its naval 
supremacy after America gained some initial success (Bourne, 1967: 359), although the 
cost of such a war could be high. The situation had changed during the Isthmian Crisis. An 
Admiralty memorandum on January 5, 1901, for example, argued that the control of the 
canal would depend on general naval supremacy as well as control of the land route. 
However, given United States’ rapidly increasing naval capability, Britain could not 
maintain naval supremacy in the Americans unless it would abandon the supremacy “in 
home waters and other areas equally vital to British interests” (Grenville, 1964: 345). 
Although the construction of a canal controlled by the United States would further 
compromise Britain’s presence in Americas, it was inevitable and Britain would hardly 
resist. After all, “foreign policy must be adapted to power as much as power to foreign 
policy” (Bourne, 1967: 350). Two memorandums of Directorate of Military Intelligence in 
March further dampened the cabinet’s confidence in a conflict against the United States. 
They reported that in a war against the United States, British defense arrangement (at 
Halifax, Bermuda and Esquimalt, for example) was not adequate, that naval supremacy of 
Great Britain in Americas-a precondition of army offensive against the United States as the 
army planned- was not secured, which rendered an army offensive against United States 
impossible (Ibid, 353-4).  
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It was because of these calculations that British First Lord of the Admiralty, 2nd Earl 
Selborne wrote that: “I would never quarrel with the U.S. if I could possibly avoid it”, 
when the negotiation of Hay-Pauncefote reached a deadlock due to a U.S. Congress 
resolution ruling the abrogation of the 1850 Treaty in April 1901. He further reasoned that 
“if the Americans choose to pay for what they can easily afford, they can gradually build 
up a navy, fully as large and then larger than ours and I am not sure they will not do it” 
(Selborne to Curzon, Apr. 19, 1901, Monger, 1963: 72, n.1). Such feeling was 
representative among British policy makers. And they were ready to make concessions to 
the United States, though reluctant. The final signature of the treaty remarked British open 
recognition of American military supremacy on the West Hemisphere. The withdrawal of 
British naval and land forces since late 1901 had been rapidly accelerated (Bourne, 1970: 
175). 
By the time of Venezuela Crisis of 1902, British policy makers had already taken the 
acceptance of Monroe Doctrine and the United States’ dominant position in the West 
Hemisphere for granted. Lord Cranborne remarked in the Parliament that: “the insistence 
of England that the Venezuelan Government should meet its engagements and respect the 
rights of British subjects is in no way an infraction of the Monroe doctrine, and they 
recognise that no nation in the world has been more anxious than England to assist them in 
maintaining that doctrine” (Dec.15, 1902, Hansard, Series 4, Vol. CXIV: 1263). The 
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voluntary compliance to Monroe Doctrine might have been further justified by the new 
observations of the Military and Admiralty. A November 1902 CDC memorandum reported 
that in an event of uncertain hostility with a continental European power, it would be of 
grave difficulty to protect Halifax, Bermuda, Port Castries and Port Royal with current 
defense arrangements, making naval defense in Americas a formidable task (CDC memo, 
Nov. 10, 1902, Bourne, 1967: 359-60). 
Until the end of 1903, the Admiralty and War Office had been quarreling about the 
defense policy in the Americas. The Admiralty, emphasizing the loss of naval supremacy 
in the Americas due to the permanent complication of European affairs, had been arguing 
that British bases in Americas were indefensible and their enhanced fortification 
meaningless, that an amicable relationship with the United States rather than defense 
arrangement was the key in imperial defense in the Americas (see, for example, Admiralty 
to the War Office, June 3, 1903, Ibid: 361). In August 1904, Admiral John Fisher wrote that 
Britain should “put the United States out of the question, as we ought to clear out from that 
Hemisphere altogether” (Fisher to Viscount Knollys, August 1904, Marder, 1959, Vol. I: 
327).  
The War Office, on the other hand, contended that the strengthening of bases in 
America was essential for imperial defense in the area. On November 25, the Committee 
of Imperial Defence (CID. Formed in 1902, it was led by the Prime Minister, and had CDC 
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and Joint Naval and Military Committee as its subcommittees) finally accepted the logic 
and argument of the Admiralty. After that, further withdrawal of military and naval forces 
rapidly took place in the Americas. In the 1904-1905 plans of redistribution of fleet, 
squadron in the Americas had seen significant reduction. Decision was made in May 1905 
that Port Castries and Port Royal would maintain only small peacetime forces. In July, 
General Staff informed CID that almost all troops were to be withdrawn from Barbados 
and St. Lucia, forces in Bermuda was also significantly cut. For armored ships, only one 
flagship and several Diamond class cruisers were left in this area (see Ibid: 363-72). As per 
defense in Canada, it was decided in December 1903 that defense of bases would be handed 
over to Dominion authorities gradually. In February 1905, it was decided that July 1, 1906 
was to be the date on which imperial troops would withdraw from Canada. In June, it was 
decided that Esquimalt was to be abandoned. Negotiation of transfer of the Halifax base 
was also started. The transfer finally took place in 1910 (Gordon, 1965: 182-7). 
The February 24 Admiralty memorandum of Canadian defense of 1905 was most 
representative of its view of a war of the United States. Since America’s enormous ship 
building program had changed the power balanced between the two powers, British naval 
superiority in West Atlantic could no longer be counted on. British forces also suffers from 
strategic distraction, which made the possibility of employing full naval power “in such a 
distant locality...hardly conceivable”, while the “happy lack of external causes for pre-
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occupation enabled the United States to...employ every ship she possesses in the Western 
Atlantic”. Britain was further disadvantaged by geographical distance, it must across 
“3,000 miles of storm-swept seas”, while the United States would fight in its home region. 
Worse still, British public would be unwilling to prepare for such a costly and hardly 
profitable war, it was doubtful whether British taxpayers would be willing to assume such 
an additional burden. The conclusion was that “neither the British Empire nor the whole 
civilized world would conquer the United States of America”, that a war with the United 
States was “supreme limit of human folly” (for excerpt of the memorandum, see Bourne, 
1967: 381-3). Despite the opposition of the General Staff and the War Office, it was this 
strain of view that prevailed in British decision making towards the United States by the 
end of this period. 
The Two Powers’ Despising of the Interests of Third Parties 
The two power’s policy towards each other in this period exemplified some 
assumptions of Kenneth Waltz’s theory of bipolar stability. That in a bipolar system, the 
two superpowers’ foreign policies towards each other are flexible since they do not need 
take the interests of other minor powers since they have only had marginal impact on the 
overall power balance. Thus, entanglements in a multipolar system would not lead to war 
in the bipolar system (Waltz, 1979). 
It is doubtful whether such rule could apply for bipolar regional systems. Such 
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systems were quite rare, since most regional systems in the history were either unilateral 
or multilateral. The Indian-Pakistan relation in South Asia clearly counters the theory. 
However, this theory seems to be valid in explaining the Anglo-American relationship in 
this period. 
 During the Venezuela Crisis of 1895, although Washington claimed to be resolved to 
protect the interests of Venezuela, it gave barely any consideration of Caracas’ interests in 
its dealing with London. Neither during the period of crisis nor the period of negotiation 
did Olney or Cleveland bother to ask the wish of Venezuela. During the negotiation starting 
from February 1896, Venezuela had not been consulted at all. The United States, with major 
British concessions on United States’ main demand of acquiescence of Monroe Doctrine 
and the request of unlimited arbitration secured, it no longer favored standing up against 
London further for Caracas. It started to meet London halfway by making concessions to 
Britain unilaterally with regard to the principle of fifty-year occupation conferring rights 
of sovereignty in settled areas (against the principle of historical evidence of who got there 
first, which Caracas insisted, see Schoultz, 1998: 121). Caracas was only noticed on the 
eve of the Anglo-American agreement reached on November 12, and the United States 
press the Venezuelan government into agreement in the next February. Caracas felt 
betrayed since the treaty recognized all disputed area, except for southern edge of Orinoco 
Delta, as territory of British Guiana. No Venezuelan was even to have a seat in the arbitral 
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tribunal until Venezuela protested strongly for the issue, and only one Venezuelan was 
allowed to tribunal after that (LaFeber, 1963: 269, 278; Grenville, 1964: 72; Schoultz, 1998: 
122-3). 
Britain was no more sympathetic to Canada’s interests in Alaska boundary disputes 
and imperial role in the defense of that territory. Canada, disgruntled by British concession 
on the Isthmian Canal issue, risked entangling Britain against United States to extract from 
the United States some entry in Alaskan coast into to the interior partially as a 
compensation of the Isthmian issue (Brebner, 1945: 259-60). However, British policy 
makers, eager to avoid any conflict with the United States, told Dominion authorities that 
nothing could be done. Although Canada’s case was relatively weak, there was still slight 
hope that Canada could get at least one such entry (Pyramid Harbor, for example). Britain’s 
betrayal of Canada regarding to the arrangement of jurists of the tribunal already 
disappointed the Dominion government. What’s more irritating to the Canadians was the 
fact that Alverstone voted in favor of the United States. Canada’s attempt to pit Britain 
against the United States failed since Britain had already decided to make wholesale 
concession to the United States to avoid a conflict. In the process of British withdrawal 
from North America, despite the oppositions of the War Office, no significant effort was 
made to enhance the defense of Canada. The overstretched empire was incapable as well 
as unwilling to protect a remote and non-essential colony against a rising colossus that 
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would rival Great Britain regarding to overall material capabilities in that region. 
Conclusions 
In this period, most of the background was similar to the last period. Crises surged in 
number in both period and in many occasions and many decision makers believed that that 
likelihood of war was quite high, or even inevitable. British Empire was still engaged 
globally and distracted, and its strategic interests in the Americas was less essential than its 
interests in Europe and the Near East. As of local distribution of power, the United States 
had preponderance regarding to material capabilities against other American states 
(constant in the value of IV1). 
However, many circumstances were different in these two periods. Firstly, the overall 
national material capability between the two powers was much more balanced in this period 
than it was in the last period, as the United States quickly caught up with British regarding 
to population, economy and industrial outputs. Although its military power was still weak, 
the growth in this field was also rapid (a change of the value of IV2). Secondly, while in 
the last period the crises finally led to hot war, in this period all the outstanding crisis was 
settled in peaceful means (a change of the value of DV). Thirdly, the behaviors of the two 
powers were also different from last period. In the last period, the American policy makers, 
out of diffidence of their national power, was cautious and adopted mainly less intense 
coercive policies from in the start, however, they were determined to have their way due 
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to the issue salience. And they adopted opportunist policies when European situation 
became volatile. In this period, however, The British, were making constantly concessions 
due to the shift of power between the two state, America’s local advantage and its strategic 
distraction. The American decision makers, on the other hand, partially due to the United 
States’ increasing material capability and partially due to British distraction, became much 
more confident assertive from the very start than the last period. However, they were also 
cautious and avoided pushing Great Britain too hard as a result of respect of Britain’s 
residual power. For example, the United States was willing to leave room for maneuver 
after they secured their major concerns, as showed by the two Venezuela Crisis and the 
Isthmian Crisis. In addition, the two states was unwilling to risk clash with each other for 
the interests of their colonies and partners. 
The behavior of the two parties supported Hypothesis4. 
Hypothesis4’ is disproved by this chapter. Although the local power asserted its 
interests, it showed considerable restraint. While the strategic regional power-Great 
Britain-opted for concessions and withdrawal, rather than refusing to compromise due to 
concerns of credibility and colonial interests. The interregional power balance did not 
generate disagreements on potential results of conflicts. Because of United States’ local 
advantage and Britain’s strategic distractions, British policy makers were well aware that 
in a war with the United States in the Americas, British colonies were not defensible, and 
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British could win such a war only at the cost of Britain’s loss of its position in other more 
essential strategic regions, even in Europe. And the only option for London was to 
recognize America’s dominance in the West Hemisphere. In addition, neither the United 
States nor Great Britain was willing to pull their partners’ chestnuts out of fire. 
Other additional explanations also had relatively weaker explanatory power. 
The argument that the United States was a status quo power that the power transition 
theorists contend is ridiculous. The United States upheld a national policy (the Monroe 
Doctrine) as international law, it started to led up an imperial path by initiating a war against 
Spain and occupied Puerto Rico, Guam and Philippines. The proclamation that “today the 
United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects 
to which it confines its interposition”, the United States was breaking the basis of existing 
international understanding. The efforts of actually abrogating the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 
and the reversal of neutralization principle was another major effort of unraveling the 
international status quo. 
The Democratic Peace theory was equally specious. Democracy was not an important 
value at that time. What the United States policy makers emphasized was the specialty of 
New World as a distinction of the Old World, where monarchism prevailed. Olney wrote 
specifically that:  
“Those pertaining to Europe are peculiar to her and are entirely diverse from those pertaining 
and peculiar to America. Europe as a whole is monarchical, and, with the single important exception 
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of the Republic of France, is committed to the monarchical principle. America, on the other hand, 
is devoted to the exactly opposite principle—to the idea that every people has an inalienable right 
of self-government—and, in the United States of America, has furnished to the world the most 
conspicuous and conclusive example and proof of the excellence of free institutions, whether from 
the standpoint of national greatness or of individual happiness” (Olney to Bayard, Jul. 20, FRUS, 
1895: 557).  
Although Britain had gone through another major reform of 1884, British decision makers 
had not changed their deep-rooted suspicious of American diplomacy, which they regarded 
as impulsive and impetuous in nature. In the exchanges between the two powers, the word 
“democracy”, “democratic” or “liberty” had been barely used, while the word “liberal”, 
though used, was not used to refer to a type of domestic system, but a moderate and open-
minded foreign policy line. 
The mutual dependent trade and economic relations did contribute to moderate the 
crisis in this period, as business circles were generally inclined to maintain peaceful 
relations. However, this was not the whole picture. After the delivery of Cleveland’s 
December 17 message in 1895, the opinion of American business circle was quite divided. 
Although there were large amounts of businessmen and financial leaders opposing the 
message, the number of supporters was was also considerable. Andrew Carnegie, John 
Stewart of the United States Trust Company, Oscar Straus, Chauncey Depew and a number 
of Boston bankers endorsed the President’s hardline policy. The financial panic of 
December 20 also could not be attributed solely to the war scare that President’s message 
helped to raise (LaFeber, 1963: 272-5). Given these factors, the real contribution of 
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economic interdependence on the peaceful resolution of the crises in this period could be 
more limited than the interdependence stability theory assumes. 
Notably, shared culture, language, religion, history and racism did contribute to 
British policy makers’ sympathy to the United States in this period, apart from the main 
causes assumed by this project. Bayard and Hay strove for amicable relations with Britain, 
and Chamberlain and Harcourt’s sympathy towards Americans was representative for 
British elites (see p. 36-7). However, more realistic policy makers, such as Cleveland, 
Olney, Roosevelt, Salisbury, Fisher and others were less affected by this feeling. Their 
decision makings were based on geopolitics and power politics. The span of explanation 
of the racism is also limited, after all, it had limited explanatory power to the outbreak of 
1812 war at least.  
The two powers’ inclination to arbitrate the disputes since Alabama Claims late 1860’s 
and early 1870’s also had impact on the resolution of crisis in this period. However, the 
Alabama Claims were mainly a diplomatic dispute which was far from reaching crisis level 
or militarized disputes level. There were also no threat of use of force during the Alabama 
Claims. Arbitration fitted well for such crisis. The crisis in the current period, however, 
triggered war scares on different occasions. Only after realist calculations did the decision 
makers of the two powers decided to arbitrate the disputes. 
The argument that the peaceful years prior to this period helped to moderate the 
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bilateral relationship and contributed to the peaceful settlement of crises in this period 
could find little bases. The pattern of behavior of both powers in this period had been 
differing from any prior period, with the United States ever more assertive and Great 
Britain ever more conciliatory. 
Overall, compared with other explanations, the assumptions of this project has more 
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America-Japanese Relations, 1931-1941 
The American-Japanese relations between 1931 and 1941 is a good case to illustrate 
how the shift of dyadic balance of material power between a local major power and an 
outside major power from rough balance to outside supremacy in severe crisis changed the 
behavior of actors, and how a relatively peaceful relations gradually developed into onset 
of war, and thus a good case to test Hypothesis3 and Hypothesis4. 
Contrary to Anglo-American relations 1805-1905, which was featured by increasing 
balance of material capability between the two nations, Japanese-American relations 
during this period was changing from relative balance to extreme imbalance in favor of the 
latter. In addition, in the Anglo-American dyads during 1805-1915, the local power, the 
United States had power preponderance in its own region. As of of the Japanese-America 
dyads, although Japan was capable to have its way against other powers in East Asia in 
most of the times in this period and thus could be regarded as a preponderant power, its 
preponderance was much more volatile than United States’ preponderance in the Americas 
from 1805 to 1905. In addition, its relative material capability had been in gradual decline 
vis-a-vis other local players, especially Russia and China. 
It was safe to say that between 1931 and 1941, the material power between the United 
States and Japan had never been balanced. However, between 1931 and 1937, with the 
lingering impact of the Great Depression and an under-budget military, the material 
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capability of the United States was at its nadir since the 1910’s. With unfortified outposts 
in the Pacific and uncooperative Dutch Indies and Britain, the United States military 
capability in the Pacific was also limited. In comparison, Japan, under the pressure of the 
Great Depression, launched its adventure in continental Asia. With the rise of militarism 
and Japan’s expanding military expenditure, Japan’s material power reached its zenith. 
Japan’s termination of Washington naval treaty in 1936 further rid Japan of the straitjacket 
of naval aggrandizement. Japan enjoyed a local favorable power balance vis-à-vis not only 
local actors such as China and Soviet Russian, but also the outside major power—the 
United States as well as Britain in this period.  
The following two chapters find that between 1931 and 1937, despite Japan’s 
aggression of China, which was a flagrant breach of the Nine Power Treaty of 1921 and 
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, the United States, aware of its disadvantaged position in 
western Pacific and Japan’s determination, regarded the development in East Asia as 
secondary interests that were not worthy of a military conflict with Japan and adopted a 
hands-off and passive resistance, or Non-recognition strategy towards Japan. Even the 
Kuomintang regime, aware of its power inferiority to Japan, with little hope of foreign 
intervention, and preoccupied by its war with Communist forces, made compromise from 
time to time to Japanese invaders in Northeastern and Northern China. Major war was 
absent during this period. 
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However, with the rise of Russian power, the balance of power on Asia continent 
tended to change in the disadvantage of Japan. Japan was pushed to consolidate its gains 
in China. At this juncture, the Kuomintang regime, with expectation of foreign intervention 
against Japan, as well as increased military power and national unity, launched determinant 
resistance against Japanese invasion. The result was the Lu Gou/Marco Polo Bridge 
Incident on July 7, 1937, which marked the outbreak of a total war between Japan and 
China. 
Starting from 1938, the balance of power between the United States and Japan had 
also been steadily shifting in the disadvantage of Japan. From October 1938, the Sino-
Japanese war was fought to a stalemate. Japan was mired in the great China quagmire. With 
the draining of resources, Japan became ever more dependent on strategic materials from 
the United States. On the other hand, the United States had been picking up material 
capability. The economy had been undergoing recovery since 1933, despite the recession 
in 1937. Accompanied with the economic recovery was the increased budget for military 
expansion. With the pass of the Naval Act of 1938, known as the Second Vinson Act, the 
United States started to pick up speed of naval construction. In July 1940, with the pass of 
the Vinson-Walsh Act, known as the Two Ocean Act, the United States launched its largest 
naval procurement in its history. ABCD powers also started to cooperate with each other 
in constraining Japan, culminating in Anglo-American Joint Staff Conferences in 
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Washington at the end of March 1941 and Anglo-American-Dutch Singapore meeting in 
April 1941. By mid 1941, Japan was not only becoming more and more disadvantaged in 
material power, but also isolated in western Pacific in terms of diplomatic relations. 
From 1938 to 1940, being more and more confident of its own power, the United 
States gradually stepped up economic sanctions on Japan from moral embargo in July 1938 
to license control of strategic material in July 1940 and finally to a de facto total embargo 
of oil in July 1941. British and Dutch, expecting the United States to offer a hand on the 
western Pacific, were encouraged to resist the Japanese. The Kuomintang regime was also 
encouraged by the growing positive attitude of the United States and persevered in resisting 
Japanese invasions in a dire condition. With Japan’s draining material power and 
deteriorating standing in western Pacific, the United States adopted an uncompromising 
attitude in the American-Japanese negotiations to compel Japan’s capitulation by defying 
Japanese compromises and adding new demands to the Japan each time. Japan, resolved to 
retain its gains of invasion of China since the Mukden Incident, relying on its local and 
focused military power vis-a-vis the United States and entertaining wishful thinking of 
United States’ unwillingness to suffer and fight an attrition war in a far away battlefront, 
sent its forces to Pearl Harbor. 
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Chapter 5 Taking a Passive Attitude: U.S. Policy towards Japan’s Expansion, 1931-
1937 
Between 1931 and 1937, several major crises took places between the United States 
and Japan. Japan’s invasion of Chinese Manchuria, bombing of Chapei of Shanghai, 
withdrawal from League of Nations, invasion of North China and termination of London 
Naval Treaty were major challenges to the international order that the United States helped 
to create after the WWI. With the impact of the Great Depression and underdevelopment 
of military force, U.S. material power was at a nadir since the WWI, while Japan, through 
military expansion, reached its power vortex in western Pacific despite the negative impact 
of the Great Depression. Throughout this period, the U.S.-Japanese relations remained 
relative stable despite Japan’s challenge of the “Open Door” policy of the United States 
regarding China and the balance of power in western Pacific established by the Washington 
system. The U.S.-Japanese relations in this period offered a good opportunity to test the 
hypotheses put forward by this chapter. 
This chapter finds that in this period, the United States was reluctant to resist Japan’s 
expansion because of the United States’ difficulties brought by the Great Depression and 
Japan’s considerable material capability and local advantage. Japan, on the other hand, with 
its increasing military capability, was assertive in strengthening its regional position to 
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prepare for uncertainties in the future. However, it also avoided extremely provocative 
policies which might force the Western powers into intervention.  
The Course of Crisis between 1931 and 1937 
Japan’s invasion of Manchuria was the first major challenge to the post WWI order 
which the United States had helped to bring into existence through Versailles and 
Washington Conferences. 
Japan’s craving for Manchuria had long history. Since late 19th’s Century, Japanese 
decision makers had regarded Manchuria as a region within its “line of advantage” (the 
term was first coined by Yamagata Aritomo, 1890), which was essential to Japan’s national 
independence among the powers of the world (Hackett, 1971: 138). With Japan’s 
industrialization and Qing China’s decline in the second half of 19th Century, Manchuria 
offered a good and ready target of resource base and market for Japanese products. It was 
also a springboard upon taking which Japan could launch further invasions on the Asian 
continent. After Japan’s war with Russia in 1904-1905 and its annexation of Korea in 1910, 
Manchuria became the frontier of confrontation with Russia. If Manchuria was occupied 
by Japan, it could also act as a buffer zone between the Japanese Empire and both the 
powerful Russian Empire and China. 
As a result, right after the Qing-Japanese War during 1894-1895, Japan attempted to 
annex Liao Dong Peninsula, the southern part of Manchuria. This attempt only failed 
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because of the joint intervention by Russia, its French ally and the German Empire, which 
tried to retain good relations with Russia. After the Russo-Japanese war during 1904-1905, 
Russia was forced to cede its lease, rights, privileges and public works and property of Port 
Arthur, Talien and the adjacent territories and territorial waters, as well as the Chan-chun 
and Port Arthur Railroad and all its branches (Peace Terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth, 
Sept. 5, 1905, Kowner eds., 2006: 447). 
In July 1926, Chiang Kai-shek launched the North Expedition with the aim of unifying 
China. With the shift of cabinet in April 1927, Japan’s policy towards Chiang’s expedition 
changed from Shidehara Kijuro’s moderate nonintervention to Tanaka Gichi’s hardliner 
intervention. During the Eastern Regions Conference convened in June 1927, Tanaka 
cabinet decided to separate Manchuria and Mongolia from China and prevent Chinese 
revolution from spreading into these areas (Hata, 1988: 287). As Chang Tsu-lin, the 
Chinese warlord in Northern China was defeated by Chiang’s army, Kuantung Army, 
conspiring to replace Chang with more pliant puppets, murdered him on his retreat to 
Manchuria without informing Tanaka (Ibid: 288). However, this scheme failed as Chang’s 
song, Chang Hsueh-liang, merged his regime with Kuomintang government in Nanjing 
despite warnings from Japan. 
 With the strike of the Great Depression in the summer of 1929, global demands of 
raw silk exports dropped sharply, which dealt a great blow to Japanese agricultural sectors. 
 
 279 
Between 1929 and 1931, Japanese export shrank 43 per cent by value (Ohkawa et al., 1979, 
Table A 26 and 27, cited from Beasley, 1987: 189). The falling of industrial prices also led 
to increase of urban unemployment (Nish, 2002: 66). At the same time, major world powers 
adopted protectionist economic policies, exemplified by the United States’ June 1930 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. Meanwhile, the Chinese, enraged by Japan’s intervention in the 
North Expedition and incident such as Jinan Incident in 1929, were filled anti-Japanese 
nationalism and started to boycott Japanese goods. 
Contrary to the export shrink in China and Manchurian region, Japanese export to 
Korea and Taiwan rose between 1929 and 1931, which convinced Japanese authorities that 
“foreign trade had resisted the depression best in those trades where Japan exercised 
political authority” (Beasley, 1987: 190) and it was essential to brought other areas where 
trade was important to direct Japanese authority. Manchuria, abundant in coal, ceramics, 
steel, oil and material needed for synthetic petroleum (Barnhart, 1987: 28-9), was long 
regarded as Japan’s economic “lifeline” and considered particularly essential for the self-
sufficient of the Japanese Empire. It became a ready target of Japanese conquer.   
It was under this context that the Japanese Kuantung army, without getting 
authorization from Tokyo, conspired the rail bombing “accident” on the Liu Tiaohu section 
of the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) and surprised the Kuomintang government by 
attacking Mukden.  
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Upon the outbreak of hostility, U.S. Minister to China, Nelson Johnson, reported that 
the aggressive act was apparently long planned and carefully and systematically put into 
act (Johnson to Stimson, September 22, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 
1931-1941, Vol. I, cited as FRUSJI hereinafter: 5). By 24, Kuantung army had occupied 
the whole South Manchurian area. Japanese authorities excused that the action was taken 
to protect Japanese subjects in the railway zone and that Japan had no territorial designs in 
Manchuria (FRUSJI: 12). This excuse belied the fact that Japanese forces started to bomb 
Chinchow on October 10 with Japanese Emperor Hirohito’s sanction early October (Bix, 
2001: 240). Chinchow was 50 miles away from the Railway Zone (see Stimson to Nevile, 
FRUSJI: 21). With the fall of Tsitsihar, the capital of Hei Longjiang on November 19, the 
whole Manchurian area fell. After that, Kuantung army proceeded to attack Chinchow, 
which fell in early January, 1932. This remarked the loss of all Chinese territory northeast 
of Shan Haiguan. 
Japan’s aggressive action constituted a flagrant violation of Chinese sovereignty and 
an egregious breach of the international order created by Versailles-Washington system and 
of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928. However, the United States reacted moderately at best.  
Upon the transpiring of Mukden Incident, Henry Stimson, the Secretary of State, only 
expressed profound surprise and concern to the Japanese Ambassador (Stimson 
memorandum, Setp. 22, FRUSJI: 5). Stanley Hornbeck, Chief of the Division of Far 
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Eastern Affairs, considered that the United States should not invoke or refer to the Kellogg 
Pact, though the actions of Japanese forces constituted a violation of the Pact (Hornbeck to 
Stimson, Sept. 20, Hornbeck Papers, Box 453). Though Washington accepted the League’s 
invitation to discuss the Manchuria Incident after the bombing of Chinchow by sending the 
Prentiss Gilbert mission to Geneva, Stimson instructed Gilbert that he should “keep 
modestly in the background” as an observer so as not to provoke Japan (Curtis Everett 
Memorandum of Stimson and Gilbert telephone conversation, Oct. 16, Papers relating to 
the foreign relations of the United States, cited as FRUS hereinafter, 1931, Vol. III, Far East: 
205; Stimson, 1936: 66). Stimson even ordered Gilbert to temporarily leave his seat when 
the Council invoked the Kellogg Pact on October 19 (FRUS, 1931 Vol. III: 242). In mid 
November, the Council was reconvened in Paris, the Secretary of League again invited the 
United States to discuss the Far East situation. This time General Charles Dawes was sent 
with the task of conferring with individual members of the Council informally without 
attending any sessions (Borg, 1964: 6). 
With the Kuantung army marching towards Tsitsihar in early November, President 
Hoover first broached the idea of using non-recognition as the main weapon against 
Japanese invasion (Stimson and Bundy, 1947: 234). After the Lytton Commission’s 
establishment on December 10, the moderate Japanese Wakatsuki Reijiro cabinet fell, 
together with Foreign Minister Shidehara, on whom Stimson had high hope to constrain 
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the militarists. The new Inukai Tsuyoshi cabinet was more militant and supportive of the 
Kuantung army. On January 2, Chinchow was occupied by Kuantung Army. Five days later, 
Stimson finally sent the nonrecognition note to Chinese and Japanese governments, stating 
that the United States does not intend to recognize any situation de facto, any treaty or 
agreement between Japanese and Chinese Republic governments that impairs the open 
door policy and the Pact of Paris, or the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Stimson to Forbes, FRUSJI: 
76). The nonrecognition policy was a passive one and no more than a moral sanction 
(Stimson and Bundy, 1947: 234). After all, the latest adoption of nonrecognition policy 
against Japan in 1915 by Secretary of State William Bryan had little success. U.S. policy 
makers only intended to clarify their opinions on the development of Manchuria. Hornbeck 
was supportive of the nonrecognition note since it was a flexible policy: “it could later, if 
and when circumstances might warrant, be canceled or revoked” (Hombeck Memo, 
“Manchuria Situation”, Nov. 21, 1931, Hornbeck Papers, box 453). In addition, Stimson 
expected that after his note sent, other government would follow suit. To Stimson’s 
frustration, the nonrecognition principle, or “Stimson Doctrine” barely got any 
international support. He looked to the British for support, only to get a rebuff, which left 
the United States out on a limb (Stimson, 1936: 101; for the British “rebuff”, see Atherton 
to Stimson, Jan. 9, FRUS, 1932, Vol. III: 19-20). 
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The failure of U.S.-British coordination might have encouraged Japan to speed up its 
invasion of China. This time was the stage was Shanghai-the financial and economic center 
of China with major Western interests. Shanghai was also one of the centers of Chinese 
nationalist activities where anti-Japanese boycott movements were widespread after the 
July 1931 Wanbaoshan Incident. Japanese invasion of Manchuria further instigated 
Chinese nationalism. In the second half of January 1932, several clash between the Chinese 
and Japanese, plotted by Japanese military aid and provoked by the Japanese took place 
(Thorne, 1972: 206), costed lives on both side. The Japanese in the Shanghai International 
Settlement staged mass meetings in early 20th, and the Japanese General Consul Murai 
Urumatsu published warning against anti-Japanese incidents, which escalated the situation. 
On January 27, the local Japanese commander sent an ultimatum to Shanghai Municipal 
Council, requesting closing of headquarters of the boycott associations. Although Chinese 
authorities complied, Japanese forces attacked residential and business sectors of Chinese 
Municipality on 28 without justification, which was met by a determined and effective 
resistance from the local Chinese 19th Route Army (see Stimson to Forbes, FRUSJI: 165-
7). Surprised and embarrassed by the new development, Japanese forces used warships and 
airplanes to bombard the Chapei area to outfight the Chinese forces. To deal with Chinese 
resistance, Japan brought in more and more reinforcement through the International 
Settlement, reportedly peaking at 70,000 (Borg, 1964: 10).  
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Japanese shooting and bombardment cost severe loss of civilian population. Japanese 
forces even intruded the adjoin U.S. sector, committing violence against Chinese civilians 
and provoked a clash with American forces. Japanese forces bombed Nanking, the capital 
of the Kuomintang regime, for an hour on February 1, raising fears that Shanghai 
bombardment was just a prelude before Japanese invasion of the Yangtze Valley. In 
February, Japanese bombs fell on American and British sections on several occasions, 
costed death and injuries (Stimson, 1936: 124-5, 142, 144). The military clash went on 
until early March. On February 9, Japan argued that due to the ineffectiveness of the Nine-
Power treaty after a ten years’ trial, new measure need to be taken regarding China. It 
proposed to establish “demilitarized zones of between 15 to 20 miles width around the 
principal trading ports in China, notable Shanghai, Hankow, Tientsin, Canton and 
Tsingtau”, as well as Manchuria (Johnson to Stimson, Feb. 9, 1932, FRUS, 1932, Vol. III: 
257). 
Unlike the remote Manchuria, United States had essential interests in Shanghai, and 
new development in Shanghai aroused “horror and revulsion” in both Europe and the 
United States (Borg, 1964: 12). However, the reaction of the United States to Japan’s 
invasion was still quite restrained.  
Like his method in dealing with the Manchuria incident, Stimson was eager to 
coordinate with the British in reiterating the nonrecognition doctrine and reconfirming the 
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principles of the Nine Power Treaty and Kellogg Pact regarding the Shanghai war. However, 
the British left him out on a limb again. On February 23, Stimson unilaterally published 
his famous Borah letter, in which he reconfirmed the principles of the Nine Power Treaty 
and the Kellogg Pact, including “To respect the sovereignty, the Independence and the 
territorial and administrative integrity of China”, which stood diametrically against 
Japanese proposal to discard the ineffective Nine Power treaty (for text of the Borah letter, 
see FRUSJI: 83-7). However, like the nonrecognition notes, the Borah letter’s effect on the 
Japanese was expected to be limited. Stimson admitted that “the only sanction the United 
States would contemplate using was that of public opinion”, which was the main opinion 
of President Hoover (Thorne, 1972: 263). The Secretary of War Patrick Hurley commented 
on Stimson’s nonrecognition notes and Borah letter that the Japanese “were actually 
laughing at America’s effort to stop by ‘nice letters’ Japan’s well-designed and well-armed 
program” (Lohveck, 1956: 96). It must be a relief for the American decision makers when 
the League passed a resolution endorsing the nonrecognition principle on March 11. 
Although no substantial measure were taken, the resolution at least saved the United States 
from its isolated position.  
Stimson and Hornbeck had thought of the option of economic sanction, but President 
Hoover, taking no stock of Congress support, immediately overruled them (Hoover, 1952, 
Vol. 2: 375). The most substantial reaction on the American said since the outbreak of the 
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Shanghai war, or since the Mukden Incident was the sending of flagship Houston and 
destroyers from Manila to Shanghai (Stimson to Forbes, Jan. 31, 1932, FRUSJI: 168), 
reinforcement of Hawaii and Philippines bases (Hoover, 1952, Vol. 2: 374) and the order 
of the American fleet, which was holding an annual maneuver in Hawaii, to remain in that 
neighborhood rather than being sent back to its west coast bases (Stimson, 1936: 138). 
Such measures were taken to remind the Japanese of the military strength of the United 
States, which constituted a warning or deterrence against further aggressive move of the 
Japanese. However, decision makers in Washington (such as Hurley) doubt whether this 
“bluff policy” could work, given U.S. reluctance in imposing sanctions. In fact, U.S. 
decision makers were quite eager in denying rumors of U.S. intention to impose sanctions 
against Japan on different occasions, which might substantially undermine the effect of the 
bluff policy (Stimson and Bundy, 1947: 245-6). 
At about the same time (Mar. 1), the Japanese puppet regime in Manchuria proclaimed 
“independence”, which was officially recognized by Japan on September 15 the same year. 
The reaction of the United States was tepid. Stimson instructed Nelson Johnson, the 
ambassador to China to report related news without taking additional action (Stimson to 
Johnson, Mar. 3, FRUS, 1932, V.III: 495-6). The American policy was to stick to the 
nonrecognition policy and wait the result of Lytton Commission. Before the Lytton report 
made public on October 2, the tension in the Far East eased down for nearly half a year.  
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The Lytton report rejected almost all major Japanese justification of its invasion of 
China. It also emphasized the importance of the maintenance of the order in Far East 
established by the Nine Power treat, which amounted to be supportive of the 
nonrecognition principles. However, major powers in the League were reluctant of 
provoking Japan, as a result, no decisive measure was taken despite the urging of smaller 
nations until January 16, 1933, when Committee of Nineteens was to reconvene.  
At this juncture, Stimson urged the League not to compromise to Japan and to exercise 
jurisdiction over the Sino-Japanese issues while state that the United States would not 
interfere to irritate the Japanese (Borg, 1964: 18-9). The report drafted by the Committee 
of Nineteen, to Stimson’s relax, placed responsibility of hostilities in Manchuria and 
Shanghai upon the Japanese, proposed nonrecognition principle and recommended the 
evacuation of Japanese forces from Manchuria. The report was submitted to the Assembly 
on February 21 and adopted three days later. With the adoption of the report, Japanese 
delegate at the Assembly, led by Matsuoka Yosuke, after making a brief and bitter remark 
about “Japan being crucified by the nations of the League” (Wilson, 1941: 279), walked 
out of the meeting, creating a major crisis in world affairs (Tansill, 1952: 117). About one 
month later (Mar. 28), Japan withdrew from the League. At almost the same time, Japan 
launched the Jehol campaign on February 21. Before that, Japan had already taken 
Shanhaiguan on January 3. On the same day that the FDR administration assumed office, 
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Japanese forces captured Chengde, the capital of Jehol, bringing its forces to the Great Wall, 
threatening Peking and Tientsin. From early March to late May, Chinese forces put firm 
resistance against the Japanese forces along the Great Wall. 
The U.S. reaction to these new developments, again, was far from steadfast, despite 
FDR’s family and personal affections to China (Nixon, 1969, Vol. II: 331-2). In the end of 
February 1933, the League had created the Advisory Committee to follow upon the Far 
East development and invited the United States and Soviet Union to cooperate (Wilson to 
Stimson, Feb. 25, FRUS, 1933, Vol. III: 210). Upon the new developments, the British 
advocated to discuss arms embargo on the Japanese. However, the arms production states 
were reluctant in taking any position until United States adopt an attitude (Wilson to Hull, 
Mar. 29, Ibid: 260-1). The new Secretary of State of the United States, Cordell Hull, refused 
to accept the responsibility (not to “assume the role of mentor to the League”) and ordered 
not to be drawn into any discussion on arms embargo (Hull to Wilson, Mar. 31, Ibid: 265).  
With Japan’s further invasion of China, Hoover administration had finally proposed 
an arms embargo resolution in early January. The idea was firstly proposed by Stimson in 
December 1932 regarding the Chaco war to empower the President to lay arms embargo to 
any country if he could secure cooperation of other arms-producing states (Congressional 
Record, Jan. 11, 1933: 1551). The resolution was met with major oppositions in the House, 
due to many Representatives’ (for example, Hamilton Fish) fear of provoking Japan into a 
 
 289 
war. Even with compromise that the scope of the resolution being limited to the Western 
Hemisphere (Divine, 1962: 39), the resolution was finally killed. FDR and Hull, despite of 
the opposition of Hornbeck, was supportive of the arms embargo resolution, and an 
identical resolution was introduced upon their assuming office on March 16. The new 
resolution passed in House a month later. However, many Senators, for fear of the tendency 
of involving the U.S. in war (FRUS, 1933, Vol. I: 366), showed doubts to the resolution. 
Senator Hiram Johnson proposed an amendment that any embargo laid by the President 
had to be applied impartially to all belligerents (Ibid: 369-78). FDR quickly backed down 
and approved the amendment, which was passed on May 27 and in effect nullified its 
original aim of cooperate with League nations against aggressors like Japan.   
 Many decision makers in the United States, especially Hornbeck, proposed that the 
United States should take a hands-off policy regarding the new development in North 
China. He believed that no initiative or action should be taken by the United States. If any 
initiation was to be taken, it was British and League’s responsibility (Hornbeck Memo, 
Mar. 16, 1933, Hornbeck Papers, Box 453). Hornbeck opposed the Italian proposal that 
the United States, Italy, Britain and France should take concerted actions regarding 
Japanese aggression in China and contended that the later three countries should take the 
initiative. Hornbeck wrote that Hugh Wilson, U.S. ambassador to Switzerland, Norman 
Davis, U.S. delegate to the League, Ambassador Johnson and Joseph Grew, U.S. 
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ambassador to Japan since June 1932, all shared the same view (Hornbeck memo, May 16, 
FRUS, 1933, Vol. III: 328). FDR seemed to share the same view, given that no measures 
was taken by the United States except for the issue of a tepid joint statement by FDR and 
Chinese Minister of Finance  T.V. Song (Ibid: 337).  
Failing in enlisting foreign help, the Kuomintang regime soon gave in. It negotiated 
with Japan the Tanggu Truce on May 31, which established a demilitarized zone between 
the Great War and the line running across Northern Hebei. The Truce marked the end of 
the two year Manchurian Crisis. After the conclusion of the truce, the U.S. decision makers 
seemed to attempt to improve the U.S.-Japanese relations as if nothing had happened. Grew 
was optimistic of the bilateral relations after the truce and wrote in an article for Japan 
Times that “It should not be at all difficult for our two nations to live in peace and harmony 
and to co-operate” (Grew, 1944: 93). Even the more assertive Hull concurred with Hirota 
that “no question exists between our two countries that is fundamentally incapable of 
amicable solution” (Hull to Hirota, Mar. 3, 1934, FRUSJI: 153). 
Such trend went on for nearly a year until the issue of Amau Statement on April 17, 
1934. In the statement, Amau Eiji, the Chief of Information and Intelligence of Japanese 
Foreign Office, proclaimed that Japan “is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying 
out her mission and in fulfilling her special responsibilities in East Asia”, Japan opposed 
“any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in 
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order to resist Japan”, and it also opposed provision of military and financial assistance to 
China by other powers (FRUSJI: 224-5). Hirota moderated Amau’s statement by 
proclaiming adherence to the Nine Power Treaty (Ibid: 229-30), however, his basic tone 
did not divert much from Amau’s. The Amau Statement could be analogized to be Japan’s 
Monroe Doctrine in East Asia, which in effect regarded China as its sphere of influence. In 
Hull’s word, many people wondered whether this had implications “partaking of the nature 
of an overlordship of the Orient” (Hull Memorandum, May 19, Ibid: 235)  
The reaction of the United States to the Amau Doctrine was little different from 
previous ones. Hornbeck proposed not to “assume or be placed in a position of leadership 
in initiating proposals for joint or concurrent action” (Hornbeck Memo, Apr. 24, State 
Department Files, cited from Borg, 1964: 79). And the United States only delivered a 
moderately phrased aide memoir to Hirota stating “no nation can, without the assent of the 
other nations concerned, rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its will in situations where 
there are involved the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of other sovereign 
states” (FRUSJI: 232). To avoid provoking Japan, the aide memoir did not even mention 
the Nine Powers Treaty. Moreover, the Far Eastern Division (FED) even recommended to 
accord no further financial assistance to China and limit military assistance to it to avoid 
future issues with Japan (see Borg, 1964: 81-3). Perhaps satisfied by the amicable tone of 
the aide memoir, Japanese ambassador, Saito Hiroshi, proposed a joint declaration of policy 
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to recognize the U.S. in eastern Pacific and Japan in western Pacific were principal 
stabilizing factors, so as to bring about a rapprochement in the bilateral relations. The State 
Department politely refused the proposal with the excuse that American people were 
adversely disposed to political alliance and there were already a number of agreements 
between the two states in place (Phillips to Grew, Jun. 18, FRUSJI: 237-9). 
In late September, Grew was informed that Japan decided to give notice to terminate 
the Washington Naval Treaty by the end of the year (Grew to Hull, Sept. 18, Ibid: 253-4). 
In 1934, Japan proposed to revise the Naval Treaty on the principle of fixing a “common 
upper limit” on the signatories, particularly on the “offensive arms” such as aircraft carriers, 
capital ships, and 8-inch-gun cruisers (Davis to Hull, Oct. 24, Ibid: 254-5). The United 
States, sticking to the principle of “equality of security” rather than “equality of armament” 
or ratio parity, refused Japanese proposals (see Ibid: 259, 266). As a result, Japan decided 
to abrogate the Washington Naval Treaty on December 19. In January, Japan further quit 
the talk of the second London Naval Treaty. 
 Grew and Hornbeck were alarmed by this new development. They were aware of the 
Japanese threat to the United States interests with its increasing naval power and possibility 
of future wars with Japan in the western Pacific. Both recommended to back up the “good” 
neighbor policy to Japan with military preparedness, especially naval preparedness, and 
follow Theodore Roosevelt’s policy of “Speak softly but carry a big stick” (Grew to Hull, 
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Dec. 27, 1934, FRUS, 1935, Vol. III: 821-9, also Diary entry the same day, Grew, 1944, 
1934: 134-5; Hornbeck Memorandum, Jan. 3, 1935, FRUS, 1935, Vol. III: 821-37). Hull 
gave full support to to these recommendations. On December 29, 1934, Admiral Joseph 
Reeves, commander in chief of the United States Fleet, announced that a naval maneuver 
was to be staged from May 3 to June 10 1935 between Hawaii and Aleutian Islands (FRUS, 
1934, V. III: 343-4) as a deterrence to Japan. However, there was no major increase of naval 
expenditure until 1940 (Pelz, 1974: 197-8, 202-4), despite the pass of Vinson-Trammel Act 
in 1934. Nor did the United States attempted to fortify the bases in western Pacific. 
In May 1935, Japan further encroached the sovereignty and integrity of China. With 
and excuse of anti-Japanese activities in Peiping and Tientsin, Japanese proposed removal 
of anti-Japanese officials, organizations and Kuomintang forces from Hebei. Nanjing 
conceded to Japanese demands and secretly confirmed these demands through sending a 
affirmative letter by He Yingqin, acting Chairman of the Peiping National Military Council 
to General Umezu Yoshijiro, commander in chief of the Kwantung Army (see Johnson to 
Hull, May 30, FRUS, 1935: 187-8; Grew to Hull, Jun. 11, 230-1). Almost at the same time, 
with the excuse of Zhangbei Incident, the Japanese proposed similar demands to Chahar 
authorities, and a similar agreement was signed between Qin Dechun, the new Chairman 
of Chahar Provincial Government and General Doihara Kenji (Johnson to Gull, Jun. 27, 
Ibid,: 277-8). These new developments in effect rendered Hebei and Chahar demilitarized 
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zones under Japanese control only without name, which was given (East Hebei Anti-
Communist Autonomous Council) on November 24. At the end of October, Hirota issued 
his three principles, which featured Sino-Japanese alliance and collaboration against 
Communism, de facto recognition of “Manchuokuo”, and trilateral cooperation among 
Japan, China and “Manchukuo” and cease of the policy of playing foreign nations off one 
against another (Ibid: 405, 429). In December, Nanking and the Japanese negotiated the 
establishment of a semi-autonomous Hebei-Chahar Political Council, which marked a 
significant step in the direction of separation of North China. 
In response to these new development in North China, U.S. foreign services still 
recommend to follow the passive hands-off foreign policy regarding China. Hull, Hornbeck, 
Grew, Johnson, Ewin Neville, U.S. chargé d'affaires ad interim in Japan, all recommended 
that the U.S. should make no representations during the whole course (see Borg, 1964: 
Chapter V, passim), even after the British delivered a message to Japan to retort Japanese 
activities and criticize the indigenousness of the autonomy movement in North China. They 
recommend that the U.S. should “exert its influence quietly and unobtrusively” in dealing 
with Japan, avoid provoking Japan and avoid conflict with Japan (see Hull to Acheson, 
July 5, Ibid: 295). 
In the next one and half years, despite the February 26 assassinations which drove 
Japanese foreign policy to further militarism, except for the small-scale Bailingmiao 
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Incident in Suiyuan that took place in February 1936, there was no further major aggression 
activity committed by Japan on China until July 7, 1937, when the all-out war broke out 
between China and Japan. 
In summary, in the period of September 1931, when the Manchuria Incident broke out, 
to early July 1937, despite constant encroachment of Japan on China and its breach of the 
international order in East Asia, the United States kept a passive hands-off policy regarding 
to East Asia development. The most assertive act was Stimson’s notes of nonrecognition, 
which left the United States “on the limb” and only made U.S. decision makers even more 
circumspect in provoking Japan. And major war did not break out between the two. The 
same can be said to other major powers, such as Britain and France. They were even more 
willing to compromise than the United States. The Japanese, after acquiring Manchuria-
Japan’s ideal resources base and product market, and established buffer zones or 
demilitarized zones around Manchuria, seemed to slow down its encroachment on China. 
During this period, given their power inferiority to Japan and the lack of outside 
support, Nanking also opted not to resist Japanese invasions with determination. Chiang, 
holding the principle of “pacify domestic affairs before engaging with foreign forces”, were 
more eager to exert control of southern China by eradicating rule of local warlords and 
Communist forces in South China, rather than put determined resistance to the Japanese in 
the North. As a result, he acquiesced to Chang’s non-resistance policy when Japan invaded 
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Manchuria, relying mainly on the League in solving the Manchuria Incident, letting local 
forces to fight the Japanese along the Great Wall in 1933 and concede to the Japanese 
demands in the 1935 North China incidents. On the other hand, Soviet Russia, preoccupied 
with the first Five Year Plan to restore its power, were also reluctant in provoking the 
Japanese in this period. In late 1931, Soviet Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs Lev 
Karakhan stated that the Russian policy to Manchuria crisis was one of “Strict non-
interference”. Russia proposed a nonaggression pact with Japan, only to be refused by 
Japan a year later. And in 1935, Russia sold its interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway to 
“Manchukuo” through Japan (Moore, 1945: 7-8, 11, 24-6). 
Explanations of the Absence of Major War in the Pacific in this Period 
Although this period was featured by turbulence and regional conflicts, there was no 
major war either between Japan and the United States, or between Japan and other local 
powers in the period of late 1931 to mid 1937. 
There was no systemic explanation of the absence of major war in this period, despite 
the existence of constant crises. Geoffery Blainey’s argument that for every thousand pages 
published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace 
(Blainey, 1973: 3) is exactly the case of this period. Scholars have been more interested 
and concerned about the origins of wars. However, they usually take absence of war for 
granted and consider that does not require explanation. 
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However, there were diplomatic historians who explained why the United States and 
China adopted conciliatory or compromising policies towards Japan in this period, which 
improves our knowledge of the absence of major war in this period. 
Some U.S. decision makers did not recommend strong reactions to Japanese invasions 
in China to avoid the fall of soft liner Japanese leaders under the pressure of their militarists 
competitors. In the early stage of Manchuria crisis, Stimson contended that the United 
States should not force the hand of Shidehara, for he want to give more room for Shidehara, 
whom he believed to be a moderate civilian order, to maneuver and get control of the 
situation created by militarists officers free of outside pressure and criticism (Stimson, 
1936: 34). Hull and Grew had similar faith in Hirota in the North China crisis and 
recommend no strong representation to Amau statement and the North China developments 
(Grew, 1944: 99; Grew and Hull telegrams, Oct. 3 and 6, 1933, FRUSJI: 123-6). and Such 
hope and belief of the moderate civilian Japanese decision makers had been raised on 
several occasions in the decision making process of U.S. foreign policies in this period. 
American decision makers were also reluctant to react strongly against the Japanese 
even in tone for fear of lack of international cooperation. After Stimson issued the 
nonrecognition notes, he found no support from Britain and other League nations After the 
Shanghai Incident, Stimson tried the second time for British cooperation, only to feel being 
betrayed again. These events left the U.S. “out on the limb” and becoming the target of 
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Japanese anti-West nationalism (see Grew to Stimson, Aug. 13, 1932, JRUSJI: 123; Oct. 6, 
1932, FRUS, 1932, Vol. IV: 705-6; Borg, 1964: 20-1). These setbacks became nightmares 
for U.S. decision makers, who tried to avoid unilateral criticism of Japanese aggression for 
fear of isolation and becoming the target of Japanese nationalism. 
Some American decision makers were also opposed to react strongly to Japanese 
invasion in China for lack of sympathy for the China both because of the fervent anti-
foreigner nationalism of the population and of the government that prevailed in China since 
late 1920’s and because of the severe disorder in China in this period. Hornbeck had bad 
impressions of the nationalism of Chinese population and Kuomintang regime due to the 
anti-foreign product demonstrations in China and Nanking’s efforts of treaty revisions to 
eliminate extraterritoriality. After 1925, Hornbeck even regarded Chinese nationalism as a 
greater menace than Japan (Hu, 1992: 104). John MacMurray, U.S. minister to China from 
1925-1929, in his famous 1935 memo, attributed the origins of Sino-Japanese war to 
extreme Chinese nationalism and Chinese boycott of Japanese products (Waldron eds., 
1992: 81-126). Some decision makers even argued putting China under Japanese control 
was better than the current disarray in China. Many U.S. decision makers, such as Neville, 
were also frustrated by Chiang’s lack of determination of fighting against Japanese, and 
China’s incapability of resisting Japanese invasion (see Neville to Hull, Dec. 4, FRUS, 
1935, V.III: 469). Lack of sympathy for Chinese and disappointment of Chinese 
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government was also an important reason why American decision makers were reluctant 
to intervene in the Sino-Japanese conflict. 
Of course, other scholars argue that the situation in the United States was essential to 
explain U.S. tepid reaction to Japan’s invasion of China. After all, the priority of both 
Hoover and FDR administration in this period was to deal with the Great Depression and 
to create employment opportunity. Because of the feeling of betrayal after the WWI, 
isolationism was also fervent in both U.S. administration and the Congress, and especial in 
the latter. Even if the administration attempt to adopt assertive policies against Japan, the 
Congress would obstruct. The Congress’s obstruction of arms embargo act exemplified the 
isolationist influence in the United States. 
These arguments are helpful in explaining the absence of major war in western Pacific 
in the period of late 1931 to mid 1937. However, these arguments all have severe limits. 
Whether the Japanese cabinet was hardliner or softliner did not have major impact on 
the United States’ Japan policy in this period. The fell of the moderate Shidehara cabinet 
in December 1931 did not change the passive policy of the United States towards the 
Manchuria Incident.  Hornbeck also observed that the difference between the Japan’s civil 
government and the military was not that big (Hornbeck Memo, Nov. 21, 1931, Hornbeck 
Papers, Box 453). They share the same objective of establish Japan as the dominant force 
of East Asia, they were different in their means to achieve their objectives. Worse still, it 
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was reported that the civil government of Japan, instead of moderating the activities of the 
militarists, were actually taking advantage of activities of the military.  
It is doubtful whether the U.S. would take stronger reactions against Japan even with 
international cooperation. The British were more willing in condemning Japanese activity 
after the North China crisis in 1935. However, this time it was the United States that refuse 
to coordinate actions. When the League invoked the Kellogg Pact on October 1932, 
Stimson ordered Gilbert to withdraw from the League conferences temporarily (see p. 5). 
The British also distrusted the U.S. decision makers. During the Manchuria Crisis, the 
British were reluctant in supporting American lead in condemning Japan because they were 
suspicious of U.S. of passing the ball to Britain, since the British considered that the United 
States did not have enough interests in China to warrant the risk of confronting the Japanese 
(Hu, 1992: 160-1). To some extent, the want of cooperation from other states in this period 
was a result of U.S. lack of determination and refusal to take the lead in confronting the 
Japanese. The United States, after all, was the most powerful state in the world at that time, 
and League members looked upon it to take the lead in dealing with Japanese invasion of 
China, which the United States categorically refused. 
Although many U.S. decision makers had major aversion of Chinese anti-foreign 
nationalism and Nanking’s incapability and indetermination in fighting the Japanese, it was 
hardly true that these feeling determined U.S. reluctance of direct confrontation against 
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Japanese invasion of China in early 1930’s. Such aversion was more intense before the 
Manchuria Crisis when Nanking was committed in treaty revisions. To most U.S. decision 
makers, Japanese invasion of China was a bigger evil than Chinese anti-foreign nationalism. 
And to most of them, Chinese anti-Japanese boycott could be justified while that would 
certainly not justify Japan’s invasion of China. Nanking’s incapability and indetermination 
to resist the Japanese was indeed a major concern to the U.S. decision makers, however, 
determined Chinese resistance in Shanghai and along the Great Wall did not seem to 
impress the United States. In fact, even after Chiang’s determined to resist the Japanese at 
all cost after July 1937, the United States was still reluctant and slow in offering a helping 
hand until late 1930’s. 
There was little doubt that to reverse the trend of economic downturn, financial 
meltdown and widespread unemployment caused by Great Depression was the top priority 
for both the Hoover administration and the first FDR administration. However, in 1928, 
when U.S. economic was still in the booming period, U.S. also showed an indifferent 
attitude towards Kuantung army’s killing of Chang Tso-lin. After the economy of the 
United States started to recover in 1935, the U.S. was still reluctant in confront the Japanese 
aggression of China directly until mid 1940. There was also little doubt that of the 
widespread isolationism prevented the United States from being actively involved in the 
China affair in this period. However, what was more interesting is the origin of isolationism 
 
 302 
itself. Isolationism per se was also caused by more fundamental factors: geopolitics and 
distribution of power. 
Moreover, the Great Depression can be regarded as a factor of declining U.S. material 
power, which is the variable that this project assumes to be a more fundamental factor in 
determining the absence of war in this period.  
This project argues that the more fundamental cause of the absence of major war in 
this period was Japan’s local power advantage vis-a-vis local players in the East Asia region, 
rough balance between Japan and the United States, and the lack of U.S. power in 
confronting Japanese power in this region (Situation II, Hypothesis 4). Although the 
material power between U.S. and Japan was far from being balanced in this period, because 
of the Great Depression, U.S. power was at its nadir since the 1910’s, while Japan, through 
military expansion, was at the peak of its material power, especially military power, which 
rendered the power balance between Japan and U.S. least unfavorable to Japan since 1910’s. 
Especially in East Asia, the Japan’s military advantage, enjoying advantage of locality, was 
at its peak vis-a-vis the United States. The local players, overawed of Japanese material 
power and with bare expectation of outside intervention on their behalf, had little option 
but to make concessions to the Japanese invaders. The outside power, such as the United 
States and Britain, having limited interests in the region due to their geographical distance 
and with no clear power advantage over Japan, also refrained from intervene on behalf of 
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China. The Japanese, after obtaining its main objective: control of Manchuria and establish 
buffer zones in North China around it, also slowed down its steps of invasion, which gave 
East Asia nearly two years of relative stability from the summer of 1935 to the summer of 
1937. 
Distribution of Power between Relevant Powers in the Period of 1931-1937 
In this period, Japan had power advantage over local powers such as China and Russia 
and rough power preponderance in East Asia, while it was least disadvantaged vis-a-vis the 
United States since the 1910’s. 
In East Asia, Japan was in a good position vis-à-vis the other two regional powers, 
Russia and China. Main index of national capability, such as Composite Index of National 
Capability (CINC) score of Correlates of War Project (COW), fail to capture weakness and 
underdevelopment of Russia and China, given their large size. However, their weakness 
was not hard to recognize. Chiang, though unified China in name in 1929, was in severe 
tension with the warlords in North and central China. From May to November 1930, 
Chiang waged a disastrous war with three powerful warlords-Yan Xishan, Li Zongren and 
Fengyuxiang, which engulfed Shandong, Henan, Anhui, Hunan and Guangxi and costed 
over 2500,000 casualties (Guo, 1981: 606-7). Though Chiang finally won the war with the 
help of Chang Hsueh-liang, the war weakened Nanking’s strength. Moreover, Chang’s 
forces stationed in North China was deployed to the Northwest to reinforce the local forces 
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there, which weakened the defense of Northeastern China, leaving the region vulnerable to 
Japan’s predation.  
Apart from the regional warlords, the fledgling Communist movement was also a 
challenge to Nanking authorities. Regarding the Communist forces as the “disease of the 
stomach and heart”, Chiang was determined to eliminate the Communist threat before 
getting ready to deal with the Japanese threat. Starting from December 1930, he launched 
five campaigned against Chinese Communists until October 1934. For the most time of 
1935 and 1936, Chiang was preoccupied with pursuing the remaining Communist force 
and consolidating its authority in South China. 
For the first half of the 1930’s, China, divided and plunged into civil war, was weak 
as it was in 1920’s. Moreover, China was in a primary stage of industrialization. The Soviet 
Union, though in much better situation than China, was also in severe difficulties. In early 
1930’s the Soviet Union was still a backward nation. Because of the devastating defeat of 
WWI and the following disastrous Civil War and Allied intervention, it only regained the 
productive level of 1913 in 1928. Modern industries were underdeveloped, with barely any 
automotive or chemical industries, nor big iron and steel centers (Moore, 1945: 1). 
Domestic situation was precarious. Starting from 1933, Stalin purged his political 
opponents on a large scale, which reached its climax during the Great Purge between 1936 
and 1938 (see Thurst, 1996). Stalin launched his First Five Year plan and collective farms 
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despite the opposition of Nikolai Bukharin, his former supporter. From a hindsight, the first 
half of 1930 had seen boost of industrialization of Soviet Union, which laid firm basis for 
its successful resistance of German invasion despite Stalin’s massive purge of military 
personnel and his incompetent handling in the early date of Soviet-German war. However, 
the potential result of Stalin’s policies was far from clear in the first half of 1930’s. The 
cost of collective farms was the great famine of 1932-1933, which caused the death of 
about 5.5 to 7 million people (Conquest, 1986: 306; Davies and Wheatcroft, 2004: 400-1). 
Despite its rapid industrialization, Soviet Russia in the early 1930’s was featured by 
political and economic turmoil. Though Japan was also far from being a fully developed 
industrial state at this time, given Japan’s proximity and strategy focus in East Asia, Soviet 
Russia was no competitor to Japan in this region. Russian Far East was more 
underdeveloped than its western core, and there was only one railway in that region, 
making the Far East the Achilles’ heel of the Communist colossus (Ulam, 1976: 198). 
On the regional level, the other two major regional powers, Russia and China, 
underdeveloped and preoccupied by dealing with domestic affairs or turmoil, could do little 
in resisting Japanese aggression and expansion in the period of 1931-1936.  
The outside powerful states with relative important national interests in the region 
were France, Britain, Dutch and the United States. After WWI, the national power of 
Britain and France declined, especially compared to the United States. The material power 
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gap between Japan and the two European states also shrank gradually between in the inter-
war period. 
According to the CINC score of Correlates of War Project COW, in the early 1930’s 
the material power gap between Japan and France dramatically shrank, that between Japan 
and Britain also shrank slightly. In the year 1937, the CINC score of Japan surpassed that 
of France and reached about 70 percent of that of Britain, as Figure 1 shows. In East Asia, 
the material advantage of Japan vis-a-vis the two European powers was more than clear.    
Figure 1: CINC score of Japan, France and Britain, 1919-1941 
 
In the meantime, in the period of 1929-1938, Japan also managed to shrink its power 
gap vis-à-vis the United States. From the Figure 2 one could see that after 1929, the ratio 
of Japanese CINC score as a percentage vis-à-vis that of the United States was steadily 
increasing. This ratio reached its peak in 1938 at around 35 percent, and then took a 
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downward trend, as Figure 2 shows. The increase was both a result of the Great Depression 
which dealt a great blow to the United States and Japan’s military expansion. 
Figure 2: CINC ratio of Japan and U.S., 1919-1942 
 
In this period, Japan was catching up with the United States in navy build-up and fleet 
quality, due to the latter’s budget limitations. Japan’s position vis-à-vis the United States 
in western Pacific was superior not only because the shrinking gap between the two navies, 
but also because the lack of fortification of U.S. western Pacific bases and lack of 




Table 17: Number and Tonnage of Battleships, Japan and the United States, 1933-19406 
 U.S. Japan Japan/U.S. Ratio 
 
Number of all 
ships 
Tonnage of all 
ships 
Number of all 
ships 
Tonnage of all 
ships 
Number Tonnage 
19337 1138 988520 183 775370 1.62 0.78 
1934 3739 1092025 220 756561 0.59 0.69 
1935 340 1084910 206 748997 0.61 0.69 
1936 324 1080715 213 772797 0.66 0.72 
1937 325 1083330 200 745594 0.62 0.69 
1938 335 1100890 236 918499 0.70 0.83 
1939 364 1240040 254 985394 0.70 0.79 
1940 380 1310260 277 1016574 0.73 0.78 
1941 681      
 
As Table 17 shows, in 1930’s, although the total battleship number of Japan was 
around 60 to 70 percent, its tonnage was around 70 to 80 percent. Japanese battleships were 
new and in good condition. And while it restrained itself in building capital ships according 
to the Washington Treaty and London Naval treaty, Japan built more aircraft carriers than 
the United States, which was not in the category of these treaties. Between 1922 and 1932, 
the United States had only laid down 40 new ships pf a tonnage of 197,640, while Japan 
had laid down 164 new ships with a tonnage 410,467 (Annual Report of the Secretary of 
the Navy, cited as ARSN hereinafter, 1932: 5). As of June 30, 1939, the United States had 
5 aircraft carriers, while Japan had 11 (Ibid, 1939: 4). In addition, in the period of 1931-
 
6 Data from Annual Reports of the Secretary of Navy, 1933-1940.  
7 These years refers to the publication years of annual reports of Secretary of Navy. 
8 “Ships now built and projected that will be under age in 1936”, Annual Report of the Secretary 
of the Navy, 1933, p. 4. 
9 “Total built”, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1934, p. 3. 
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1938, because of the impact of Great Depression and the influence of Isolationism in the 
Congress, the naval budget of the United States was quite limited, making it difficult to lay 
down new battleships and turn the balance of naval strength in its advantage. The 1934 
Vinson-Trammel Naval Act was dwarfed by Japanese Replenishment programs in ship 
building (Evans and Peattie, 1997, Chapter 8; Pelz, 1974: 196-7). 
In this period, Japanese Air force also closed the gap with the United States at least in 
numbers. By January 1932, Japan had 1300 aircrafts while the United States had 1780. 
However, the numbers became 1800 and 1900 by January 1936 and 2000 and 2200 by 
January 1937 (1935 and 1937 Aircraft Yearbook). 
Apart from the narrowing gap in overall strength, in the western Pacific, the United 
States’ position vis-a-vis Japan was even weaker. There was no major U.S. military 
presence east of Hawaii. U.S. bases in the western Pacific were unfortified. It was 
suspected by U.S. Naval intelligence service that Japan, breaching the Washington Treaty, 
had started to arm the mandated islands in the early 1920’s. Japan also refused the “courtesy 
calls” of U.S. fleets in 1920’s and 1930’s, perhaps to avoid the leak of Japan’s fortification 
efforts (Borg, 1964: 236-240) which started from early 1930’s (see, for example, Grew, 
1944: 82). The issue of fortification of Pacific Islands was not taken seriously by U.S. 
policy makers until 1938, when the Congress established the Hapburn Board to investigate 
the issue. Though the Hapburn Board report urged fortification of 25 bases, nothing was 
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done until 1940 because of disagreements between the administration and the Congress 
(Borg, 1964: 250-2). In early 1931, Admiral William Pratt described the position of the 
United States vis-à-vis Japan in East Asia as “simply appalling” (Thorne, 1972: 72). 
Of course, with regard to production capability and war potential, Japan was no match 
to the United States. However, the United States, trapped with Great Depression and 
isolationism, could not unleash its war potential. Moreover, the United States did not feel 
the China crisis in this period an urgent threat to its national security.  
U.S. Decision Making in this Period: Reluctant Power with Limited Resources 
As seen in the first section, U.S. decision makers were extremely circumspect in not 
provoking Japan during the course of Manchuria Crisis, Shanghai Incident and North China 
crisis. Even Stimson’s nonrecognition note in early 1932 was regarded as too provocative 
that policy makers tried to avoid such direct rebuff in Shanghai Incident and North China 
crisis. 
Not committed due to lack of vital national interests at stake VS Japan’s 
determination 
Geographically, the United States is oceans away from East Asia. And it had relatively 
limited essential interests in East Asia. Although its had economic, colonial interests and 
reputational interests in this region, it always had the option of withdrawal. U.S. trade to 
the Far East, especially China, was also limited. The only place that the United States might 
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fight for in this area in the 1930’s was Philippines. But United States planned to give 
independence to Manila in this period. Although United States was one of the signatories 
of Nine Power Treaty which proclaimed to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of China, the treaty did not obligate the signatories to take measures if the principle was 
violated. The United States regarded that treaty as “moral instruments” (Hoover, 1952, Vol. 
II: 368). 
The record of U.S. East Asia policy also seemed to reveal that the United States had 
limited concerns in that part of world. In 1907, U.S. ambassador to Japan, Thomas O’Brien, 
signaling U.S. acquiescence of Japan’s control of Southern Manchuria (Pash, 2014: 19). 
The Root-Takahira agreement reconfirmed this policy by agreeing to respect the “existing 
status quo” and Japan’s “territorial possessions” in the Pacific (Takahira to Know, Nov. 30, 
FRUS, 1908: 510-1). The 1917 Lansing-Ishii agreement again signaled U.S. acquiesce to 
Japan’s “peculiar interests” in China, especially in Shantung, South Manchuria and Eastern 
Mongolia due to “short distance” and “territorial contiguity” (Lansing, 1935: 292, 295-6).  
On the other hand, Japan was a local power in East Asia. After annexing Korea, Japan 
bordered with China directly. Developments in China had great impact on the Japanese 
Empire and Japan was ready to intervene in any developments in China, especially 
Northern China, which contradicted Japanese interests. Japan was committed in its cause 
of establishing itself as the dominant force in this area.  
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After the outbreak of Manchuria Crisis, Stimson had proposed economic sanction 
against Japan. President Hoover considered that economic sanctions “meant war when 
applied to any large nation”, and he would not fight wars in East Asia against Japan. He 
said he was “willing to go to war for the preservation of America”, but he would not “go 
around alone sticking pins in tigers” by imposing futile sanctions (Ibid: 366). Secretary of 
the Interior Ray Wilbur produced a memorandum arguing that Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria did not “imperil the freedom of the American people, the economic or moral 
future of our people”, and “(n)either our obligation to China, nor our own interest, nor our 
dignity requires us to go to war over these questions” (Ibid: 369). 
Hornbeck’s view was not different, if not more indifferent, than Hoover and Ray’s. 
He certainly knew that geography alone would dictate that Japan had more vital interests 
than the United States in Manchuria. He argued that “(g)eography, again, is a factor not to 
be neglected. Japan is ‘on the spot’ whereas all commercial rivals are thousands of miles 
away”. Japan was the only Oriental nation to rank among the great powers and was in a 
good position to develop Manchuria: “(i)f any nation is to be the mandatory for this 
neglected corner of the earth with its important undeveloped resources, every consideration 
indicates Japan” (Hornbeck memo, undated, Hornbeck Papers, Box 242). 
If Manchuria was the “neglected corner of the earth”, Shanghai and North China was 
clearly not. However, Hornbeck’s view of these two places was not to much different from 
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that of Manchuria. 
In May 1933, when Chinese forces and Japanese invaders were fighting along the 
Great War in a final stage, Hornbeck did not seem to be much concerned and argued that 
under such situation the United States “has not much to lose”. Moral principles might suffer 
further breach and U.S. trade prospects might be further impaired, “but from the point of 
view of material interest there is nothing there that is vital to us” (Hornbeck Memo, May 
9, 1933, Hornbeck Papers, Box 103). In January, 1934, Hornbeck wrote again that in the 
Far East, the United States had “not any vital interest at stake; also, that it probably never 
will have” (Memo, Jan. 11 1934, Hornbeck Papers, Box 453). 
On the other hand, Hornbeck recognized that Japan had much more stake in the 
western Pacific and was much more committed than the United States to get its way in the 
region. In 1932 and 1933, Hornbeck contended several times that the determination and 
political will of the Japanese should not be underestimated, that Japan would not permit 
any nation to stand in the way of Japan’s “inevitable destiny” of becoming the dominant 
state in East Asia (Hornbeck memo, Mar. 14, Hornbeck Papers, Box 453). And even if the 
United States adopted successful economic sanction policy against Japan and ruined 
Japan’s economy, the Guantung army would strive for autonomy in Manchuria (Memo, Jul. 
12, Hornbeck Papers, Box 453). Given Japan’s commitment and limited U.S. interests in 
the western Pacific, Hornbeck recommended not to provoke Japan and adopt a policy of 
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hands-off in the China affairs. 
Stimson was one of the most assertive decision maker of the United States regarding 
to the Manchuria Crisis and Shanghai incident. He regarded that geographically, the United 
State was an adjacent neighbor to China while European powers were remote absentee 
landlords (Stimson, 1936: 234). However, his own thinking seemed to belie his belief of 
his view of China as an important neighbor, since it seemed that he might not believe that 
the U.S. had vital interests in China. He regarded that the most important U.S. interests was 
not that commerce, but of political and humanitarian idealism (Ibid: 153-5), while Japan 
was determined in get its way in China. So although he had recommended economic 
sanctions against Japan after Shanghai Incident, he was against any suggestions of direct 
intervention by Western powers of other governments (Ibid: 150). With his proposal of 
economic sanction and collaboration with Britain failed, he was finally settled with a public 
letter to Borah to state the official view of the United States while avoided any further 
provocations to Japan. 
Hull inherited Stimson’s policy as the Secretary of States. Despite his constant talk of 
the principles of Nine Power treaty, it seemed he also did not regard the developments in 
China concerned the vital interest of the United States. Although he refuted British claim 
that the British was “more interested materially in the Orient than the United States”, his 
Orient policies could hardly justify his arguments (Hoover, 1948: 280). In March 1934, he 
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fully supported FDR in signing the Tyding-McDuffie Act which was to grant Philippines 
independence by July 4, 1946 (Ibid: 278). Two month later, he told Saito that Japan and the 
United States “are at present the trustees of the greatest civilization in history” and the two 
should avoid misunderstanding or material differences and “promote both national and 
world progress” (Ibid: 283). These actions could by no means dissuade the Japanese from 
further invasion of China and encourage Chinese resistance against Japan. 
The foreign services were also not extremely bothered by Japan’s invasion of China 
and did not think major U.S. interests were at stake. After the Tangku Truce was signed, 
Johnson regarded Japanese encroachment on North China as no direct threat to American 
security and that “does not mean the loss of a dollar from an American purse”. However, 
he did show concern of the probability that the extension of Japanese influence in China 
might impair U.S. trade with China and U.S. position in the Pacific. However, that was not 
the concern “at the present time” (Johnson to Hornbeck, Jun. 1, 1933, Ibid). 
Ambassadors in Japan in this period, Forbes and Grew, were well aware of Japan’s 
determination in intervening in Chinese affairs and expansion in Asia. Grew reported in 
September 1932 that to Japan, Manchuria “is one of supreme and vital national interests”, 
and “regardless of foreign opposition of whatever nature, the Japanese Government firmly 
intends to see the Manchuria venture through. Unless prevented by superior physical force, 
it is determined to proceed” (Grew to Stimson, Sept. 3, 1932, FRUSJI: 102). To avoid 
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conflict with a resolved Japan, he maintained that the United States should be restraint 
regarding to the Manchuria Crisis, despite his advice that the United States to be prepared 
(Grew, 1944: 70-1). 
The public opinion in the United States, while sympathized with China, especially 
after the Shanghai Incident, did not regard the Far East as a major concern for U.S. national 
interests. The isolationist publication Hearst epitomized the general public opinion of the 
United States towards the development of Far East before the conclusion of Tangku Truce: 
“All that is not OUR business. It interested us. We sympathize. But it is not our concern” 
(Krama memo, Borg, 1964: 89). Even the internationalist papers shew little concern after 
the Tangku Truce, the tone of which was not much different from the isolationist press. The 
press were also aware of Japanese determination in the Far East, and given limited U.S. 
national interests in the remote region, many of them also advocated recognition of Japan’s 
special interests in China. The Isolationist papers advocated conciliation policy regarding 
Japanese invasion in China from the very start. Even some internationalist papers, such as 
Milwaukee Journal, which had shown assertive attitude against Japan and advocate 
sanctions on Japan in the former years, started to alter the tone, advocating the United 
States to recognize Japan’s special interests in China after Amau declaration (Ibid: 89-92). 
Some isolationist press even argued that U.S. trade with China or even trade with Asia 
as a whole was not a vital national interest for the United States. Roy Howard of the 
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Scripps-Howard newspapers told Johnson that he felt that the “potentialities of direct 
American trade with China and Asia are not of sufficient importance to justify the United 
States in undertaking the expense that would be necessary to maintain a naval force in 
Pacific adequate to maintain the United States in the Philippines, and keep open under all 
conditions access to Chinese ports by American goods in American ships (Johnson to Hull, 
Jun. 12, FRUS, 1933, Vol. III: 361). 
Want of material power to constraint Japan’s invasion 
The United States not only lacked the willingness to intervene against Japan’s 
invasion of China, given the rough balance of material capability between the two state and 
Japan’s local advantages, it also lacked the wherewithal to stop Japan. American naval 
development was impeded by the Great Depression in the first half of 1930’s. The United 
States lacked both willingness and power to confront Japan in the Far East. 
As shown by the last section, Japan’s material capability disadvantage vis-a-vis the 
United States in this period had been narrowed in the period of 1931 to 1937. Although the 
United States had much more war potential, it was not unleashed in this period for various 
reasons. The decision makers in the United States were well aware of the situation. With 
no vital interests involved in the Far East, the United States had even less reason to force 
Japan’s hand, or even to speed up military preparation against Japan. 
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Right after the outbreak of Mukden Incident, the hardliner policy maker, Stimson, had 
considered military intervention. However, he concluded that with America and Britain 
reducing the size of their respective navies in relation of that of Japan and the impact of 
the Great Depression, it was “physically impossible for any single Western nation 
successfully to intervene by military force in such a matter as Manchurian dispute even if 
it should desire so to do” , and with limited national interests involved, none of the nations 
in Europe or America “even if able, had the slightest desire to go to war in such a 
controversy” (Stimson, 1936: 56). 
Hornbeck’s attitude towards Japan was more conciliatory. He believed that Japan 
chose 1931 to launch the invasion because Japanese decision makers calculate that in that 
year, no power could challenge Japan. Hornbeck seemed to agree with Japanese decision 
makers’ calculations. During the Manchurian Crises, Hornbeck considered that given 
Japan’s military advantage in the Far East and lack of vital interests of the Western powers 
in this region, no power could restore the status quo ante in Manchuria. He recommended 
that the United States should accept the fait accompli and take a passive course regarding 
the crisis. He wrote that because of these reasons, no power could drive Japan out of 
Manchuria and “They must and will permit her armed forces to remain there - for some 




Apart from Japanese resolve in getting its way in the Far East, Grew was also 
impressed by Japanese military efficiency. In Grew’s view, Japan’s army, navy and air force 
were quite efficient and the American would be shocked if they realize Japan’s military 
efficiency. Japanese forces were “the best coordinated and balanced, and therefore on the 
whole the most powerful fighting instrument that existed anywhere in the world”. Although 
Japan was inferior to the United States regarding drawing on industrial resources for a total 
and protracted war, it had no parallel in fighting a short-term, surprising war (Grew to Hull, 
May 11, 1933, Grew Papers, cited from Borg, 1964: 38). Respect for Japan’s military 
capability was one reason that Grew advised the United States to establish friendly relations 
with Japan avoid war with it, and to adopt restraint policy regarding the Chinese crises. 
In addition, while Japan was concentrated in East Asia, the United States had spread 
its limited naval capability too thin. President Hoover had gathered his military advisers to 
discuss the situation of the United States getting into a war with Japan alone. They 
concluded that given the United States’ limited military advantage over Japan at that time, 
military operation against Japan would not be advisable. Although most advisers agree that 
the United States could win, however, that would take four to six years. Given the United 
States’ national interests in other part of the world, “the naval reserves we must keep 
elsewhere would greatly reduce the effective strength which we could apply to Japan in her 
own waters”. The current fleet ratio (Hoover’s advisers calculate the ratio as 5:3, however, 
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the real ratio at that time was lower than that) between the United States and Japan was not 
enough to for the United States to fight against Japan effectively in the Far East. Both the 
navy and army need to be reinforced, which might take five years, before they were ready 
to fight Japan in that region. Moreover, in such a war the Philippines would be temporarily 
lost and the result would be looting and suffering of the Philippines (Hoover, 1948: 367-
8). 
Lack of International Cooperation 
Apart from the limitation of material capability of the United States vis-a-vis Japan in 
Far East , and its limited national interests and lack of willingness to confront Japan in that 
region, the lack of international cooperation, especially the half-hearted Britain was also 
an important factor discouraging the United States from confronting Japan in the Far East. 
After the Manchuria crisis, Stimson supported economic sanctions against Japan, and 
wanted to coordinate U.S. policy towards Japan with Britain. However, Britain was even 
reluctant to cooperate in the non-recognition policy. That was because although Britain had 
important national interests in China, decision makers did not regard it great enough to 
justify military confrontation with Japan. British had important colonial interests in 
Southeast Asia. However, given Japan’s overwhelming material capability in the Far East 
and Britain’s limited overall material power advantage vis-a-vis Japan, it considered the 
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best policy was to adopt conciliatory policy with Japan and avoid conflict with it in that 
region. British decision makers were suspicious about the United States when the later 
propose to coordinate bilateral policies and adopt harsh policies against Japan, since they 
considered that the United States’ interests in the Far East were too insignificant to justify 
a showdown policy against Japan. They regarded U.S. suggestion as a scheme of luring 
Britain into confronting Japan alone. 
British analysis of U.S. intention reflected United States’ limited national interests in 
the Far East and their suspicion of U.S. willingness to confront Japan for Japan’s invasion 
of China. Given the major tone of U.S. policies in the period of 1931 to 1937, such 
suspicion was quite reasonable. However, lack of British cooperation in turn discouraged 
the United States from taking any further substantial action in restraining Japanese invasion 
in China during this period. British policy in this period also shew that when an outside 
great power did not have overwhelming material capability against the local great power, 
it would most probably adopt conciliatory policies with it even if it has important national 
interests at stake in the far away region. This is especially true when it does not have strong 
and reliable allies to cooperate with against the local great powers’ aggressive or assertive 
activities. 
Nanking’s Policy of Waiting for a Better Time to Resist the Japanese Invasion 
In this period, Chiang Kai-shek also adopted a policy of compromise towards the 
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Japanese invaders. This fact also discouraged the United States from actively confronting 
Japanese invasions in this period. 
China was the local target of Japanese invaders, if China failed in resisting and driving 
out the Japanese invaders, it would face the destiny of loss of the nation (亡国). The loss 
of the nation was a constant nightmare of the Chinese people. With the loss of Song 
Dynasty to Mongolian invaders in the 13th Century, tens of millions of Chinese were 
murdered by the invaders, and with the loss of Ming Dynasty to Manchuria conquerors, 
there was also a major population decline. Accompanied by loss of population was the 
atavism of social and political system as well as culture. Chiang was well aware of this, 
and he was in general determined to resist the Japanese invasion. In his diaries, he 
repeatedly remind himself not to forget to revenge the insult by the Japanese. Starting from 
May 1928, he had been repeatedly writing “revenge the humiliation” in the front of his 
diaries, and since January 4 1933, he had been writing the word in the front of his diaries 
everyday (see Qin, 1978, Vol. 1: 222; Vol. 2: 251) until the victory of anti-Japanese war. 
He was also well aware that China should rely on itself in resisting Japanese invaders. He 
wrote in his dairy that “if we fail in strengthening ourselves and only rely on help from 
others, how can we win” (Chiang diary, Sept. 25, 1931, Qin, 1978, Vol. 2: 133). Sentences 
like this were quite abundant in his diaries. Chiang also remarked in late 1931 that he had 
made up his mind to lead the army to head North to fight the Japanese invaders (Chiang 
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remarks, Nov. 19, 1931, Qin, 1978, Vol. 2: 154). 
However, given the then domestic and international situations, Chiang actually 
adopted a policy of “enduring shame and humiliation” and strove to avoid war with Japan, 
which was shared by most of Kuomintang high level officials. Domestically, Chiang’s 
regime was challenged by warlords and Communist expansion. Chen Jitang in Guangdong, 
Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi in Guangxi, Sheng Shicai in Xinjiang, Sun Dianying in 
Ningxia, Yang Hucheng in Shaanxi, Yan Xishan in Shanxi, Han Fuqu in Shandong were 
all semi-independent warlords and obstacles of China’s full unification under the 
Kuomintang regime (Chiang’s dairies, Jan. 28 and Feb. 17, 1934, Yang, 2002: 394). In 
addition, Communist movement was considered by Chiang as “the disease of stomach and 
heart” (Qin, 1978, Vol. 2, passim). Apart from these factors, Japanese aggressors were far 
stronger than the Kuomintang regime regarding to military strength. Chiang considered 
that if Kuomintang were driven by irrational patriotism and fought Japan alone in this 
period, the result could be only defeat rather than success. And the destiny of defeated 
nation would only be further loss of territory and sovereignty (Chiang’s remark, Jan. 11, 
1932, Ibid: 164). 
With power inferiority to Japan and want of outside assistance, Chiang considered 
that his regime must make concessions to Japan short of formally conceding territory and 
sovereign rights to it, and enhance the strength of his regime. To strengthen his regime, on 
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the one hand, he must defeat warlords and Communist revolutionists and unify Chinese 
before fight against the Japanese invaders. On the other hand, he considered that weak 
nations such as China must rely on foreign nations to confront Japanese invasion. And if 
foreign assistance was not currently available, China should wait for the change of the 
global situation.  
On the regional level, Chiang had thought of the assistance of Russia. Chiang started 
to negotiate with Russia about reestablishment of diplomatic relations at the end of 1932. 
However, Russia, at this time, were concentrating its energy on the first Five-Year Plan and 
had no intention of provoking Japan. Worse still, Russia attempted to encroach upon China 
from Mongolia and Xinjiang. Chiang also decided to bide his time and await the outbreak 
of a war between Japan and Russia. In 1936, he was happy to see the tension between 
Russia and Japan to raise regarding Mongolia. However, to his disappointment, the war he 
was expecting did not take place (see Chiang diaries, Apr. 1 and May 1, 1936, Qin, 1978, 
Vol. 3: 286, 289). 
Chiang also looked upon the assistance from the West. He hoped that the League could 
restrain the Japanese invaders and for Britain and the United States to intervene on behalf 
of China. However, the West responded tepidly. Chiang complained about the empty word 
of the West and expected that the international aid would only come slowly and slightly, 
far from enough to rely upon to resist the immediate invasion of the geographically 
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adjacent Japan (Chiang to Huang Fu, May 27, 1933, Qin, 1978, Vol. 2: 323). Chiang 
decided to make concessions to Japan, bide his time and wait for the change of the global 
situation. He calculated that the second world war would take place around 1936 (Chiang’s 
remark, Apr. 11, 1932, Ibid: 192-3). The expected WWII would be a turning point for 
China’s destiny. And he anticipated that the European powers and other world powers 
would dispose of Japan jointly after the settlement of European war (Mar. 14, 1936, Qin, 
1978, Vol. 3: 281). Before the outbreak of WWII, China should bide its time, endure the 
humiliation and shame, and avoid major clash with Japan. 
Chiang’s response against Japan’s invasion is a proof that when a local weak power 
is confronted with a much more powerful and locally advantageous local power and could 
not get outside supports, it will make concessions to the latter until its power balance vis-
à-vis the latter improves or it gets more outside supports. 
Such policies seemed to be rational for Chiang and Kuomintang. However, Nanjing’s 
passive resistance to Japan in the period of 1931-1936 was one of the reasons why the 
United States adopt conciliatory policies regarding Japanese invasions of China. As 
Johnson complained, the United States would not intervene on behalf of a nation that was 
wanting of the spirit of self-help (Buhite, 1968: 80). 
The same thing could be said to Soviet Russia. With little to be based upon in its Far 
East territory and the poor agriculture situation in 1931 and 1932, Russia did not have 
 
 326 
enough power to stop Japan’s aggression alone in the Far East. In addition, Russia found 
that the West almost did nothing in preventing Japan’s aggression and it stood alone during 
in the early 1930’s. Russia also suspected that the Western nation were willing to see Japan 
heading north and being involved in military conflict with Russia. In this context, Russia 
also decided to avoid provoking Japan (see, for example, Moore, 1945: 16-7, 22). Although 
Russia started to build up military capability in the East and encouraged migration there, it 
tried to avoid any excuse of provocation with Japan. In spite of Chinese protests, it 
negotiated the sale of C.E.R. to Manchukuo through Japan in 1935. It also tried to settle 
the border disputes between Manchuria and Russian-controlled Mongolia when the border 
disputes came to a head in 1936. 
With Russia’s conciliatory policy against Japan and its suspicion of the West, the 
United States failed to cooperate with Russia in blocking Japan’s invasion of China, despite 
their establishment of diplomatic relations in 1933. 
Japan’s Decision Making in this Period: Invasion with Restraints 
 It is very hard to describe the Japanese decision making in this period as a 
coordinated and centralized one, with the Kuantung army constantly making decisions on 
its own, which usually contrasted the decision making of the Foreign Ministry and Army 
Ministry. The policy of military departments also made different decisions from the civilian 
government. Even different service in the military made different policies. However, the 
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central theme of Japanese strategic objective in this period was relatively clear and constant 
both for civilian leaders, military leaders and the leaders of Kuantung army. That was to 
establish and secure an independent Manchuria and force Nanking, and the international 
society, if possible, to recognize the new status quo, or at least acquiesce the de facto 
independence of Manchuria. Nevertheless, while the military, especially the Kuantung 
army took an opportunist strategy, in general, the civil government tended to be less 
opportunist, though it did not refuse to take advantage of the fruit of the military’s activities.  
In this period, Japan’s invasion of China had been ruthless and constant. It was also 
determined to build a navy powerful enough to deter the Western powers from intervening 
against its expansion. Nevertheless, compared with the period of 1937-1941, when Japan 
was determined to subjugate China to its imperial order, Japan was still willing to restrain 
itself to some extent and at some point, so as to avoid total war with Nanking and to avoid 
provoking the United States and Britain in this period. Such attempts were revealed by 
settlement of the Shanghai Incident in 1932, the Tangku Truce in 1933 and the settlement 
of North China Crisis in 1935. This might be explained by the fact that in this period, Japan 
did not regard the local threat imposed by Russia and outside threat imposed by the United 
States as imminent, and the encroachment upon China was also not as urgent as the case 
after 1937. 
Unlike Manchuria, the United States had substantial interests in Shanghai. The United 
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States responded to the Shanghai Incident by dispatching naval reinforcement to Shanghai 
and ordering American fleet conducting annual maneuvers around Hawaii to stay there. 
Aware of Britain and the United States’ seriousness, Japan was willing to restrain itself. In 
early February, except for the Manchuria issue, Japan shew positive attitude to Stimson’s 
proposal of settlement of the incident (Buhite, 1968: 72-3). However, Stimson’s insistence 
on the Manchuria issue ended the negotiation. With Nanking’s determined resistance, Japan 
realized that they had bungled the situation and started to find a way out without losing 
honor. Matsuoka, then Vice President of the South Manchuria Railway, told Johnson that 
Japan would get out of the Shanghai “mess” but knew no way of doing so with honor 
(Johnson to Stimson, Feb. 21, 1932, FRUS, 1932, Vol. III: 412). After taking Woosung 
Forts on March 2, Japan felt its honor secured, and gave up pursuing the retreating Chinese 
forces and started to negotiate with Nanking. On April 29, Japanese army reluctantly 
accepted the Lampson proposal of the League. At the same time, with the support of the 
British, Chinese retracted their concession on the voluntary restricted zones. Japan 
conceded to Chinese insistence and British pressure (Shimada, 1984: 318). 
With the proceeding of the war along the Great Wall, the Western powers started to 
show concern to the new development. The United States, Britain, France and Germany 
started to sound out Japan’s intentions between mid-April and mid-May in 1933. Japanese 
decision makers of the Foreign Ministry and Chiefs of Army, while tried to avoid provoking 
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the Western powers, also realized that the clash along Great Wall had fought into an 
impasse. As a result, they also tried to negotiate with Nanking. Even the hardliner 
Kwantung army decision makers, fearing of over-reaction of foreign powers, reverted to a 
more conciliatory attitude by mid-May. On May 15, General Muto Akira announced that 
Japan would return to the line of the Great Wall if the Chinese forces abandoned the 
“provocative attitude” and withdrew some distance from the “border” (Shimada, 1983: 46). 
After seizing several favorable positions, Japan started to negotiate the Tangku Truce with 
Nanking. 
The North China crisis after 1933 did not cause major military confrontation between 
China and Japan. Japan’s aim was to force Nanking into recognizing the independence, or 
at least de facto independence of Manchukuo. When Nanking refused to accept such 
condition, Japanese policy makers decided to make North China as a buffer zone between 
Manchuria and the rest of China. However, Japanese policy maker saw no point in 
provoking the Western powers by escalating the North China Crisis. Such attempt was 
revealed by Hayashi Senjuro cabinet’s policy of improvement of relations with the United 
States. The foreign Minister of Hayashi cabinet, Sato Naotake, contended that the current 
difficulties with the United States stemmed from the latter’s concerns with China affair and 
if Japan adopted a “fair” policy towards China, Japan could avoid crisis with the United 
States. Sato also asserted Japan’s intention of maintaining the Open Door policy in Central 
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and South China (Grew to Hull, Mar. 12, FRUS, 1937, Vol. III: 41; see also Crowley, 1966: 
318). Besides, Japanese policy makers also tried to stabilize its relation with Nanking so 
that it could focus on the coming threat from Russian. 
Only several hours after the issue of Amau statement, Amau announced that the 
statement was unofficial to avoid provoking the Western powers. Foreign Minister Hirota 
also explained in a week that Japan had no intention in seeking privileges in China or 
provoke the Western powers. And Japan’s policy was complete observance and support of 
the Nine-Power Treaty (Grew to Hull, Apr. 25, 1937, FRUSJ: 227). Japanese ambassador 
to the United States also told Under Secretary Phillips that Japan upheld the principle of 
Open Door and equal opportunity in China (Saito to Phillips, Apr. 25, 1937, Ibid: 228-9). 
Japan undertook several measures to deescalate the China situation since the end of 
1935 and the beginning of 1936. The first move was to coordinate policy making between 
the civilian government and the military. Accordingly, the Committee on the Current 
Situation was formed in the spring of 1936. With the establishment of the committee, inter-
ministerial accord was reached and the army promised not to escalate the Northern China 
crisis (Crowley, 1966: 293). However, the Committee also set the objective to realize the 
separation of North China as a buffer zone between Manchuria and other part of China on 
August 7, 1936 (International Military Tribunal of the Far East, cite as IMTFE hereinafter, 
Exhibition 216). Nonetheless, by the spring of 1937, Japanese policy makers gave up the 
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effort to separate the whole North China from Nanking and inclined to dissolve the East 
Hopei government so as to readjust the relationship with China towards a more conciliatory 
one. The Army Ministry also gave support to this decision by early 1936 (Shimada, 1983: 
226-7). Given Japan’s relative restraint attitude towards the North China Crisis since late 
1935, from the end of 1935 to mid 1937, although the bilateral relations saw no major 
breakthrough, neither did major military clash or diplomatic confrontation take place 
between the two parties, except for the Mongolia battle fought between Kuomintang forces 
and Japan-supported Mongolian forces in late 1936.  
To sum up, in the period of late 1931 to mid 1937, Japan was determined to create and 
secure an independent Manchuria as a part of its self-sufficient empire. Japan’s ambition 
over Manchuria was unswerving. Even Hayashi cabinet’s policy towards China had been 
known as conciliatory, Sato still proclaimed that he had no intention of future negotiation 
about “Manchukuo”(Grew to Hull, Mar. 12, FRUS, 1937, Vol. III: 41). To achieve this 
objective, Japan had been constantly and ruthlessly encroached upon China. However, 
compared with the next period (Mid 1937 to 1945), Japan was unwilling to risk provoking 
the Western powers and totally breaking off the relationship with Nanking. As a result, 
Japan shew some restraint on itself by reaching truce and some type of agreements with 




In the period of September 1931 to July 1937 could be regarded as a Situation II 
situation. Due to Japanese military built-up, the blow that the Great Depression dealt on 
U.S. economy and the following shrink of U.S. military expenditure and the spread of 
isolationist political atmosphere in the United States, as well as absence of U.S.-British 
policy coordination, the material power balance between Japan and the United States was 
relative balanced compared to the period of 1937 and 1941. Japan also enjoyed near 
preponderance in East Asia, given the weakness of Russia’s political turmoil and China’s 
civil war. This period marked a period of serious crisis between Japan and China and Japan 
and the United States. Japan had been constantly and ruthlessly encroaching upon Chinese 
sovereignty and territorial integrity during this period, leading to wars in Manchuria, 
Shanghai and along the Great Wall. The bilateral relation was challenged by the Manchuria 
Crisis, the Shanghai Incident, Japan’s withdrawal from the League, Amau announcement, 
North China Crisis and Japan’s withdrawal from London Naval Conference. However, all-
out war did not break out between Japan and China during this period, nor did major war 
between Japan and the United States. 
Despite of the major crisis, the United States and Japan did not clash with each other, 
which was in accordance to prove Hypothesis1 and Hypothesis2. 
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The absence of major interregional war in this period could be partially explained by 
U.S. policy makers’ acknowledgement of the limitation of current national capability and 
political infeasibility that it was impossible for the United States to intervene against Japan 
on behalf of China. Given Japan’s fair material capability, local military advantage and 
determination in getting its way in East Asia, it was unlikely to make major concessions 
when faced with a U.S. bluff. It would take the United States several years to get ready to 
confront Japan in East Asia, given Japan’s geographical proximity and military efficiency. 
Although in an all-out war the United States could finally win out, however, military 
advisers calculated that it would take four to six years to defeat Japan with the current level 
preparedness and the costs did not justify the gains of such a war. 
American decision makers were also unwilling to take risks to confront Japan with 
their lukewarm concerns over the developments in East Asia, given its geographical 
distance from the region. President Hoover clearly claimed that he would go to war for 
America but not for the China Crisis. A war with Japan for China did not worth its value, 
and avoiding war with Japan because of China was a consensus among U.S. policy makers. 
Stimson, the hardliner decision maker against Japan, proposed economic sanction against 
Japan for he thought such policy would not lead to war. And this proposal was dropped by 
both Hoover and F.D.R. administration in this period for fear of provoking Japan. Public 
opinion also inclined to a policy of non-intervention. 
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In addition, international cooperation against Japanese bully policy in East Asia was 
also meager in this period. Britain, being much weaker in terms of material capability of 
the United States,  both lack the capability and willingness to confront Japan. Russia, 
bothered with domestic turmoil and international isolation, was rehabilitating through Five 
Year plans and was reluctant in challenging a ascending and powerful Japan in East Asia, 
where its military capability was far from developed.  
The victim of Japan’s invasion — the Kuomintang regime of China, much weaker 
than Japan, preoccupied in defeating the warlord and Communist force, was reluctant in 
challenging Japan alone. Nanking tried to enlist international support for its resistance of 
Japan but found tepid response, which discouraged its efforts and determination in resisting 
Japanese invasion. While Nanking blamed the wanting of international support for its 
failure of resisting Japanese invasion, the United States blamed Nanking’s lack of 
determination in resisting Japanese invasion for its unwillingness of providing substantial 
support to China.  
Lack of capability, willingness, and international cooperation, the United States took 
a passive  policy against Japan’s invasion of China and bully policy in East Asia in this 
period. As a result, the United States adopted a policy of non-provocation towards Japan 
and non-intervention in East Asia, which prevented a major war between the two powers. 
On the other hand, Japan, though determined to incorporate Manchuria into its 
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program of the establishment of a self-sufficient empire, also refrained from pushing too 
hard to provoke the Western powers. 
During this period, Japan’s regional position was not severely challenged by local 
players. China was still mired in civil war and domestic turmoil, which made it a ready 
target for Japan’s predation. Japan had already listed Russia as the top threat to Japanese 
imperial program. However, Russia’s threat was still not imminent in this period, for it 
suffered domestic political turmoil and a grave famine in this period and was preoccupied 
with its development through the Five Year Plans. In addition, its military preparedness in 
the Far East was far from competent. Although these trends started to alter in the spring of 
1936, when Russia was to complete the second Five Year Plan in one year, Japan did not 
take dramatic steps in further securing its imperial system until mid 1937. 
Nor was Japan’s regional position severely challenged by foreign powers. Due to the 
new developments of the late 1920’s and early 1930’s, Japan’s relative material capability 
vis-a-vis the United States had been least unfavorable to Japan in decades. Japan’s relative 
material capability in this period was getting closer to Britain’s in this period. Locally, 
Japan enjoyed advantage over these Western powers in terms of military power and 
logistics, given the Western powers’ domestic turmoil, local disadvantage and relative 
indifference to the developments in East Asia.  
Although such factors gave Japan incentive to encroach upon China and incorporate 
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Manchuria so as to build a self-sufficient empire, Japan felt no imminent urgency to expand 
its empire by forcing Nanking to accept all its requirements in this period. Nor did Japan 
bother to provoke the Western powers into more assertive policy against itself by 
dramatically escalating East Asia Crisis. As a result, in this period, despite Japan ruthless 
invasion of China and Kwantung army’s obstinate invasion program and opportunist 
strategies, the civil government of Japan still restrained itself at certain point to avoid 
further escalation and was not dominated by opportunism, as revealed by the settlement of 
the Shanghai Incident, the Tangku Truce and the North China settlement in late 1935. 
Although Japan was determined to incorporate and secure its gains in Manchuria, it did not 
stick to the policy of separation of the whole North China from Nanking’s rule. Most 
Japanese decision makers reached the consensus that an all-out war with China should be 
avoided. Such policy diametrically contrasted Japan’s policy after July 1937. 
The policies of the United States, Japan, Russia and China in this period were 
generally in line with Hypothesis4. However, the case of Japan challenged the hypothesis 
to some extent, since Kuantung army did adopted opportunist policies in invading China. 
This was due to the fact that in this period, Japanese government could hardly be regarded 
as a unitary actor. While the civil government adopted a relative restrained policy towards 
East Asia, the military, especially the Kuantung army, adopted an opportunist 
encroachment and invasion policy in Northeastern China. 
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The case disapproved Hypothesis4’. Although Japan stepped up its aggression of 
China and expansion in East Asia in this period, and the Kuantung army adopted 
opportunist strategies to encroach upon China, the civil government still tried to restrain 
the actions of the military. In general, the Japanese government kept some extent of 
constraint on its aggression, and was willing to make certain compromise with Nanking to 
avoid over-reactions from the West. Compared with the next period, Japan’s policy in this 
period was much more moderate. Although Japan’s expansion in East Asia and invasion of 
China was to overturn the international order of Washington system in East Asia that the 
United States led to create and threatened the United States trade interests and colonial 
interests in Philippines, the United States did not see such a threat as extremely damaging, 
and was willing to take a passive attitude rather than risk confrontation with Japan through 
actively intervention to fight for its credibility. Although they were sympathetic to Chinese 
government, it only adopted a non-recognition policy regarding Japan’s encroachment on 
Chinese territory. The Nanking government of China, failing in securing international 
intervention, also made concessions to Japan and wait for a better time to recover its lost 
territories.  
The explanatory power of the other additional explanations was also limited compared 
with Hypothesis4 in explaining the course of crisis in this case. 
The imbalance peace theory of E1 had some explanatory power in accounting for the 
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absence of all-out war among regional powers. Russia and China avoided all-out conflict 
with Japan because of their inferior material capability to Japan in East Asia. Japan, while 
embarking upon a course of encroaching upon China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
was also willing to restrain itself to some extent at certain point. However, contrary to the 
prediction of E1, it was the absence of extreme power imbalance between Japan and the 
United States that prevent the United States from adopting more positive and active policies 
against Japan, which prevented a bilateral war. Japan’s relative restraint also originate from 
its feeling of no imminent threat from the West. 
In this period, Japan was clearly a non status quo power. It unscrupulous committed 
direct invasion and war to alter the status quo in East Asia, which flagrantly violated the 
sovereignty of China and breached Nine Power Treaty and the 1928 Kellogg Treaty. On 
the other hand, the United States was a status quo power and the protector of the 
Washington Treaty system in East Asia. However, major war was avoided in this period 
between the two in the period of 1931-1937, which contradict the predictions of E3. 
There was no doubt that E4 could partially apply to U.S.-Japanese relations in this 
period. Economic interdependence between Japan and the United States was high, and U.S. 
decision makers did not want to severe economic relations with Japan when Great 
Depression had already dealt great blow to U.S. economy. Although Stimson and Hornbeck 
attempted to take advantage of Japan’s unproportionate economic dependence of the 
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United States by employing economic sanctions, their proposals were met wide oppositions 
and were turned down. Japan, fear of over-reaction of Western powers, also restrained itself 
to some extent. However, E4 fails in accounting for the situation of the period of 1937 and 
1941, when the bilateral crisis escalated into war despite Japan’s increasing dependence on 
the United States.  
Other alternative explanations might argue that it was because that the Great 
Depression paralyzed the United States for a while that the United States failed to react to 
Japan’s invasion of China. However, such explanation failed to see that the United States 
had been adopting a passive policy against Japanese invasion despite the fact that its 
economy was recovering from Great Depression between 1935 to 1937. In addition, before 
the Great Depression stroke in 1929, Japan violated China’s sovereignty by intervening 
against Chiang’s North March, producing the Ji’nan Incident, and murdering Chang Tso-
lin in May and June 1928. The United States reaction towards these incidents were tepid at 
best. Besides, the negative impact of Great Depression to the United States could be regard 
as a further drop of the United States relative material capability vis-a-vis Japan, which can 
be captured by the BOP variable that this project proposes. 
The isolationist explanations focused on the symptom rather than causes. Isolationist 
attitude towards development in East Asia was actually the result of geographical distance 
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Chapter 6 The Road to Pacific War 
The Pacific War which broke out on December 7, 1941 was a typical example of a 
major war between United States-an outside power with superior material capability and 
Japan-a local power with much less material capability. This case offers a good opportunity 
of testing the Hypothesis4. If the theory holds, one is expected to see that relying on their 
respective advantages, both powers tried to force the other into compromise and denied to 
back down, the result was a spiral of escalation leading to the outbreak of war. 
Unlike the last period (mid 1931 to mid 1937), in the period of mid 1937 and 1941, 
all the parties started to take on a more assertive policy. Nanking no longer tolerate Japan’s 
ruthless invasion of China, Tokyo no longer made efforts to avoid all-out war with China, 
and started to seek allies against its potential rivals and adversaries. Washington started to 
adopt harsher policies on Japan and escalated economic sanctions gradually. British and 
Dutch also started to harden their policies against Japan. Although Russia and Japan signed 
neutrality pact in April 1941, the relations of the two powers had been in constant 
deterioration in late 1930’s, as revealed by the severe border clashes and wars in this period. 
In this period, Japan was mired in the China quagmire, which enormously drained its 
material power. As a result, in this period, Japan had become even more dependent on the 
United States for energy and resources. On the other hand, Japan’s rivals and adversaries 
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were gaining power, despite the fact that Japan still held near-preponderance power in East 
Asia. Since 1936, Nanking had enhanced its control of South China and reached agreement 
with the Communist Party. China’s military power was also growing. Russia had completed 
its second Five Year Plan in 1937, which substantially boosted its national power. The 
United States had been recovering from the Great Depression since about mid 1930’s. 
Despite the 1937 economic downturn, the United States was rapidly restoring its material 
capability. Its military strength also increased rapidly through 1938 and 1940 naval acts. 
The United States also started to fortify its pacific basis, especially in the Philippines. 
This Chapter also finds, relying on the recovered material capability and with the 
request of its local allies, Washington started to push hard on Tokyo in negotiations and 
refuse to back down. Many American decision makers were arrogant and believed that 
given the large power gap between the two states, Japan was unlikely to pick a fight with 
the United States, even war broke out, it would be a easy win for America. American public 
opinion was of similar thoughts. 
U.S. allies in the Western Pacific, after being aware of U.S. intention to support them 
against the Japanese, also became determined to resist Japan’s requests, speeding up 
Japan’s plan of invasion.  
On the other hand, Japanese negotiators was willing to make concessions during the 
negotiation, only to find American negotiators put up with new demands. Japanese decision 
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makers were aware that Japan was unable to defeat a much more powerful United States 
in a war. However, they calculated the United States would be preoccupied with European 
affairs, while taking advantage of its locality, Japan would swiftly defeat U.S. East Asian 
allies and consolidated its power base in French Indochina and Dutch East India, which 
would provide Japan with resources to sustain a protracted war. With the fall of U.S. East 
Asian allies and the prospects of protracted war, its willingness to fight would gradually 
wear thin. Out of diffidence and relying upon United States’ preoccupation in European 
affairs, their perceived local advantage upon the United States and United States’ lack of 
willingness to fight a protracted war in East Asia, Japanese decision makers were 
dominated by opportunism and attacked Pearl Harbor. 
Relying on their own perceived advantages, all sides were unwilling or unable to make 
major concessions. The American arrogance met the diffidence, perception of local 
advantage and opportunist policies of Japan, which ultimately led to the outbreak of war.  
The Courses of Crisis Escalation and the Road towards the Pacific War 
The escalation between the United States and Japan had been relatively slow until mid 
1941. However, before mid 1941, there were also several major escalations between the 
two parties.  
China is at the center of East Asia question and Japan’s large-scale invasion of China 
after the Lu’gou (Marco Polo) Bridge Incident, which took place on September 7, 1937, 
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especially Japan’s attack of Shanghai, was a major threat to U.S. open door policy, 
nondiscrimination trade principle and its commercial interests and influence in China and 
East Asia. President Roosevelt delivered the “Quarantine Speech” on October 5 as a moral 
support to Chinese resistance against Japan. However, this policy did not lead to major 
escalations. Hull instructed ambassador to China, Nelson Johnson, to urge Chinese foreign 
ministry not to reject any Japanese proposal but to keep open the “door to negotiations”. 
Hull considered Japanese invasion of China is undesirable but not intolerable, and it was 
not worth a confrontation with Japan for something less than a vital national interest (Berle, 
1973: 137-8).  
The State Department’s responses to the USS Panay Incident, Japan’s control of 
settlement in Shanghai, Tianjing and Guangzhou, Japan’s continuous invasion of China 
were also quite weak. And Hull made great efforts in obstructing and delaying the embargo 
upon Japan. Generally, the United States “had never considered China important enough 
to justify a fight” (Utley, 2005: 72). U.S. aid to China was minimal, especially before Pearl 
Harbor, which prevented rapid escalations between it and Japan for the time. 
However, the United States started to react to Japan’s invasions with more positive 
efforts since mid 1938. Hull imposed “moral embargo” in July 1938 and with the 
cooperation of U.S. airplane-related manufacturers, Japan could no longer import aircraft-
related and aeronautical products from the United States (Peace and War, cited as PW 
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hereafter, 1983: 89). On September 26, 1939, United States gave formal notice for 
termination of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan (FRUS, 1939, the 
Far East, Volume III: 558). And in January 1940 the termination went into effect. These 
measures were gradual and more symbolic than substantial. Their effect on Japan was 
limited. 
The real blow to Japan came on July 26, 1940. The United States started to require 
license on petroleum above eighty-seven octane, steel and scrap iron on Japan. To secure 
strategic resources and deter the United States, Japan launched the southern advance to the 
French Indochina between August and September 1940, asked for new demands from 
Dutch East India regarding strategic resources by sending Kobayashi and Yoshizawa 
missions, and signed the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940. France was compelled to 
allow Japanese occupation of Haiphong and establishment of Japanese bases in Tonkin. 
The reaction of the United States was lukewarm. It offered only moral support for French 
Indochina and suggested Dutch East Indian companies to cooperate with Japan within 
some limits (Feis, 1950: 98-9). However, in December, iron ore, pig iron, ferro alloys and 
several semifinished goods and finished steel products were added to the U.S. control list 
to Japan. By the end of July 1941, Japan could barely import from the United States 
resources other than crude oil (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, cited as 
FRUSJ hereinafter, Vol. II: 222-3). However, by this time, no oil embargo was applied upon 
 
  348 
Japan by the United States. 
 On the other hand, Japan continued the negotiation with the Dutch Indies to prepare 
for further uncertainties(Van Mook, 2011: Chapter IV). Senior Japanese policy makers had 
talked about separating Indies from Holland. Negotiation opportunities with the United 
States was also sought by the second Konoe cabinet. On November 7, Konoe Fumimaro, 
the prime minister, endorsed the view of Nomura Kichisaburo, the Japanese ambassador to 
the United States, to avoid taking unlimited hard line against the United States and to take 
prudent use of the Tripartite Pact (Tsunoda, 1994: 16-17). And the talks between Father 
James M. Drought, Vicar General of the Roman Catholic Foreign Mission Society of 
America at Maryknoll and Japanese director of the Industrial Federation Central Bank, 
Ikawa Tadao started on November 29, which became a major channel of communication 
between Japan and the United States until April 1941. 
Since the spring of 1941, the paces towards confrontation rapidly took up speed. On 
April 16, when Hull brought up the “four principles”, which included “territorial integrity 
and sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, equality of opportunity, maintenance 
of the status quo in the Pacific” (Memorandum of Hull, Apr. 16, 1941, FRUSJ, 1931-41, 
Vol. II: 407). This was the first time that the United States officially stated its principles in 
dealing with Japan, though without stating its concrete demands. On June 6, Hull handed 
Nomura an oral statement, which pronounced issues that had estranged U.S.-Japan 
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relations: Japan’s relations with the Axis, China issues and peace in the Pacific area (Hull, 
1948: 1008-9). These issues were confirmed, explained in detail (for example, withdrawal 
of troops from China) and expanded (for example, nondiscrimination in international 
commerce was added) in Hull’s June 21 proposal (PW, 1983: 677-83). Nomura later framed 
these requirement as three issues: Japan’s relations to the Axis; the retention of Japanese 
troops in North China and Inner Mongolia, and application of the principle of 
nondiscrimination in commercial relations (Pearl Harbor Attack, cited as PHA hereafter, 
1946, Part 12: 21-2). The United States had been insisting on these principles and the solve 
of the issues as the condition of a U.S.-Japanese agreement until the outbreak of the war. 
Since then, U.S.-Japanese talks had become more intense than before, with proposals and 
counter-proposals produced from each side. However, their differences was never abridged.  
Because of both Batavia’s uncooperative attitude regarding the provision of resources 
to Japan and the breakdown on bilateral negotiation in mid-June, and Washington’s 
uncertain attitude to the ongoing U.S.-Japan talk, to secure the provision of rubber and tin, 
to establish bases for further expansion in Southeast Asia, and to coerce the United States 
into negotiation, in late July, Japan advanced to South Indochina, which was decided by 
several liaison conferences in June (Ike, 1967: 43-4, 60-1, 72). Unexpected by Japanese 
policy makers, within a week of learning Tokyo’s new move, the United States froze 
Japanese assets on July 18. And on August 2, it imposed oil embargo on Japan as a response. 
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Britain and Dutch immediately followed suit. Dismayed by this new development and lack 
of progress in the talk with the United States, on the September 3 Liaison conference senior 
Japanese decision makers decided to make preparations to wage war against the United 
States if negotiation did not produce results before a certain deadline.  
Japanese diplomatic efforts became even more intensive after that. Though Japan 
extended the deadline of military action several times and the United States was well aware 
of the deadline through MAGIC, no result came out of the bilateral talks. Hull gave up the 
modus vivendi on the U.S. side and presented his November 26 notes, which included 
multilateral nonaggression pact, immediate unconditional withdrawal of Japanese forces 
from China, refusal of acknowledge any Chinese government other than the Chiang Kai-
shek regime and abrogation of the Tripartite Pact (Hull to Nomura, Nov. 26, 1941, FRUSJ, 
1931-41, Vol. II: 769-70). These contents of the notes could find no counterpart from any 
previous U.S. proposals and counter-proposals. This note was regarded by Japanese 
decision makers as a harsh-conditioned ultimatum, the U.S.-Japanese relation reached the 
point of no return, and Japan decided finally to strike. 
Existing Explanation of Origins of the Pacific War 
The origins and causes of the Pacific War on December 7, 1941 have raised academic 
interests ever since the war broke out. The war is special because of the enormous material 
power capacity disparity between the weaker attacker-Japan, and the stronger victim-the 
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United States. Besides, both sides wanted to avoid the war at the first place but found 
themselves unable to help but fell further down in the escalation spiral. 
Many politicians regards Japanese action as merely a mad or desperate one, giving 
America’s overwhelming power over Japan. To use Congressman Hamilton Fish’s words, 
Japan’s action was no difference from committing “military, naval, and national suicide”. 
“Whom the God would destroy they first make mad” (quoted in Sagan, 1989: 323), Japan 
was destroyed in the Pacific war rightly because of its madness. Many scholars also argue 
that the then Japanese decision makers were irrational, seized by desperation and a sense 
of fatalism. Is that true? If not, what factors lead to the final decisions of attacking Pearl 
Harbor on the Japanese part? Apart from the man, bureaucratic and state level causes, is 
there a system level cause of the Pacific War, which to some extent affect the behavior 
patterns of the related actors? 
There are many scholars trying to explain why Japan chose to launch an attack against 
a far wealthier and powerful adversary and blundered into a full scale war with it in 1941.  
Many scholars argue that the war has been a result of security dilemma and the failure 
of deterrence. Both sides wanted to avoid war and tried to deter the other party from further 
escalation, however, the policies that were carried out by the two sides did not prevent, if 
not accelerated, the gradual escalation. Japan joined Germany and Italy in the Tripartite 
Pact and widened its resources base by marching into Indochina to deter American from 
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obstructing Japanese course of establishing New Order in East Asia, while the United 
States transferred its naval base from California to Pearl Harbor in mid 1940 and fortified 
Philippines in late 1941 in order to deter further Japan southern advance. All these measures 
unintentionally provoked the other party, increased the fear rather than allay it of the other 
party and led a road downwards towards war. Scott Sagan argues that it is the failure of 
mutual deterrence due to miscalculation and unintentional provocations on both parts that 
led to the final outbreak of the pacific war (Sagan, 1989). 
Other scholars argue that it was because of the inflexible policy of the United States 
that escalated the situation and finally led to war. For example, Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull’s stubborn refusal to accept a modus vivendi in place of a comprehensive agreement 
in the months leading up to the war is said to be a direct cause of the war (Langer and 
Gleason, 1953: 869-872). However, their explanation of why America adopted such an 
inflexible policy are different. Revisionist scholars argue that F.D.R. adopted inflexible 
policies to maneuver Japan into attacking the United States so that the United States could 
get rid of isolationism and find a reason of getting involved in the global war (Tansill, 
1952). Some realist scholars, however, blamed Hull for adopting a idealistic, legalistic and 
moralistic approach of foreign policy that finally made Japan had its back on the wall 
(Schroeder, 1958, Chapter IX). Still, there were scholars argued that many hardliners in the 
United States did not expect the Japan would attack the United States and the U.S. could 
 
  353 
have a relative free hand to escalate, given the the disparity in strength between Japan and 
the U.S. (Hosoya, 1968: 111-112). 
Another major group of scholars use prospect theory to explain the outbreak of the 
Pacific War. Japanese military leaders considered that war was inevitable and the “window 
of opportunity” was closing to Japan (Van Evera, 1999: 89-94). Japan started to use 
stockpiled material in 1941 and Japanese military officers warned that “our Empire’s 
national power is declining day by day” and “there is no alternative but to go to war now” 
(Ike, 1967: 131, 207). Prospect theorists also argue that since decision makers perceived 
that they were on the losing ground, they became more risk-acceptant, and decided that a 
war earlier was better than later (Levy, 1997). A related argument is that Japanese decision 
makers were under a condition of desperation and were possessed by the feeling of fatalism, 
and “it is easier to make decisions in the face of uncertainty if one is fatalist” (Ike, 1961: 
xxvi). 
Still other scholars argue that the unwanted escalation is a result of bureaucratic 
politics and military groups controlling the foreign strategy agenda. Some bureaucrats in 
the United States drove her along the way of escalation with Japan by imposing economic 
sanctions against Japan without considering the implications for the whole diplomatic 
picture. For example, Dean Acheson inadvertently blundered a limited freeze into a total 
embargo, to the frustration of F.D.R. and many other senior decision makers (Feis, 1950: 
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242-48). President Roosevelt was ineffective in coordinating his own staffs. F.D.R. and 
Secretary of State Hull were also responsible for failure of holding the bureaucracy in 
control, and the foreign policy establishment in the administration was a “snake pit” (Utley, 
2005, especially p. xv). On the other hand, in Japan, the atmosphere of gekokujo (rule from 
the below) permeated, and the war rattling mid-level officers had great influence on the 
direction of foreign policy and strategy, and they bent Japanese policies towards war for 
their parochial interests (Asada, 1973; Snyder, 1991). 
T.V. Paul, however, argues that Japan dared to attack the United States because the 
strategic calculations of the Japanese decision makers were featured by short-term 
considerations, what they expected was a traditional war on the model of Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-5 (Paul, 1994: 69). 
Some scholars argue from a cultural and psychological perspective. There are scholars 
arguing that Japanese culture is a status-sensitive one, and before the Pacific War, it had to 
make a choice between the two “repugnant alternatives” of waging war with a far stronger 
nation and relinquishment of and empire, which also means the “destruction of what had 
come to constitute the nation’s self-image” (Pyle, 2007:203), and ultimately, Japan opted 
for the first alternative. Japan refused to surrender to the sanctions of the U.S. because of 
its risk-taking culture and “samurai do-or-die” spirit (see, for example, Grew to Hull, Dec. 
1, FRUS, 1939, Vol. III: 606-607). Richard Lebow claims that it is Japanese decision 
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makers’ wishful thinking-that a war with the United States may be avoided, for the 
American public would became unfavorable to such a war when they became aware of the 
potential cost of such a war-that led Japan to launch the Pearl Harbor attack which, on the 
contrary, rallied the American public under the flag and brought the Unites States into war 
(Lebow, 1981: 274). There are also scholars argue that, the war between Japan and the 
United States, in some Japanese leaders’ perception, is a culture war between spiritual and 
moral Eastern culture represented by Japan and materialist corrupt Western culture 
represented by U.S. that is inevitable (Dower, 1987).   
All these theories help to account for some aspect of the whole picture. However, most 
of these explanations focus on the immediate, or direct causes of the war, rather than the 
underling, permissive or structural courses of war (Waltz, 1959). Instead of explaining why 
the war took place, these theories detail the conditions under which the war took place and 
describe how the conflict escalated. For example, the failure of deterrence explanation only 
describes the process and course of escalation, but they stop short of explaining the 
underlying forces that drove the escalation and failure of deterrence. The prospect and 
window of opportunity theory explained the timing, rather than the cause of war. 
Bureaucratic and individual level analyses did not fully explain why the decision-making 
groups or military groups were uncompromising in the two countries. Cultural explanations, 
although plausible, are often used as propaganda tools. In foreign and strategic decision 
 
  356 
making, culture considerations are often secondary. Scholars criticizing the inflexible 
policy of the United States are usually misleading in explaining the inflexibility of U.S. 
policy towards Japan. Chihiro Hosoya is right that it is due to the enormous power disparity 
between the U.S. and Japan that emboldened the hardliners in the U.S.. He was also right 
that Japan’s activities were risk-taking, however, he did not elaborate the rationale behind 
the risk-taking policies. 
To understand the underlying and permissive courses of war, a structural model 
analysis based on rational, or bounded rational actor assumption is helpful.  
The Dyadic Power Distribution 
Power gap between the United States, the strategic regional power, or the outside 
power and Japan-the locally near preponderant power-was huge before the Pacific War, 
making the power distribution of U.S.-East Asia interregional system a extremely 
imbalanced one. 
In the period leading to the Pacific War (mid 1937 to late 1941), with the United States 
recovering from the negative impact of the Great Depression and starting its military built-
up, the gap of U.S.-Japanese material capability ceased narrowing and started to widening 
again. According to the Correlates of War (COW) data, the Comprehensive Index of 
National Capability (CINC) score for the United States is 3.67 times of that of Japan in 
1941. The U.S.-Japanese CINC ratio had been declining since late 1920’s, from a high 
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point o 6.47 in 1926 to the nadir of 2.89 in 1938. However, since 1938, the ratio had been 
picking up again. In 1942. the ratio was restored to the level of early 1930’s (4.65). 
 
Figure 3: Ratio of CINC Score of the United States and Japan, 1926-1942 
Japan in 1941 was in a state of full mobilization while the United States in that year 
was far from being mobilized. If the United States were fully mobilized, the power 
disparity between it and Japan would far exceed 3.67 times. In addition, two important 
material capability factors in the COW data are total population and urban population. 
These two factors moderated the CINC score of the two parties. Since in the 1930’s and 
1940’s the ratio of total and urban population of the United States and that of Japan was 
less dramatic (a little bit over two times) comparing with other index. The gap between the 
two countries were far more dramatic in terms of index such as Iron and Steel Consumption 
(ISC) and Primary Energy Consumption (PEC). During 1932-1941, the average ratio of 
ISC between the United States and Japan is 7.70:1, while that of PEC is 14.95:1. GDP of 
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for Japan was 196 billion dollars (Harrison, 1998: 10). Relative shares of total world 
manufacturing output of the United States in 1938 was 28.7 percent, while that value of 
Japan was 3.8 percent (Hillmann, 1952: 439). H.C. Hillmann calculated the relative war 
potential of the powers in 1937, the score of the United States was 41.7 percent, while that 
of Japan was 3.5 percent (Hillmann, 1952: 446). 
Moreover, the change of CINC score ratio could not capture some essential change in 
the U.S.-Japanese power gap. Japan’s economic reliance on the United States was high 
before the Pacific War. In 1936, Japan took 8 percent of America’s export, while America 
took over 20 percent of that of Japan’s, and about all of the items the United States bought 
form Japan the United States can get along without (Morgenthau, Book 87: 384, 386). 
Besides, Japan highly relied on the United States to obtain the energy and resources it need 
for industrial development. In 1936, 66 percent of Japan’s imported petroleum came from 
the United States (Hosoya, 1968: 114). Asymmetric interdependence between the two 
states increase the power of the party which is less dependent over the party which is more 
dependent because the former is less vulnerable and sensitive to the latter’s actions 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977).  
With Japan entrapped in the China quagmire, its demand for resources and energy also 
soared. As a result, its dependency on the United States for resources and energy increased 
sharply, giving the United States even more leverage on Japan regarding to the relative 
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vulnerability and sensitivity.  
There was no denial that the military power of Japan before the Pacific War was quite 
strong. In the period of 1931 and 1937, the military power gap between Japan and the 
United States was narrowed to some extent. The aircraft production of Japan in 1939 was 
4467, while that for the United States was only 2195 (Overy, 1980: 21). The total naval 
tonnage of Japan in 1937 was 874,000, not far from that number of the United States, which 
stood at 1099,000 (Wright, 1942: 670).  
However, with the economic recovery of the United States, the FDR administration 
started to increase its military expenditure, and such efforts met much less oppositions in 
the Congress. These efforts gradually arrested the narrowing of U.S.-Japan military gap. 
The United States had begun to recover from Great Depression since about the mid 
1930’s. Actually, after the Great Depression reached its climax and U.S. economy its nadir 
in 1933, U.S. economy had already started to bounce back with the initial programs of the 
New Deal. However, while the banking system was stabilized, the economic downturn was 
still not forestalled, the unemployment rate was still above 20 percent in 1935 (20.1 
percent). In 1937, the rate fell to about 15 percent (14.3 percent). But the recession in 
September 1937 led to the increase of the rate in 1938 (19 percent) again. The rate fell 
under 10 percent in 1941 (9.9 percent, for unemployment rate data, see Table III, CSR-12, 
Labor Section, Economic Division, 1982). In 1933, the GDP of the United States ($587.1 
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billion, in 1987 dollars) was about 70 percent of that of 1929 ($821.8 billion). In 1936 and 
1937, the GDP was restored to about the level of 1929 ($777.9 billion and $811.4 billion 
respectively). Because of the recession of mid 1937, the GDP of 1938 saw a decline, 
however, the GDP in 1939 surpassed the that of 1929 (for the figures of GDP, see 
Department of Commerce of the United States, 1993: 3). Starting from March 1936, 
commercial loans reversed its decline since 1929. The recession of September 1937 did not 
last long, and recovery started off again in the spring of 1938.  
Generally speaking, since mid or late 1938, the economic strength of the United States 
started to be restored to the pre-Great Depression level. Since this time, the United States 
also took on a path of constant economic expansion. 
Accompanied by the economic recovery and expansion was the increase of U.S. 
military expenditure. Figure 4 reveals that after starting from 1935, the military expenditure 
of the United States had been increasing substantially. After 1939, it had been increasing 
even more precipitously. Given Japan’s conversion into war-time economy in 1937, such 
increase did not make U.S. military expenditure immediately surpass that of Japan. 
However, starting from 1940, the military expenditure gap between the United States and 
Japan had been widening inexorably in the former’s favor again (data from COW database). 
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Figure 4: U.S. Expenditure and Ratio of U.S.-Japan Military Expenditure 
Moreover, the naval balance between the United States and Japan was also turning to 
the former’s advantage because its pass of 1938 Naval Act and 1940 Two Ocean Navy Act.  
However, in terms of comprehensive national material power and war fighting 
potential, the gap between the United States and Japan was more enormous. There is little 
doubt that the United States enjoyed huge advantage in terms of balance of power over 
Japan before the outbreak of Pacific War in 1941. 
Before 1938 Naval Acts, U.S. naval power increased slightly due to the Vinson-
Trammell Naval Act of 1934. That Act authorized the building up of naval strength to the 
1922 Treaty limits. The 1938 Naval Acts, both a result of economic recovery and Japan’s 
invasion of China and Germany’s remilitarization efforts, one the other hand, mandated to 
increase the U.S. navy strength by 20 percent (see U.S. Statutes at Large, 52 Stat. 75th 
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mandated to increase the U.S. Navy strength by 70 percent (see U.S. Statutes at Large, 54 
Stat. 76th Cong., 3rd Sess.: 779-80). The 1940 Naval Act was the largest naval procurement 
bill in U.S. history, if not in world history. With the pass of these acts, the naval strength of 
the United States was to overwhelm that of Japan in a short period, making the overall 
material capability balance between the United States and Japan more imbalanced in favor 
of the United States. 
In addition, U.S. diplomatic position in East Asia was also much improved vis-a-vis 
an increasingly isolated Japan in that region, as the United States got allies and partners in 
that region. Encouraged by U.S. recovery and its pressure on Japan, British, Dutch and 
Chinese policy makers became more positive in resisting Japanese demands and invasion. 
Chiang persisted in resisting the ruthless Japanese aggression in spite of the loss of massive 
territory to Japanese invaders. Dutch refused to meet further Japanese demands for oil and 
resources in mid 1941. Most significantly, British, Dutch and Americans started to 
coordinate their policies against Japan in the spring of 1941 as they held the Singapore 
Chief of Staff Conference, which set the “geographical limits on land and sea beyond which 
Japanese forces could not be permitted to go without great risk to the defenders” (Feis, 
1950: 170). On the other hand, Japan was increasingly isolated in East Asia. 
On the other hand, as of the local power distribution in East Asia, Japan still had near 
power preponderance in this period, although its relatively power vis-a-vis China and 
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Russia had been in steadily declined since the mid of last period.  
After the Nomonhan ceasefire between Soviet Union and Japan on September 16, 
1939, the Soviet Union turned its attention to Europe. Only one day after the ceasefire, 
Soviet Union invaded Poland, and later Baltic states and Finland. In 1939, the Soviets 
launched war on Finland, which generated poor results. The Soviets expanded with 
expectation that these new areas would become a battlefront against Hitler’s Germany 
(Ulam, 1976: 289). Soviets’ focus on Europe gave Japan free hands in East Asia. The fall 
of France and Germany’s air offensives against Britain in mid 1940 further weakened 
Japan’s rivalries in East Asia. Despite the quagmire of China, Japan’s power advantage in 
East Asia was clear in East Asia, especially since September 1939. 
However, in this period, Japan’s advantage in the region was in constant shrink 
compared with the last period. Russia’s material capability had been substantially 
strengthened with its conclusion of the second Five Year Plan in 1937 and the commence 
of the third Five Year Plan. Soviet third Five Year Plan generated relative limited results in 
terms of its original objectives. However, since it became focused on military preparation, 
it substantially boosted Moscow’s military power. Russia was also reinforcing its military 
capabilities in the Far East by increasing the investment of transportation in the Far East in 
its first Five-Year plans (Moore, 1945: 25). 
At the same time, Nanking’s strength was also enhanced in this period. Chiang 
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strengthened his control of several central and western China provinces, such as Sichuan, 
Guizhou and Hunan as he waged war and expelled Communist forces from these provinces. 
He also established his own influence by appointing his own local leaders in these 
provinces during 1934 and 1935. With the settlement of Guangdong and Guangxi Incident 
in August and September 1936, and the settlement of Xi’an Incident in December in the 
same year, Chiang reached agreements with Guangdong and Guangxi warlords and the 
Communist Party. The power of the central government of China over the local 
governments, especially in South China, was enhanced (see Eatman, 2008: 147-51). The 
military strength and industrial capability of China also was also enhanced by mid 1937. 
In 1931, there were less than 100 airplanes, this figure increased to 855 by 1936 (Zhang, 
1977, Vol. II: 461). Although China’s heavy industry was still extremely poor, its morale 
was raised by Chiang’s centralization efforts and the fair growth of its industrial and 
military strength. 
To sum up, in the period of 1937 to 1941, United States managed to forestall the 
closing gap between the material capability of itself and that of Japan, and the material 
capability gap between the two was widening again in the United States’ favor. In East Asia, 
although Japan still enjoyed material capability preponderance against the Soviets and 
Chinese, the advantage had been in steady decline since the mid of the last period (1931-
1937). Despite the increase of Nanking’s economic and military strength and Russian 
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developments in East Asia, their material capability was dwarfed by that of Japan. Other 
local powers in East Asia, outshone by the material capability of Japan, was more dwarfed 
by that of the United States. These facts further made the power distribution of U.S.-East 
Asian interregional system a extremely imbalanced one in favor of the outside power-the 
United States. 
American Decision Making: An Arrogant Power Refusing to Make Concessions 
During the American-Japanese talks in 1941, the Japanese side made several 
concessions, however, the United States refused to budge from its principles, which 
contributed to the breakdown of the bilateral talk and the outbreak of war. 
Regarding to the issue of Tripartite Pact, Japanese May 12 draft stipulated that Japan 
remains obligation of military assistance to Axis Power, however, “its alliance with the 
Axis Powers was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the nations which are not at 
present directly affected by the European War from engaging in it” (PW, 1983: 658). In the 
early stage of negotiation, Japan had insisted that the United States kept out of the European 
War (see, for example, Konoe, 1946: VII). However, Japan’s June 15 draft stated that 
“Japan would not be obliged to act under the Tripartite Pact” if the United States “became 
involved in the European War through measures of self-defense” (Hull, 1948: 1010). 
Konoe even answered Hull’s oral suggestion (actually a demand) of changing the cabinet 
on June 21 by kicking Matsuoka, who was an ardent supporter of Axis relations, out of the 
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third Konoe cabinet on July 16. In the September 6 proposal, Japan recognized U.S. attitude 
to the European war “be decided by the concepts of protection and self-defense”, and, “in 
case the United States should participate in the Europeans War, the interpretation and 
execution of the Tripartite Pact by Japan shall be independently decided” (PW, 1983: 735-
6). The independence of action was confirmed in Plan A of November 5. Kuruso Saburo, 
Japan’s special envoy to the United States, further declared on November 17 that a U.S.-
Japanese understanding would “outshine” the Tripartite Pact (Tsunoda, 1994: 308). 
Regarding to the China issue. Japanese May 12 draft said nothing about withdrawal 
of troops. However, in the September 6 proposal, it was stated that upon the rehabilitation 
of normal relations between Japan and China, “Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces 
from China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between Japan and 
China” (PW, 1983: 736). In Plan A, the withdrawal of troops was specified: except for 
Inner Mongolia, North China and Hainan, Japanese troops “will begin withdrawal 
simultaneously with the establishment of peace in accordance with arrangements to be 
made between Japan and China”, and for the “necessary period of time” in the three 
sections, Japanese decision makers “have in mind 25 years” (Ike, 1967: 209-10). 
There was no mention of nondiscrimination in commercial relations in the May 12 
proposal either. In the September 6 proposal, however, it was stipulated that “the economic 
activities of the United States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an 
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equitable basis” (PW, 1983: 736). In Plan A, “will recognize the application of the principle 
of nondiscrimination in the entire Pacific region, including China, if this principle is 
applied throughout the world” (Ike, 1967: 210).  
Contrary to Japan’s concessions, the United States was putting forward new 
conditions on each of its proposals or statements. On the June 21 proposal, the U.S. put 
forward its principles of negotiation: “considerations of protection and self-defense” 
towards the European war, the commercial nondiscrimination principle, and Japan should 
withdraw troops from China “as promptly as possible” (PW, 1983: 678-80). In reply to 
Japan’s September 6 proposal, Hull handed a statement to Nomura, suggesting vaguely that 
Japan should further clarify on the “indeterminate period” of withdrawal of troops from 
China, on withdrawal from Indochina and on its attitude towards Tripartite Pact (Ibid: 759-
60). During the talks on November 17, 18 and 20 (after Plan A was rejected on November 
15), the U.S. side further implied that Japan should abrogate the Tripartite Pact and their 
suspicion of the New Order in East Asia as a whole (Hull said that both the New Order and 
GEACPS were “slogans of the Nazi type”), that Japan’s withdrawal from China should be 
more swift and complete, and that “fundamental principles” should be established (Ibid: 
789-99). In Hull’s November 26 note, further new and harsh conditions, such as 
multilateral nonaggression pact, “immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Japanese 
forces and police from China and French Indochina”, no independent Manchukuo, 
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abrogation of Tripartite Pact, renouncement of Japan’s extraterritorial rights in China, were 
added (Ibid: 810-2). 
From these facts it seemed that while Japan was eager to reach an agreement, even a 
modus vivendi with the United States, the United States was in no hurry to reciprocate. It 
usually used vague words, spoke of principles and attached new conditions to decline 
Japanese proposals, or push Japan into offering further concessions. Hull’s insistence that 
Japan was intransigent in making concessions was hypocritical, and his insistence on 
abrogation of the Tripartite was confusing. Through the MAGIC interceptions, he must 
have known Germany was displeased of the Japan-U.S. talk, however, the Japanese 
government, not even ignored Germany’s concerns, but also kicked out the No. 1 supporter 
of the Pact, Matsuoka from the cabinet in July. British Ambassador to Japan Robert Craigie 
reports on September 30, 3 days after the anniversary of the Pact, that “KONOE sincerely 
desires to steer clear of Axis dangers”, he also complained that “while the Japanese want 
speed and cannot yet afford to go beyond generalizations, the Americans seem to be playing 
for time and to demand the utmost precision in definition before agreeing to any contract 
for a step of rapprochement” (Craigie to Eden, International Military Tribunal of the Far 
East, cited as IMTFE hereafter, transcripts, 25848-50, Doc. No. 1844, Def. No. 2908). 
Decision makers in the United States, including Hull and F.D.R. should have also learned 
the wane of the Pact through these developments (Jone, 1954: 315, fn. 1). Grew specifically 
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reported that both the third Konoe and Tojo cabinet attempted to “correct the error of 1940” 
(Grew to Hull, November 3, 1941, FRUSJ, Vol. II: 702). Stanley Hornbeck, special adviser 
of Hull and the former director of Division of Far East (FE) of State Department, deemed 
that “Japan is not helping Germany except in a negative way” (Hornbeck Memorandum, 
September 5, FRUS, 1941, Vol. IV: 427). 
 From this evidence it was safe to say that in the U.S.-Japan talk, the real intransigent 
party was the United States rather than Japan. So why the United States was so reluctant in 
making concessions? 
Confident of power superiority over Japan 
Many U.S. decision makers believed that U.S. power superiority over Japan and 
Japan’s difficulties in the China quagmire rendered concession to the latter unnecessary. 
Japan dare not wage war against the United States, and it was up to Japan to make 
concessions. Even Japan waged war against the United States, it would not be too difficult 
to defeat Japan.  
For quite a long time, West Pacific was not the main theater that the United States 
decision makers attached great importance. FDR, while focused on the European affairs, 
left the Pacific affairs mainly to Hull. The Department of State followed a midway line of 
“no confrontation, no withdrawal, no assent” (Utley, 2005: 10) with regard to Japan’s 
invasion of China. From the last section, we could also see that U.S. reactions to the 
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developments of East Asia was relatively lukewarm.  
However, with the United State gradually getting rid of the negative impact of the 
Great Depression and widening the material capability gap between itself and Japan since 
late 1930’s, senior decision makers in the United States had become more contemptuous 
of Japanese power than the period of 1931 to 1937. As early as October 1939, when the 
military presence of the United States in East Asia was still relatively weak, Grew warned 
F.D.R. that if U.S. put sanctions on Japan with regard to oil, it was likely that Japan would 
take southern advance to take the Dutch East Indies. The president replied contemptuously 
that “Then we could easily intercept her fleet” (Feis, 1950: 41). 
Upon Japan’s advancement to southern French Indochina on July 24, the United States 
announced freezing of Japanese assets in the United States on the next day and oil embargo 
on August 2. What President Roosevelt had in mind initially was a freezing limited in 
nature that would not result in a total embargo, which might prompt Japan to strike at the 
Dutch Indies, U.S. possession in East Asia or even the United States itself-the very situation 
that the United States tried to avoid. FDR decided that “Funds for the export licenses would 
be released in accordance with the amounts Japan should be allowed to have; in the case 
of oil this was low octane in 1935–36 amounts” (Utley, 2005: 153). U.S. decision makers 
believed that this freezing would deter Japan from further expansion. Given Japan’s 
reliance on the United States for its resources, especially on oil, FDR thought that this 
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policy was shrewd and would be effective. 
However, in the real implementation of the freezing policy, it was not hard to find that 
what initially intended as a limited freezing effort actually turned into a total embargo that 
the President had wanted to avoid, due to the administrative procedures. 
Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary, took up the responsibility to turning Roosevelt’s 
ideas for a limited freeze into a actual plan, and he gave the task of drafting the detailed 
directions to Dean Acheson, the then Assistant Secretary of State. On August 5, Acheson 
met officials from the Treasury and Justice departments, astonished by how much oil of 
Japan was eligible to buy under the freezing guidelines, they agreed not to release funds to 
Japan for the purchase of items for which Export control had already issued licenses. These 
efforts were actually a de facto total embargo. Preoccupied with other business, it took 
nearly a month before Hull became aware of what was going on. However, Hull, concerned 
of sending the wrong signal to Japan that the United States was willing to back down, 
accepted the de facto total embargo. 
Acheson’s calculation resembled that of those officials working in the financial and 
treasury apartments, such as Henry Morgenthau. They thought that Japan would never 
attack the United States, given the huge power gap between the two powers, so that the 
economic sanction would be safe (Utley, 2005: 156). In retrospect, Acheson acknowledged 
that he underestimated Japan’s resolve for he calculated that “(t)he consequence of war, in 
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view of the vastly preponderant strength of the United States and the temper of our people, 
were almost certain to be disastrous to Japan” (Acheson, 1969: 37), and that he did not 
expect that Japan took this embargo as a threat to the very existence of the Empire. 
The basic tone in the FE was similar to Acheson and Morgenthau’s train of thinking. 
Hornbeck insisted non-compromising attitude to Japan. He thought the United States had 
overestimated Japan’s capacity to injure it (Hornbeck Memorandum, September 5, FRUS, 
1941, Vol. IV: 427). On July 23, he insisted imposing assets freeze on Japan, he argued 
“(u)nder existing circumstances, it is altogether improbable that Japan would deliberately 
take action” that “would mean war between that country and this country” (Hornbeck 
papers, Box 463, Folder July 1941).  
Similar view was shared by the military. Head of Military Intelligence Division of 
Chief of Staff and Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Sherman Miles reported that economic 
sanction on Japan “would, in the opinion of this Division, force Japan to take any steps in 
the way of aggressive action which she does not plan to take anyway, when a favorable 
opportunity arises, nor would they precipitate a declaration of war on us by Japan” (Miles 
Memorandum, July 25, PHA, Part 15, 1946: 1345), conversely, it “offers the best chance 
of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific 
area and of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact” (Ibid, August 16, 1346). This was 
because “Japan lacks essential raw materials to support either her manufacturing industries 
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or a major war effort” (Ibid, September 5, 1353), thus “war with the United States is the 
last thing desired by Japan” (Ibid, September 2, 1349). With the economic sanctions of the 
United States, the Konoe cabinet would likely to be forced into distancing themselves from 
the Axis states.  
Hornbeck also opposed the Konoe-FDR meeting. He contended that “the Japanese 
Government has no intention of making war on the United States”, since “(t)he government 
that is in danger is the Japanese Government. The men who are in danger are Japanese high 
officials (Hornbeck memorandum, August 30, FRUS, 1941, Vol. IV, 1956: 414), that “Japan 
is in a weakened and perilous position...Japan is in no position to attack, with expectation 
of success, either the Russians, the British and Dutch or the United States; It is the Japanese 
who are eager for and who are asking for this conference”, and this eagerness “is a 
confession of internal weakness and external weakness” (Hornbeck Memorandum to Hull, 
September 2, 419, Ibid). With the United States’ power superiority against Japan and 
Japan’s difficulties, “(c)onclusion of an agreement with Japan is not an urgent desideratum. 
We are not in great danger vis-à-vis Japan and Japan is not capable of doing us any great 
injury. Japan, entangled and weakened as she is by the ‘Chinese incident’, does not possess 
military capacity sufficient to warrant an attack by her upon the United States with any 
reasonable expectation on her part or ours of her defeating us in war. Were Japan to attack 
us,we could with a wisely strategic use of less than one-half of our Navy maintain a sound 
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defensive position while we prepared for an ultimate offensive” (Ibid, Hornbeck 
Memorandum, September 5, 427).  
Even Grew, who observed Japan’s military efficiency (see last chapter), its resolve in 
facing “disaster rather than cede in the face of progressive pressure of exerted by any other 
nation” (Ibid, Grew to Hull, August 19, 382) and thus urged caution, acknowledged Japan’s 
weakness in the face of the United States. He reported that “(t)he evidence indicates that if 
Japan is to engage in a war with a major power, the morale of the people will need further 
strong stimulation. At best they will go into it blindly, doggedly, desperately. They will not 
be confident” (Ibid, Grew to Hull, August 29, 409). 
The despise of Japan was shared by many military staffs and officials. Apart from 
Miles, Harold Ickes, who was then in charge of coordinating petroleum for national defense, 
also disdained Japan’s capacity. He concluded that the ABD coalition, together with Russia 
and China, “could probably crush her (Japan) within a few months” (Entry August 2, 1941, 
Ickes, 1955: Vol III: 592). Higher level military officials also shared such contempt. Henry 
Stimson, the Secretary of War, was an important representative of this train of thought. In 
a October 2 memorandum, Stimson pointed out that the best diplomacy against Japan was 
“a policy of the utmost firmness”. He reasoned that “Japan has historically shown that she 
can misinterpret a pacifistic policy of the United States for weakness. She has also 
historically shown that when the United States indicates by clear language and bold actions 
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that she intends to carry out a clear and affirmative policy in the Far East, Japan will yield 
to that policy even though it conflicts with her own Asiatic policy and conceived interests” 
(Stimson and Bundy, 1948: 384-5). In supporting for further economic pressures on Japan 
in fall 1940, he tried to persuade FDR that “any risk that Japan would enter the Indies to 
get oil could be met by sending a flying squadron of American warships to the point of 
danger” (Stimson diary, October 8, 1940; Feis, 1950: 124). Frank Knox, the Secretary of 
Navy, shared similar view with Stimson and also called for further economic pressure, 
though his admirals, such as Harold Stark reported that the navy was still not prepared to 
wage war against Japan (Feis, 1950: 123). This train of thinking did not seem to change for 
Stimson and Knox. They also had since long favored further economic sanctions and were 
enthusiastic supporters of the freezing of assets and oil embargo which was imposed late 
July and early August 1941 (Ibid, 239).  
The decision makers’ despite of Japan was also reflected by their decision of 
transferring Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic. They believed that a smaller fleet was enough to 
deter the Japanese or deal it a great blow if hostility broke out. During May and June 1941, 
one quarter of the Pacific fleet had already been moved to Atlantic. Nevertheless, in June, 
Stimson and Knox even advised to move a second section of the Pacific Fleet to Atlantic, 
which was rejected by the admirals (Stimson diary, June 6 and 19, 1941). 
Under the influence of contemptuous hardliners such as Hornbeck, Morgenthau, 
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Stimson, Knox, Ickes and Norman Davis, chair of committee of the Council on Foreign 
Relations’ War and Peace Studies project, F.D.R. and Hull adopted an intransigent policy 
vis-a-vis Japan. The Konoe-FDR conference proposal of Japan, which many believed 
might help to avoid the final showdown (see, for example, Pash, 2014: 204-5), was rejected. 
Japanese proposal of September 6 was also turned down, which led to further diplomatic 
deadlock between the two powers. 
Even when the senior decision makers in the United States became aware of the 
coming showdown, they speculated that when hostility broke out, the most likely target of 
Japan would be China’s Yunnan province, Thailand or French Indochina. For them, even 
an attack on Philippines would be less likely (for example, FDR thought so, see Sherwood, 
1948: 428), since Japan was unwilling to challenge the United States directly and would 
avoid a head-on clash with the United States, not to mention the expectation of an attack 
on Pearl Harbor. 
The overconfidence that the U.S. decision makers had of its superior power over Japan 
could also be reflected in their calculations when they decided to reinforce the defense of 
Philippines. 
Through MAGIC interception and U.S. foreign service stationed in Tokyo, especially 
ambassador Joseph Grew, the United States sensed the hostility of Japan and the possibility 
that Japan would attack U.S. possessions in Asia. Although many decision makers still did 
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not believe in that, preparations were made. Since August 1941 , the United States started 
to plan the reinforcement of the defense capability of Philippines (PHA, 1946, Part 32: 
561). 
The military commanders decided to reinforce the defense capability of Philippines 
by basing B-17 and B-24 bombers in Philippines so as to deter Japan not only from 
invading Philippines per se, but also from advancing towards British and Dutch colonies. 
Far before the deployment of these units was completed, General L.T. Gerow, the War 
Plans Division Chief, believed that air and ground units already sent to the Philippines or 
scheduled to be sent had already changed the entire picture in the Asiatic area and that the 
“flying fortress” would discourage Japan from further escalation and thus would had a vital 
bearing to the course of the war as a whole (Manchester, 2008: 195-8). After their 
deployment, U.S. military planners believed that these bombers posed major threat to 
Japanese cities should U.S. assets in East Asia be attacked by Japan. “Stimson found his 
military advisers swinging to the belief that with an adequate force of these heavy bombers 
the Philippines could become a self-sustaining fortress capable of blockading the China 
Sea by air power” (Stimson and Bundy, 1948: 388). Stimson wrote to FDR on October 21 
that “even this imperfect threat, if not promptly called by the Japanese, bid fair to stop 
Japan’s march to the south and secure the safety of Singapore” (PHA, 1946, Part 20: 4444). 
Stimson told Hull on October 6 that 3 months were needed to secure the position in the 
 
  378 
Philippines (Stimson and Bundy, 1948: 389), while Marshall estimated the earliest date 
that Philippines would have “reasonable defense” would be December 5 or December 10 
(Marshall’s testimony, September 2, 1944, PHA, 1946, Part 32: 561). 
With such overconfidence, there were less incentives to make major concessions to 
Japan in the Western Pacific. 
Apart from the decision makers’ overconfidence of U.S. power superiority over Japan, 
the general public were also complacent of U.S. material power and were contemptuous of 
Japan’s threat. They saw little point in making concessions to Japan and were generally 
hostile to Japan. To some extent, such public opinion pressure also affected the decision 
making process. Because the public contempt on Japan, while public opinion over U.S. 
participation in the European war was relative divided, their inclination of being tough on 
Japan was quite united (Schroeder, 1958: 185, 189).  
Japan was widely criticized by mainstream U.S. press as Nazi Germany in Asia. On 
September 23, a New York Time (NYT) article described Japan’s activities as playing 
“Hitler’s game at Singapore, in the Netherlands Indies and in other parts of Asia” (Sep 23, 
1941, NYT: C22). And to prevent Japan from this, liberal journals widely believed that the 
best way was to step up embargo against Japan: “the cordon around Japan is to be drawn 
so tight that a Japanese stroke is rendered helpless in advance” (Bisson, Amerasia, October 
1941, cited from Schroeder, 1958: 191). Nathaniel Peffer, Far Eastern correspondent for 
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the New York Tribune, wrote on August 2 that “Japan should be put in chancery 
economically...All economic relations with Japan should be severed. Nothing should be 
bought from Japan, nothing sold it. There must be complete non-intercourse——joint 
Anglo-American economic blockade at first, with the weapon of naval blockade held in 
reserve” (Peffer, Aug. 2, 1941, Nation: 87-9). 
These journal correspondents did not see major risk in adopting the policies they 
recommended, their train of reasoning was similar with the hardliner decision makers. 
They speculated that since the Allied states had reinforced their presence in Western Pacific, 
“we shall not need to divert strength from the main front against Hitler in order to oppose 
effective resistance to any reckless move Japan may make” (Nov. 28, 1941, NYT: C22). 
Apart from the reinforcement by the Allied States, Japan had been confronted with great 
difficulties, in this context, “Great Britain and America should seize the offensive...for the 
first time they can do so with a minimum of risk...now Great Britain and America can 
blackmail Japan” (Peffer, Aug. 2, 1941, Nation: 87-9). Many commentators contended that 
Japan was in such difficulties that to stop Japan from further expansion or even forced it 
out of China, economic pressure would suffice without resort to military means (Young, 
Aug. 1941, Amerasia). 
Of course, there were journal commentators or reporters who thought that chances 
still existed of a war with Japan if the United States exerted too high pressure upon Japan. 
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However, given the large power gap between the United States and Japan, they believed, 
not unlike the hardliner decision makers, that such a war would be won without much 
difficulty. Thomas Bisson speculated that should war broke out between the United States 
and Japan, within six months a “rapid victory” would win against Japan (Bisson, Nov. 3, 
1941, The New Republic: 579-81). 
To summarize the view of the opinions of the main journals, especially the liberal 
ones, “A strict embargo would bring Japan to her knees in a matter of months”, even war 
broke out, it would be a easy victory, the United States Navy alone “could probably destroy 
Japanese naval power in shorter order” (Aug. 4, 1941, New Republic: 137-7). With such a 
unbalanced power advantage in favor of the United States, there was little reason to make 
major concessions to Japan. 
With the complacence and arrogance of hardliner government and military officials, 
as well as of the press, it is understandable that Hull and F.D.R. also tended to adopt a 
hardliner policies against Japan and were unwilling to make major concessions, or might 
have even tried to sabotage the process of informal talks with Japan with vague 
disagreements and new conditions.  
Fear of loss of Allies 
However, being aware of Japan’s deadline was to be touched, Hull did attempt to reach 
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a modus vivendi with Japan shortly in mid-November despite the pressures from various 
channels and their sabotaging efforts to prevent agreement in the ongoing informal talks, 
though the aim of this modus vivendi might simply be to delay Japanese actions and gain a 
six month period of preparation for the United States. Nevertheless, FDR and Hull finally 
dropped the modus vivendi plan. Apart from confidence of America’s capability in 
defeating Japan in the coming year, one of the other reasons that senior decision makers 
decided to drop the plan was the fear of loss of allies. Chiang Kai-shek vehemently opposed 
the idea of modus vivendi. For fear of Chiang making concessions with Japan and the loss 
of the “Chinese quagmire”, Hull and FDR finally decided to drop the plan and present the 
ultimatum-like ten-point November 26 note to Japan. Of course, the concerns of loss of 
allies was also based on its power superiority over Japan. It was the calculation of U.S. 
material superiority over Japan and its capability to defeat Japan at reasonable costs that 
encourage American decision makers to support the allies. In the last period (1931-1937), 
when America’s power advantage over Japan was at its nadir, American concern over its 
partners had been relatively limited. 
FDR’s suggestions of “Six Months” modus vivendi was sent to Hull probably on 
November 17, after U.S. rejection of Japan’s Plan A, and just before or just after FDR’s 
interview with Kurusu and Nomura (for the timing of the note, see Feis, 1950: 312, and 
Langer and Gleason, 1953: 872). After some days of work, the American version of draft 
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modus vivendi was produced on November 22 as a reply to Japan’s Plan B, which was 
handed over to Hull on November 20. The main points of the draft were: peace in the 
Pacific; Japan’s withdrawal from southern French Indochina and limitation of Japanese 
forces in northern French Indochina; mutual removal of freezing measures (U.S. will also 
approach the British and Dutch on this matter); U.S. “would not look with disfavor upon 
the inauguration” of conversation between China and Japan; and the temporary nature of 
the modus vivendi (PHA, 1946, Part 14: 1110–5). These points were not very far from 
Japan’s Plan B, which proposed: no more advance to Southeastern Asia from both parties; 
Japan withdrawal its troops in French Indochina after restoration of peace between Japan 
and China, or the Pacific area; U.S.-Japan cooperation in acquisition of goods and 
commodities from Dutch Indies; U.S.-Japan restoration of commercial relations; U.S. 
refrain from measure and actions prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of peace 
between Japan and China (FRUSJ, Vol. II, 755–6).  
At this juncture, even the hardliner FE tried to make some temporal agreement with 
Japan. Staffs of the FE even proposed “direct amicable negotiation for a peaceful settlement 
of their differences”, and during the course of the “amicable negotiation”, the United States 
“will hold in abeyance shipment of supplies of a military character to China”. However, if 
the negotiation failed, the United States would resume its aid to China (Draft Suggestions 
to the Secretary of State prepared by Far Easter Division concerning proposed “Modus 
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Vivendi”, Nov. 11, 1941, PHA, 1946, Part 14: 1091-2). Hardliners from the military, Knox 
and Stimson, eager to gain more time to get fully prepared for a war with Japan, were also 
positive in reaching a modus vivendi with Japan as a delaying strategy. 
However, on November 25, FDR and Hull decided to drop the plan, giving up the 
effort of nearly two weeks since 11 that month. Consideration of the situation of alliance, 
especially that of China, played a major role in the decision in the evening of November 
25. 
After the November 22 draft modus vivendi was produced, Hull called in British and 
Chinese Ambassadors and Australian and Netherlands Ministers to notice them the draft 
together with Japan’s November 20 note (Plan B). Except for Chinese Ambassador Hu Shih, 
other participants in this meeting were “well pleased”, even Hu did not show “serious 
concerns” (Memo of conversation between Hull, Halifax, Casey, Loudon and Hu, 
November 22, PHA, Part 14: 1122-3). A renewed draft was produced on 24, with little 
change except for details of trading items to be permitted with Japan after the conclusion 
of temporal agreement. 
On 24, a second meeting between these people were held. This time, however, upon 
receiving orders from Chiang, Hu vehemently opposed the draft modus vivendi. Chiang 
telegraphed Hu on November 24 (Chungking time, it should have been received by Hu 
before the second meeting) that “On this U.S.-Japan negotiation, if the United States relax 
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and change its policy of economic blockade on Japan, however little it was, before the 
question of withdrawal of Japanese invasion army from China was fundamentally solved, 
Chinese anti-Japanese campaign would be certain to collapse, U.S. assistance to China in 
a later time would all be illusions. China would no longer expect to rely on the assistance 
of friendly nations. And from then on, international good faith and human morality would 
no longer be heard” (Chiang to Hu, November 24, 1941, Qin edited, Vol. 4, Part II: 758-9). 
During the second meeting on 24, Hu dwelt on the matter of reducing the Japanese troops 
remaining in Indochina from the proposed 25,000 to 5,000 (PHA, 1946, Part 14: 1144). 
With the vehement opposition of Hu, the meeting broke up with Hull concluding that he 
was not sure whether he would present the draft to the Japanese. Because the British 
ambassador had not received instructions from his government, Hull decided to wait for 
British opinions. 
China continued to put its pressure on the United States. Chinese Foreign Minister 
Quo Tai-chi accused that the United States inclined to appease Japan at the expense of 
China (Quo to Hu, Nov. 24, 1941, FRUS, 1941, Vol. IV: 654). On 25, Hu spoke with 
Hornbeck that 25,000 Japanese troops would be enough to attack Yunnan Province and cut 
China off the Burma road-the lifeline of China. Owen Lattimore, U.S. Political Adviser to 
Chiang, also reported Chiang’s strong aversion of the to the draft, and he “had never really 
seen Chiang Kai-shek agitated before” (Currie to Hull, November 25, Ibid: 651-2). The 
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modus vivendi would make Chinese dismayed, Chiang’s trust on U.S. undermined, and 
“Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and 
urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery” (Lattimore to Currie, Nov. 25, Ibid: 
652). 
Then came British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s view: “Of course, it is for you 
to handle this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one 
point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? Our 
anxiety is about China. If they collapse, our joint dangers would enormously increase” 
(Churchill to FDR, November 26, 1941, PHA, 1946, Part 14: 1300. However, Hull might 
have known the contents of this message on the night of 25, see Feis, 1950: 317-318, fn. 
25). 
Chinese and British attitudes had great influence on FDR and Hull. One of U.S. major 
advantage over Japan was the latter’s being bogged down in the China quagmire. Hornbeck 
reasoned that “it would not be in the interest of the United States or in the interest of Great 
Britain that the Japanese-Chinese hostilities be put to an end by any process which leaves 
Japan’s military machine undefeated (undiscredited) and intact...Japan’s present 
involvement in China is to the advantage of the United States and Great Britain...” 
(Hornbeck memorandum, April 7, FRUS, 1941, Vol. IV: 124-5, for U.S. determination to 
keep Japan bogged down in the China quagmire, see Copeland, 2015: Chapter Five). If 
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there would be negative development on the China battlefront, the Allied Nations’ position 
would severely deteriorate. China and Britain’s negative opinion wavered Hull’s support 
on the modus vivendi. 
Hull also had other considerations. He had concerns over public opinion. He had been 
charged and criticized as an appeaser by the Congress and the public for many years, “a 
modus vivendi would leave him open to new, more vitriolic charges” (Pash, 2014: 238; 
Lange and Gleason, 1953: 891). Given the contemptuous view of Japan and 
uncompromising attitude of the hardliners, such as Stimson, Knox, Acheson and other 
important figures in the administration, he worried about a split within the administration. 
Hull’s concerns over hardliners might be overstretched, given Stimson and Knox’s 
eagerness in gaining more time for preparation. However, their hardliner attitude in the past 
did justify Hull’s concerns over their attitude towards the modus vivendi. With Allies’ 
reinforcement and their newly gained strength in East Asia, time was less important in the 
winter of 1941 than half a year ago. 
With American power advantage and reinforcement in Western Pacific, with concerns 
over uncompromising public opinion and hardliner colleagues and thus split in the 
administration, and with concerns over allies’ morale and unity, Hull decided on 25 night 
to give up the modus vivendi and presented the ten-point ultimatum-like note on the next 
day, which was also prepared by the FE, basing on the White-Morgenthau memorandum 
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of November, at the same time of the modus vivendi 17. The ten-point note, according to 
Morgenthau “had been prepared some time ago in case the United States was ready to break 
off with Japan” (Blum, 1970: 417-8). He finally let go the last hope of temporal settlement 
between the United States and Japan without discussions with the military decision makers 
(Lange and Gleason, 1953: 894; Tsunoda, 1994: 310). Hull told Stimson on 27 morning 
that “I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox-the Army 
and Navy” (Statement of Stimson, PHA, 1946, Part 11: 5434-5). 
Other Western Pacific Players’ Calculations in Resisting Japan 
It was also worth noticing that the reason that other Western Pacific states, including 
local powers such as China and Dutch Indies, and outside powers such as Britain, which 
were much weaker than Japan, made their mind to resist Japan in 1940 and 1941 largely 
because they expected the U.S. assistance, U.S. uncompromising attitude allowed by its 
power superiority, and the final inevitability of the involvement of the United States in the 
war in Western Pacific. One reason that the United States opted for intervening in the 
Western Pacific was that if the United States abandoned its position from that area, other 
powers would follow suit, and Japan would be “given a free hand in the region” (Utley, 
2005: 13). 
Scholars argued that the reason why Nanking changed its policy against Japan in 1937 
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was that it estimated that the Western powers would intervene on behalf of China if Japan 
further invaded China and that its confidence of successfully resisting Japan’s invasion 
grew with German-trained divisions (Borg, 1964: 308-17; Crowley, 1966: 346). There was 
no denial that Chiang based his determination to resist Japanese invasion in 1937 because 
of his estimation of outside assistance and Nanking’s growing capability. However, these 
explanations failed in accounting for why Chiang was willing to believe that the Western 
powers were willing to intervene on behalf of China, given that nothing came out of the 
Western powers in early 1930’s.  
Chiang made up his mind because of the change of power balance between Japan and 
the Western powers, especially the United States, that between Japan and Russia, and that 
between Japan and China. Chiang calculate that, as the United States got rid of the negative 
impact of the Great Depression and recovering their material capability, it would be more 
capable of punishing Japan if the latter further encroached upon China’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. One reason of Chiang’s initiation of the battle of Shanghai was to get 
the Western powers involved. Given Western interests and investments in Shanghai, one of 
the reasons of Chiang’s offensive was to lure Western powers into mediation or even armed 
intervention (Sun, 1993: 92), and at least it could show both Chinese determination and 
Japan’s ruthlessness to the Western residence living in Shanghai.  
Apart from Western assistance, it was Chiang’s long belief that a Soviet-Japanese war 
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would be inevitable in the long term. With Russia’s growing power due to its Five-Year 
Plans and the increasingly frequent Soviet-Japanese border clash since 1936, the day of 
Soviet-Japanese showdown would not be quite far away (Qin edited, Vol. 4, Part II: 758-
9). And Russia would come to China’s assistance if a Sino-Japanese war broke out. Right 
after Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Chonghui started to 
communicate with Soviet Ambassador to China Dmitri Bogmolov, and the Ambassador 
talked about the possibility of Soviet-China mutual non-aggression and mutual assistance 
treaties. He also remarked that even without these treaties, the USSR was still willing to 
assist China with arms and military supply worth of 50 million yuan, and China could repay 
in installments with goods and commodities (Wang to Chiang, July 8, 1937, Compilation 
of Diplomatic Documents in the Period of Republic of China, cite as CDDPRC herein after, 
Vol. VII, Part I: 384-6). Other high rank officials at Nanking, including Chiang himself, 
also talked to Bogmolov on related issues (Ibid: 389-99). Nanking and USSR finally 
concluded the Treaty of Mutual Non-aggression on August 21 and China did get substantial 
military assistance from USSR in its war against Japan . 
In addition, Chiang did get some confidence in successfully resisting Japan because 
of the growing prowess of Kuomintang forces. His confidence also came out of Nanking’s 
growing control over Southern China due to the settlement with Guangdong and Guangxi 
warlords and the Communist forces in 1936. The control of western provinces such as 
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Sichang and Guizhou would allow the Kuomintang forces to resist Japanese invasion in a 
protracted war.  
However, with the war against Japan proceeded, Chiang gradually realized that his 
armed force was still no match for the Japanese and direct Russian intervention would not 
be forthcoming, with tension in Europe surged to the boiling point and the final outbreak 
of European war. Chiang calculated that if the United States refused to assume the 
leadership position in the Far East, there was high possibility that Russia, France and 
Britain would appease Japan or even make alliances with it. Apart from self-reliance policy, 
Chiang deemed “the resolution of question of Far East, especially relations between China 
and Japan, actually depends on the United States. China only follows the leadership of the 
United States, and the policy of China will be determined with regard to the attitude of the 
United States” (Chiang’s conversation with U.S. Ambassador, August 29, 1939, Koo, 1997, 
Vol. I: 444). United States’ financial assistance to China in 1939 and 1940, though meagre, 
signaled its commitment to China’s course, and boom up Chinese leaders’ morale and 
confidence. 
Chiang’s concerns was justified by Britain’s conferring Chinese revenue of customs 
(under British control) to Japanese Yokohama Specie Bank in the May 1938 British-
Japanese agreement on Chinese Customs and shutting down Yunnan-Burma road for three 
months in July 1940. Dutch Indies were also ready to supply Japan with the resources that 
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Japan required in the course of the bilateral negotiation.  
Only after the two governments were assured of the support of the United States did 
they start to resist Japan. French Indochina, however, was helpless given its direct 
proximity to Japanese influence. It did not offer major resistance against Japan before they 
subjugated to Japan’s request in 1940 and 1941. It was only after they were aware of U.S. 
willingness in resisting further Japanese invasions, Britain and Dutch became willing and 
confident in resisting Japan’s pressure, which made possible the Singapore Chief of Staff 
Conference in the spring of 1941.  
Japanese Decision Making: a Resolved Regional Power Adopting Opportunist 
Strategy 
Although the case studies of this project have IV1 controlled, which dictates the 
regional power distribution to be preponderant, it is interesting in giving a short account of 
how regional power balance changed Japanese decision makers’ policy towards China from 
mid 1937 to early 1938. Although Japan still had near power preponderance in East Asia 
in this period, compared with other cases, the local power distribution in East Asia during 
this period had more multipolar feature. 
One important reason, if not the most important reason, that Japanese decision makers 
finally decided to bring the Nanking regime to knees and annihilate Southeastern Asia was 
their concern of the ever growing power of Russia vis-à-vis Japan. Given the increasing 
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frequent border disputes with Russian in 1936, many Japanese decision makers believed 
that an early settlement with China must be registered in order to concentrate their energy 
in preparing a showdown with Russia. Some policy makers were also concerned with the 
expansion of Nanking government’s power (FRUS, 1937, Vol. III: 99; Crowley, 1966: 320). 
Tojo Hideki, then Chief of staff of Kwantung Army, remarked on June 7, 1937 that to 
be prepared militarily against Russia, Japan should decisively deliver a blow upon Nanking 
to remove the menace at the rear (IMTFE, Document 1841). Tojo’s remark expressed the 
“prevailing sentiments” of the Kwantung army (Crowley, 1966: 321).  
Most decision makers in central government, especially those in the Army Ministry, 
still favored a non-expansion and local settlement policy before and after the Marco Polo 
Bridge Incident broke out. However, eager to settle the crisis in China so as to prepare for 
a confrontation with Russia, the demands that these decision makers required from 
Nanking were extremely harsh. These policy makers conditioned peaceful settlement with 
Nanking on several requirements, including Nanking’s recognition of the independence of 
Manchukuo and Prince Teh’s regime in Inner Mongolia, an anti-Comintern Pact between 
China and Japan, and the establishment of autonomous government in five provinces in 
North China and enlargement of demilitarized zone in the Yangtze region (see “Essential 
Points of Policy Toward the China Incident”, Oct. 1, 1937, IMTFE, Document 1362; 
Dirksen to German Foreign Ministry, Dec. 23, 1937, Documents on German Foreign 
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Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. I: 802-4; Lockhart to Hull, Jan. 15, FRUS, 1938, Vol. III: 
26). The imperial Conference of January 11, 1938 adopted the “Fundamental Policy for the 
Disposition of the China Incident”. Apart from the aforementioned conditions, the 
document specifically contended that cooperation “with Japan in an anti-Soviet policy in 
East Asia” as a condition of the settlement of the current bilateral crisis. If the Nankings 
refused to meet these conditions, it must be forced into (IMTFE, Document 3090). 
Unsurprisingly, these conditions were rejected by Nanking, which became more 
confident than the period of 1931-1936. The Konoe cabinet reacted by proclaiming that it 
would no longer deal with Chiang, instead, it would seek to establish a new Chinese regime 
with which to conduct negotiation (Statement by Japanese Government, Jan. 16, 1938, 
FRUSJ, Vol. I: 427-8).  
It is clear that at the beginning of this period, Japan was actively preparing a war 
against Russia, in which it attempted to give the latter a decisive defeat. To achieve this 
objective, it was willing to resolve the China menace on its rear by military offensive, 
which was expected to be swift. However, with Japanese forces mired in the China 
quagmire and its defeat at Russians’ hand at Nomonhan in 1939, the outbreak of European 
war and Russia’s preoccupation with European affairs, its policy on Russia changed 
towards a neutrality agreement in 1941. 
With Russia ceasing assistance to Nanking in 1941, the latter found that they had 
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fought Japan into a stalemate, and the much powerful United States was willing to assist. 
As a result, Nanking persisted in resisting Japanese invasion. 
Japan’s Determination in Getting its Way in East Asia 
In this period, with the United States and other Western power’s sanctions, Japan 
became more determined to have its way in East Asia. As a result, it speed up its aggression 
and invasion in the region to build a self-sufficient empire. Given the geographical 
proximity, there is also little doubt that Japan had major stakes in the developments in East 
Asia, especially in China. Other major powers’ gain in East Asia were salient threat to 
Japan. 
The most menacing and immediate threat to Japan in its history almost all originated 
from East Asia: the Mongolia Empire in the thirteenth century, Romanov Russia in the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century, and Soviet Union after 1920. The ambition 
of Japan in East Asia has also been immense. Ever since Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the seed of 
the ambition of conquering the Korean Peninsula and invasion of the Chinese mainland 
has been sowed. In the second half of nineteenth century, “The power vacuum in Northeast 
Asia created by decaying regimes in China and Korea drew the great powers into an intense 
competition for strategic advantage from which Japan could stand aside only at its own 
peril” (Pyle, 2007: 95). To ensure Japanese security in the region, Japan participated the 
imperial struggle for colonies and sphere of influence. Japan grabbed Taiwan from Chinese 
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Qing Dynasty, competing with Russia in China’s Liaotung Peninsula, preempted Russia in 
the 1904-1905 war and annexed Korea thereafter. 
The Russo-Japanese war, however, brought Japan at a crossroad. After that war, 
Parkinson’s law that “a nation’s feeling of insecurity expands directly with its power” 
(Deutsch, 1968: 88) ruled and Japan felt increasing insecure in East Asia. After 1905, 
especially after the WWI, Western powers started to try to contain Japanese influence in 
East Asia (Pash, 2014, Chapter 1 and 2). Japan and Western powers were caught in the 
classic security dilemma situation, with the strengthening of power of Western competitor 
in the region. To deal with this situation, two strains of thoughts emerged: Greater Japan 
with continued expansionism in East Asia and little Japan satisfied with the postbellum 
status quo (Hata, 1989: 271). Gradually, the former thought prevailed. Japan started to seek 
regional hegemony and created the idea of New Order in East Asia. On February 22, 1934, 
Prime Minister Hirota Koki observed in the Diet that “Japan, serving as the only 
cornerstone for the edifice of peace in East Asia, bears the entire burden of its 
responsibilities” (Crowley, 1966: 196). 
Japanese leaders also considered that Japan’s great power status depended on the 
establishment of the New Order, or the GEACPS. The lessons of WWI in Europe 
intensified Japan’s feeling of the need of building a New Order in East Asia. Before WWI, 
wars were short and decisive and finance and material needed in wartime had been 
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provided by neutral countries. In this context, what is needed is “Rich nation, strong army”. 
However, WWI provides the rules of modern wars. They are waged as total wars that are 
prolonged and without neutral party and belligerence without capability of self-sufficiency 
were lost. Self-sufficiency and autarky became an important factor for national security, 
especially in times of contingency and emergency to guarantee their economic and defense 
security (Carr, 1946; Waltz, 1979). This is especially true for a resource-poor island nations 
such like Japan. Senior Japanese decision makers decided that “nations had to supply 
themselves during wartime with adequate quantities of raw materials and manufactured 
goods. Reliance on other countries for the material of war was a sure path to defeat” 
(Barnhart, 1987: 9). To achieve autarky, the home islands and empire in Taiwan, Manchuria 
and Korea is no longer sufficient. “The control of richer territories, such as China, was 
imperative” (Ibid: 23). Japan’s New Order in East Asia signifies a large self-sufficient 
Japanese empire system in East Asia guaranteeing Japanese preeminent position in East 
Asia, which the Japanese senior officials considered necessary to Japanese security in the 
region or even national survival. They regarded the establishment of New Order in East 
Asia, or sphere of influence as determinate of self-preservation and self-defense of Japan 
(this was mentioned multiple time during Liaison Conferences and Imperial Conferences, 
see, for example, Essentials for Carrying out the Empire’s Policies, cited as Essentials 
hereinafter, document produced on September 6 Imperial Conference; Tojo’s remark on 
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November 5 Imperial Conference, Ike, 1967: 152, 211). 
The unraveling of world economy in 1929 and the following formation of Western 
trading blocs centered by Britain, France and the United States that helped to cushion the 
blow of the economic melting down further convinced Japan that a self-sufficient empire 
is essential for national security and survival. Japanese leaders believed that the world 
would be redivided into a few blocs, and “Each great power should have to acquire more 
resources, mobilize its people, and drive out other nations’ economic and political 
influences from the region under its control” (Iriye, 1997: 65). 
In the last period (1931-1937), Japan had already embarked upon building a self-
sufficient empire by invading Manchuria and Northern China. With limited foreign push 
back, Japanese decision makers were not anxious to expand with haste. In the current 
period, however, with sanctions of the United States and other states, Japanese decision 
makers felt the emergency of aggression and expansion to establish the autarkic empire to 
which Japan had long aspired.  
Senior Japanese decision makers’ resolve in exerting Japan’s Monroe’s doctrine in 
East Asia, and at least some control over China, had great effects in their determination of 
risking war with the United States. 
On January 21, 1941, Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke claimed that “the 
establishment of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere is a life-or-death requirement 
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for Japan”, several days later, he stated that “if the United States does not understand 
Japan’s rightful claims and actions, there is not the slightest hope for an improvement in 
Japanese-American relations” (Tsunoda, 1994: 8). Japanese Army Chief Sugiyama Gen 
during 30th Liaison Conference on June 12, 1941 remarked that “If we are strong, I believe 
the other side will refrain from action”. Nagano Osami, Chief of the Imperial Japanese 
Navy General Staff, also claimed that “We must resolutely attack anyone who tries to stop 
us” (Ike, 1967: 50-1). Although Matsuoka and Sugiyama could be regarded as 
representatives of tough attitude towards the United States, the resolve of creating 
GEACPS was shared by most Japanese leaders. On the July 2 Imperial Conference, the 
document of “Outline of National Policies in View of the Changing Situations” was 
produced, and it was the collective decision of Konoe cabinet that in “strengthening our 
advance into the Southern regions...our Empire will not be deterred by the possibility of 
being involved in a war with Great Britain and the United States” (Ibid: 78). Statements of 
such a train of thought was frequently seen well after Matsuoka’s resignation on July 16. 
On the August 5 proposal, Japan called the United States, Britain and Netherlands to 
suspend military measures in the Southwestern Pacific (PW, 1983: 707). On the September 
6 Imperial Conference, one of the minimum demands of Japan was “The United States and 
Great Britain...shall not secure any military rights in the territories of Thailand, the 
Netherlands East Indies, China, and the Far Eastern section of the Soviet Union” (Ike, 1967: 
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136). In the final formal proposal (proposal A produced on November 5 Imperial 
Conference, proposal B was a modus vivendi) before the outbreak of war, Japan still 
insisted on maintaining forces on North China, Inner Mongolia and Hainan island for 25 
years (Ike, 1967: 209), and there was no intention of giving up an independent Manchukuo. 
The reason of Japan’s insistence was plainly stated on a draft produced on September 
13, 52nd Liaison Conference in reply to U.S. ambassador Joseph Grew’s statement 
regarding peace in China. In the draft, Japan claimed that geographic proximity would 
naturally dictate that the relation between Japan and China “will be close and of a special 
character”, this is a “natural phenomenon of mankind” and “natural order of things” (Ike, 
1967: 172). Japanese decision makers regarded that a certain level of control over China 
and a buffer state (Manchukuo) between China and Japan as a salient issue for Japan’s 
immediate national security, given China’s direct proximity to Japanese empire. An 
independent Manchukuo was also essential for strategically important resources and 
energy that Japan badly needed. On the September 6 Imperial conference, it was even 
deemed that “we must put China under the complete control of our Empire. To do that, it 
is absolutely essential to station the necessary forces there” (Ike, 1967: 160). Japan policy 
makers had been used to compare its relations with China to U.S. relations with Mexico, 
and regard the former relationship as more important than the later (Pash, 2014: 37-8). The 
same logic applied to other part of East Asia in a less extent. Matsuoka said on January 21, 
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1941 speech that “the Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China, if only for 
geographical reasons, should be in intimate and inseparable relationship with Japan” 
(IMTFE, 1948, Judgement, Part B, Chapter VII: 900). However, Southeast Asia was not as 
important as China, given China’s immediate geopolitical proximity to Japan. Japan’s 
south advance in July 1941 was to “force the capitulation of the Chiang regime” (Summary 
of July 2 Imperial Conference, Ike, 1967: 78), and in later talks with the United States, 
Japan offered withdrawal from Indochina when peaceful settlement in China was realized 
(Ibid, Contents in Proposal A: 201-10). Japanese leaders considered that it naturally had 
special stakes in East Asia because of its proximity to the region. Japan, claimed its then 
senior officials, was adopting a justifiable Asian Monroe Doctrine, much in the way that 
America had been done in the Western Hemisphere since the nineteenth century and the 
Great Britain had been done to get itself involved in the defense and security of Lower 
States since Marlborough (Crowley, 1966: 188). 
Given Japan’s geographical proximity to Asian continent, most Japanese decision 
makers were determined to maintain Japan’s established influence on Asian continent. The 
reason why they opposed October 2 Memorandum of the United States was that if that was 
accepted, “the established position of Japan in Manchuria and Korea would be prejudiced 
and Japan would be compelled ultimately to withdraw entirely from the continent” (Togo, 
1956: 125-6). On the October 23 Liaison Conference, Togo Shigenori, the Foreign Minister, 
 
  401 
put forward his plan of negotiation with the United States. Although most participants 
agreed to withdraw from French Indochina upon certain conditions, and very reluctantly 
agreed to the nondiscrimination treatment in trade and abandon Japan’s special position in 
China based on geopolitical propinquity, Sugiyama, Tojo Hideki, the new prime minister 
(the third Konoe cabinet resigned on October 17 because of lack of agreement with the 
United States), Suzuki, Shimada and even Kaya were all opposed to his plan of 
withdrawing from China in five years (Ibid: 130–1). 
That was also the reason why Nomura considered that among the “three issues”, only 
the second one (retention of troops) the toughest to reach agreement. Nomura explained to 
Hull on September 3 and reported to Tokyo on October 3 that among the three issues, two 
had already been solved (Tsunoda, 1994: 219-220; Togo, 1956: 121). With the evidence of 
last section, it was clear that Japan was willing to make concession regarding the issue of 
Tripartite Pact and principle of commercial nondiscrimination. Japan was even ready to 
make concessions on Indochina if peace could be established between China and Japan. If 
Plan B, as a modus vivendi, could be accepted, Japan would move its troops stationed in 
southern Indochina to northern Indochina and with “the settlement of the China Incident 
or upon the establishment of a just peace in the Pacific area”, Japanese troops would 
withdraw from Indochina (Ike, 1967: 211). 
However, Japan was much more reluctant in compromising on security issues 
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regarding China. Japan insisted the independence of Manchukuo and never made any 
compromise on this issue despite the concessions that Japan had made regarding the other 
two issues since early September (see “Basic Japanese terms of peace with China” that 
Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda Teijiro handed over to Grew on September 22, 
711.94/2624, PW, 1983: 744). Japan was also reluctant in making concessions regarding 
the withdrawal of troops from China. In the September 6 proposal Japan claimed that it 
would “withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance with the 
agreements between Japan and China” (Ibid, 711.84/2344, 736) and in the September 22 
“Basic Japanese terms of peace with China”, Japan claimed that it would station troops and 
naval forces in certain areas of China “for a necessary period of time”. Neither documents 
clarified how long it would take before Japan saw fit to withdraw (Ibid, 711.94/2624, 744).  
In fact, Japan had been extremely eager to pull out of the Chinese quagmire. It had 
tried hard in forcing Chiang Kai-shek into negotiation and for this aim desperately installed 
the puppet Wang Jingwei regime. Japan had also been requiring the United States to 
mediating a Japanese-Chinese peace talk since March 1941 (Copeland, 2015: 191). 
However, it could not afford to subject to the conditions of the United States, especially 
the withdrawal of troops in Northern China and Inner Mongolia. With the urge of the 
United States, Japan finally clarified what was a “necessary period of time”—25 years after 
the establishment of peace between Japan and China—in Plan A of November 5 (Ike, 1967: 
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209-10), which was an absurdly long period for the United States to accept. To use Tojo’s 
words, that is a time “close to ‘forever’” (Hotta, 2013: 227). 
Japan’s resolve in East Asia and especially in China made it next to impossible for it 
to make major concession to the United States related to issues such as Manchukuo and 
withdrawal of troops from China in a short period. After learned of Hull’s November 26 
notes, which called for unconditional and total withdrawal of Japanese troops from China 
and implied the repudiation of the Nanking puppet regime and Manchukuo, even moderate 
leaders like Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori considered that if Japan were to submit to 
these requirements, the establishment of a New Order in East Asia—Japan’s “immutable 
policy”—would be thwarted, and “the international position of our Empire would be 
reduced to a status lower than it was prior to the Manchurian Incident, and our very survival 
would inevitably be threatened...Britain and the United States would gain control over 
these regions. The prestige of our Empire would fall to the ground, and our role as stabilizer 
would be destroyed” (Togo’s remark on the December 1 Imperial Conference, Ike, 1967: 
270-1). Tojo also remarked that “At the moment our Empire stands at the threshold of glory 
or oblivion” (283), and “our Empire has no alternative but to begin war against the United 
States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands” (263).   
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European Affairs, Perception of Local Advantage and Japan’s Policy of Opportunism 
Japanese decision makers were well aware of its material inferiority to the United 
States in this period. It was “unanimously agreed” in Japanese decision making circles that 
the United States could not be defeated in case of war, given its much superior power 
potential (Togo, 1956: 126). Despite being diffident, Japanese decision makers calculated 
that as a focused local power, Japan had many advantages over the United States, such as 
concentration, local advantage, determination and morale, and Japan could win the war by 
forcing the United States into negotiated peace existed. Particularly, they were eager to 
seize the opportunity of United States’ preoccupation with the Europe, where Hitler was 
leading a winning course against European powers in this period to American decision 
makers’ aversion. 
The first advantage of Japan vis-à-vis the United States was Japan’s determination 
and resolve to get its way and willingness to fight and absorb cost in fighting in East Asia, 
while the United States had relatively less vital or substantial interests in East Asia, and 
thus was less willing to absorb high cost in fighting in this region. Such gap of resolve was 
partially a result of geographical distance. 
Japan’s commitment in East Asia was accounted for in the last section. The United 
States, however, seemed to be less resolved in preserving the status quo in this region given 
its past behaviors. U.S. was willing to recognize Japan’s position in South Manchuria, 
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Eastern Mongolia and Shantung in 1900’s and 1910’s. In 1930’s, it reacted lukewarmly to 
the Manchurian Crisis, North China Crisis, Marco Polo Bridge and Shanghai Incident, and 
even the Panay Incident. Although its policy started to get harsher since the 1938 moral 
embargo, Japanese policy makers might have reasons to doubt how much cost the United 
States was willing to bear in a war in East Asia. 
The second advantage of Japan over the United States was that while Japan was solely 
focused in the East Asia theater, the United States would fight a two-front war and much 
of its energy would be distracted to the European theater, this would reinforce Japan’s third 
advantage vis-a-vis the United States—local military balance at least in the short term. At 
the same time, Japan is more willing to absorb costs in East Asia, given its limited strategic 
focus. 
Japan, as an East Asia power, was wholly concentrated in that region. Though 
attempted to reap the fruits of Germany’s conquest in Europe, improve the relation with 
Russia via Germany, and deter the United States from intervening East Asia affairs (see 
Schroeder, 1958: 20-1), did not want to fight Germany’s wars. Thus, its attitude towards 
Tripartite Pact was non-committed from the very start. On a Liaison Conference held on 
September 4, 1940, Japanese decision makers decided that Japan would make decisions 
independently regarding the use of force against the United States and Britain (IMTFE, 
Doc. no. 2137D). As a result, in the protocol of Tripartite Pact, it was stipulated that 
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whether or not a contracting party or parties had been attacked should be determined by 
the respective governments, and when an attack took place, how to assist would also be 
determined by the respective governments (IMTFE, Doc. no. 1656N). During the talks in 
1941, Japanese decision makers and negotiators, except for hardliners such as Matsuoka, 
were willing to make compromises on Tripartite Pact. 
Taking advantage of the European war, Japan took several risks in this period. It 
continued its invasion on China, invaded French Indochina right after France’s fall in 1940 
and again in a week after Germany invaded Soviet Union in 1941. One reasons that Japan 
was emboldened to take these risks was that it expected that the United States would focus 
on the European theater, which was reported by Washington Times-Herald on May 29 
(Konoe, 1946: IX). This seemed to be proved during May and June 1941, when the United 
States moved one fourth of its Pacific fleet to Atlantic theater (PHA, 1946, Part 33: 696), 
“more ships than the Japanese destroyed at Pearl Harbor”. The one fourth ratio was the best 
that Yamamoto expect that he could possibly destroy when planning the Pearl Harbor attack 
(Prange, 1981: 133). 
Japan’s attitude towards the European War and its responsibility to Axis nations also 
changed overtime because of the logic of distracting the United States. Japan only 
attempted to use Tripartite Pact as a deterrence against the United States intervention in 
East Asia and it would not fight Germany’s war. As a result, after the outbreak of Soviet-
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German war in late June, Japanese policy makers no longer insisted on that the United 
States not to enter the European war after early July. And no later than mid-September, 
there were discussion in the military that “it might be desirable for America to enter the 
European War since she would then waste her national strength” (Konoe, 1946: XXIII).  
Before the Pearl Harbor attack, Japan tried to take advantage of the waning Tripartite 
Pact to secure a promise from Germany that if Japan waged war against the United States, 
Germany would join the war, so as to further distract the United States in the coming war. 
On November 23, German ambassador to Japan, Eugen Ott, received requests from a 
Japanese general for assurances of German help if war broke out between Japan and the 
United States (Schroeder, 1958: 151). Germany was delighted in offering the promise since 
it had already been in ad hoc war with the United States. On November 28, Japanese 
ambassador to Germany, Oshima Hiroshi, got positive hints from Ribbentrop that “German 
attitude towards the United States is being considerably stiffened. There are indications at 
present that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if necessary” (PHA, 1946, 
Part 12: 200). The Tripartite Pact, with the initial objective of deterring the United States 
from intervening in Europe and East Asia, was also a distracting or burden-sharing device 
for both Japan and Germany. 
Japanese considered that the development of European war had great impact on their 
war in East Asia. The more European war proceeded to Germany’s the favor, the more 
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efforts would the United States put in that theater, and the less the strategic burden would 
be shouldered by Japan in East Asia. That’s why Nagano remarked that what followed from 
the first-stage operation would depend to a large extent on both overall national strength 
and “on developments in the world situation” (Tsunoda, 1994: 274).  
With the United States’ mounting diplomatic and economic pressure and with 
Germany’s advancement in its invasion of Russia, Japanese decision makers believed that 
the developments in the world situation was favorable to them, and the opportunity was 
worth taking to using military forces to coerce the United States to compromise.  
In addition, with Japan’s rapid naval build-up since it decided to end the disarmament 
era in 1934, Japan’s local power advantage vis-a-vis the Western powers had increased 
enormously. As a result, by the fall of 1941, Japan’s naval power had assumed clear 
advantage over the United States in the Pacific, and had even assumed absolute equality in 
numbers with the ABCD alliance, as shown by Table 18 (data from Roskill, 1954, Vol. I: 
560-1). However, with Allied forces spreading “from Hawaii across the Philippines to the 
Dutch East Indies and on to Singapore, and the Japanese could easily concentrate superior 
forces against these scattered ships” (Pelz, 1974: 221; for similar assessment from Japanese 
decision makers, see Sugiyama’s remark on November 5 Imperial Conference, Ike, 1967: 
226), Japan even enjoyed a short-term effective military advantage over the ABCD allies 
as a whole in West Pacific. 
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Table 18: Numbers of Warships of the Pacific Maritime Powers 
 Aircraft Carriers Battleships Cruisers Destroyers Submarines 
Japan 10 10 36 113 63 
The United States 3 9 24 80 56 
Britain, Dutch, 
and Free French 
0 2 12 20 13 
In addition, being a local power, Japan also enjoyed the advantage of proximity to 
strategic targets in Southeastern Asia, which made it possible to present the United States 
a fait accompli before it could respond.  
With Japanese short term local advantage and the European theater distracting the 
United States, Japanese military planners calculated that if Japan could shift the power 
balance in West Pacific further in Japan’s favor by dealing a major blow to the U.S. Pacific 
fleet with one stroke, Japan would have enough time (half a year) to invade Britain and 
Dutch colonies in this area and consolidate its gain . 
Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, Commander in Chief of Japan’s Combined Fleet and the 
main designer of Pearl Harbor attack, had started to brood the scheme of Pearl Harbor 
attack since December 1940. In January 1941, he wrote to his close friend Onishi Takijiro, 
chief of staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, that in a war with the United States, Japan must 
keep U.S. navy out of the Western Pacific for approximately six months before the first 
stage of operation completed (Prange, 1981: 18). Crippling U.S. Pacific fleet for six months 
thus became the central objective of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Japanese military planners 
calculated that in the six months after the decisive attack, Japan would enjoy a short-term 
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military preponderance in the Western Pacific area.  
Taking advantage of this preponderance, and also of Japanese Empire’s proximity to 
the targets in Southeastern Asia, Japanese military planners expected that they were to land 
on Philippines and Malaya, and “to occupy Guam, Wake, Hong Kong, British Borneo, and 
Thailand, and advance bases were to established in the Bismarcks, Dutch Borneo, the 
Celebes, Molucca, and Timor” (Wohlstetter, 1962: 340). They also expected that operation 
would be swift, Malaya and Philippines were to be occupied within fifty days and the whole 
southern area ninety days from the start of hostilities with the Allied states. To use 
Yamamoto’s word Japan “shall run wild for the first six months or a year” (Prange, 1981: 
10).   
According to the Japanese military planners, being hemisphere away, denied of 
forward bases and distracted by battles on other theaters, Great Britain and the United 
States would be immobilized in at least six months, which allowed Japan the time not only 
to occupy these strategic targets, but also consolidate its gains. Within the six-month 
interim, Japan would be able to exploit the natural resources in these new territories, 
strengthen the defensive perimeter, establish a ring of island fortresses in West and Central 
Pacific and build a self-sufficient Empire that would afford a protracted war against the 
United States. Although Japan could not defeat the United States and Britain in a war, it 
could create an “impregnable sphere” or consolidate to an “invincible position”, which 
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would assure the existence of a “chance of not losing” (for this logic, see Wohlstetter, 1962: 
343; Sadao, 1973: 255; Prange, 1981: 14; Barnhart, 1986: 451; Tsunoda, 1994: 164, 173, 
274). To use the words from Draft Proposal for Hastening the End of the War against the 
United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Chiang, a document produced by the 
69th Liaison Conference: “Our Empire will engage in a quick war, and will destroy 
American and British bases in Eastern Asia and the Southwest Pacific region. At the same 
time that it secures a strategically powerful position, it will control those areas producing 
vital materials, as well as important transportation routes, and thereby prepare for a 
protracted period of self-sufficiency” (cited as Hastening hereinafter, November 15, 1941, 
Ike, 1967: 247, the same logic was presented on September 6 Imperial Conference, by 
Nagano, Ike, 1967: 153; Tsunoda, 1994: 274). 
Those cabinet members who were skeptical of waging war with the United States, 
such as Financial Minister Kaya Okinori and general director of the Cabinet Planning 
Board, Suzuki Teijichi, had grave doubts on the material sustenance of the Empire when it 
would be engulfed in a war with the United States. However, the opportunist assumptions 
that Germany would sustain its conquering momentum in Europe and draw main attention 
of the United States to the European theater and that Japan would secure its material 
sufficiency through consolidation in Southeastern Asia tended to mitigate these concerns. 
Although Nagano recognized the potential high losses in secure the transportation from the 
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South Seas, he vaguely claimed that “If we could protect the ships and make up the losses, 
I assume that our marine transportation would be all right” (Nagano’s remarks on 
November 5 Imperial Conference, Ike, 1967: 235). Such opportunist prospectus dampened 
Kaya and Suzuki’s doubts, or at least rendered these questions difficult to answer (Hotta, 
2013: 221).  
According to Japanese military planners’ calculations, after the six-month interim, the 
United States would gradually recover from the blow. At such a juncture, Japan, relying on 
its geographical proximity and local advantage, would commence Kato Kanji’s “attrition” 
and “interceptive” strategy: relying on Japan’s advantage of proximity and the United 
States’ disadvantage of being an outside power with long transport route, Japan would use 
submarines and destroyers to intercept and ambush American fleets when they traveled the 
long way in Pacific and to “wear down the American fleet as it crossed the Pacific” (Pelz, 
1974: 28), and “to lure the main fleet of the United States [near Japan] and destroy it”. This 
was the very strategy that Japan employed against Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. 
To assure the success of this strategy, Japanese navy had built the world’s first-class torpedo 
carriers and long-range torpedo bombers (Spector, 1985: 45–6). Nagano was confident in 
this strategy and tried to persuade the anti-war Foreign Minister Togo that since “the Navy 
would sink the American fleet as it sailed north from the Central Pacific toward the area of 
the Mandates”, “there was no need for pessimism” (Togo, 1956: 142). At the same time, 
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taking advantage of locality vis-a-vis Great Britain, Japan would force the separation 
between British colonies in the Asia (including India) and Great Britain proper (Ike, 1967: 
248) to force it out of the war.  
Discounting U.S. willingness to fight 
Apart from strategic concentration, short term advantage of military balance and 
geographical proximity, the opportunist Japanese policy makers calculated that they also 
had another advantage over the United States, which was the high fighting morale of its 
military leaders and soldiers, and the willingness to sacrifice and absorb high costs. As 
discussed in the last section, since Japanese policy makers believed that the decision for 
war was forced upon Japan, and it was fought for the “self-preservation and self-defense” 
of the Empire, “the morale of the officers and men of the Army and Navy is high; that unity 
in domestic politics is greater; that there is willingness on the part of individuals to make 
sacrifices for the nation as a whole” (Tojo’s remark on December 1 Imperial Conference, 
Ike: 264). His remarks were backed by Nagano, who claimed “all of the officers and men 
in the task forces of the Army and Navy have extremely high morale and are prepared to 
lay down their lives for their country” (Ibid, 272). In this alleged “self-defense” war, the 
spirit over material tradition and self-sacrifice spirit of Japanese military men was 
dramatically manifested in airmen with “firm determination not to return alive” on the X-
day (Prange, 1981: 349), the Shimpu (later known as Kamikaze) attack force fighters, and 
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those who touted the idea of “hundred million people fight with the resolve to sacrifice 
their lives” (Toland, 1971: 846). 
In comparison to Japanese resolve to fight, many senior Japanese decision makers 
assessed that the United States, hemisphere away from the East Asia and distracted by the 
European war, was unwilling to bear high costs and in a protracted war in a war fought in 
Pacific and it would be possible to force it into negotiation.  
On the November 5 Imperial conference, Tojo remarked that deploying Japanese 
troops could let the United States learn about the determination of Japan, and “if they 
recognize that Japan is determined, then that is the time we should resort to diplomatic 
measures” (Ike, 1967: 238). And if the final diplomatic efforts failed, through “initial 
military victories and the threat of further and more decisive action”, Japan would be able 
to “seek a ‘reconsideration’ of the situation by the American people” (Butow, 1961: 239). 
Generally, the possibility of success lies in destroying “the will of the United States to fight” 
(Ike, 1967: 248). 
When senior Japanese decision makers determined to advance south in the summer of 
1940, they assumed that the United States would be reluctant in fighting a two-front war 
too early and would not react vigorously as long as the American lives and land were not 
endangered. Such judgement seemed to be justified by the United States’ lukewarm 
reactions to Mukden Incident, Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Panay incident and Rape of 
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Nanking. One operational planner of the South Advance, Colonel Tsuji Masanobu, recalled 
later that “Our candid ideas at the time were that Americans, being merchants, would not 
continue for long with an unprofitable war” (Tsuji, 1960: 21). Japanese decision maker 
thought even they attacked Dutch, British and French colonial possessions, “no war with 
the United States seemed inevitable so long as Japan respected the security of its territories 
in the Pacific” (Iriye, 1971: 270). One year later, when the Japanese drive further south to 
southern Indochina was met with total oil embargo, Japanese decision makers were 
“stunned” again by the severity of the American reaction (Sadao, 1973: 254). This was 
because they regarded that although this move would provoke the United States, since the 
situation of German-Soviet war was in Germany’s favor, the United States would not go to 
war if Japan moves into French Indochina (Sugiyama’s remarks on July 2 Imperial 
Conference, Ike, 1967: 88) and the embargo was regarded as a warn of war.   
 For many Japanese military planners, one important justification of the Pearl Harbor 
attack was that such a attack would render “the morale of the U.S. Navy and her 
people...sink to the extent that it could not be recovered” (Prange, 1981: 16), and the United 
States would “throw in the towel after its fleet was destroyed” (Barnhart, 1986: 454). With 
the Pearl Harbor attack, they speculated, the United States would become aware of Japan’s 
determination of establishing new order in East Asia, and might reconsider their existing 
policies. 
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Japanese decision makers also speculated that if United States’ Pacific allies were 
defeated, the United States would “lose the will to fight on” (Butow, 1961: 348). If 
Chungking was forced to make peace with Tokyo and Great Britain were deprived of their 
colonies and outposts in East Asia, and forced out of the war, the morale of the United 
States would further fall. Tsukada Osamu, Vice Chief of Staff, deemed that “If Britain is 
defeated, America will have to do some thinking” (Tsukada’s remarks on the 66th Liaison 
Conference, Nov. 1, Ike: 1967: 205). Public opinion in the United States would turn (see 
Essentials, September 6, Ike: 153).  
In addition, according to the calculation of senior Japanese decision makers, though 
there was no chance of military defeat of the United States, after Japan consolidated the 
“impregnable sphere” in Southeastern Asia and afforded a protracted war with the United 
States, and adopted the attrition strategy, the willingness of the United States to fight on 
would be gradually worn down and there would be a increased chance of negotiated peace 
between the two countries. The United States would be robbed of the will to fight and a 
Japan-formulated peace would be accepted (Butow, 1961: 328). 
With the shock of Pearl Harbor, the loss of allies, bases and outposts in the Pacific, 
the heavy loss of fleets because of Japanese attrition/interception operation, and with an 
invincible Japanese presence in the Southeaster Asia, many Japanese decision makers 
speculated that the morale and willingness to fight of both U.S. decision makers and 
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population would be severely damaged. With further propaganda efforts, it was possible to 
persuade Americans “the uselessness of a Japanese-American war”, and “American public 
opinion will be directed toward opposition to war” (Hastening, November 15, Ike, 1967: 
246). Under such context, a negotiated peace with the United States would be possible. 
With salient interests in East and determination to get its way in East Asia, with United 
States’ preoccupation with European affairs, with perceived local advantage over the 
United States, and with its wishful underestimation of U.S. willingness to fight, Japan 
ultimately adopted opportunist policy to attack Pearl Harbor. 
Conclusions 
The Pacific War broke out in a situation where Japan had near preponderance in East 
Asia and the United States had power superiority over Japan. However, Japan’s relative 
material capability vis-a-vis its local rivals, Russia and China, was on decline. The United 
States, relying on its power superiority, was arrogant and reluctant in making major 
concessions to Japan, the East Asian allies of the United States, tried to court the help of 
the United States to resist Japan’s aggression. On the other hand, Japan, committed in its 
New Order or GEACPS but diffident on its material inferiority vis-a-vis the United States, 
was willing to taking advantage of the United States’ preoccupation in Europe. In addition, 
Japanese decision makers perceived that they had local advantages. With these conditions, 
Japanese decision maker was dominated by opportunism, believing that in a war with the 
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United States, Japan could gain a time of half a year, long enough to establish a self-
sufficient empire that could sustain an attrition war with the United States. United States, 
unwilling to suffer high cost, would negotiate with Japan. 
Relying on their respective advantages, they were unable to make an agreement, 
which finally led to the outbreak of war. The outbreak of the Pacific war is a good proof of 
and Hypothesis3. 
This case also negates Hypothesis3’. Japan, as a weaker local power, was not deterred 
by the superior strategic regional power, the United States. Despite the United States’ 
maritime power projection capability, Japanese decision makers perceived it had local 
advantages over the United States and taking advantage of the United States’ preoccupation 
with European affairs, adopted opportunist policies and started the Pacific War. 
For the additional explanations, neither did Japan’s clear power advantage among East 
Asia states nor U.S. clear power advantage over the whole East Asia region prevented the 
outbreak of Pacific War in 1941, which disprove Hypothesis3’. Although Japanese decision 
makers were aware that the United States could not be defeated, they still tried to wear it 
down in protracted war and to reach a negotiated settlement. This was due to Japanese 
decision makers’ calculation of their advantage of locality and strategic concentration, as 
argues in this chapter. 
The claim that geography was increasingly less important in modern time was wrong 
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in the case of Pacific War. As this chapter shows, an important reason of their commitment 
on the New Order in East Asia was their geographical proximity to this reason. Japanese 
decision makers considered that a special relation between Japan and other East Asia was 
natural, given their geographical proximity. One major reason that Japanese decision 
makers opted for war was their calculation of advantage of locality. The attrition and 
interception strategy, their belief of swift war against the British and Dutch, and their 
discounting of the U.S. willingness to fight were all based, or at least partially based on 
geographical and geopolitical calculations. Even some of these calculations were 
miscalculations, they further proved that policy makers rely on their psychological map, in 
which geographical distance play an important part (Gray, 1977: 59; O’Sullivan, 1986: 11). 
The argument that economic dependence dampens the likelihood of war 
(Hypothesis4’) was a poor fit in explaining the origins of the Pacific war. Japan hugely 
depended on trade with the United States, this did not reduce its willingness to fight a war 
with the United States. Rather, Carr and Waltz’s argument that major powers strive for 
more independence and certain level of autonomy hold true for the origins of Pacific War. 
Interdependence generates sensitivity and vulnerability, and those states with less 
sensitivity and vulnerability will have power advantage over those with high sensitivity 
and vulnerability (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Japan, as the party of high sensitivity and 
vulnerability in its trade relations with the United States, was antipathetic to the over-
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dependence on the United States and was committed to build a self-sufficient empire 
through the New Order, or GEACPS, as the Chapter shows. On the other hand, the United 
States, despite the fact that its export trade with Japan was about four times that with China 
in 1937, and the loss of China market “will be hardly noticed in out total trade” 
(Morgenthau diary, entry on September 8, 1937, Book 87: 384-5; Russett, 1972: 60), opted 
for trade embargo on Japan in 1940 and 1941, while offered support to the cause of China-
a lesser trading power. As argued in this Chapter, this was due to U.S. decision makers’ 
belief in their power superiority over Japan, rather than economic benefit calculation. 
Dale Copeland’s argument that “(h)ighly pessimistic trade expectations combined 
with extreme dependence on raw materials pushed Japan into war on December 7, 1941” 
(Copeland, 2015: 186, Hypothesis5’) made some sense from appearance. However, unlike 
this Chapter, he did not explain why Japan did not subject to the U.S. pressure rather than 
fight. He was also wrong to conclude that the United States was unwilling to relax 
economic sanction due to its scheme to draw Japan into attacking south rather than north 
in cooperation with Nazi Germany to attack Russia(Ibid). Such conspiracy theory could 
not account for FDR, Hull and FE’s attempt to make a modus vivendi with Japan after 
November 17. In addition, as this chapter shows, the Tripartite Pact was falling apart 
starting from April 13, when Matsuoka signed the Neutrality Pact with the Soviets despite 
Ribbentrop’s suggestion that Germany’s relation with the Soviets had deteriorated severely, 
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until the eve of the war (November 23). After the discussion of the German-Soviet war on 
Liaison Conferences of June 25, 26, 28 and 30, Japanese decision makers finally decided 
not to join the war “for the time being” on the July 2 Imperial Conference (Konoe, 1946: 
X; see also Ike, 1967: 90). Although Matsuoka and the army still insisted in marching north, 
the former was kicked out of third Konoe cabinet, while the latter gave up it northern march 
plan on August 9, with Sugiyama notifying Tojo the army’s decision not to exercise military 
force against the Soviets in 1941 (Tsunoda, 1994: 155). Given the severity of Siberian 
winter, the United States should have been aware that Japan would not attack the Soviets 
until the spring of 1942 if it did not attack by the beginning of September 1941.  
Apart from these alternative explanations that are raised in the First Chapter of this 
project, other specific explanations of the origin of the Pacific War also have limitations. 
The prospect theory was right that state became risk-acceptant with a pessimistic 
expectation of the future (“gradual exhaustion”), however they are better able to explain 
the timing (“better now than latter”) rather than the fundamental cause of the war, which is 
the task of this Chapter. The cultural explanation that Japanese culture is position sensitive, 
though plausible, could not account for the complicated decision making process of both 
powers..  
Many aspects of Scott Sagan’s mutual failure of deterrence theory are similar to the 
arguments of this chapter. However, Sagan did not clarify factors that lead to the deterrence 
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failures enough. He also did not produce a generalizable theory from the study of the origin 
of Pacific War. 
The bureaucratic and parochial interests arguments have their merit in explaining the 
outbreak of the Pacific War. There was no doubt that the military had great influence in the 
Liaison Conference, and its operation was close to independence from the control of the 
civil government. The military also tried to hide statistical data from the civil government 
upon which the study of Japan’s potential of war could be studied (see, for example, Togo, 
1956: 127). However, these arguments either failed to explain why there were so many 
hardliner decision makers in FDR administration, and fail to recognize that the military 
was not fully in control of state policy in Japan. Major concessions were made in Japanese 
proposals to the United States, the deadline of negotiation was conferred from mid-October 
to mid-November and finally the last day of November. Nor was the military altogether 
intractable. The Supreme Command, though seemed to be out of control in the early days 
of Second Sino-Japanese War, did not show such independence from state affairs in the 
prelude to the Pacific War. Although the task forces to attack Pearl Harbor was given 
operational orders on December 2, one of the orders was “should it appear certain that the 
Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the 
commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to 
reassemble and return to their bases” (PHA, Part 13: 393, see also p. 417). On the other 
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hand, as this chapter shows, many moderate Japanese civil decision makers and even 
officials in the Foreign Ministry were also committed in the New Order and GEACPS, 
reflected by their opposition of abandonment of Japan’s special position in China and 
withdrawal from China in a short time, given the geographical propinquity between the 
two countries (Togo, 1956: 130-1). 
Japanese decision maker’s strategy could not be accounted for by a simple “wishful 
thinking” or irrational actor theory. These calculations was not irrational altogether. After 
all, great power did become worn down in wars of attrition and make concessions, 
especially when they fought in foreign lands, as shown by the American Revolution war 
and the Boer Wars. They were also right that the main focus of the United States was the 
European theater. With the U.S. concentration in European theater, the calculation of the 
ratioist military decision makers was not altogether wrong that if Japan’s naval power 
(calculated by tonnage) reached 70 percent of that of the United States there was high 
possibility that Japan could stand firmly against it.  
Although Japanese military planners mainly focus their attention on the early stage of 
war, the did have long-term plans, which was to wear down U.S. willingness to fight 
through attrition and interception strategy, swiftly defeating the local allies of the United 
States and building an “impregnable south sphere”, as this chapter argues. Their 
speculation of American’s unwillingness to suffer on foreign lands was opportunistic, but 
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not altogether wrong. They thought the United States was reluctant in provoking Japan, so 
as to avoid a two-front war. They thought this might be proved by the fact that embargo in 
1940 did not seem to be harsh. The monthly rate of petroleum exports to Japan rose by one-
sixth during the second half of 1940. Besides, in 1939 Japan had imported 1.2 million 
barrels of American gasoline, however, in the six months following the gasoline freezing 
policy imposed on July 26, 1940, Japan imported 3.4 million barrels (Utley, 2005: 126). 
Despite American public’s hostile and contemptuous attitude towards Japan, public support 
to intervene East Asia if the United States was not directly attacked was tepid. In October 
1941, public support for defend of Burma Road was 29.8 percent, Singapore 34.6 percent, 
Australia 35.4 percent, and Dutch East Indies 39.9 percent, the opposition rates were 37.1 
percent, 33.0 percent, 33.3 percent and 29.1 percent respectively (Cantril edited, 1951: 783). 
On October 22, when asked the question “Should the United States go to war now against 
Japan” in a American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO), 74 percent of the participants 
answered “No” (Ibid: 975). They were also right that the attack at Pearl Harbor would 
cripple U.S. Pacific fleets for approximately six months. The United States’ limited 
willingness to suffer was also reflected by the ultimate use of the atomic bomb in 1945. If 
not for the absolute weapon, it would be difficult to predict how much more casualties the 
United States was willing to suffer before the final defeat of Japan. 
It was not altogether impossible to consolidate Japanese gain in the South Seas. 
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However, in the implementations of the strategy of “impregnable south”, there were also 
major tactic failures. To consolidate its gains in the South Seas, Inoue Shigeyoshi, 
commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy Aviation Bureau, submitted a plan to Oikawa, 
calling for fortification of land bases and build-up of land-based air power on the scattered 
islands in the Pacific and securing maritime traffic by strengthening convoy capability 
Convoys (Tsunoda, 1944: 280). However, this “profoundly insightful” plan was ignored by 
Oikawa and Nagano. As a result, the South Sphere had never been impregnable for the 
Japanese after it took it. 
There were other grave miscalculations of Japanese decision makers regarding to the 
establishment of a self-sufficient empire and the wearing-down-U.S.-willingness strategy. 
Although they had never discounted the capability of the United States, they had still 
underestimated horrendous military potential of the United States. They had also 
underestimated the loss of themselves in the coming war. They had major miscalculation 
of American’s reaction when American assets and bases were attacked. Their estimation of 
the amount of shipping loss was just one quarter of what really toke place (the estimation 
was loss of 1000000 tons the first year and 800000 tons in each succeeding year, but the 
real loss was 1250000 for the first year, 2560000 for the second year and 3480000 for the 
third year, see Hashimoto, 1954: 241).  
To sum up, while the existing literature have done great job in explaining the origins 
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of the Pacific War, the theory proposed in this project can definitely make further 
contributions to it. 
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Sino-American Relations, 1950-2010 
Since the establishment of People’s Republic of China, Beijing and Washington had 
been rivalries from 1949 to 1971 and from 1989 to 2016. Only from 1971 and 1989, with 
the common adversary — the U.S.S.R. — in mind did the two powers forge a quasi-alliance 
relations for almost two decades. 
The relationship was severed by crisis in the Taiwan Strait on many occasions — in 
1950, 1954, 1958, 1995–6 to the stage of potential armed clash during the two period. 
Apart from Taiwan, crisis on the Korean Peninsula in 1950, on Indochina in early 1960’s, 
in East and South China Sea in 2010’s had also pushed the two powers on the brink of 
militarized disputes. 
The distribution of material capabilities between the two powers had been extremely 
imbalanced in favor of the United States in the early dates of the P.R.C., even with the 
assistance offered by Moscow. With the industrialization of China, the power gap shrank 
in a slow pace in 1950’s to 1970’s, though not without reversals given China’s domestic 
turmoil from 1958 to 1976. Starting from 1978, especially from mid 1990’s when China 
embraced market reforms, the gap had been shrinking rapidly. 
In the two periods under study, China had relatively clear advantage vis-a-vis other 
regional actors. In 1950, thanks to the alliance with Moscow and its political and military 
support, the great havoc wreaked by WWII on Japan and other parts of East Asia, and the 
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anti-colonial movements in the region, China, or the Soviet-Chinese bloc, did enjoy some 
type of preponderance over other regional actors. In the period of 1995-2016, on the other 
hand, China had been on the way of becoming a global class major power. Other states in 
East Asia, even Japan, had been overshadowed by China’s rapid development. 
In 1950, confident of its superior power, ignoring Beijing’s constant measures of 
deterrence and warnings, Washington intervened in the Korean War and pushed north of 
the 38 parallel which finally led to Beijing’s involvement in the war. Chinese decision 
makers, finally opted for an offensive against the much more powerful adversary. While in 
the period of 1995–2016, facing with China’s restrained reactive assertiveness, the United 
States tends to tread cautiously despite show of signals and resolve to support its Asian 
allies. China, although became more confident in asserting its national interests, maintained 
cautious in dealing with the United States. As a result, the major crisis between the two 
were resolved peacefully in this period. 
These findings confirm Hypothesis1 and Hypothesis2. However, the mechanism 
through which the large power gap led to war in the 1950 case and the roughly balanced 
power led to peaceful resolution of crisis in the 1995-2016 period need to be further 
investigated. The transpiring of these two periods offer a good opportunity to test 
Hypothesis3 and Hypothesis4. 
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Chapter 7 Developments Leading up to Yalu, 1950 
This Chapter finds that given the power superiority that the United States enjoyed 
against China and Soviet Union, American decision makers were arrogant and 
contemptuous of Chinese warnings on the 38th parallel. The Chinese leaders, on the other 
hand, did not consider waging war against the United States when the latter intervened in 
the Korean War. However, as the UN army crossed the 38th parallel and the American 
decision makers intended to eliminate the North Korean regime, they changed mind. Given 
the geographical proximity between North Korea and China, Chinese decision makers, 
diffident on its power inferiority, was concerned of the Korean situation and that the next 
target of America’s military action would be China. With calculations of the dispersion of 
the United States’ military power and its perception of Chinese local advantage, Chinese 
decision makers decided to confront the United States on the Korean Peninsula rather than 
on Chinese mainland later. 
The Sino-U.S. clash during Korean war had a long origin. In 1910, Imperial Japan 
annexed Korea with the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty. After Japan’s defeat in WWII in 
1945, the Soviet Union and the United States divided the Peninsula into Soviet and U.S. 
occupation zones along the 38th Parallel. With the drawing of iron curtain, the unification 
of the peninsula became well-nigh impossible and the two Koreas became independent 
states respectively in 1948. At the same time, U.S. assistance to Kuomintang during 
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Chinese civil war, the sign of Sino-Soviet Pact in February 1950 and U.S. blockage of 
PRC’s seat in the UN put major tensions in the relationship between PRC and the United 
States. The Korea war broke out on June 25, 1950 as the Communist North Korean leaders 
endeavored to unify the Korean Peninsula and initiated an offensive on the South. The 
North Korean army advanced smoothly at the early stage. They occupied Seoul-the capital 
city of the South-on the third day of the war. In spite of the intervention of UN force in 
early July, North Koreans drove the combined UN force into the corner of Pusan by 
September. However, with MacArthur’s Inchon landing on September 15, the situation 
rapidly reversed to the disadvantage of North Korea forces. On September 28, the UN force 
retook Seoul and advanced further north, the South Korean Army crossed the 38th parallel 
on September 30. Feeling threatened, Chinese leaders warned that it would not allow U.S. 
forces to cross the 38th parallel. Ignoring Chinese leaders’ warnings, U.S. decision makers 
decided to send forces above the 38th parallel. It was against this backdrop that senior 
Chinese leaders decided to wage war against the United States. 
The Course of Escalation towards War 
This project finds that until late September and early October, when the United States 
was determined to cross the 38th parallel and North Korea collapsing, there was no serious 
decision for war of senior Chinese leaders. Despite Mao Zedong’s own inclination for war, 
there was no major and continuous efforts for him to persuade other senior Chinese leaders 
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into agreeing the war against the United States. Although preparation of contingencies was 
made, senior Chinese leaders, even Mao and Zhou Enlai, who were relative positive in 
waging war against the United States, had not made up their mind in fighting against the 
United States. They hope a display of force along the China-North Korean border could 
deter the United States from crossing the 38th Parallel. However, with the danger of the 
falling of North Korea, Mao and other Chinese leaders started to feel threatened and some 
of them felt the necessity and urgency to respond. 
From late June to late September: United States intervention in Taiwan Strait and 
Korean Peninsula and China’s Deterrence Efforts 
The Korean War broke out on June 25 with the North launching attack to the South. 
Chinese leaders’ response to the event was indifference in the first several days. Their tepid 
attitude could be firstly attributed to the fact that the Soviet and North Korean leaders had 
not been in close contact with Chinese leaders regarding to the development of the situation 
on the Peninsula. Stalin gave Kim Il-sung sign of approval of his military adventure in 
Korean Peninsula as early as January 30, he and Kim had in-depth discussions on Kim’s 
plan when Kim secretly visited Moscow on April 10. However, Kim noticed Mao of his 
plan of military unification as late as May 13, one and half month before the military 
offensive were undertaken by the North (Shen, 2017: 209–221). Not until June 28 did 
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Pyongyang noticed Beijing of the outbreak of the war which took place three days earlier. 
At this time, the relationship between China and North Korea was lukewarm at best. China 
did not sen a diplomatic representative to Pyongyang until July 8. Zhou complained later 
that Pyongyang shared little information with China regarding their military plan. China 
asked to send military personnel to observe the development on the battlefield, only to be 
ignored by Pyongyang (Roshchin to Stalin, Sept. 18, 1950). In addition, the war went on 
well for the North until late August, and it seemed that although the United States posed 
threat, the threat was not imminent. Senior Chinese leaders felt no urgency in assisting 
North Korea. Moreover, China was in deep economic difficulty at that time, and national 
unification has not been completed. Tibet and Taiwan was still not liberated, spies, bandits 
and other anti CPC forces was still active in Southern China. CPC leaders spend a lot of 
efforts in dealing with these domestic problems. 
However, to the senior Chinese leaders’ grievance, the United States responded to the 
Korean War by sending the 7th Fleet to Taiwan Strait on June 27 to neutralize the region, 
so as to obstruct both Beijing’s air and sea operations against Taipei, and Taipei’s operations 
against Beijing. Truman administration, falsely believing that Pyongyang’s initiation of 
War against Seoul was a coordinated effort of the Communist bloc to weaken the United 
States in Asia, in which Beijing took a part, made such decision to prevent the conflict from 
spreading to the Taiwan region, which would further undermine the United States’ position 
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in Asia vis-à-vis the Communist bloc (Truman, 1956: 334). Truman’s new policy on 
Taiwan was a major change from its policy of “let the dust settle” on the Taiwan issue. 
At the same time, Washington also dominated the agenda of Security Council of 
United Nations (UNSC) at the absence of Soviet representatives and UNSC passed 
Resolutions 82 and 83 on June 25 and 27, respectively, demanding Pyongyang to withdraw 
to the north of the 38 parallel and request UN members to provide assistance to Seoul. On 
June 29, U.S. Navy was ordered to block the coastline of North Korea and Douglas 
MacArthur, the Commander in Chief of Far East, was authorized to employ air, naval and 
limited army forces to support Seoul (The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, 
Far East, Jun. 29, FRUS, 1950, Vol. IV: 240-1). On July 2, American army landed on Pusan. 
United States’ intervention in the Taiwan Strait on June 27 ruined Mao’s plan of 
unifying China. Shen Zhihua argued that since that date, the war with the United States had 
begun for Mao (Shen, 2017: 323-4). On June 28, Mao remarked on the 8th meeting of 
Central People’s Government Committee: “The people of the nation and all the world 
(should be) united and fully prepared to defeat any provocation efforts of the American 
Imperialists” (Pang and Feng, 2013: 159–160). On July 7, several days after the U.S. army 
fought the first battle on Korean Peninsula, the Central Military Commission of CPC 
(CMCCPC) held the first National Defense Session, and decided the establishment of the 
Northeast Frontier Defense Force (NEFDF), containing four infantry armies and three 
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artillery divisions, totaling 250,000 troops, to prepare for uncertainties on the northeastern 
border and assist Pyongyang if necessary (Mao, 2010: 158–9). It seems that Mao has 
already decided to fight against the United States in Korea. 
In fact, at this time, the Korean situation was just one of Mao’s focus. Mao’s remark 
on June 28 was mainly about Taiwan, it only shortly mentioned Korea, together with 
Philippines and Vietnam. He was also concerning with the situation in Tibet, Vietnam and 
the bandit and spy problem. This was not the case after late September. It was also widely 
accepted that the initial aim of the establishment of NEFDF was to “prepare without using” 
(Zhou, 1997: 45), or to “repair the windows and doors before it rains” (Wang, 2002: 12). 
From these accounts, the NEFDF was both a preparation for contingencies and a deterrence 
to the United States that China’s red line should not be crossed. 
Since then, Beijing had been speeding the efforts of preparation and deterrence. PLA’s 
General Logistics Department was asked to implement new plans of soldier recruitment 
after demobilization since early 1950 and political mobilization movement with the slogan 
of “defending the safety of our country” among PLA soldiers was implemented (Chen, 
1994: 136). Infrastructure defense and logistics preparation in Northeast were also 
implemented in early August (Ibid: 137-8). All these measures were to ensure, to use Mao’s 
own words, that “in any case, we shall be fully prepared so that we won’t get caught by 
surprise and rush into an unprepared war” (Mao’s remark early July, China Today, 1990: 
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17-8). Mao and Zhou's concerns were understandable. For example, Commander of Air 
Force, Liu Yalou, reported to Zhou on July 18 that “enemy surveillance aircraft had 
frequented Dan Dong (known as An Dong back then) city” (Liu to Zhou, July 18, Zhou, 
2008, Vol. 3: 65). 
However, since early July, Mao and Zhou had mentioned sending army to support 
Kim on different occasions. As early as July 2, Zhou had mentioned to N. Roshchin, Soviet 
Ambassador to China, that if the United States crossed the 38th parallel, Chinese troops 
would fight against the United States in a volunteer method (Roshchin to Stalin, July 2, 
Kim and Park: 76). According to Kim Il Sung, Mao mentioned to Kim’s representative that 
if Pyongyang considered necessary, China could send its own army to Korea, China had 
prepared 4 army corps (320,000 troops) for contingency (Shtykov to Stalin, July 20, 
Russian declassified documents: Sino-Soviet Relations, RDDSS hereafter, Vol. 2: 437). On 
August 5, Mao sent Gao Gang, the then Commander and Commissar of Northeastern 
Military Region, to make sure that the NEFDF is ready and capable to fight by early 
September (Mao 1987: 454). However, because of the difficulty of preparation, on August 
18, Mao and Nie Rongzhen, then Acting Chief of the General Staff, told Gao and Deng 
Hua, then commander of 13th Army corps, respectively, to delay the date to September 30 
(Mao, 2010, Vol. I: 184; Nie, 1986: 738).  
Mao seemed to be positive in sending NEFDF to Korea. He might have triple aims: 
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Firstly, if the battle went smoothly for Pyongyang, China could send army to speed the 
collapse of adversarial forces and expand influence on the peninsula (Kim and Park, 2016). 
Secondly, to deter the United States from crossing the 38th parallel. Thirdly, as a hedge 
against uncertainties, if the United States was about to cross the 38th parallel, China should 
be prepared for war. However, it seemed that he felt no urgency and had not ultimately 
made up him mind by then. 
As early as August 4, during a Political Bureau (PBCPC) meeting, Mao contended 
that “North Korea must be helped. If American Imperialists win the war, they will be 
arrogant and will threaten, or even provoke us. So we must help North Korea, in the form 
of voluntary army. Of course, we must find a opportune timing, but we must be prepared” 
(History of Resisting America Assisting North Korea War, HAANKW hereafter, 2000: 90). 
Zhou also remarked that “To strive for victory, the Chinese factor must be added” (Bo, 
1991: 43). On August 11, during a military conference in Shenyang, Xiao Jinguang, who 
was appointed as the Vice Commander of NEFDF, addressed that the future task of NEFDF 
was to enter the Korean War and assist Pyongyang to fight the United States (HAANKW, 
2000: 91).  
Nonetheless, no evidence showed that Mao made major efforts in persuading other 
members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee (SCCCPC) in supporting sending 
army until early October. Mao’s remarks on August 4 were “more of an assumption that 
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precautions averts perils, rather than a decision of action” (Editorial group of Zhou Enlai’s 
Biography, 1998: 46; Jin, 1998:1341). On the same day, Mao approved Nie’s report of 
sending high cannon forces to North Korean side to secure the safety of Yalu Bridge (Pang 
and Jin, 2003: 109). Given China’s assistance of North Korea of horses, transportation of 
military material and mobilization of technicians of Korean nationalities living in China to 
return North Korea (see Zhou, 2008, Vol. 3 : 17-19, 61), the “China factor” at this time 
might refer to the Chinese assistance to North Korea rather than direct military intervention. 
From the start of the war to China’s intervention, its red line was America’s cross of 
38 Parallel. In that sense, Mao and Zhou’s promise to Kim in July and August might only 
be a moral support for Kim, or their own inclination at best. These promises did not likely 
receive the collective approval of senior party leaders, not to mention that of Moscow. That 
could explain why after conversation with Shtykov on July 19, Kim complained that he did 
not know that Mao’s suggestion to send army was only an idea of his own rather than a 
collective idea by him and Stalin (Shtykov to Stalin, July 20, RDDSS, Vol. 2: 437). And it 
is highly likely that until early October, the collective decision of the senior leaders of CPC 
was still that the main function of NEFDF was preparation for contingency, or to deter and 
hedge at best, rather than to wage war soon.  
However, in mid-August, the war on Korean Peninsula was drawn to an attrition (Mao 
had already expected this late July, see Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, 1993 :163), and U.S. 
 
  445 
bombers breached into Chinese airspace and killed Chinese citizens on August 27 and 30.  
Mao and Zhou was anxious. Mao urged Gao to accelerate the process of preparation 
and complete the preparation for war by the end of September (Mao to Gao, Aug. 18, 1987: 
469). Nie advised to prepare second-line forces and Mao approved Nie’s advise (August 
20, Mao, 2010: 185). Zhou convened a military conference and gave an address on August 
26, which stated that the original consideration was that if Pyongyang’s military campaign 
went smoothly, the aim of establishing NEFDF was “preparation without using”. However, 
the basis for that consideration no longer existed after mid-August. Although North Korea 
people were brave, China should shoulder the burden of destroy the U.S. army. And 
NEFDF should be ready to fight in 1951 (Zhou, 1997: 43-8). In early September, Mao 
ordered 50th Corps in Hubei Province, Ninth Army Corps near Shanghai and Nineteenth 
Army in Northwest to reinforce NEFDF, a further action of both preparation and deterrence. 
However, sources showed that at this time there might not be considerations for 
participate in the war even for Mao. Gao reported to Mao on August 30 that if China 
participate in the war, the enemy would bomb the railroad, bridges and companies in 
Northeast, and suggested to deploy railway column to Northeast and transfer industrial 
facilities in South Manchuria further north. Gao also suggested to inform the province-
level leaders of the intention of participation of the war. Mao, while accepted most of Gao’s 
suggestions (Gao made eight suggestions in total), including transfer and ammunition and 
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Gao’s air defense plans, did not approve these three suggestions (Mao to Gao, Sept. 3, 1950, 
Mao, 2010: 198-9). If Mao’s disapproval of Gao’s suggestion of informing province-level 
leaders could be considered as his attempt to keep policies confidential11, it seemed that 
Mao’s disapproval of the two other suggestions could at least be partially attributed to the 
fact that Mao did not consider war with the United States to be imminent and military 
readiness and air defense would suffice at that time, apart from technical limitations. Zhou 
also implied that it was still not the time that all types of transfers must be made (Zhou to 
Mao and Liu, Sept. 3, Zhou, 2008: 250). 
There was also a movement of Signature for Peace since May 1950, with the start of 
Korean War, this movement had been picking up momentum. On August 13, Chinese 
Defending World Peace Conference advocated to extend the signature movement from big 
cities to small towns and villages (Xinhua Monthly, September 15, 1950: 1006). This 
movement was still quite alive in late August. This movement did not seem to be an effort 
in misleading the enemy, given the other simultaneous peaceful measures taken, such as 
support of Soviet Union’s proposal of peaceful settlement of the Korean issue at the U.N. 
China had already actively taken up anti-America measures by peaceful meanings 
 
11 Mao seemed to decide that if necessary, China should join the war secretly so as the surprise the 
enemy and score early victories. Mao’s tactic was to “avoid expose ourselves too early”. See Mao’s 
comments on the question of sending artillery observers to Korean frontier to do investigation, July 
18, 1950, MMMSF, p. 166. 
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since late August. From late August to late September, Zhou wrote to Secretary of U.N. 
and president of Security Council to accuse the United States of intervention of Taiwan 
affairs, breach of Chinese airspace, bombardment of Chinese assets, killing Chinese 
citizens and blockade PRC’s entrance (see Zhou’s telegrams on Aug. 24, 26, 28, 30, Sept. 
10, 16, 17, 24, Zhou, 2008: 193-4, 216-221, 281-2, 303-4, 307-9). 
With Mao’s order, Gao had already begun the preparation intensively. On August 13, 
he addressed the senior officers of NEFDF:  
“If the American invaders were to occupy North Korea, there would be no doubt there 
they will prepare to attack Northeastern and North China, to attack our motherland. So, 
whether shall we allow it to take down North Korea, make preparation, become arrogant, 
and only destroy them when they attack China; or shall we take the initiative and cooperate 
with Korean People’s Army, destroy the enemy and protect ourselves beyond our border? 
Obviously, destroy the enemy beyond our border is beneficial for us, for our friends, and 
for the mission of anti-imperialism and pursuit of peace and democracy of the people in 
the world...Now the Party and the People ask us to destroy the invading troops of American 
Imperialists, (we should) bravely take the burden of this honorable battle task” (HAANKW, 
2000: 91–2). 
Given Gao’s reluctance in acceding to sending army on the October 4 meeting, these 
remarks might have more propaganda effect than substance, and as methods to fulfil Mao’s 
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August 5 order to Gao that “make sure to build high morale, to be fully prepared. And the 
questions of thoughts in the troops must be solved” (Mao, 1987: 454). 
There are two memoirs of Chinese officials that claim or imply that decision of 
sending army to Korea had already been made in early August and early September. 
According to Li Jvkui, then director of Logistics Department of Northeast Military Region, 
when he stopped by Beijing in early August, Nie told him that the Central Party had already 
made decision to assist North Korea, resist the United States and to send troops into Korea 
(Li, 1986: 263). Chai Chengwen, counselor for summoned back to Beijing, reported to 
Zhou the new development of Korean War on September 1. He remembered he had the 
impression that senior CPC leaders had already made a decision that China would surely 
send troops to Korea, the remaining issue was just when to issue the final order, since Zhou 
asked him on the day that “If the situation were to change suddenly and calls for our 
sending troops to Korea to wage war, what difficulties do you expect will we face?”. 
However, after he talked to Lin two days later, Lin shared his reservations of sending army 
and even asked him whether North Koreans leaders was ready for fighting a guerrilla war 
in the mountains. Chai was confused and wondered whether the senior leaders had changed 
the final decision in one day (Chai and Zhao, 1989: 78-9). Neither Li nor Chai were senior 
decision makers. Li’s account may be inaccurate, or Nie, to urge Li to fully prepare the 
logistics for the NEFDF, intentionally told him that war decision had been made. Chai’s 
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impression, however, reflected the fact that consensus of senior Chinese leaders were not 
reached at that time. Even efforts of unifying opinions were lacking. 
On September 15, MacArthur landed on Inchon, the North Korean army suffered a 
debacle and the situation on the Peninsula reversed. With victory on the battle ground, 
MacArthur kept pushing North. On September 25, Seoul was retaken by the UN forces.  
After Inchon landing, senior Chinese leaders started to worry about the negative 
development on the peninsula. Necessity of participation in war was discussed intensely. 
Chai remembered that on September 17, Gao showed him a letter from Mao in which Mao 
said “it seems we cannot afford not to send army” (Chai and Zhao, 1989: 79). Liu Shaoqi 
told Roshchin on September 21 that if necessary, China would fight against the United 
States (Roshchin to Stalin, Sept. 22, 1950, RDDSS, Vol. 3: 61).  
However, it seemed that the deterrence and hedging strategy had not been totally 
abandoned, since Chinese leaders thought the United States was deterrable. This can be 
revealed in Mao’s talk with Academician Yudin on September 22. During this talk Mao 
said “the United States does not want a long and large scale war, what they are doing is to 
test our capability and to see how Soviet Union, China, and the public opinion will respond” 
(Roshchin to Stalin, Sept. 22, 1950, RDDSS: 62). Zhou seemed to share the view. During 
Zhou’s talk with Roshchin and Soviet military advisers on September 18, three days after 
the Inchon landing, he said that the United States, Britain and France were worried about 
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Soviet and Chinese participation in the war, and “we should take advantage of this worrying 
psychology and adopt policies that could reveal our intentions. In this respect, the move of 
Chinese forces from South to Northeast will be enough to make American and British 
government uneasy” (Roshchin to Stalin, Sept. 18, 1950, RDDSS, Vol. 3: 51). It was 
relative clear that Zhou implied in this talk that the aim of the movement of Chinese forces 
was to deter the United States. Lei Yingfu, who worked at War Room of the General Staff 
at that time, also recalled that Mao and Zhou deemed that “regarding to the question of 
sending army to assist Pyongyang, (we) should warn the enemy and force them to back off 
from difficulties. We won’t let go the opportunity if the enemy should stop at the 38th 
parallel and offer peace negotiation” (Lei, 1997: 155). 
As a result, at this juncture, apart from military deterrence, Beijing mainly used 
diplomatic ways to warn the United States in the aim of facilitating settlement of the 
Korean War. Chinese leaders had constantly warned Washington that China’s red line 
should not be crossed. On September 21, Zhou called in Panikkar and warned him the 
severity of the United States’ attempt to cross the 38th parallel (HAANKW, 2000: 135). Four 
days later, Nie warned through Kavalam Panikkar, then Indian ambassador to China. Zhou 
and Nie’s warnings were the first time senior Chinese decision maker warned Washington 
through diplomatic channels directly (HAANKW, 2000: 135; Panikkar, 1955: 108). Mao 
decided to let Zhou declared to the world on September 30 that “Chinese people will not 
 
  451 
tolerate the invasion of foreign countries, and will not have their arms folded and give 
Imperialists free hand to invade and rampage our neighbors” (Zhou, Sept. 30, 1950, Zhou, 
1990: 24). 
Mao and Zhou also expressed their hope of peaceful settlement on several occasions. 
During Zhou’s talk with Roshchin on September 18, he said “As is known to all, Soviet 
Union and China advocated for peaceful settlement of the Korean issue in the U.N....” 
(Roshchin to Stalin, RDDSS, Vol. 3: 51). During Mao’s talk with Yudin on September 22, 
Mao also said, “there is possibility that the United States might seek compromise in the 
Korean Peninsula if it could do so without losing face”. He even implied that if the China 
was to be admitted to the U.N. and established diplomatic relationship with the United 
States, China would have more constraints before they conducted anti-Americanist 
activities in Asia (Roshchin to Stalin, Sept. 22, 1950, RDDSS, Vol. 3: 62–3). At the same 
time, China was still supporting Soviets’ proposal of peaceful settlement in U.N. 
At the same time, Beijing was lukewarm at best in pulling North Korea’s chestnut. 
After Inchon, Kim sent Park Il-yu to Andong, Park reported the gloomy situation after 
Inchon, and “sincerely asked China to send troops to assist them”. Hong only told him that 
he would report his requests to Central Committee and they will send troops to assist them 
immediately after the Central Committee made such decisions (Hong, 1990: 8-9). On 
September 18, Kim sent Mao a telegram to report the latest situation, Mao replied on 20, 
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emphasizing that Pyongyang should “consider how to preserve the main force in order to 
destroy the enemy separately under the general principle of self-reliance and long-term 
struggle”. Mao also gave Kim advice of how to fight the United States without mentioning 
China’s help (Mao, 2010: 219-20). Mao’s reply seemed to imply that Pyongyang could not 
rely on China’s intervention. According to Kim, Beijing and Pyongyang had an agreement 
that Beijing would assist Pyongyang should the enemy land on Inchon, Chinnampo or 
Wonsan (Shtykov to Gromyko, September 21, RDDSS, Vol. 3: 58), this was clearly not 
coming out in late September.  
Before the end of September, it seemed that Chinese decision makers had not set up 
their mind in intervening on behalf of Pyongyang, and NEFDF had still been a deterrence 
force. This may be because Chinese decision makers considered that their red line had not 
been crossed by the United States.  
Game changer: United States’ ignorance of China’s warning and its crossing of 38th 
parallel 
The United States’ crossing of 38th Parallel was the condition upon which China would 
enter the conflict. This was the red line drawn by Chinese policy makers at the early days 
of the war. Without the red line crossed, China would not participate the war. During Zhou’s 
talk with Roshchin in early July, he clearly mentioned the crossing of 38th parallel condition. 
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As a response to Zhou’s talk, Stalin sent a telegram to Roshchin and confirm the 38th 
parallel condition (Stalin to Roshchin, July 5, RDDSS, Vol. 2: 429). Zhou and Nie formally 
warned the United States through diplomatic channels in September 20’s.  
And on October 3, after knowing South Korean army had crossed the 38th parallel, 
Zhou met with Panikkar the second time warning of the crossing of 38th Parallel (Zhou, 
1990: 25-7). Zhou clearly told Pankkar that it did not matter if the South Korean forces 
crossed the 38th parallel, “but American intrusion into North Korea would encounter 
Chinese resistance” (Panikkar, 1955: 110). Zhou later recalled that China warned the 
United States twice not to cross the 38th parallel, or China would not ignore, but “the 
United States would not listen, and marched to Yalu river, cornering us to the wall, only 
then we resisted the United States and assisted Korea” (Zhou’s talk on Apr. 24, 1963, Zhou, 
1990: 328). After Chinese leaders made decisions to send army, Stalin sent Mao a telegram, 
stating: “the reason that we asked you to send five to six army corps to Korea is that we 
clearly know that according to the announcement of Chinese leaders, China will send a part 
of its armed forces to support Korean colleagues if the enemy crossed the 38th parallel” 
(Stalin to Mao, Oct. 4, 1950, RDDSS: 81-82). This also confirmed that the 38th parallel as 
the red line was not only the decision of China, but also the shared understanding between 
Beijing and Moscow. 
It seemed that Mao did not like to talk about the 38th parallel condition himself. 
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However, he recalled in 1956 that “ If American Imperialist would intervene, but not cross 
the 38th parallel, we will not intervene; if they cross the 38th parallel, we must intervene” 
(Mao’s talk with Delegation of Central Committee of Soviet Communist Party, September 
23, 1956). Xianzhi Pang and Chongji Jin wrote that this was Mao’s “bottom (line)” (Pang 
and Jin, 2003: 110). 
Zhou and Nie sent clear message to the United States in late September and early 
October, both through Panikkar (Zhou on September 21, Nie on September 25, Zhou again 
on October 3) and through public speech (Zhou on September 30) that the 38 Parallel was 
Beijing’s red line. Nevertheless, the decision makers in the United States refused to believe 
that China meant its words. 
The American decision makers, however, had been positive in crossing China’s red 
line from the very start of the war. As early as July 1, no more than one week since the war 
broke out, U.S. director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs of State Department, John 
Allison, had already prepared a memorandum to Dean Rusk, then Assistant Secretary of 
State for Far Eastern Affairs, in which he deemed that “we should continue right on up to 
the Manchurian and Siberian border, and, having done so, call for a UN-supervised election 
for all of Korea”, although he was “not at all certain we can” (FRUS, 1950, VII: 272). John 
Foster Dulles, consultant to the Secretary of State, prepared a memorandum to Paul Nitze, 
the then Director of Policy Planning Staff (PPS), stating that in the interests of “peace and 
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security in the area”, “if we have the opportunity to obliterate the line as a political division, 
certainly we should do so” (July 14, Ibid: 386). Allison’s stance on crossing the 38th 
parallel only grew more assertive, in a memorandum he sent to Nitze, he claimed that even 
a prospectus of a global war should be accepted, and “ (w)hen all legal and moral right is 
on our side why should we hesitate” (Ibid: 461). Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, 
finally acquiesced to this vein of thoughts (McLellan, 1976: 282–3). 
 From the military, MacArthur expressed the similar idea of occupying all of Korea 
and “compose and unite Korea” on July 13, when he hosted General J. Lawton Collins and 
Hoyt Vandenberg at his headquarters (Collins, 1969: 82-3). According to the memoirs of 
Wellington Koo, then Taiwan authorities’ “ambassador” to the United States, on July 19, 
Yin’en Jiang reported to him that Colonel Victor O’Kelliher, liaison between State 
Department and Taiwan “Embassy”, informed him that “the U.S. government has decided 
to march directly to North Korea to settle the Korean question once for all”, and Louis 
Johnson, the then Secretary of Defense, had persuaded President Truman to authorize the 
campaign to North Korea with U.S. troops alone, at the cost of his own position of Defense 
Secretary if the campaign failed (Koo, 1997, Part II, Vol. VII: 924–5). 
On September 7, Joint Chiefs of Staffs (JCS) produced a memorandum, after 
consultation with MacArthur, in which it was deemed necessary to take operations both 
north and south of the 38th parallel, and called for revision of NSC 81, which recommended 
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“reoccupy Korea up to the 38th parallel” (FRUS, 1950, Vol. VII: 707). The result was NSC 
81/1, which concluded that the U.N. force would be “in pursuance of a roll-back in Korea 
north of the 38th parallel”, provided that “at the time of such operations there has been no 
entry into North Korea by major Soviet and Chinese Communist forces, no announcement 
of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea” (Ibid: 
716). It is reasonable to conclude that the Truman administration had already determined 
to march north of 38th parallel at latest by September 7 (see also Bradley and Blair: 560). 
However, taking account of the assertive attitude of many important policy makers, it is 
possible that this decision was made earlier. Voices of conservatives such as George 
Kennan, Charles Bohlen, and Nitze were drown in the voices of sea of supporters of 
crossing 38th parallel, including Allison, Dulles, Rusk, MacArthur, Johnson, and George 
Marshall, who succeeded Johnson in early September and cautious supports of these 
recommendations, such as Acheson. 
At the same time, the mainstream analysis of Western intelligence service was that 
Nie and Zhou’s warnings were bluffs. Consequently, Truman approved the directive 
prepared by the Department of Defense to authorize MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel, 
and on September 29, Marshall sent MacArthur a secret telegram, ordering him “feel 
unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th parallel” (FRUS, 1950, 
Vol. VII: 792–3, 826). As a result, the United States started to push for the crossing of 38th 
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parallel in the United Nations. On the night of September 30 to October 1, South Korean 
forces crossed the 38th parallel. MacArthur called on North Korean forces to cease 
hostilities on October 1 and the U.N. forces continued pressing north (MacArthur, 1964: 
359). 
On September 29, Mao received Zhou’s report about the United States’ decision to 
cross the 38th parallel and the probability that UN forces would ride directly at Pyongyang 
(Zhou, 1997: 58-9). It signaled the failure of the deterrence efforts of China by deploying 
NEFDF in the Northeastern Provinces and constant warnings of Beijing. More forceful 
methods must be adopted to safeguard China from the threat posed by an advancing 
American force. 
The United States’ attempt to cross the 38th parallel made a sea change. Mao, Zhou 
and other Chinese senior leaders began to make their minds to participate the Korean War. 
The prospective of the imminent collapse of Pyongyang and the loss of a buffer zone posed 
immediate and urgent threat to the security of China. On October 1, Stalin sent Mao a 
telegram, asking Beijing to send army to North Korea as volunteer (Stalin to Roshchin, 
Oct. 1, 1950, RDDSS, Vol. 3: 72). Later the same day, Kim and Park Hon-yong wrote Mao 
a letter, asking for PLA’s assistance (Kim and Park to Mao, Oct. 1, Chinese Military 
Museum).  
It was clear that at this time Mao had already set his mind to participate in the War. 
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However, senior CCP decision makers did not approve Mao’s decisions at first. 
Mao sent Gao and Deng a telegram, calling Gao to leave for Beijing and Deng to 
“complete the preparation work ahead of time, and be ready to move and fight the new 
enemy according to the original plan” (Mao to Gao and Deng, 2 a.m. Oct. 2, Mao, 1987: 
538). He also drafted a telegram to Stalin on October 2, stating that China was to send part 
of the army to North Korea to join the war (Mao to Stalin, Mao, 1987: 539-40). However, 
Mao did not send out the telegram to Stalin (Shen, 2017: 282-4). Instead, he talked to 
Roshchin about the downsides of Beijing’s intervention, including the difficulty Chinese 
army faced and the need of cautious consideration. Roshchin deemed this to be a reversal 
of Mao and Liu’s previous opinion that China was decided to assist North Korea and PLA 
had high morale and was able to defeat the United States if necessary (Roshchin to Stalin, 
Oct. 3, 1950, RDDSS, Vol. 3: 77-8). Mao’s reversal of idea might be explained by the fact 
that during the October 1 SCCCPC meeting, Mao and Zhou had persuaded the other 
members of SCCCPC, however, in an extended SCCCPC meeting convened on October 2, 
most participants proposed caution regarding the question of sending army to Korean 
peninsula and Mao could not get his own decision through. It was likely that Mao wrote 
the October 2 telegram after the October 1 SCCCPC meeting, while talked to Roshchin 
after the extended SCCCPC meeting on October 2 (see also Shen, 2017: 284-5). 
On September 30, South Korean army crossed the 38th parallel and the U.N. forces 
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continued pushing north. This latest development was learned by Beijing on October 3 
(Beijing was not sure whether American army had done the same then, see Jin, 1998, 1347). 
This information expedited senior Chinese leaders’ decision making. On October 4 and 
October 5, two extended PBCPC meeting were held to discuss participation in the war. 
During the October 4 meeting, there were still many participants who urged caution. It was 
said Zhu De and Liu Shaoqi expressed concerns, while Gao and Lin Piao directly expressed 
disagreement on the issue of sending army (Xie, 1993: 162-4; Wang, 2002: 162-3). Most 
senior leaders urged caution. Their main argument was that the material power gap between 
China and the United States was too large and China had been exhausted by continuous 
wars and poorly armed. In addition, the domestic threats such as the bandits and spies had 
not been solved (Peng, 1988: 321; Shi, 2001: 376). However, on October 5, after Peng 
Dehuai and Mao’s speech, most senior leaders were persuaded of the salience of the threat 
and the need to act. Decision for war was quickly made. On the next day, Mao told to 
Roshchin that China had decided to join the war. However, he implied that, China need 
assistance from the Soviets for ammunition help and air cover (Roshchin to Stalin, Oct. 7, 
1950, RDDSS, Vol. 3: 84-6). On the same day, Zhou convened a meeting participated by 
senior leaders from the party, government and military, he said “Now that the question is 
not whether we should fight, but the enemy forces us into fighting”, and the theme of the 
meeting changed from discussing whether to send army but how to strive for victory after 
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sending army (Li et al., 1997: 84). On October 8, Mao ordered the reorganization of 
NEFDF into PVA, with Peng as the commander and Political Commissioner. And the PVA 
was ordered to march to Korea immediately (Mao, 2010, Vol. 1: 235). 
Table 19: Ratio of Number of Records of Korea Situation in Documents of Mao and Zhou 
Document 
Ratio of Number of records of 
Korea situation, Jun. 25- Sept. 29 
Ratio of Number of records of 
Korea situation, Sept. 29-Oct. 19 
MMMSE 12/44 (27.27 %) 24/32 (75 %) 
Chronicle of Mao 21/142 (14.79%) 35/57 (61.4%) 
MMSE 3/88 (3.41%) 19/28 (67.86%) 
Chronicle of 
Zhou 
27/132 (20.45%) 16/23 (69.57%) 
ZMSE 29/171 (16.96%) 13/23 (56.52%) 
 
To sum up, the United States’ decision of crossing the 38th parallel was the dividing 
line of senior Chinese leaders’ decision. This can also be proved by analyzing the gravity 
of Mao and Zhou’s policy focus between June 25 and October 19. In fact, there was only 
12 out of 44 articles mentioning Korean situation between June 25 to September 29 in Mao 
Zedong’s Military Manuscripts since the Establishment of PRC (MMMSE hereinafter). This 
figure becomes 24 out of 32 between September 30 and October 19 (Mao, 2010: 154–267). 
In Chronicle of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), the corresponding figures are 21 out of 142 
entries and 35 out of 57 entries, respectively (Pang and Feng, 2013: 159–217). The 
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corresponding figures of Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Establishment of PRC 
(MMSE hereafter) are 3 out of 88 and 19 out of 28 respectively (Mao, 1987: 422-572). That 
of Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949-1976) are 27 out of 132 and 16 out of 23 (Li and Ma, 
1997: 49-87), respectively. That of Zhou Enlai’s Manuscripts since the Establishment of 
PRC (ZMSE hereafter) are 29 out of 171 and 13 out of 23 (Zhou, 2008: Vol. 2: 518–530 
and Vol. 3: 1–411). These figures are also clear illustration of the change of senior Chinese 
leaders’ mind and the gravity of work before and after the United States’ attempt to cross 
the 38th parallel. They also reflect how significantly the United States’ crossing of 38th 
parallel had affected senior Chinese leaders’ calculation. 
After decision of sending army, on October 8, Mao immediately ordered Zhou and 
Lin to visit Stalin in Crimea to discuss potential Soviets assistance to PVA, such as air 
coverage, ammunition and arms, as well as the details of Chinese strategies and tactics in 
the coming war. To Zhou’s surprise, Stalin told him during their talk on October 11 that 
Soviet could assist China with guns, ammunition and tanks, however, Soviet air force 
would not be ready until two or half and two months later (Li and Ma, 1997: 85). Since 
Mao and Zhou had in advance decided that if Soviet Union offered air coverage, China 
would send army to Korea immediately; if not, it would delay in sending armies to 6 
months later (Mao and Zhou’s talk with Kim, October 10, 1970, Mao, 2010, Vol. 3: 372–
4), Zhou told Stalin that China would not send army for the moment without Soviets’ air 
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coverage (Shuang, 2004: 132–3). Stalin told Zhou that “Since China has difficulties, it is 
fine if it does not send army. Even if we lose North Korea, we are still Socialist, and China 
still exists” (Jin, 1998: 1352). Stalin and Zhou sent Mao a telegram with their joint 
signature, suggesting that Chinese army should not cross the Korean border if not fully 
prepared; Korean forces should retreat and organize guerrilla warfare, experienced recruits 
and commanders of the Korean forces should be transported secretly to Northeast China 
reorganized into army corps there. However, Stalin intentionally and politely wrote “Wait 
for your decision” at the end of the telegram (Stalin and Zhou to Mao, October 11, 1950, 
RDDSS: 91). 
Mao was startled by this telegram. Nevertheless, he ordered Peng, Gao and other 
senior Northeastern officers to stop proceeding, so was Song Shilun’s Ninth Army Corps, 
which was the second line reserved force (Mao to Peng, Gao, Deng, Hong Xie and Mao to 
Rao Shushi and Chen Yi, October 12, 1950, Mao, 2010: 247-8). However, after in-depth 
consideration, he changed his mind. Mao decided to ignore Stalin’s suggestions again. On 
October 13, Mao convened a PBCPC meeting and discussed the latest development with 
Peng, Gao and other members of PBCPC, they “unanimously” deemed that even without 
Soviet air support, “China should still send army to assist Korea under the situation that 
the U.S. force crossed the 38th parallel and march north on a large scale” (Pang and Jin, 
2003: 212). On the same day, Mao telegraphed Zhou to inform him of the new decision. 
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On the next day, he asked Zhou about details of Soviet assistance, especially whether it 
could offer air coverage in two to two and half months (Mao to Zhou, 3 p.m. October 14, 
1950, 2010, Vol. 1: 257). Six hours later, he informed Zhou the decision to move on 
October 19 (Mao to Zhou, 9 p.m. October 14, 1950: 259). Zhou immediately informed 
Stalin the two telegrams of Mao. As an answer to Mao, Stalin asked Molotov to tell Zhou 
that Soviet air force could only be stationed in Chinese territory, and would not fight in 
Korea even after two or two and half months later (Li and Ma, 1997: 87).  
This was a major back-paddling decision on the part of Soviet Union. However, Mao 
and other senior Chinese leaders’ determination were not wavered by Stalin’s decision. 
Mao became aware of Stalin’s new decision no later than 9 p.m. October 15. He asked 
Zhou to continue negotiating with Soviet leaders, especially Soviet air defense of Beijing 
(Pang, Feng et al., 2013, Vol.: 215). On October 17, Mao telegraphed Peng, Gao and other 
senior leaders in Northeast and ordered them to be prepared to get moved on October 19 
and asked Peng and Gao to be back to Beijing on 18, at the same time, they should wait for 
confirmation of order on 18, the day on which Zhou would be back in Beijing (Mao, 2010, 
Vol. 1: 265). On 18, a Central Committee (CCCPC) meeting was convened, Mao remarked 
that: “Now the enemy is besieging Pyongyang, and they will reach Yalu River days later. 
No matter how much difficulties will we face, there can be no change in PVA’s assisting 
Korea, and the river will be crossed according to previous plan with no delay of time” 
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(Wang et al., 1993: 407). It seemed that during this meeting, even given the new decision 
of Stalin, there was on opposition of sending army, the main question was “the first-step 
war plan and other measure that should be adopted” (Wang, 1998: 443). Thus, the timing 
to cross the Yalu river was finally decided. It was clear that after October 13, the remaining 
question was just when to cross the Yalu River (on 17 or 19), Stalin’s new decision on 
October 14 did not have major effect on Mao’s decision to send army. 
Existing Literature on the Cause of Sino-American Clash in the Korean War 
As the only major power war in the post WWII era, the outbreak of hostility between 
China and the United States in the Korean war had raised academic interests ever since its 
outbreak. However, most of these literature focus on the decision making of both powers, 
rather than bring forward a theory explaining the outbreak of the war. 
Chen Jian argues that China entered the war because of three rationales: “the party’s 
revolutionary nationalism, its sense of responsibility toward an Asian-wide or worldwide 
revolution and its determination to maintain the inner dynamics of the Chinese revolution” 
(Chen, 1994: 213-4). Shen Zhihua, while agrees with Chen that the ideological account 
does make sense (Shen argues that Mao’s Central Kingdom mindset also pushed him in the 
decision), national security was also a major concern for Mao and Chinese leaders (Shen, 
2017: 322-5). Allen Whiting, however, argued that PRC fought the United States out of 
vulnerability and insecurity as well as of its belief of its own propaganda of U.S. 
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“imperialist aggression” (Whiting, 1960: 154, 158-9). Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai shared 
the view of Whiting by arguing that Chinese decision for war was made mainly out of 
security concerns, and Mao’s decision was based on “a choice of the least dangerous of his 
limited options”. Besides, Hao and Zhai also believed that the Sino-U.S. clash could have 
been avoided if the two parties better understood each other’s intention (Hao and Zhai, 
1990: 106, 115). 
Zhang Shuguang argued that the then Chinese Communist leaders, driven by “military 
romanticism”, which emphasized that war and violence could settle disputes and improve 
a situation, and human superiority in spirits and morale could beat technological superiority 
(Zhang, 1995, especially pp. 10-11), deemed that a war against the United States was 
winnable. 
Many scholars also argued that the lack of formal diplomatic relations also impaired 
Beijing’s capability in communicating messages and signals strong enough to deter the 
implementation of the U.S. policy (see, for example, Zelman, 1967 and Kalicki, 1975; 
Whiting, 1960: 168-72). Specifically, Walter Zelman argued that the secrecy of Chinese 
troop movement in mid-October undermined the effectiveness of the signal of deterrence 
(Zelman, 1967; George and Smoke, 1974: 201; Lebow, 1981: 149). 
Still other scholars argue that Chinese leaders were reluctant in pulling Soviet’s 
chestnuts out of fire. However, to secure Soviet assistance and support, Chinese leaders 
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have to take the risk. Whiting deemed that Russian influence, although not a determining 
factor of Chinese intervention, was a contributing factor to Chinese decision making 
(White, 1960: 152–4). 
On the U.S. side, scholars attributed U.S. miscalculations to U.S. distrust of Chinese 
warning and their transmitting channels (for Truman mistrust of Panikkar, see Truman, 
1956, Vol. 2: 362), the despising of Chinese power and their overconfidence of their own 
capability and thus their deterrent capacity over Chinese Communists. The United States 
also failed either to deter or to reassure Beijing that it had no predatory motives against the 
PRC regime (see, Spanier, 1959: 97, 125, 130; Foot, 1985: 77–82; Paul, 1994: 87–9). 
The deterrence of PRC failed because of assurance failure, which is an important part of 
effective deterrent (Schelling, 1966: Chapter 2). Acheson has failed in assuring Chinese 
that their interests and territory would not be violated by UN forces. And MacArthur had 
violated Washington’s directives to keep non-Korean troops away from the Manchuria 
border (Christensen, 1992: 133). Clear Chinese warning was also too late to reverse U.S. 
decision of crossing the 38th parallel (Zhou’s clear warning was on Sept. 30 and Oct. 3, 
later than the authorization of MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel given by Truman to 
MacArthur, see Christensen, 1996: 153). 
Other scholars also argued that domestic pressures tempted Truman and Acheson to 
adopt assertive policies. Truman and Acheson was criticized of the “loss of China” and 
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being appeaser of Chinese communists. They deemed that a smashing victory in Korea 
would enhance the prestige of the administration, which was needed for the upcoming mid-
term Congressional elections (Lichterman, 1963: 596). 
Many other scholars argued that the Truman administration was determined to solve 
the Korean issue once for all because of the budget constraints. If the North Korean regime 
was left unscathed, in the long term it would cost the United States considerably to defend 
South Korea, this was unbearable given the constrained budget and the large scope of U.S. 
responsibility (Christensen, 1992: 148). 
Alexander George and Richard Smoke, on the other hand, contended that it was 
Truman administration’s reluctance of acknowledge of the policy error of attempting to 
unify Korea by force and thus of accepting information that challenged the premises and 
wisdom that led to the outbreak of Sino-U.S. clash (George and Smoke, 1974: 191). 
Although most of these analyses contributed to the understanding of the outbreak of 
Sino-U.S. hostility in October and November 1950, they have major short comings. For 
example, the ideological, “military romanticism” and nationalism argument failed in 
explaining Chinese caution before the United States crossed the 38 Parallel. Most of the 
rest arguments, on the other hand, focused on the immediate or direct cause of the bilateral 
clash in the Korean War. They have neglected the more fundamental cause driving conflict, 
neither have they formulated a theory of permissive cause of the clash. They also did not 
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take into account of the then U.S.-Soviet power balance.  
The outbreak of Sino-U.S. conflict was a typical case of a conflict between a weaker 
local power and a much more powerful strategic regional, or outside power, which is the 
focus of this project.  
Power Distribution in the U.S.-East Asia interregional System in 1950 
By late October 1950, the United States was the most powerful state in the world. 
With its mainland largely unscathed in the WWII, it was the world’s economic and financial 
center, and had the most modernized military force and atomic bombs. Even the 
comprehensive power of the Soviet Union, the second most powerful state in the world and 
China’s most important ally, was far behind  that of the United States. The Soviet Union 
was still recovering from the second world war, which costed it 270 million population and 
wrecked great havoc of its industrial and agricultural centers (for the costs of WWII to 
Soviet Union, see Riasanovsky, 1963:585). It did not restore the population of 1941 until 
mid 1950’s. The nuclear power of Soviet Union was still at a fledgling stage. The United 
States calculated that the nuclear force of Soviet Union would not be a major threat to the 
United States until mid 1950’s (Leffler, 1992: 332). Regarding to economic and financial 
power, Soviet Union was even further behind that of the United States. Soviet Union was 
ready to make concessions when its expansionary policy was confronted firmly by the 
United States, as proved by Iran and Turkish Strait crisis in 1946. The United States 
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enjoyed a preponderance of power in 1950. 
As of dyadic power distribution between China and the United States, the 
comprehensive power of China, which was devastated by the fourteen-year anti-Japanese 
Imperialism War and a four-year civil war between Kuomintang and Chinese Communists 
since 1946, was by no means comparable to that of the United States. In 1950, the China’s 
iron and steel production was 0.69 percent of that of the United States (606 thousand ton 
versus 87.85 million ton), that figure of prime energy consumption was 2.38 percent (29.56 
millions versus 1.24 billions of coal-ton equivalents, above data from Correlates of War 
Datasets), the figure of real GDP was 28.77 percent ($354551.87 versus $1987355.88, 
Gleditsch, 2014, calculated at 2005 dollar prices). 
The United States’ material supremacy over the whole East Asia region made the 
power distribution of the U.S.-East Asian interregional system a clear imbalanced one in 
favor of the outside power. 




Real GDP Standing Army 
Iron and Steel 
Production 
CINC Score 
USA 14559000 1987355.88 1460 87848 0.28 
USSR 15510433 707969.71 4300 27329 0.18 
China 2558000 354551.87 4000 606 0.12 
Japan13 289212 146953.67 119 6988 0.030 
 
12  Military expenditure is calculated in thousands of dollars, standing army is calculated in 
thousands, Iron and steel production is calculated in thousands of tons. Together with CINC score, 
these data are from Correlates of War National Material Capability datasets. 
13 The data of military expenditure, Standing Army, Iron and Steel Production and NMC score of 
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On the other hand, for the local power distribution China, or more specifically, the 
Sino-Soviet bloc enjoyed power preponderance in East Asia. With Japan devastated in the 
Pacific War and the sign of Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in early 1950, the Sino-
Soviet bloc became the dominant force not only in Northeastern Asia, but also in Asia at 
large. It was against this backdrop that Kim Il-sung was tempted to launch his adventure 
in the South. Sino-Soviet backed forces were also on the advance in Indochina, ready to 
force French influence out of the area. 
With such tremendous gap in national material capability, how did Chinese 
Communist leaders finally made up their mind to fight against an outside colossus? China’s 
crossing of Yalu River is another typical case of interregional clash between two major 
powers from different regions and with unbalanced power engaging in a war when major 
crisis concerning them took place. 
American Decision Making: Arrogant Power Despising Chinese and Soviet 
Capability 
From the very start of intervention, American decision makers were positive of 
crossing the 38th parallel and unifying the whole Korean Peninsula, and there did not exist 
a large divide between the civil government and the military (Foot, 1985: 70–1). The civil 
 
Japan used are 1952 data from Correlates of War National Material Capability datasets.  
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government has been no more negative in advocating the crossing of 38th Parallel. 
Although cautions were taken at the early stage of the intervention, and the decision of 
crossing of 38th parallel was made late August or early September, policy makers had been 
inclining towards such policy at a very early stage. 
There were various factors affecting U.S. decision to intervene in Korean War and 
cross the 38th parallel. Calculations for the upcoming election, Senator McCarthy and his 
cohorts’ pressure, concerns over the loss of U.S. prestige, and prevention further “Soviet 
aggression” in other parts of the world all played important parts. However, in reaching 
these decisions, the potential reactions of PRC and the Soviets had been an essential 
concern and analyzed since the outbreak of war.  
U.S. assessment of potential Chinese reaction  
In general, the American decision makers were contemptuous on China’s capability 
and did not believe it would wage war against the United States for North Korea. 
It was worth noticing that in American decision of intervention of Korean War on the 
night of June 29 and early morning 30 (from 6: 59 p.m. 29 to 8: 05 p.m., 30, see Joint 
Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur, Ibid: 240-1; Truman, 1956: 343), Chinese intervention in 
Korea and possibility of a conflict with it had been barely taken into calculation. There 
were more discussions on new possible Chinese activities regarding the Taiwan region and 
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Indochina. Between the onset of U.S. intervention and late July, the discussion had been 
focused on Soviet price for its exerting influence on North Korea to a peaceful settlement 
(possibly seating Communist China to UNSC) and the possibility that PRC and Soviets 
would reoccupy North Korea before the UN forces cross the 38th Parallel. Only three hours 
after the decision of sending ground forces was made on June 30, did Philip Jessup and 
George Kennan bring forward the possibility of Chinese intervention for the first time. 
However, there was few follow-up discussions on this issue. Only on July 22, George 
Butler, Deputy Director of the PPS drafted a memorandum, for the first time gave relatively 
detailed analysis that a further drive north of 38th Parallel would greatly increase the 
danger of conflict with Chinese communists or Soviet forces (FRUS, 1950, VII: 453). 
In the early date of U.S. intervention in the Korean War, U.S. policy makers deemed 
that it was highly unlikely for China to intervene, given the latter’s domestic turmoil and 
limited capacity. 
On July 6, one day before the UNSC Resolution 84 was passed and U.N. forces was 
established, the Department of Army prepared a memorandum, claiming that U.S. 
announcement of backing up U.N. decision by Strategic Air Force might be enough for a 
“psychological deterrent to the Chinese people, including those in the military forces” (Ibid: 
311). 
On July 11, Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) reported that Chinese Communist 
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forces had no experience of fighting well-trained force equipped with modern weapons, 
and it had “practically no capability” of reinforcing or supporting the North Korean air and 
naval forces (Records of the Army Staff, July 11, RG 319, National Archives, cited from 
Foot, 1985: 81). 
Even if China was to intervene in the war, the policy makers calculated that given 
America’s power superiority over China, America’s ability to deal militarily with any 
Chinese intervention was very optimistic (Ibid: 82). The United States could take bombing 
action that would result “ultimately...in the destruction of the rail, water and road carriers 
of the Chinese transportation system and the thin industrial base of Chinese economy” 
(Division of Chinese Affairs, July 12, RG 59, National Archives, Ibid: 83). 
These analyses seemed to be further confirmed given the constraint responses of PRC 
to United States intervention from early July to late September. Apart from sending ethnic 
Koreans back to North Korea to fight the war, giving North Korea material assistance and 
gathering troops in Manchuria, it seemed that China did not inclined to intervene directly. 
Until late September, public announcement criticizing the United States mainly focused on 
U.S. intervention on the Taiwan Strait and blocking PRC’s legitimate seating in UNSC, 
U.S. intervention in Korea was only occasionally and shortly mentioned. 
Until this time, U.S. analysis regarding Chinese reaction was right. Basing on Chinese 
policy of last section, one could conclude that Chinese government was indifferent with 
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U.S. involvement in the Korean War, as long as the 38th parallel was not crossed. However, 
these signals led U.S. decision makers to believe that even the U.N. forces crossed the 38th 
parallel, the likelihood of direct Chinese and Soviet intervention was not large enough to 
justify a halt of the operation. They took Chinese and Soviet cautions as weakness. 
After receiving Panikkar’s report of Nie and Zhou’s warnings, Dutch, Swiss, Belgian 
representatives in China and U.S. consul in Hong Kong all regarded their warnings as bluff 
(see FRUS, 1950, VII: 765, 768, 858, 901-2, 912-3). British and U.S. analysis shared the 
same vein of thought. They had an array of reasons to dismiss Chinese warnings as bluff. 
North Korea was a Soviet ally rather than Chinese ally, and China would not fight Soviet’s 
war against the United States, which would only make China more dependent on the 
Soviets. China’s real concern was Soviet control (Smith, 1972, 201-2). China won’t fight 
U.N. forces which might reduce its likelihood of getting seated at UN or UNSC. CIA 
deemed that the most favorable time for intervention in Korea for the PRC and the Soviets 
has passed (Memorandum of CIA, Oct. 12, FRUS, 1950, VII: 934). U.S. consul general to 
Hong Kong concluded that Chinese assistance to North Korea was more likely to be 
diplomatic support and material assistance (Wilkinson to Acheson, Oct. 2, Ibid: 852). 
However, the most important reason they calculated was that China won’t fight a war 
against a far more powerful state than itself while confronted more than enough domestic 
problems, which was the same reason according to which the United States decided to 
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intervene in the Korean War in late June and early July. 
British analysis on September 28 fully reflected this vein of calculation. British 
Embassy to the United States put four arguments against China’s intervention: “(i) her 
internal position has not been consolidated; (ii) Her ambitious plans for economic 
reconstruction and industrialization might have to be sacrificed...(iii) Her military capacity 
to face major hostilities is doubtful...(iv) Her people overwhelmingly want peace not war”. 
China was more likely to opt for diplomatic means rather than military intervention to deal 
with the Korean situation. China’s pressure on Indian “may therefore be designed primarily 
to break the United Nations front against North Korean aggression” (the British Embassy 
to the Department of States, Sept. 28, Ibid: 814-5).  
United States Ambassador to Moscow also regarded Zhou’s October 3 warn to 
Panikkar as “last minute Chinese attempt to play upon Indian apprehension to point where 
maximum profit for China and USSR can be salvaged from North Korean reverses” (Kirk, 
Oct. 3, Ibid: 850). MacArthur shared similar analysis, his appraisal was that since China 
had no Air Force and cooperation between PRC and the Soviets was very difficult, the 
possibility of Chinese intervention was very little, and since the United States had Air Force 
in Korea, “if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest 
slaughter” (MacArthur’s remarks during Wake Island meeting, Oct. 15, Ibid: 953). With 
United States’ “unopposed air forces”, “with their potential capable of destroying, at will, 
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bases of attack and lines of supply north as well as south of the Yalu, no Chinese military 
commander would hazard the commitment of large forces upon the devastated Korean 
peninsula. The risk of their utter destruction though lack of supply would be too great” 
(MacArthur, 1964: 362). 
U.S. assessment of potential Soviet reaction  
It was another story for the Russian case. Unlike China, USSR had enormous material 
capability, although still far inferior to that of the United States. One of the aims of U.S. 
intervention in the Korean War was to “check and reduce the preponderant power of the 
USSR in Asia and elsewhere” (Draft Memorandum by Messrs. John M. Allison and John 
K. Emmerson of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Aug. 21, FRUS, 1950, VII: 620). In 
spite of minority opinions of Jessup and Bohlon (see Memorandum of Conversation, Jun. 
30, ibid: 258), most U.S. decision makers considered that compared with Chinese 
intervention, “Soviet Russia’s intervention seemed the more probable, and at the same time 
more potentially disastrous” (Schnabel and Watson, 1998: 108). U.S. decision makers were 
circumspect in not provoking the USSR into a major war. However, judging from Soviet’s 
lukewarm attitude to U.S. intervention of Korean War, together with its back-down on the 
issue of Iran, Turkish Strait, Greece and Berlin, policy makers in the United States 
concluded that Russian power was exaggerated and Russian dared not to fight for North 
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Korea for fear of the onset of a global war. 
Unlike its attitude to China, right upon the outbreak of the Korean War, the United 
States started to appraise the possibility of Soviet intervention if the United States took 
determined to intervene. Admiral Alan Goodrich Kirk, U.S. ambassador to USSR, 
speculated that the United States could deter Kremlin by determined countermeasures, 
since the latter was not ready for a global war (Kirk to Allison, Jun. 26, FRUS, 1950, VII: 
169; similar analysis was seen in a telegram Kirk sent to Acheson on Jun. 27: 196). Such 
analysis was shared by U.S. ambassador to France (Bruce to Acheson, Jun. 27, Ibid: 203). 
One day before the establishment of U.N. forces, Kirk again deemed that the Soviets were 
“not disposed to enlarge the conflict” into a Asian or global war, and would likely to employ 
diplomatic tactics to “drive wedge in unanimity free world” (Ibid: 315-6). Until mid-
August, this seemed to be the prevailing analysis in the foreign service, intelligence 
community and the military (see for example, Bohlen’s assessment, Aug. 3; Ridgway’s 
assessment, Aug. 8; Kirk’s telegram, Aug. 11; Allison’s analysis, Aug. 12, Ibid: 522, 541, 
557, 570). There main reason was that the Soviets were not ready for a general war for now 
or the near future. 
This seemed to be confirmed by Soviet reaction to U.S. intervention in the war. 
Compared with Chinese responses, the response of the Soviets to U.S. intervention seemed 
to be even constrained. The Soviets did not even issue warnings of intervention to the 
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United States. After twice bombing of Rashin (Najin), a town but seventeen miles from 
Soviet territory, and even a Soviet aerodrome, Soviet reaction was still constrained. From 
the start of U.S. intervention to Chinese intervention in the war, Soviet had been striving 
for reaching a peaceful settlement through U.N.  
Soviet restraint led American decision makers to believe that the Soviet was 
apprehensive about an all-out war and would not intervene even when 38th parallel was 
crossed. Starting from mid-August, speculations that Soviet might occupy North Korea 
with its own forces or PRC forces, or intervene directly was brought forward by CIA, NSC 
and PPS. However, by the end of August, these departments again inclined to believe that 
the large scale PRC or Soviet units were unlikely to employed to fight in southern part of 
the peninsula, and it was even possible that the Soviet would opt for a hands-off policy in 
the north (see NSC 81/1, FRUS, 1950, VII: 714). Notably, after late September, the major 
tasks for State Department and its foreign establishment, intelligence community and 
military was to assess the probability of Chinese intervention, while the appraisals of Soviet 
intervention was relatively few, and most of the struggle against the USSR took place in 
UN. When pushing for the pass of U.N. resolution authorizing the cross of 38th parallel, 
Rusk commented that the British representative in Moscow believed that the Soviets would 
not intervene (Sept. 27, FRUS, 1950, VII: 772). CIA also reported that “a consideration of 
all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such 
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action is not probable in 1950. During this period, intervention will probably be confined 
to continued covert assistance to the North Koreans” (Oct. 12, Ibid: 934). 
One of the reasons that led U.S. decision makers to believe that the possibility of 
Soviet direct involvement in Korea was low was that the strategic gravity of the USSR was 
in Europe rather than East Asia, and the USSR would be reluctant to be entangled in East 
Asia. On the contrary, it was in the Soviets’ interests to have the United States bogged down 
in an East Asia conflict, have its economic and military capacity drained, and efforts 
dispersed, giving the Soviet Union a strategic advantage in the European theater (see, for 
example, Douglas to Acheson, Jul. 14; Bruce to Acheson, Jul. 28, Ibid: 382, 487-8). 
In most of the negative analysis of possibility of Soviet’s intervention in the Korea 
War, the most important factor was that the Soviet Union was not ready for general war at 
1950 or in the near future and that the North Korean invasion was a local affair (interview 
with Kennan, Paige, 1968: 147) and a limited challenge probing for a soft spot (interview 
with Ambassador Jessup, Ibid: 171; Military Situation in the Far East, cited as MSFE 
hereinafter, 1951, Part 2: 1070). Such belief implied that many U.S. policy makers believed 
that the power of the Soviet Union was exaggerated and the United States and the West 
actually had material power advantage over the Soviets or even the Communist bloc as a 
whole. After all, the Soviets had retreated from Iran, Turkish Strait, Greece and Berlin in 
the proceeding years, showing that it was reluctant in confronting the United States’ 
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superior power. The Korean War was just another such case of Soviet strategy of expansion 
and probing for soft spots of the West without being committed militarily, and a U.S. policy 
of firmness would work again in stopping the Soviet expansion and forcing it to retreat 
without triggering another war. Although there was a danger of potential Russian 
involvement, given these considerations, the calculated risk was worth taking. 
This vein of though could be reflected by the appraisal of the then U.S. ambassador 
to Moscow, Admiral Kirk. On the day that Korea War broke out, Kirk recommended that 
“Kremlin's Korean adventure thus offers us opportunity to show that we mean what we say 
by talking of firmness, and at same time, to unmask present important Soviet weaknesses 
before eyes world and particularly Asia where popular concept Soviet power grossly 
exaggerated as result recent Soviet political and propaganda successes that area” (Jun. 25, 
FRUS, 1950, VII: 139). The Soviets would show flexibility with fingers burnt after they 
sought tentative jabs beyond Iron Curtain frontier (Iran, Greece, Berlin, see Kirk to 
Acheson, Jul. 27, Ibid: 483). Similar view was shared by U.S. counselor to Moscow, 
Walworth Barbour, who regarded Moscow’s moderate reactions as “forced smile of an 
exposed scoundrel”, which “are not indications of basic Soviet change of heart but may be 
early ephemeral fruits of policy of containment and building of ares of strength” (Barbour 
to Acheson, Oct. 19, FRUS, 1950, Vol. IV: 1264).  
Many decision makers believed that the United States had stronger hand over the 
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Soviets in 1950. Truman believed so, although he was not sure of how much stronger was 
the United States (Truman, 1956: 335). Bradley believed that because of U.S. had much 
more production capability, Russians would be convinced of its inability of winning a total 
war. Russia only had one railway line in Far East, which limited its supply capability and 
thus warring capacity. Although this factor could not preclude war, he deemed that it might 
be a deterrent to Russian which enabled U.S. to accept limited challenges (MFSE, 1951: 
743, 1069-70). Admiral Forrest Sherman, then Chief of Naval Operations, also thought that 
Russia had severe communication problems. And he believed that the United States had 
great deterrent capability to the Soviets. Given technical, industrial and military potential 
and residual power of the United States, there was a realization on the Soviet part that in a 
general war they would be defeated (Ibid: 1568, 1658). 
Tactically, MacArthur deemed that Soviet air force was probably no match for U.S. 
air force, there were no Soviet troops readily available for Korea, and before they could 
transfer (six weeks were needed) enough to Korea the winter would set in (Substance of 
Statements Made at Wake Island Conference, 15 October 1950, FRUS, 1950, VII: 954). He 
even boasted he had “plenty of troops adequately with the Chinese and even with the 
Russians if they should prove so foolish as to enter the arena at this stage...” (Tokyo to FO, 
Oct. 3, cited from Lowe, 1986: 224). 
From the available resources, U.S. analysis of Soviet was largely correct. The Soviet 
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Union was very reluctant in intervening directly on Pyongyang’s behalf, it was also quite 
cautious in confronting the United States indirectly by sending air forces to assist the 
Chinese PVA. Throughout the war, Soviet Pilots were strictly prohibited from flying 
territories held by enemy forces in case of being shot down and captured (Schecter and 
Luchkov, 1990: 146). It might also be right that Soviet power in 1950 was exaggerated by 
some Western politicians and press. Stalin only allowed Kim to strike after he was assured 
that the United States would not intervene. He approved Kim’s plan out of weakness rather 
than of expansionism imagined by the authors of NSC-68 (Weathersby, 1993: 28, 36). 
Soviet reluctance and unwillingness might also lie in the fact that the Far East affairs were 
just a second thought for the USSR. However, this region was the only strategic focus for 
Chinese decision makers, and they finally determined to fight the U.S. if the latter crossed 
the 38th parallel. And Kremlin was delighted to see the United States bogged down in the 
Far East and was willing to offer China qualified assistance.   
In general, U.S. decision makers believed that “the Russian were not ready to risk 
global war over Korea; and China was not militarily capable of unilateral intervention” 
(Bradley and Blair, 1983: 570). With these appraisals, it was the general consensus of the 
military, the State Department and the foreign establishments, the intelligence agencies that 
PRC and the Soviets would not intervene. The U.S. decision makers gradually hardened 
their position. In the earlier stage, there was no decision of crossing the 38th parallel. This 
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gradually changed into letting the South Korean army bear the main burden of operation 
north of 38th parallel, and crossing the 38th parallel but to stop when confronted with major 
PRC or Soviets forces. This policy was further changed into if the PRC and Soviet forces 
entered into the conflict without public announcement the U.S. forces should continue 
operation as if they were still fighting the North Koreans (NSC-73, see memorandum by 
James Barco, Aug. 25, FRUS, 1950, VII: 647). The NSC 81/1 finally stated that “(a)s long 
as action by U.N. military forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, the 
U.N. Commander should continue such action and be authorized to take appropriate air 
and naval action outside Korea against Communist China” (Sept. 9, ibid: 718).  
The U.S. decision makers deemed that as long as enough cautions were taken, PRC 
and the Soviets would not participate in the ongoing war. These cautions included: “The 
United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist 
China” (NSC-81/1, ibid: 717), “UN forces should not proceed north of the 38th Parallel if 
Soviet or Chinese Communist forces have occupied North Korea to the 38th Parallel or if 
major Soviet or Chinese Communist combat units have engaged or clearly intend to engage 
in hostilities against UN forces” (Sept. 14, Ibid: 727) and crossing of 38th parallel would 
only take place when “at the time of such operation there has been no entry into North 
Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, 
nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. Under no circumstances, 
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however, will your forces cross the Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea and, as a matter 
of policy, no non-Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast provinces bordering 
the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border” (Sept. 26, Ibid: 781).  
However, since policy makers believed that possibility of large scale of PRC and 
Soviet intervention was limited, these cautions made little difference in the decision of the 
crossing of 38th parallel by the U.S. forces, which was determined at latest on September 
7. The knowledge of the decision of the crossing of 38th parallel by U.S. forces as U.S. 
pushed for a resolution containing such contents in U.N. altered the whole course of 
Chinese decision making regarding the Korean War. 
Chinese Decision Making: A Resolved Power Taking Advantage of Locality 
What made this final decision possible despite the large power gap between the United 
States and China?  
Realist theorists that contend large power gap between two major powers helps to 
prevent major conflict will expect the smaller powers tend to make concessions when they 
confronted with a much more powerful adversary. The United States in 1950 is very close 
to being a unipole in the international system. Even Soviet Union under Stalin was very 
reluctant in directly confronting the United States. Senior Chinese leaders, well aware of 
this fact, still chose to fight the war against the world’s leading superpower.  
This chapter finds that China intervened mainly because the United States was to 
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crossed the 38th parallel which posed a major and prominent threat to the security of China 
proper. The Korean issue became salient for China. Many senior leaders, such as Mao, 
Zhou and Peng were quite resolved to fight against the United States after the 38th parallel 
red line was crossed. Another essential factor is the assessment of likelihood of getting 
Chinese objectives in a war against the United States. Such assessments were made and 
many senior leaders believed that the defeat of the United States was possible given China’s 
high level of courage, morale, and other advantages of locality vis-à-vis the United States. 
In addition, the United States had global commitment, especially in Europe and Middle 
East, and the resources it could deploy in East Asia was relatively limited, making it 
possible to force it into compromise in a war. If there was no possibility of wining, it would 
also be hard to persuade other cautious senior leaders of CPC. Although many Chinese 
leaders were concerned about the risks of intervention, when they were shed light on the 
salience of the issue, the severity of the threat and the possibility of wining, they were 
convinced and agreed to bandwagon with Mao and Zhou’s decision of intervention. 
Salience of the threat and Determination to Fight 
The United States’ crossing of 38th parallel and the upcoming collapse of North Korea 
posed an imminent and salient threat to China’s security. Before late September, with North 
Korea resisting the United States, the threat of the United States was still not quite 
imminent. So China’s policy was preparation of a reserved force (NEFDF) for contingency 
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without using it. Unlike many scholar’s accounts (see Shen, 2013: 262, 271; 2015), China 
did not formally request that the Soviet Union send army to assist Korea during this period. 
Apart from the unpreparedness, the reason might be senior Chinese leaders might have felt 
no urgency in sending armies before late September. On July 2, Zhou’s remarks of sending 
army was strictly conditioned on the United States’ crossing of 38th parallel, which was 
still a far prospective. Although Kim mentioned to Stalin China’s intention to intervene on 
July 13 and 19, there was no parallel direct Chinese demands to Stalin to send army. 
Although Mao and Zhou mentioned Korea must be helped on the August 4 PBCPC meeting, 
there was no formal request to the Soviets of sending Chinese army to intervene on the side 
of North Korea. Even during Zhou’s talk with Roshchin and Soviet military advisers on 
September 18, there was no direct request of China’s intervention. With no formal requests, 
it was highly doubtful whether Soviets refusal or ignorance of China’s intention of sending 
army had ever existed. Chen Jian argued that this was partially due to Stalin and Kim’s 
reluctance of having Chinese army fight against the United States. Nevertheless, Kim was 
positive in having Chinese help when it was on the edge of collapse, as shown before. 
Stalin was reluctant, for fear of expansion of Chinese influence on Korea, and of further 
escalation of the war, as Shen argues (Shen, 2017: 274). But it might also be possible that 
without the American troops crossing the 38th parallel, which was the shared 
understanding of condition of China’s sending army to Korean between Moscow and 
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Beijing, and without China’ s further offer of its intention to intervene, Stalin considered it 
improper to urge Beijing.  
Since late September, however, with North Korea collapsing and the prospect that the 
United States might march to China-Korea border, senior Chinese leaders were gravely 
alarmed. Mao said: “Korea is right next to us. If Americans occupied Korea, we will never 
have peaceful days. Stand idle and watch the United States destroy Korea, it’s 
unreasonable!” (Lei, 1997: 153). It is said Mao recalled the logic of Tanaka Yoshiichi in 
1927: “To conquer the world, one should first conquer Asia; to conquer Asia, one should 
first conquer China; to conquer China, one should first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia; 
and to conquer Manchuria and Mongolia, one should first conquer Korean and Taiwan”. 
Japanese followed this order since 1895. “With American Imperialists invasion of Korea 
and Taiwan in 1950, they are repeating the invasion route of Japanese Militarism”. “With 
North Korea’s peril, China’s security is under severe threat at the same time” (Xie, 1993: 
159-60). Zhou seemed followed the same logic, and considered the United States had 
inherited the scheme of Japan (Zhou, 1997: 75). It seemed many other senior leaders share 
the same view. Hu Qiaomu later wrote an editorial on People’s Daily, which detailed the 
same logic between Japan and the United States (Hu, 1992: 420-422). Hu’s editorial might 
have propaganda aims, but it did reflect shared thought of many senior leaders. It seemed 
that many senior Chinese leaders did believe that after taking North Korea, the next target 
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of the United States was Chinese Northeast. Zhou got information that “they want to 
comfort China and cross the 38th parallel, after that, they will get China” (Zhou, 1990: 30). 
If the United States was trapped in Korea, they would not invade China. According to Wang 
Ming, at 8 p.m. on November 10, 1952, Liu Shaoqi had a talk with him. During the talk, 
Liu recalled that when Mao heard Truman fired MacArthur, he was very distressed and 
said “If we had known that things changed so much, and known that the United States 
really did not want to fight against us, then why should we send army to resist America and 
assist Korea, which damaged Sino-American relations?” (Wang, 2004: 201). 
A related concern was that the United States was actively rearming the “Japanese 
Imperialists” and should it occupied Korea, it would do the same thing to Korea, which 
will pose a major threat to China. And China had a major interest in preventing that from 
happening. By late June or early July, the armed police force of Japan had already reached 
21,8000 (Chai and Zhao, 1989: 64). 
Korea situation was a salient concern to Chinese leaders, since they regard Sino-North 
Korean relation as “lips and teeth” relations. As early as early July, Ye Jianying, the First 
Secretary of CPC South China Bureau, mentioned “Teeth feel cold when lips are gone. 
China cannot stand by and must make preparation” (Wang, 2002: 16). Mao confided to 
Peng on October 4 that “Now that they had fought along on our doorstep, how can we 
retreat and avoid conflict?” (Xie, 1993: 165). Peng analyzed that night that, “(if) the United 
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States were to occupy North Korea, it would border on us and pose a threat at Northeast 
China; it controlled Taiwan and is posing a threat to Shanghai and East China. It could 
easily find an excuse to invade China at any time. Tiger will eat people, and it only depends 
on its appetite to decide when to eat. There is no good in compromising to it” (Peng, 1981: 
257). Peng’s grain of analysis was shared by Deng Hua (Hong, 1990:19). On October 6, 
Zhou said on a CMCCPC conference: “We do not want to fight. However, our enemy 
forced us. They are about to reach Yalu River, we cannot stand idle. This is to assist Korea, 
but also self-defense. Teeth feel cold when lips are gone” (Xu, 1998: 24). After the meeting 
Mao asked Zhou how the meeting went and heard of Lin’s complaints. Mao appeared to 
be angry and mentioned patriotism, the “Lips and Teeth” metaphor as well as the 
internationalism (Lei, 1997: 158). On a Shenyang meeting, which was held on October 9 
and participated by officers above the corps level, Peng also emphasized the close “Lip and 
Teeth” relationship between North Korea and China (Du, 1989: 21). On October 14, Peng 
addressed on the People’s Volunteer Army (PVA) officers mobilization conference: “if 
American Imperialists were to occupy Korea, they will be direct threat to us. They will 
send forces to Vietnam and Burma, and made trouble for us everywhere. We will be forced 
into a passive position, which will be harmful for our national defense and border defense” 
(Peng, 1988: 322). 
On October 24, in an address to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
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Conference (CPPCC), Zhou summarized the reason why China should enter the war. Once 
again, the “lips and teeth relationship was mentioned”. He said “If Korea were to be crashed 
by American Imperialists, then our Northeast would have no peace. Half the heavy industry 
in our country locates in Northeast, and half of Northeastern industry is in the south, which 
is under coverage of the enemy’s bombardment threat...If the American Imperialists 
reached the Yalu river, how could we produce in peace? ...Passive defense will not work. 
That will also cost a lot...And year after year, we do not know when will it invade us. How 
can we produce and develop in peace under such situation. In addition, if the enemy 
invaded and occupied Korea they would not stop...While we do not make up trouble, the 
enemy set fire on our doorstep” (Zhou, 1997: 73-4). 
These concerns were quite realistic. Northeast industrial center is the most important 
heavy industry center in China, and South Manchuria was the center of Northeast industrial 
center. The electricity of South Manchuria was mainly provided by the Shuifeng power 
station (the biggest power station in Asia then), which was on the North Korean side of 
Yalu river. If the United States got control of Shuifeng power station, most factories of 
South Manchuria would be forced to shut down (Xu, 1990: 25). 
In general, crossing of the 38th parallel posed salient national security threat to China 
and was a major escalation in the eyes of senior Chinese leaders. Peaceful production and 
development are endangered. If the United States were to take North Korea, Chinese 
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Northeast would be liable to constant harassment, and to defend the Northeast would cost 
no less than direct military intervention. And many leaders believed that the United States 
would not stop at Korean Peninsula, after taking it, the United States would also take 
Vietnam and Burma, and finally it would use Korean Peninsula as a base and springboard 
to invade China. 
Of course, there is no wondering that Mao and Zhou had some ideological 
commitment to Korea and had feelings of major power responsibilities, as Chen and Shen 
argued. Other Chinese leaders also occasionally mentioned the principle of 
internationalism. Mao said on October 4 that “All what you said were reasonable. However, 
I feel sad to stand idle as others are in grave danger”. Also during these days, Mao said 
“We did have difficulties, many comrades do not agree to send army, and I understand that. 
But we are a great power, if is not right not to fight, and stand idle to others’ death” (Bo, 
1991: 43). Peng also thought that the war should be fought to encourage the people of the 
world to oppose Imperialists and expand the influence of Socialist bloc (Peng, 1981: 258). 
Zhou also mentioned that “we should promote revolutionary morality and principle” (Zhou, 
1997: 73).  
However, compared with the length of senior Chinese leaders’ remarks about national 
security, the length of these ideological reasons were very limited. It might to be far 
stretched to contend that the above Mao’s words are totally out of ideological fervor. Before 
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that sentence, Mao also said: “Comrade Enlai had warned Mr Truman much earlier that 
you should not cross the 38th parallel. If you were to cross, Chinese government will not 
stand idle...But they crossed, challenging Chinese government directly (jiang le 
jun)...What should we do? Chinese government must keep words!” (Wang, 2002: 161) 
Given this context, it seems that Mao’s remarks on great power responsibility could be 
understood as the United States’ crossing of 38th parallel threatened China’s status as a 
great power, which is also a national security concern and parallel Japanese leaders’ 
thought on the eve of the Pacific War. Peng’s internationalism thoughts were his second 
thoughts, his first thought was the threat to the national security. In Zhou’s speech on 
October 24, after his mention of “revolutionary morality and principle”, he continued: 
“only if Korea won, the peaceful bloc would not be breached. If the Korean loophole was 
breached, then other directions would also be breached. If the door of Eastern bloc were to 
be breached, and our own door were to be breached by the enemy, how can we have the 
leeway of talking about development?” (Zhou, 1997: 73) Zhou’s internationalist concern 
actually was related to national security concerns. In Nie Rongzhen memoirs, there was 
little mention of revolutionary and ideological moralities. Nie said “It was not Comrade 
Mao Zedong was combative. The question was that the United States was already waging 
wars on our borders, what else should we have done except for fighting against it?! Thus, 
we decided to fight” (Nie, 1986: 739). 
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Local Advantages and Probability of Obtaining the Objective 
Chinese decision makers were well aware of the power gap between China and the 
United States. Mao feared that after the fall of North Korea, the United States, arrogant in 
its superior material capability, would be encouraged to set China the next target. Mao also 
feared that if North Korea fell, Stalin would force Beijing to accept northeastern China as 
a base of Kim’s residual forces Soviet Union would have an excuse of stationing army in 
northeastern China. China’s sovereignty would be compromised. Mao thought the best 
choice was to fight the United States at Korea (Shen, 1995: 323–5, 336–7). China’s 
objective in confronting the United States on the Peninsula was to ensure the survival of 
North Korea and force the United States back to the 38 Parallel.14 
Apart from the determination to fight, Chinese leaders also believed that the 
probability of obtaining Chinese objectives was reasonable, given Chinese morale to fight, 
America’s distraction and Chinese local advantage vis-a-vis the United States. 
On September 5 Mao summarized the shortcomings of the United States: “Firstly, 
their battle line, which starts from Berlin to Korea, is too long; Second, their transportation 
line, separated by two oceans, the Pacific and Atlantic, is too long; Third, their fighting 
capacity is too low” (Mao, 2010, Vol. 1: 202). Peng basically shared the same logic, he 
considered the American soldiers had low morale because “they fight for Imperialists 
 
14 This objective was changed in early 1951 into liberation of the whole Peninsula. 
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which is opposed by the people, and they are weary of war”, while Chinese army fought 
for the oppressed people and justice, so they had the support of people of the whole world. 
Chinese army was “brave and dare to fight close engagements”. In addition, “American 
Imperialists fight the war across oceans and have difficulty in logistics. It takes them 38 
days to go back and forth” (Peng, 1988: 323-4).  
Because China was fighting on its doorstep and aimed to defend itself against foreign 
invaders. Chinese leaders were resolved to fight the war hard and more willing to absorb 
cost. So was Chinese soldiers. On the planning meeting of NEFDF which was convened 
by Zhou held on August 31, senior military leaders calculated that the first year of the war 
may cost 200,000 casualties (Xu, 1990: 19). Senior Chinese leaders decided this cost must 
be born early October. On September 25, during a talk with Panikkar, Nie remarked that 
“We have considered all the issues. They may even throw atomic bomb on us...kill millions 
of people. However, a country cannot defend its own independence without paying 
sacrifice” (Chai and Zhao, 1989: 74). Peng remarked on October 5 that “sending army and 
assisting Korea is necessary. Even if we were to be badly defeated, that only means we win 
the liberation war a few years later” (Peng, 1981: 258). Peng famously put forward the 
argument that since United States was threatening the northeastern and eastern China, 
China should prepare for long war and have the spirit of “Development after havoc inflicted 
by war”. Mao also remarked on October 13 that “Even if we can not beat the United States 
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we should still fight...”(Wang, 1995: 87). Even after he was informed that Soviets would 
not offer air cover and the United States would inflict great damage to by air strike, Mao 
said China did not fear the air strike and would bear the damage, and still insisted sending 
army to fight (Mao to Zhou, Oct. 13, 1950, Mao, 2010, Vol. 1: 252-253). Zhou recalled 
later that Mao deemed that “though we faced with so many concerns, they are conquerable 
difficulties, or difficulties we have to endure, and are costs that we have to pay to strive for 
the great victory” (Zhou, Jan. 23, 1951, 1997: 139). 
Du Ping remembered in his army corps, at least half of the soldiers were activists who 
did not fear sacrifice (Du, 1989:14). In Hong Xuezhi’s memoirs, he mentioned the 
assessment of China’s capability vis-a-vis that of the United States during a NEFDF 
meeting held in late September, which was participated by Deng Hua, Lai Chuanzhu, 
himself, Xie Fang and Du Ping. In their assessment, one advantage that China had over the 
United States was “Chinese army is brave, good at fighting, does not fear of sacrifice and 
is hard-working and enduring, while the army of the United States cannot endure 
difficulties”(Hong, 1990: 10). After knowing the Soviet Union would not send air forces 
to assist PVA, Deng Hua and other senior officers in 13 Army Corps remarked: “We must 
conquer all difficulties, endure all pains” to complete the “daunting, difficult and honorable 
task” (Qi, 2016: 69). 
Chinese leaders deemed that China had higher fighting morale than the United States. 
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Chinese soldiers thought that they were fighting a just war to defend their country. They 
were convinced that without ousting the United States from the Korea Peninsula, there 
would be no peaceful days for China. They had grave and resentful feeling against the 
United States. A popular song was circulated among PVA soldiers: “American Imperialists 
are like fire, they will burn China after Korea. Chinese neighbors, hurry up and fight the 
fire. To save China requires saving Korea!” (Du, 1989: 17). In addition, Chinese soldiers 
could endure dire difficulties and loss. Liang Xingchu, the commander of 38th Army, 
deemed that many PVA fighters were from Northeast China, they had high morale would 
fight bravely since the American Imperialists were at their doorstep and posed a direct 
threat to their hometown (Wang, 2002: 43). On the other hand, many senior Chinese leaders 
believed that the United States soldier had low morale, unwilling to fight hard battles, 
fearing loss and being cut of the route of retreating, had low battling spirit, and could not 
endure the cold weather in the coming winter in North Korea (Zhou, 1997: 93, 108; Hong, 
1990: 10; Wang, 2018: 59, 133). This was especially true because the American forces was 
fighting a war in the other hemisphere without domestic support, and public opinion in the 
United States would become more anti-war and the morale of American forces would 
further fall if American forces were encountered by major difficulty in the war. Many senior 
leaders believed that American soldiers were less capable in fighting than Japanese, or even 
South Korean soldiers. 
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Chinese leaders also believed that there is possibility that the United States would 
“retreat from knowing the difficulties”, because the United States had low level of resolve 
and fighting morale. Zhou remarked on October 24 that “The policy of the United States 
is to produce and enlarge war step by step. If we give it strike and resist, they might shrink 
back, or they will follow its original plan...American Imperialist use military forces to 
oppress peoples of every nations, we need to neutralize their efforts, and make them retreat 
from knowing the difficulties, and then we can solve problems” (Zhou, 1997: 74-6). Zhou 
also deemed that “In the United States, most people do not want war. According to Cankao 
Xiaoxi, all the invasion forces of the United States in Korea want to return home” (Zhou, 
1997: 109). 
Besides, while the United States was distracted by international affairs in other parts 
of the world, China could concentrate and mobilize all its resources to fight the Korean 
War. Although Korean War was known as a limited war, China made large-scale 
mobilization for it. In this respect, China had clear local advantage against the United States. 
Zhou sent Gao and Li Fuchun a telegram on November 5, stating: “Whatever the Northeast 
demands, we will spare no efforts to meet and help you out of difficulties. Whatever the 
Northeast has decided, we will be your backing shield and support you in implementation. 
The authorities of some affairs belong to the Central Committee, but you can still decide 
at your own discretion. Central Committee will ratify subsequently on your notice. 
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Whatever can be integrated to the Northeast, we agree so” (Zhou, 1997:87). Chen Yun, 
then Secretary of SCCCPC, who was in charge of fiscal policy, remarked on the second 
National Fiscal Conference, that the fiscal policy should prioritize the war: “There is no 
doubt that the war is the first priority. All should be submitted to war, and all for the victory 
of war” (Chen, 1984: 112). To use the buzz word of the time, Chinese policy is “All for the 
frontier”. Zhou also remarked “Our initial thoughts for the fiscal budget of 1951 annual 
year was to emphasize investment and development...However, our enemy won’t allow as 
to do that. It first get Taiwan, then Korea, still it want to attack mainland. This situation 
forces us to change the fiscal budget to adjust to the demand of war...(we) have to shelve 
the plan of peaceful development...now that the fire has burned to our doorstep, (we should) 
prioritize quelling the fire” (Zhou, 1997: 93-4). To take an instance of “prioritizing quelling 
the fire”, as the First Secretary of Southwest Bureau, Deng Xiaoping mobilized the 
Southwest resources to support the Korean War. Deng encouraged large companies to 
subscribe for ammunition and arms to support the frontier. Rich people contributed their 
private properties to support the war, women in the countryside made daily articles for the 
soldiers. Southwestern military cadres were transferred to the frontier to fill the positions 
of the lost officers (Liu, 2013). By late October, PVA had 260,000 forces mobilized for war, 
and losses could be continuously replaced all cross China.  
On the other hand, U.S. forces spread all over the world. Zhou calculated that with 14 
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divisions in Europe, Japan, islands and America proper, the United States could only deploy 
7 to 8 divisions to deploy in Korea. By late November, the United States would lose 30,000 
in Korea, “this means, the armed force of the United States is declining day by day...no 
matter how many naval and air forces one have, one cannot win the land battle without 
army...This is a puzzle for the United States—could they throw all forces to Korea while 
let the colonized people to rise up and get rid of the control of the United States?...To solve 
this problem, (the United States) will retreat from knowing difficulties” (Zhou’s remark, 
Nov. 25, 1950, Zhou, 1997: 107). United States was especially disadvantaged in an attrition 
war. It can not afford such a war since they had many other frontiers to fight or guard and 
domestic support will gradually decrease. 
Chinese forces did not enjoy much advantage of locality over that of United States in 
many other respects. For example, Chinese commanders and forces were no more familiar 
to the geography, terrain of North Korea and thus the marching route than their American 
adversaries (Deng Hua to CMCCPC, Sept. 2, in Wang, 2018: 160). Chinese forces also had 
severe language and transportation problems (Selected Sources of Chinese PVA’s Resisting 
America Assisting Korea War, SSCPVA hereafter, 1978, Vol. 3: 1). However, he 13th army 
corps were familiar with battles in mountainous terrain. According to Deng Hua, terrain 
and climate in North Korea was similar to that of South Liaoning, which the three Armies 
has been used to (Wang, 2002: 54-5). China could recruit Korean Chinese guides and 
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translators, which gave slight advantage to Chinese force. 80 percent liaison staffs of PVA 
were Korean Chinese, they had special roles to play in the Korean War (Meng and Liu, 
2012: 199).  
Apart from that, Chinese leaders believed that Chinese forces were adept at guerrilla 
tactics such as close engagement, night engagement, bayonet engagement and outflanking 
tactics, which was not the weakness of the United States (Zhou, 1997: 108; Hong, 1990: 
10; Wang, 2018: 114). While the Mountainous North Korea was not considered as an ideal 
battlefield for modernized U.S. forces. In addition, Chinese forces also enjoyed the 
advantage of surprise. Since the United States did not believe that Chinese forces would 
take the risk, senior Chinese leaders also tried to keep the advance of Chinese forces to 
Korean Peninsula as a secret, so as to take advantage of surprise attack. Senior Chinese 
leaders ordered main Chinese media not to reveal the movement of Chinese forces (in 
Mao’s word “Do without saying”, see Mao to Deng Zihui and Tan Zheng et al., October 
19, 1950, Pang and Feng, 2013: 216) and keep the information tightly limited to senior 
CPC leaders (Mao to Deng Hua, Tan Zheng et al., October 19, 1950, Mao, 2010: 267). 
Actually, it was not until November 8 did China publicly announced China’s participation 
of the war (Zhou to Chai, Zhou, 2008: 473). 
Senior Chinese leaders also believed that the local military balance favored Chinese 
forces, especially in the initial stage against the South Korean forces. And when South 
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Korean forces were defeated, the willingness of American forces to fight on would waver. 
So Mao’s order to PVA was “ensuring initial victory”. To achieve this aim, Mao and Peng 
decided to attack and defeat the South Korean army, rather than the American army in the 
initial stage, which was more likely to achieve (Mao, 2010: 268-9). Mao considered that 
after the initial victory, especially if Chinese forces could root out several divisions of the 
South Korean forces, the situation would be “loosen” (Ibid: 257). The word “loosen” might 
mean that they believed after defeat of the South Korean army, the morale and the 
willingness to fight of the United States might grossly fall and there was the probability of 
forcing the United States onto the negotiation table (Pang and Feng, 2013: 221-2). If PVA 
and North Korean forces could annihilate the South Korean force, “there will be more 
leverage to expedite the retreat of the American Imperialists” (Mao and Liu’s talk with Kim, 
December 3, 1950, Pang and Feng, 2013: 254), this might because they thought the morale 
of the U.S. forces would further fall and so was their domestic support, which might force 
American leaders to make concession. This was the same logic with Zhou’s “making the 
United States retreat from knowing the difficulties”. 
Even if the United States would not retreat after the initial victory of PVA, they could 
not afford a war of attrition given their low morale, the lack of domestic support, the fact 
that they had too many frontiers to take care of, and more essentially, their logistical 
difficulties. 
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Many senior Chinese leaders emphasized the logistic advantage of Chinese army vis-
a-vis the United States. Chinese soldiers were fighting with their back on the mother 
country and Soviet Union, which made logistics and supply much easier (HAANKW, 2000: 
159). In addition, being poorly equipped, Chinese armies had less need for ammunition 
and gas. On the other hand, the armies of United States, with modernized equipment, had 
high demand for ammunition and gap. Most of their logistics need to be transported over 
oceans. Their logistic line was still much longer than Chinese one even if they could get 
some material from Japan. Some leaders exaggerated the difficulty faced by the United 
States, it was rumored that “Even the drinking water of the United States armies comes 
from Japan. According to Korean People’s Army, American soldiers could not get used to 
the local water in Korea. They usually get diarrhoea after drinking the local water” (Hong, 
1990: 10). Though not without difficulties (Chai Chengwen and Deng Hua had reported 
the difficulties of transportation and translation on September 1 and 2, respectively, see 
Chai and Zhao, 2002: 78; Wang, 2018: 160), Chinese still had an advantage over the United 
States regarding logistics. In a war of attrition, the logistical difficulty of the United States 
will be further exposed (for example, see Deng Hua’s remark, Wang, 2002: 210). 
However, when PVA engaged in real battle with the United States, it was immediately 
clear that much of the expected logistical advantage of were exaggerations, if not illusions, 
at least at the initial stage. With the superiority of air power of the United States, logistics 
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was a major disadvantage for the PVA fighters rather than advantage (Xu, 1990: 18; also 
see Zhang, 2000, especially pp. 29-33). Although the logistical situation was improved 
somewhat under the leadership of Hong Xuezhi later (Qi, 2013), there was no doubt that 
Chinese logistical advantage was either miscalculation, just came out of logical reasoning. 
But they did provide psychological comfort which was important for the senior decision 
makers to convince themselves and Chinese people that victory over the United States was 
possible. Chinese leaders’ conclusion that China had logistical advantage over the United 
States, as well as their courage to fight largely depended on their psychological map, much 
to Gray and O’Sullivan’s observations (Gray, 1977: 59; O’Sullivan, 1986: 11). 
Nevertheless, in respect of resolve, morale and concentration of capability, China did 
have local advantage vis-a-vis the United States. With these advantages, Chinese leaders 
believed that it was possible to win over the United States on Korean Peninsula, especially 
in an attrition war, which gave them confidence in sending armies to fight the Resisting 
America Assisting Korea War. 
To sum up, with a salient threat on the border, and the probability of victory due to 
the advantage vis-a-vis the United States regarding morale, logistics (though an illusion), 
concentration of power, local military balance and other local advantages, senior Chinese 
leaders ultimately decided to fight the United States on Korean Peninsula. To use Mao’s 
own reasoning: “Regarding to the Korea issue, if we stand idle, American Imperialists will 
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take further steps and follow the old way of Japan to invade China, or even more fierce 
than Japan. It wants to stab three sharp knives on us, one on our head from Korea, one on 
our waist from Taiwan, and one on our feet from Vietnam. If there is any change over all 
under the heaven, they will attack us from three directions, and we can only resist passively. 
The aim of our resisting America assisting Korea is rightly to prevent their wishful thinking 
from realizing. ‘Parrying one fist to deter hundreds of fists’. We resist America assist Korea 
to defend our home and country. We don’t fight unwinnable wars. Comrades of the Central 
Party has made comprehensive considerations and study, and made up the strategy of 
attrition war which ensures victory, and then we send PVA out” (Pang and Feng, 2013: 230-
1). 
Compared with the American decision before 1812 and Japanese decision in 1941, the 
decision making of the local power before the Korean War had some distinctive features. 
For example, Chinese leaders’ decision making before the Korean War was less opportunist. 
Chinese leaders were quite cautious in the decision of war. When China decided to fight 
the United States, the United States was also not entangled in wars of other parts of the 
world. However, Chinese decision makers might calculate that the general background of 
America-Soviet struggle in Europe and Middle East provided an appropriate opportunity 
to fight the United States on the Korean Peninsula, since the United States could not afford 
to redeploy large amount of forces on the Korean frontier. In this sense, Chinese leaders 
 
  505 
did not totally avoid opportunism in decision making against a much more powerful state. 
In addition, in making decisions on participation of Korean War, the Soviet factor was 
of great importance for Chinese decision makers. The local power distribution was featured 
by preponderance in this period. However, the preponderant local force was the Sino-
Soviet bloc rather than China. Compared with the United States’ position in America since 
1805 and Japan’s position in East Asia from 1931 to 1941, China relied more on a third 
power. However, in the current period, despite the mutual suspicion, the Sino-Soviet bloc 
had been relatively tight, especially regarding to the Korean situation. The Soviet Union 
was also willing to assist China in the Korean War to distract the United States from the 
European frontier. It was not very problematic to regard the Sino-Soviet bloc as a unitary 
force regarding to the Korean War. 
Conclusions 
Sino-U.S. clash broke out in a situation when the Sino-Soviet bloc had power 
preponderance in East Asia and the United States still had power superiority vis-a-vis the 
bloc. On the one hand, the United States decision makers, relying on its power superiority, 
despising Chinese and even Soviet capability, and expecting Chinese and Soviet cautions, 
were arrogant and reluctant to retreat from its decision to rollback North Korean invasion 
and destroy the North Korea regime. On the other hand, senior Chinese decision makers 
felt threatened by the prospectus of presence of U.S. forces at its doorstep and determined 
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to have a independent North Korean regime as a buffer state between it and the U.S. sphere 
of influence on the Korea Peninsula. Relying on their (perceived) local advantages and 
American strategic distraction, Chinese policy makers were determined in the war if U.S. 
forces crossed the 38 parallel. Relying on their (perceived) respective advantages, the two 
parties were unable to deter each other, which finally led to the outbreak of war. The 
outbreak of the Sino-U.S. clash in the Korea War is a good proof for Hypothesis2 and 
Hypothesis4. 
This case also disproves Hypothesis4’. Chinese decision makers were not deterred by 
United States, the superior outside power which enjoyed global preeminence. They 
perceived that they had local advantages over the United States, despite its powerful power 
projections capabilities. They ultimately took risks confronting the United States directly 
at the Korean frontier. 
This case also negates some of the alternative explanations that were listed in the First 
Chapter. 
U.S. power preponderance on the global scale did not prevent the outbreak of Pacific 
War in 1941, which disprove Explanation1’. 
With the increase of Soviet power, the United States and the USSR were under power 
transition in late 1940’s and the whole 1950’s. However, despite their clash of interests on 
the Korean Peninsula, these two powers showed extreme cautions and circumspect in the 
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whole course of the Korean War. They were extremely reluctant in confronting each other 
directly. It was the China and North Korea, which were secondary and lesser powers, which 
was no match for U.S. material capability that took up the risk and challenged the United 
States. This fact could partially undermine the explanatory power of power transition 
theory (Explanation2’) in the case of Korean War. 
The claim that geography was increasingly less important in modern time (H6’) was 
wrong in the case of Korean War. Senior Chinese leaders did not show intense nervousness 
about U.S. intervention in the Korean War. However, they became desperate in warning 
and deterring the United States when they learned that the United States attempted to wipe 
out the North Korean regime-a bordering state of PRC and a buffer zone between it and 
the U.S. sphere of interests in Northeast Asia. In their decision of waging war against the 
United States, their (perceived) local advantage of supply, short-term military balance and 
high morale of Chinese soldiers to protect their country were important factors that were 
granted by geographical proximity to the battleground. O’Sullivan and Gary’s argument is 
also relevant to this case study, which partially supports H4. 
Apart from these alternative explanations that are raised in the First Chapter of this 
project, other specific explanations of the origin of the Sino-U.S. clash in the Korean War 
also have limitations. 
The deterrence failure theory worked well in the Korean case. However, the reason of 
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the failure was not that the United States failed to reassure PRC. From this chapter we 
could clearly see that even the United States attempt to reassure PRC and kept non-Korean 
troops away from the Manchuria border, China would still fight, since Mao’s red line was 
the crossing of U.S. troops of the 38th parallel and the existence of North Korea as a buffer 
state, rather than any type of buffer zone (for U.S. plans of buffer zone, see Christensen, 
1992: 126-7, ft.10). As shown by this Chapter, the true reason of deterrence failure was that 
given the issue salience and (perceived) advantage of locality, a weaker local major power 
might not be subjugated to the deterrence of a much powerful outside power; on the other 
hand, given its superior material capability, the outside power was also unlikely to be 
deterred by the local major power. 
Chen’s ideological and Chinese centralism explanation has relatively little 
explanatory power in China’s decision of intervention in the war. War is not game, and 
senior Chinese leaders were well aware of this. Mao’s generation was cautious in waging 
wars that did not involve China’s direct national security. Mobilization of Chinese 
population to make a total transformation of Chinese society could have been reached only 
through anti-American propaganda without entering the war. And his explanation could 
not account for the difference of senior Chinese leaders’ attitude before late September and 
after. China aided Vietnam and Korea’s revolutionary movements in 1950’s because these 
two states were China’s immediate neighbors, and China could not afford to have them fall 
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into its adversary’s sphere of influence. 
Zhang Shuguang believed that the then Chinese Communist leaders were featured by 
“military romanticism”, which emphasized human superiority in spirits and morale over 
technological superiority and people’s war strategy (Zhang, 1995, especially pp. 10-11). 
This is only partially true. As mentioned above, first generation Chinese leaders were 
actually very cautious regarding war and conflicts. And although they believed morale and 
spirits, along with other advantage of locality could give PVA advantage, they had no 
illusion of China’s disadvantage in military technology. 
The argument that Zhou’s warnings on September 30 and October 3 made some sense 
However, the directive that Truman sent to MacArthur clearly dictated that the 38th parallel 
should be crossed only if “at the time of such operation there has been no entry into North 
Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, 
nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea” (Truman to MacArthur, 
Sept. 26, FRUS, 1950, VII: 727). And the U.S. forces only crossed the 38th parallel on 
October 7. If Washington took seriously of Zhou’s warning, there were still 4-5 days to 
change course. It was Washington’s overconfidence of its power superiority and 
miscalculation that led to the final face-off. 
The communication and signaling failure argument did make sense, however, with 
China’s deployment of around 300,000 troops in Manchuria, Zhou’s public announcement 
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and Nie and Zhou’s warnings through Panikkar were clear signals to the United States. 
However, the Truman government, despising Chinese capability and miscalculating 
China’s determination, refused to attend to Chinese warnings. Thomas Christensen also 
doubted the communication failure arguments, he contended “(g)iven the American 
incentives to end the Korean problem once and for all, Truman might have ignored even 
the most direct Chinese warnings” (Christensen, 1992: 149). 
Many scholars argue that China was forced upon to intervene by the Soviet Union, or 
by the collective efforts of Soviet Union and North Korea. They argued that it was Stalin’s 
urging of Mao to send army to Korea that forced Mao’s decision. According to Yang 
Shangkun, during the October 5 SCCCPC meeting, Mao compared China, Soviet Union 
and North Korea as a troika, “the cart was pulled by three horses, and now that the other 
two are determined to go forward, what choice do I have?” During the meeting, Mao left 
and talked to Vladimir Kovalev, the Soviet representative in China, who was accompanied 
by Shi Zhe, Mao’s Russian translator. Twenty minutes later, Mao returned to the meeting 
and said “As expected, the other two horses are determined to pull, how can I not pull!” 
And then the senior leaders decided that Peng commanded the PVA and marched to Korea 
(Su, 2009: 12). In this account, it seemed that Mao’s decision was influenced by the Soviet 
Union. 
There is little doubt that Mao, Zhou, Peng and all other senior Chinese leaders 
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considered the assistance from the Soviet Union as an important condition upon which to 
win the war against the United States on Korean Peninsula, given the poor equipment of 
the PVA soldiers. However, it was too far-fetched to argue that Soviet pressure was the 
decisive reason for China to send army to Korea. 
Firstly, some questions might be raised to Yang’s account. There is no record of this 
account except for Su Weimin’s record of Yang memory. Shi Zhe himself did not mention 
this event in his two main memoirs (Shi, 1991 and 2001). Yang did not mention this event 
in his diary, either.15 Su Weimin became Yang’s secretary in July 1954. Even though there 
is no reason to doubt the authenticity of Su’s account, a single account is still relatively 
weak in accounting for such a decisive decision. 
Apart from that, CPC leaders were firmly attached to the principle of self-reliance. In 
addition, it is well known that Mao had been disobedient to orders from Moscow. During 
the civil war, Mao continuously ignored orders or suggestions from Moscow. Right on his 
visit to Moscow from late December 1949 to February 1950, Mao forced Stalin into making 
major concessions regarding the issues of Lvshun, Dalian and South Manchurian railways, 
which displeased Stalin and gave him incentive to change his mind into supporting Kim’s 
adventure. When major Chinese national interests were at stake, Mao has never retreated 
 
15 In fact, there was not any entry under the year 1950 in Yang’s dairy, see, Yang Shangkun Dairies 
[Yang Shangkun Riji], Volume 1 (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 2001). 
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from foreign pressure. 
In addition, compared with Soviets pressure, Mao had more concerns over the 
disagreements of his colleagues within the CPC, which was guided by the principle of 
collective decision making then. That is why after noticing the disagreements and concerns 
of senior CPC leaders on the October 2 extended SCCCPC meeting, Mao, despite his own 
inclination of sending army, decided not to send the prepared telegram to Stalin in which 
he consented to send army to Korea upon the request of Stalin and Kim on October 1 
(Stalin’s tone was quite strong in his request telegram, however, Mao still dared to refuse). 
Instead, Mao talked to Roshchin about the disagreements and concerns of senior CPC 
leaders and said there was major difficulties and refused to send army (Roshchin to Stalin, 
October 3, 1950, RDDSS, Vol. 3: 77-78). It seemed Stalin, though not without reluctance, 
had no intention, or probably no hope, to force Mao’s hand. Before he was aware of 
SCCCPC’s new decision on October 5, he replied to Mao (about his talk with Roshchin on 
October 2) that it was Chinese colleagues’ decision to decide whether the difficulties in 
China could be dealt with (Stalin to Mao, RDDSS, Vol. 3: 82), which meant it was Chinese 
leaders’ choice to decide whether they would send army to Korea.16 
From what occurred on October 12 and 13, it also seemed that even if Mao should 
 
16 On the Mao’s disobedience to Stalin, also see Shen Zhihua, Disclosure on Korean War [Chaoxian 
zhanzheng jiemi] (Hong Kong, World Books Co. LTD, 1995), p. 334. 
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decline Stalin and Kim’s request, Stalin would have accepted the fact and sought other 
policies in dealing with latest developments on Korean Peninsula. Mao’s refusal to Stalin’s 
request on October 2 and his ignorance of Stalin’s suggestion during October 12 and 13 
further proved: 1. When confronted with salient threat of the Chinese national security, 
Mao was resolved to fight and had never shrink in front of Soviet pressure, and “whether 
Soviet Union would offer air force and arms did not decisively affect Mao’s determination 
to send army” (Wang, 1995: 87). 2. Senior Chinese leaders considered the United States 
marching north of 38th parallel, the coming collapse of North Korea and the probability of 
the establishment of an American client on its border as salient national threat and national 
security was the first consideration when they made the decision to fight war. 3. Chinese 
leaders were resolved to fight and accepting in absorbing major costs. These things were 
clearly not present before late September. If Mao and other senior Chinese leaders felt the 
same salient threat and urgency in the earlier period (late June to late September), they 
might have insisted in sending armies to Korea to fight against the United States with 
whatever level of military readiness they had in an earlier time. 
 
  514 
References 
Bo Yibo, Retrospects on Several Major Decisions and Events [Ruogan zhongda juece 
yu shijian de huigu] , Vol. 1 (Beijing: Communist Party of China Central Party School 
Press, 1991). 
Bradley, Omar N. and Clay Blair, A General’s Life: An Autobiography (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1983). 
Chai, Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian, Negotiation at Panmunjom [Banmendian tanpan] 
(Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, 1989). 
Chen, Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American 
Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 
Chen, Yun, Selection of Chen Yun’s Works [Chenyun wenxuan], Volume 2 (Beijing: 
People’s Publishing House, 1984). 
Christensen, Thomas J. “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The 
Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams”, International Security, Volume 17, Number 1, 
Summer 1992, pp. 122-154. 
——Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American 
Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton University Press, 1996). 
Collins, J. Lawton, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1969). 
Cumings, Bruce, The Origins of the Korea War, Volume II: The Roaring of the 
Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton University Press, 1990). 
Department of Logistics Academic Research of Logistics Academy of People’s 
Liberation Army edit, Selected Sources of Chinese People’s Volunteer Army’s Resisting 
America Assisting Korea War [Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng 
ziliao xuanbian] (Beijing: Logistics Academy of People’s Liberation Army, 1978). 
Department of Military History Study of Academy of Military Science, History of 
Resisting America Assisting North Korea War [Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng shi], Vol. 1 
(Beijing: Military Science Press, 2000). 
Du, Ping, At the Headquarters of the People’s Volunteer Army [Zai Zhiyuanjun 
Zongbu] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, 1989). 
 
  515 
Editorial group of Zhou Enlai’s Biography, “Resisting America Assisting Korea War” 
[Kangmei yuanchao], Literature of Chinese Communist Party, 1998, Issue 1, pp. 45-55, 59. 
Foot, Rosemary, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean 
Conflict, 1950-1953 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985). 
Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers/Department of State, 1950, 
Vol. IV, Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union; Volume VII: Korea. 
George, Alexander L. and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: 
Theory and Practice (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1974). 
Jin Chongji, Biography of Zhou Enlai [Zhou Enlai Zhuan] (Beijing: Central Party 
Literature Publishing House, 1998). 
Goncharov, Sergei, John Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and 
the Korean War (Stanford University Press, 1993). 
Hao, Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History 
Revisited,” The China Quarterly, No. 121 (Mar., 1990), pp. 94-115. 
Hong, Xuezhi, Remembering the Resisting America Assisting Korea War [Kangmei 
Yuanchao Zhanzheng Huiyi] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Art Press Art Press, 1990). 
Hu, Qiaomu, Collected Works of Hu Qiaomu [Hu Qiaomu wenji], Volume 1 (Beijing: 
People’s Publishing House, 1992). 
Koo, Wellington, Memoirs of Wellington Koo [Gu Weijun Huiyilu], Abbreviated 
Version (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1997). 
Lebow, Richard Ned, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crises 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). 
Leffler, Melvyn, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman 
Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford University Press, 1992). 
Li, Jvkui, The Memoirs of Li Jvkui [Li Jvkui huiyilu] (Beijing: People’s Liberation 
Army Press, 1986). 
Lei, Yingfu and Chen Xianyi, As Adviser at the Supreme Command: Memoirs of 
General Lei Yingfu [Zai zuigao tongshuaibu dang canmou: Lei yingfu Jiangjun huiyi lu] 
(Nanchang: Baihuazhou Literature & Arts Press, 1997). 
Li, Ping, Ma Zhisun et al., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai [Zhou Enlai Nianpu], edited by 
Literature Research Office of the CCP Central Committee (Beijing: Central Party 
 
  516 
Literature Publishing House, 1997). 
Liu Quan, “Deng Xiaoping’s leadership in Southwestern Movement of Resisting 
America Assisting Korea” [Deng Xiaoping lingdao xinan kangmei yuanchao yundong], 
Literature on Party History [Dangshi Wenyuan], September 2013, pp. 11-16. 
Lowe, Peter, The Origins of the Korean War, Second Edition (London and New York: 
Longman, 1997). 
MacArthur, Douglas, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1964). 
Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Establishment of People’s Republic of China 
[Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao], Volume 1 (Beijing: Central Party Literature 
Publishing House, 1987). 
Mao Zedong’s Military Manuscripts since the Establishment of People’s Republic of 
China [Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao], Volume 1 and 3 (Beijing: Military 
Science Press, 2010). 
Mao Zedong, Collected Works of Mao Zedong [Mao Zedong Wenji], Vol. 6 (Beijing: 
People’s Publishing House, 1999). 
Meng, Qingyi and Liu Huiqing, “Chinese Yanbian Korean Ethnic Group and Korean 
War” [Zhongguo Yanbian Chaoxian zu yu Chaoxian zhanzheng], Northwest Journal of 
Ethnology, No. 1 2012, Total No. 72, pp. 196-207. 
Military Situation of the Far East, Hearings before the United States Senate 
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations United States 
Senate, 82nd Congress, Part 1 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 
1951).  
Nie Rongzhen Memoirs [Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army 
Press, 1986). 
Paige, Glenn D., The Korean Decision: June 24-30, 1950 (New York: The Free Press, 
1968). 
Paul, T.V., Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
Pang Xianzhi and Jin Chongji edit, Biography of Mao Zedong [Mao Zedong zhuan], 
Volume 1 (Beijing: Central Party Literature Publishing House, 2003). 
 
  517 
Pang Xianzhi, Feng Hui et al., Chronicle of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976 [Mao Zedong 
nianpu, 1949-1976], Volume 1 (Beijing: Central Party Literature Publishing House, 2013). 
Panikkar, K.M., The Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat (London: George Allen & 
Unwin LTD, 1955). 
Peng Dehuai’s Self Account [Peng Dehuai Zishu](Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 
1981). 
Peng Dehuai, Selection of Peng Dehuai’s Military Writings [Peng Dehuai Junshi 
Wenxuan] (Beijing: Central Party Literature Publishing House, 1988). 
People’s Daily, October 1, 1950: A1. 
Qi, Dexue, “Great Contribution of Hong Xuezhi’s Leadership to the Logistical Work 
of People’s Volunteer Army” [Hong Xuezhi lingdao zhiyuanjun houqin gongzuo de juda 
gongxian], Military History Studies, Issue 3, 2013, pp. 144-150. 
—— Contest among Giants: High Level Decision Making during Resisting America 
Assisting Korea War [Juren de jiaoliang: Kangmei yuanchao gaoceng juece] (Shenyang: 
Liaoning People’s Publishing House, 2016). 
Shen, Zhihua, Disclosure on Korean War [Chaoxian zhanzheng jiemi] (Hongkong: 
World Books Co. LTD, 1995). 
——Mao Zedong, Stalin and Korean War [Maozedong, Sidalin Yu Chaoxian 
Zhanzheng] (Guangzhou: Guangdong People’s Publishing House, 2013). 
—— Selections of Russian Declassified Documents: Sino-Soviet Relations 
(RDDSS)[E’luosi jiemi dangan xuanbian: zhongsu guanxi] , Vol. 2 and 3 (Shanghai: 
Oriental Publishing Center, 2015). 
——“The Decision-making Process of Sending Army to Korea and the Analysis on 
its Motivation,” Yanhuang Chunqiu, 2015, Issue 2, pp. 58-66. 
Riasanovsky, Nicholas, A History of Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1963). 
Shi, Zhe and Li Haiwen, On the Side of Great Historic Figures: She Zhe’s Memoirs 
[Zai Lishi Juren Shenbian: Shi Zhe Huiyilu] (Beijing: Central Party Literature Publishing 
House, 1999). 
Schecter, Jerrold L. and Cyacheslav V. Luchkov edited and translated, Khrushchev 
Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990). 
 
  518 
Shi, Zhe, My Life: Shi Zhe’s Self Account [Wode yisheng: Shizhe Zishu] (Beijing: 
People’s Publishing House, 2001). 
Schnabel, James F., and Robert J. Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III: 1950-1951, The Korea War, Part One 
(Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 1998). 
Shuang Shi, The First War since Foundation of People’s Republic of China: 
Panoramic Recording of Resisting America Assisting Korea War [Kaiguo diyi zhan: 
kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng quanjing jishi], Vol. 1 (Beijing: History of Communist Party 
of China Press, 2004). 
Smith, Gaddis, Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1972). 
Spanier, John W., The Truman-MacArthur Controversy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1959). 
Su, Weimin, “Yang Shangkun’s Talk on Resisting America Assisting Korea War”, Bai 
Nian Chao, Issue 4, 2009, pp. 10-14. 
The War to Resist America and Assist Korea [Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng], China 
Today (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1990). 
Truman, Harry S., Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume Two Years of Trial and Hope 
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1956). 
Yang Shangkun Dairies [Yang Shangkun Riji], Volume 1 (Beijing: Central Party 
Literature Publishing House, 2001). 
Wang, Bo, Mao Zedong’s Tough Decision: The Process of Decision Making of 
Sending Chinese People’s Volunteer Army to North Korea [Mao Zedong de jiannan juece: 
Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun chubing chaoxian de juece guocheng] (Chinese Social 
Science Press, 2002). 
——Record of Peng Dehuai’s Entrance in War in Korea [Peng Dehuai ruchao 
zuozhan jishi] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 2018). 
Wang, Ming, Fifty years of Communist Party of China [Zhonggong wushi nian], 
translated by Xu Xiaoying, et al., (Beijing: Oriental Publishing House, 2004, Limited 
internal Publication). 
Wang, Yan et al., Biography of Peng Dehuai [Peng Dehuai zhuan] (Beijing: 
Contemporary China Publishing House, 1993). 
 
  519 
Wang, Yan edit, Chronicle of Peng Dehuai (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 
1998). 
Wang, Yazhi, “Several situations before and after Mao Zedong’s decision of sending 
army to North Korea” [Mao Zedong chubing chaoxian qianhou de yixie qingkuang], in 
Literature of Chinese Communist Party, 1995, Issue 6, pp. 85-89. 
Weathersby, Kathryn, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korea War, 1945-
1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives”, Cold War International History Project, 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper No. 8. 
Whiting, Allen S., China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War 
(Stanford University Press, 1960). 
Xie, Lifu, Records on the Korean War [Chaoxian Zhanzheng Shilu], Volume 1 
(Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1993). 
Xinhua Monthly, September 15, 1950, Volume II, Issue 5, No. 11, p. 1006. 
Xu, Yan, The First Contest: The Resisting America and Assisting Korea War in 
Historical Retrospection and Introspection [Diyici Jiaoliang: Kangmei Yuanchao 
Zhanzheng de lishi Huigu yu Fansi] (Beijing: China Radio and Television Publishing 
House, 1990). 
Zelman, Walter A., Chinese Intervention in the Korean War: a Bilateral Failure of 
Deterrence (Los Angeles, University of California, 1967). 
Zhang, Shuguang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-
1953 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995). 
Zhang, Mingyuan, “Military Logistics in Snow and Wind: Remembering the 
Logistical Guarantee during the Resisting America Assisting Korea War ” [Fengxue 
Zhanqin: yi kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng de houqin baozhang], Contemporary China 
History Studies, Nov. 2000, Vol. 7, No. 6, pp. 25-35. 
Zhou Enlai’s Manuscripts since the Establishment of People’s Republic of China 
[Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao], Volume 2 and 3 (Beijing: Central Party Literature 
Publishing House, 2008). 
Zhou, Enlai, Selection of Zhou Enlai’s Military Writings [Zhou Enlai Junshi Wenxuan], 
Vol. 4 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1997).  
 
  520 
Chapter 8 U.S.-China Crisis in East Asia, 1996–2016 
Just like the U.S.-Japanese Relations, material power between the United States and 
China had never been strictly balanced. However, between 1995 and 2016, the power 
balance between China and the United had been much balanced compared with their last 
period of rivalry (1950–1971). In the region of East Asia, on the other hand, the material 
power of China has been becoming more and more unbalanced against other regional 
players, including Japan. 
During this period, U.S.-China relations in East Asia had been fraught with major and 
smaller crises. Crisis out of the region, such as 1999 U.S. bombing of Chinese Yugoslavian 
Embassy, also had negative impact on the bilateral relations. The United States has also 
been encouraging East Asian states or regions that had territorial disputes with China such 
as Japan, Vietnam, Philippine and Taiwan to confront China by giving them material and 
rhetorical supports, which emboldened them to challenge China. Other East Asian States 
have also been careful enough not to push the disputes too hard so as to avoid escalation. 
Up to the present, U.S.-China disagreements and contests in both Taiwan and South 
China Sea (SCS) have far from being settled, great power rivalry in East Asia has continued, 
and concerns of potential of military clash between the two powers still exist, it might be 
predicted that the possibility of great power war is quite low, though that does not mean 
that “war” by other methods, such as economical, technological, ideological and cultural 
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infiltration, stigmatization and promotion of the other’s national split, would not take place. 
This chapter finds, however, both powers remained constrained in these crises. 
Although China was more assertive regarding Taiwan and its maritime interests, it was also 
cautious and avoided major clash with the United States. This was the result of its growing 
confidence of its national power. The United States, although tried to contain China’s 
growing power, also tried to avoid major clash with China despite the request of its local 
allies. Local states having disputes with China, although try to entangle the United States 
in the crisis, was also cautious not to provoke China into military clash. 
U.S.-China Crisis in East Asia in the 1996-2016 Period 
In this period, the two powers have gone through major crisis regarding Taiwan 
(especially in the 1995-1996 Strait Crisis) and SCS (in the 2010’s), while other minor crisis, 
such as the EP-3 incident in 2001 also abounds. But before getting into this period, it is 
helpful to look into the post-Korean War bilateral relations in the Cold War. 
Post-Korean War U.S.-China Crises in the Cold War Era, 1953–1971 
In this period, the two powers confronted with each other in several crises, including 
the 1954–1955 and 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the U.S. intervention in the Laos Civil War 
in 1961. Most of these crises took place along China’s southern borders and were related 
to Taiwan and Indochina. 
 
  522 
Although China suffered from the Great Leap Forward Movement (1958), the Great 
Famine (1959–1961), Cultural Revolution (1966–1976, its height was 1966–1969), and 
many top military leaders had been purged in this period, its industrial capability had 
increased enormously since the end of the Korean War. The iron and steel production in 
1950 was 0.6 million ton, the figure reached 2.23 in 1954, 5.35 in 1957, 9.64 in 1964 and 
21.32 in 1971; while the military expenditure in 1950 was 2.56 trillion U.S. dollar in 1950, 
the figure became 2.54 in 1954, 6.22 in 1957, 12.9 in 1964 and 21.60 in 1971. In 1950, 
Chinese iron and steel production was 0.7 percent of that of the United States, and military 
expenditure 18 percent, the figure became 8 percent and 25 percent in 1964, and 20 percent 
and 29 percent in 1971 (COW data). Although the gap was still high, especially if quality 
was taken into consideration, it had shrunk significantly, especially given the fact that 
China had built a relatively complete industrial system, and it acquired nuclear and 
strategic missile capability in mid 1960’s. In addition, in 1950’s, Chinese-Soviet alliance 
was in its heydays, while the material power of Soviet Union was alleged to be catching 
up that of the United States in mid and late 1950’s. 
The American decision makers still regard the material capability of China as of 
limited threat, though not as negligible as it was in 1950. The United States actively 
intervened in favor of Taiwan authorities in 1954 by signing the “Sino-American Mutual 
Defense Treaty” with Chiang in 1954. In January 1955, the Congress passed the Formosa 
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Resolution, and it was signed by President Dwight Eisenhower on January 29. The 
resolution authorized the president to “employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he 
deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the 
Pescadores against armed attack” (Joint Resolution by the Congress, Jan. 29, 1955, FRUS, 
1955-1957, Vol. II, China: 162-3). Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Chairman of 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Arthur Radford even considered use of nuclear weapons to 
intervene in the offshore islands. Dulles was “well convinced him that atomic weapons 
were the only effective weapons which the United States could use against a variety of 
mainland targets”, while Radford remarked that the JCS had “consistently asserted” that 
“we should have to use atomic weapons” (memo of NSC meeting, March 10, 1955, Ibid: 
347-9). In the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Dulles and the then JCS Chairman, Nathan 
Twining again contended that “we would strike at Communist air fields and shore batteries 
with small atomic weapons” (Sept. 2, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XIX: 118). 
In the Laos and Vietnam Wars, the American decision makers showed their despise of 
Chinese military power, and decided to intervene directly. Roger Hilsman, Director of the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, remarked in 1963 that although China was capable 
of generating severe and costly troubles, it was not a formidable military power due to its 
lack of modern technology and industrial base, and it was well within United States’ sphere 
of destruction (Hilsman Papers, cited from Tao, Vol. II: 253). American decision makers 
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calculated in January 1964 that given the economic and agricultural difficulties in China 
and its rift with Soviet Union, China would be too weak to intervene if the United States 
escalated its intervention in Vietnam (Jan. 22, 1964, JCS memo, Porter, 1981: 262). With 
these calculations, the United States escalated its intervention after the Tonkin Gulf 
incident in 1964. 
However, compared with its decision makings in the summer of 1950, the United 
States had been much more restrained. Such restrain was partially due to its fair respect of 
Soviet Union’s power (before the Sino-Soviet rift) and the increase of China’s material 
capability. Though China was still far from being powerful enough to challenge the United 
States even in East Asia, American decision makers were careful not to getting entangled 
in a new war with China. In signing the 1954 defense treaty, the United States would also 
restrain “from assisting or encouraging offensive actions against Communist China or 
seaborne commerce with Communist China, and restrain the Chinese Nationalists from 
such actions” (NSC 5429/4, Dec. 10, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIV: 1009). The United 
States also suggested that Taiwan authorities should retreat from offshore islands, 
especially Tachen, except for Quemoy and Matsu (Jan. 21, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 
II: 95-6). In the 1958 crisis, Washington again implied that Taiwan authorities should 
retreat from Quemoy and Matsu, since “it would be foolish to keep these large forces on 
these islands...it would not be wise of prudent to keep them there” (Dulles, Sept. 30, The 
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Department of State Bulletin, hereinafter cited as Bulletin, Vol. 39: 602). In both crises, 
Dulles and JCS’s nuclear proposal was rejected by Eisenhower and other decision makers.  
The United States also showed constraints in the wars of Laos and Vietnam. Even 
after American decision makers decided to intervene directly in ROV after the Tonkin Gulf 
Incident, they still tried to avoid further provocation of China. President Johnson was 
adopting a strategy of “slow escalation of air war”, while “watching for every possible sign 
of reaction” from China. The reason of the strategy rather than an all-out, total assault on 
the North was that “(i)f China should suddenly react to slow escalation...the United States 
would have plenty of time to ease off the bombing” (Mar. 1965, The Pentagon papers: the 
Defense Department history of United States decisionmaking on Vietnam, hereinafter cited 
as Pentagon, Vol. III: 354). To avoid provocation of China, a twenty-five to thirty mile 
buffer zone was kept from bombing below the Vietnam-Chinese border for the most of 
time, except for in the summer 1967 under Operation Rolling Thunder, and the Red River 
dikes was permanently kept from attack during the war (Whiting, 2001: 181). 
In this period, Chinese decision makers also sensed that the United States did not want 
a fighting war with China. Accordingly, although Chinese decision makers constantly 
pursued national interests regarding Taiwan and Indochina, they also restrain itself from 
touching the red line of the United States after feeling out where it was. As a result, 
although hot wars had barely ceased in the period of 1953–1971 in East Asia, the two 
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powers had never fought against each other on battlegrounds directly. 
Crises in the period of 1995–2016 
In this period, Taiwan was still one of sources of U.S.-China crisis. After early 1990’s, 
with the collapse of Soviet Union, North Korea, having suffered from economic difficulties, 
felt threatened by the U.S.-South Korean alliance, and attempted to build nuclear arms. As 
a result, North Korea became another sparkling point in the region that involved the two 
powers. With the development of Chinese naval capability and anti-access/area denial 
(A2/AD) capability, and the maritime territorial disputes since the late 2000’s, SCS became 
another source of bilateral crisis. 
Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1995–1996 
After the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, China 
suffered from a backlash in international image and the underling condition for U.S.-China 
quasi-alliance had been removed, and the bilateral relations was left to drift, especially 
during William Clinton’s first term of presidency. With disputes regarding human rights 
and China’s MFN status, United States’ accusation that China played a negative role in 
international anti-proliferation regime and the following Yinhe Incident of 1993, bilateral 
relations deteriorated precipitously. However, starting from late 1993, with the efforts of 
numerous think tanks, a China policy of “comprehensive engagement” was set in motion. 
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However, at the same time, after Taiwan’s democratization, its policy makers, 
especially Taiwan’s “President” Lee Teng-hui turned to separatism. Many conservative 
Congressmen in the United States, dissatisfied by Clinton’s moderate policy on China since 
1993, started to take advantage of the Taiwan issue to exert pressure on the administration. 
With the cancel of martial law of late 1980’s, Taiwan’s reforms contrasted the 
mainland’s crackdown at Tiananmen, which boosted Taiwan’s international image, 
especially to conservative American political elites. At the same time, Lee Teng-hui, who 
was preparing for the first election by universal suffrage in Chinese history in 1996, was 
eager to won votes by ending Taiwan’s international isolation (Lampton, 2001: 46). 
Accordingly, in 1992, Taiwan authorities had decided in an official report to expand 
Taiwan’s “Lebensraum” in the international society. Between 1993 and 1995, Lee’s 
administration strove for increase Taiwan’s international exposure by flexible “substantial 
diplomacy”, “pragmatic diplomacy”, and “vacation diplomacy”, i.e., paying official visits 
to third world states of Southeast Asia, Middle East, Africa and Latin America. They also 
attempted to return to the U.N., which was unsurprisingly futile given the Mainland’s veto 
power. Both in official speech and their remarks during the visit, Taiwan officials attempted 
to propagandize their separatist idea of “one country, two entities” and “ROC in Taiwan” 
as against Mainland’s “one country, two systems” policy of reunion (see Su, 1999: 719-
22). 
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 Unsurprisingly, Lee was mostly eager to conduct “vacation diplomacy” on the 
United States. His administration spared no efforts in investing in the lobbying companies 
and research institutes in the United States to get Taipei’s voice through. In early May of 
1994, Lee attempted to spend one night in Hawaii as a stopover en route to Costa Rica. 
However, Washington was reluctant in accommodating Lee, only allowing him to stay 45 
minutes at the airport. Lee felt offended, and refused to leave his plane as a protest (Chen, 
1995: 289-90). And Clinton administration was criticized ferociously by opponents on the 
Capitol Hill. In November 1994, the midterm election ended up with conservative 
Republicans control of both houses of the Congress, the first time since 1954. They were 
willing to support Lee’s course at cost of U.S.-Mainland relations. Cold War warrior Jesse 
Helms from North Carolina became the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. House Speaker Newt Gingrich not only considered Lee’s visit “a decision that 
the administration has to make”, but also called for Taiwan’s “self-determination” and 
readmission to U.N. after a meeting with Kuomintang officials in early 1995 (Lekic, Feb. 
3, 1995, Associated Press).  
Such clamoring finally triggered the third Taiwan Strait Crisis. As the beneficiary of 
Lee and with the request of Lee’s “friends”, Cornell University, Lee’s Alma Mater had been 
working for Lee’s visit since early 1994 (Su, 1999: 733–4). In 1995, Republican Congress, 
leading by Helms, exerted pressure on the Clinton administration to approve Lee’s visit. 
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On May 9, the House resolved, and the Senator concurred that the President should 
promptly indicated that the United States welcomed the private visit by Lee to Cornell 
University, and will welcome a transit stop by him in Anchorage, Alaska, to attend the 
“USA–ROC Economic Council Conference” (H.Con.Res.53, the 104th Con.; Con. Rec., 
Vol. 141, No. 76: S 6306-15). Clinton, after meeting with several Democratic Senators, 
represented by Chuck Robb from Virginia, decided to concede to Congress’s visa decisions 
on May 17. 
Lee started his visit to Cornell on June 7. On 9, he delivered a speech in which he 
implied his dissatisfaction of the fact that Taiwan “does not enjoy the diplomatic 
recognition that is due from the international community”. He also emphasized the people 
of “ROC”, the “Taiwan experience” of democratization and economic growth (Lee, 1995). 
These remarks far exceeded the intended “purely private” nature of the visit, which irritated 
the Department of States officials who deemed Lee’s activities “had gone well beyond the 
conditions of his visa” (Christopher, 2001: 244).  
Not surprisingly, mainland’s reaction was ferocious. Several high-level bilateral talks 
were suspended. Chinese ambassador Li Daoyu was recalled, so was American ambassador 
J. Stapleton Roy, the result that for three months, top diplomats were absent in each side’s 
capitals. Many high level meetings were also canceled. On June 27, Harry Wu, a 
naturalized American citizen (Wu got his U.S. citizenship in early 1994) and journalist 
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reporting China’s forced labor products was arrested under the charge of false visa and 
spying (see Suettinger, 2003: 228-30). On June 30, a routine exercise by PLA was 
conducted in the strait. On July 10, Gringrich called for a restoration of diplomatic ties with 
Taiwan, that Clinton administration should stipulate to Beijing that it “has to live with the 
reality that the people of Taiwan are a free people and deserve it” (Kovaleski, Jul. 10, 1995, 
Washington Post: A01).  
After a week since Gringrich’s remark, Beijing announced military drill to be 
exercised from July 21 to 28 on July 18, this was also Beijing’s answer to Taiwan’s 
numerous small scale military exercises conducted in 1995 and 1996. Before this event, 
Beijing had tried to get promise from the United States that Lee would not visit again but 
was politely denied (Lampton, 2001: 52). On August 10, Beijing again announced that from 
August 15 to 25 another live fire military drill would be conducted 90 nautical miles north 
of Taiwan, as a warning as well as a retaliation to deter Lee from further separatist activities. 
In response, Washington dispatched carrier Nimitz through Taiwan Strait on excuse of 
weather condition on December 19 and 20, first time since 1979. 
However, after Qian-Christopher talks in Brunei on August 1, Li Zhaoxing (Vice 
Foreign Minister)-Peter Tarnoff (U.S. Undersecretary of State) talk in Beijing, and Jiang-
Clinton talk at Lincoln Center on October 24, which involved topics of Washington’s 
promise of limitation of future Taiwan leaders’ visit (Tao, 2004, Vol. III: 268-9), the 
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bilateral relations went through a short period of conciliation. 
Nevertheless, this period did not last long. In late 1995, the two powers wrangled 
about human rights issues relating to Wei Jingsheng and Tibet. Regarding to Taiwan, 
Christopher told Qian during ASEAN annual conference on August 1, 1995 that though 
Washington could promise such visits would be rare, personal, private, unofficial and 
unpolitical, it could not promise to decline visa or visits for Taiwanese “Presidents” in the 
future (Christopher, 1998: 289). Washington also turned down Beijing’s suggestions of 
negotiation of the fourth Communique (Ibid: 425; Liu, 2001: 86-9, 96-7). It also intimated 
Beijing that Jiang’s state visit would not happen any time before the 1996 election. This 
was because Clinton administration concern for a reception of Chinese President would 
have negative effect for the upcoming election given China’s poor human rights records 
(Mann, 1998: 343). During January and February 1996, despite Beijing’s opposition, 
Washington approved transit visas of Taiwan’s “Vice President” Li Yuan-zu three times on 
his visit to Guatemala and Haiti via the United States (Ross, 2006: 105-6). In addition, 
Taiwan frequently held military exercises in early 1996 before the presidential campaign 
(Su, 1998: 747). These new developments might have alarmed Beijing that Taipei and 
Washington, despite their rhetoric of adherence to the “One China” principle, might 
surreptitiously collaborate with each other to go further down the way of Taiwan splittism. 
They might have also convinced Beijing that further actions were needed to deter both 
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Taipei and Washington from adopting such a policy. 
As a result, on March 5, 1996, Beijing, announced that missile tests would be 
conducted from 8 to 15 the same month. Four days later, a live-fire tests in East and South 
China Sea from 12 to 20 was announced (Liu, 2001: 102-3). The tests and exercises were 
also alleged to be held in order to undermine Lee’s presidential campaign. During the first 
period of missile test of exercise (there were three periods of exercises, conducted from 
Mar. 8-15, from Mar. 12-20, and from Mar. 18-25 respectively), Beijing test-fired missiles 
which technically bracketed Taiwan. One of the nuclear capable M-9 missiles flowed over 
Taipei (Christopher, 2001: 245). Secretary of Defense William Perry told the visiting Vice 
Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu that he was concerned by Beijing’s bracketing Taipei, since 
that meant “establishing the range so the missile commander could then hit any target in 
between” (Tyler, 2000: 32). 
The March war games was the height of the crisis. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff John Shalikashvili ordered that some preliminary mobilization preparations be made 
for defense of Taiwan in case of a war broke out (Ibid: 27). Clinton convened his ministers 
and advisers on March 9 and inquired whether a war would break out. Finally, to show 
American determination to stand up to its interests in East Asia and to “counsel Taiwan 
against provocations that might ignite conflict”, Washington decided to dispatch carrier 
Nimitz with its escort to reinforce the carrier Independent battle group in Japan. The two 
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ships were to patrol and observe in the waters near the strait, which would “marshal the 
biggest fighting force in the Western Pacific for a long time [since Vietnam]” (by Winston 
Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in Tucker, 2001: 486). 
And the decision was announced on March 11. 
At the same time, the Congress also reacted. On March 19, the House passed a 
resolution, which favored that the United States military forces should defend Taiwan in 
the event of “invasion, missile attack, or blockade by the People’s Republic of China” by 
a large margin of 369 to 14 (H.Con.Res.148, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess., Cong. Rec.-House: 
H 2343-55). Two days later, the Senate amended that the President, in consistence with 
TRA of 1979, should “reexamine the nature and quantity of defense articles and services 
that may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability in 
light of the heightened military threat”. The amendment was passed by a margin of 97 to 0 
(Mar. 21, 1996, Senate Amendment No. 3562, Cong. Rec.-Senate, Vol. 142, No. 40: S 
2622-7). The actions of the United States undoubtedly escalated the situation by increasing 
the possibility of military confrontation with Beijing. War scares were expressed by 
popular press from Asia and the United States (Lampton, 2001: 53).  
Nevertheless, the two parties displayed restraint during the whole course of Chinese 
military drill. The U.S. carrier battle groups kept well off the Taiwan Strait. After the end 
of Chinese military drill, the height of the crisis was passed. By mid-March 20’s, the crisis 
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wore thin. On March 26, Perry remarked that he thought the crisis had passed during a talk 
to American Business Association (Liu, 2001: 106). Bilateral relations improved gradually 
since then. In April and May, high level American officials such as Clinton, Christopher 
and Anthony Lake, the National Security Adviser, made conciliatory and reassuring 
speeches on several occasions, and made gestures such as lifting some military technology 
export limitations on China (Su, 1998: 752). During the “strat rap” visit of Lake from July 
6 to 10, Lake assured Chinese leaders that U.S. military presence was not to contain China, 
that the United States “wants China to be part of the system governing the world in the 21st 
century”, and “wants China to help design that system”. And for the first time, a proposal 
of exchange of state visit of the two Presidents was extended (Mann, 1998: 343). After 
Lake’s event, bilateral relations had seen major improvements, especially after the 
exchange of state visits of the two presidents in 1997 and 1998. 
However, the repercussions of the crisis had far from subsiding. From a hindsight 
review, what happened in the next several years after the crisis was just the rehearsal of the 
challenges that the bilateral relations is faced today. Despite Clinton administration’s 
reassuring attitude towards China, the promise of “three nos” regarding Taiwan, and the 
fact that engagement finally had their way in late 1990’s, the “China threat” theory was 
developing in both official and unofficial circles and became an insidious undercurrent. 
The supporters of this theories included conservatives in the Republican Party and Human 
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Rights fighters in the Democratic party. According to them, China’s threat came from every 
aspect. Economically, large amount U.S. trade deficit to China increased the latter’s foreign 
reserve and thus enormously enhanced China’s economic power. Militarily, China’s 
military expenditure had been on increase since the end of the Cold War, worse still, its 
military expenditure had been largely non-transparent. Allegedly, China had also export 
dangerous arms to “rogue states” such as Iran and Iraq, which was considered a threaten to 
the international non-proliferation regime. Strategically, China was considered to intend to 
replace the United States as the hegemony in Asia. Some conservatives even regarded that 
China, with an authoritarian regime, totalitarian society and nationalist ideology, had a 
potential of becoming a Nazi regime like Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany, which 
would be a threat to democracies (Sieff, 1997: A 19; for the contents of this paragraph, see 
Tao, 2004, Vol. III: 282-297).   
The immediate product of this undercurrent was the Cox Report conducted by the 
House’s Cox Commission. The report, relying on untenable resources, accused China of 
stealing, spying on American nuclear and other military technology or acquiring other 
advanced technology easily due to Washington’s loose technology transfer regulations. The 
final report was partially made public by the House, the report accused Chinese scholars, 
students and companies as a part of China’s spying net (Kan, 1999). Such accusations 
became a good sale for popular press and made good public exposure. These accusations 
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led to a witch-hunting sequences such as limitations on the transfer of advanced 
technologies, such as computer and missile technologies to China, and arbitrary detainment 
of Li Wenhe, an allegedly Chinese spy. Although such witch-hunting activities did not last 
long, the undercurrent has awaited other opportunities to erupt. 
George W. Bush administration was influenced by such undercurrents, and it labeled 
China as “strategic competitor” both during the campaign and after assuming office (see, 
Rice, 2000: 57; Quadrennial Defense Review, cited as QDR hereinafter, Sept. 30, 2001). 
Although the Great Middle East War distracted Bush administration from dealing with 
China and it made similar promises on Taiwan with his predecessor, it dealt with China rise 
in another way, that is balance against China’s influence in Asia by cultivating relations 
with China’s neighbors (see Pang, 2019: 33-5). During Bush’s eight years in office, he 
enhanced U.S.-Japanese relations, and encouraged Japan to get rid of its defensive military 
traditions. He also strove to improve U.S.-India relations and U.S.-Indonesia relations, 
which suffered setbacks during Clinton administration. U.S.-Vietnam relations and U.S.-
Australia military cooperation was also enhanced in Bush’s term. The basic line of Bush’s 
China policy was “Don’t Push China Down, Raise Others Up” (Tellis, 2013: 112-3). The 
Obama administration had largely inherited this strategy by adopting the 
Pivot/Rebalancing strategy which allocated more resources to support Asian allies and 
partners. 
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South China Sea Crisis, 2012-2016 
The SCS had not flashed out as a major sparkling point in world politics until 
Washington adopted the Pivot/Rebalancing strategy. After the pronouncement of the 
United States’ back in Asia, however, conflicts started to flash out. 
After the end of Cold War, apart from several small incidents such as the 1995 
Mischief incident and non-violent frictions, SCS was not a spotlight in Asia international 
politics until the issue was taken up by senior U.S. officials. ASEAN states that have 
maritime disputes with China, such as Vietnam and Philippines, and to a lesser extent, 
Brunei and Indonesia, having sensed Washington’s intention to further balance against 
Chinese influence in the region. They wasted no time in turning the great power 
competition to their own interests. 
In 2008, U.S. Minister of Defense Robert Gates delivered a speech during the Shangri-
La Security Dialogue in Singapore which has been held annually since 2002. During the 
speech, Gates urged “the maintenance of a calm and non-assertive environment in which 
contending claims may be discussed and, if possible, resolved”, and that “(a)ll of us in Asia 
must ensure that our actions are not seen as pressure tactics, even when they coexist beside 
outward displays of cooperation”. In addition, he emphasized principle of strategic access, 
freedom of commerce and navigation, and “freedom from domination by any hegemonic 
force or coalition” in the region (Gates, 2008: 99-100). This was the first time that senior 
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U.S. officials took up the issue of SCS and freedom of navigation (FON, see Hayton, 2014: 
189). After the change of administration, Obama administration was more interests in 
cultivating Southeast Asia states to balance against China. In her February trip to Asia 
states, Secretary of States Hillary Clinton announced Washington’s interests in signing the 
ASEAN Treaty on Amity and Cooperation, which was done in July. Regional players easily 
detected Washington’s interests in balancing against China’s influence in East Asia.  
Apart from talks, Washington also doubled down its presence in SCS. In March 2009, 
the first bilateral confrontation in the SCS since 2002 took place when Chinese PLAN 
seized USNS Bowditch, an unmanned U.S. underwater vehicle. USNS Impeccable, an 
unarmed surveillance ship, entered Chinese EEZ to spy on China’s Yulin ballistic 
submarine base. Five Chinese vessels intercepted Impeccable 75 miles south of Hainan 
Island and made a failed attempt at cutting the cable of the ship. After a short confrontation, 
Chinese vessels allowed Impeccable to withdraw safely. When Impeccable was escorted 
by U.S. destroyer to continue its operation, PLAN did not escalate the situation. After the 
incident, both governments, based on different interpretations, accused the other of 
violation of maritime international law (see Green et al., 2017: 52–65).  
On the other hand, as the deadline of submission of information on Outer limits of the 
continental shelf, which was due on May 13, 2009 drawing near, claimants of SCS began 
to submit their claims. Vietnam and Malaysia submitted their joint case on May 6. As a 
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response, China submitted its own case on the next day, which included Nine-Dash Line 
claims for the first time. But such claims were congruent with China’s past claims (see 
Swaine and Fravel, 2011: 3). 
Encouraged by Washington’s interests in balancing against China, Vietnam and 
Philippines started to make efforts to internationalize the SCS disputes so as to exert 
pressure on China. In November 2009, Vietnamese Foreign Ministry hosted a large 
international academic conference on the issue of SCS. The United States was also willing 
to cooperate with Hanoi and Manila. The Obama administration termed the courting of 
Southeast Asia (vis-a-vis Northeast Asia) as a “Rebalance within the Rebalance” (see 
Parameswaran, 2020: 112-3). During the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in October 2010, 
Clinton repeated the tone of Gates in 2008, and for the first time, the SCS disputes was 
mentioned in ARF. Washington and Hanoi also implied or called for ASEAN unity to stand 
up against China in SCS disputes (Hayton, 2014: 191-2).  
After the official announcement of America’s “Pivot to Asia” in November 2011 
(Clinton, 2011: 57, 63), Hanoi and Manila became much more emboldened, they became 
more provocative and assertive in dealing with China, and China, boasting of its newly 
acquired maritime capabilities, showed similar assertiveness in response. On April 8, 2012, 
China and Philippine escalated a maritime dispute around Huangyan Island (Scarborough 
Shoal) in the Zhongsha Island Groups to a one-month standoff. For a long time, there had 
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never been serious confrontation between the two states in the surrounding area, although 
cases of arrest and detainment of other states’ fishermen largely abound. This time, 
however, Philippine Navy attempted to arrest eight Chinese fishing boats that were 
operating in the lagoon of Huangyan Island and dispatched BRP Gregorio del Pilar, its 
biggest warship. This activity had special symbolic meanings. Philippine soldiers boarded 
upon the Chinese fishing ships and started investigation. Moreover, according to Chinese 
media, Filipino Foreign Ministry publicized photos of Filipino soldiers held Chinese 
fishermen at gunpoint (NetEase, Apr. 11, 2012), which was highly provocative. Later, 
Filipino soldiers boarded again to arrest Chinese fishermen and confiscate the ships. At this 
juncture, Beijing sent two paramilitary Chinese Marine Surveillance (CMS) ships to stop 
the Philippine operation. Although the situation shortly de-escalated with Philippine 
dispatching coastguard ships in place of the navy frigate on April 12 and negotiation ensued, 
no result came out of the negotiation, which led to a one-month standoff. Manila, wishful 
of Washington intervention, showed little interests in accommodation despite Beijing’s 
unilateral overture of de-escalation from April 20 to 23, in which it withdrew two out of 
the three warships from the area (Green et al., 2017: 107–108). 
The stand-off was dangerous since it directly included China, and a U.S. ally which 
was eager to entangle Washington in the confrontation. Nevertheless, despite Philippine’s 
call for assistance from ASEAN and the United States, they offered very limited help. In 
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mid-April, Manila and Washington conducted annual Balikatan military exercises. 
However, Washington, to avoid further antagonizing Beijing, made unilateral changes to 
the exercise (Ibid: 103-4). Although Washington and Manila held first-ever “2+2” meetings, 
during which Washington repeated the principles stated by Gates and Clinton in 2008 and 
2011, and promised to help Manila to build a “minimum credible defense posture through 
robust cooperative security assistance programs”, Washington kept a vague attitude on the 
Huangyan/Scarborough disputes. It reiterated its neutrality on the question of sovereignty 
of SCS, refused to include the Huangyan/Scarborough disputes under the Mutual Defense 
Treaty (Apr. 30, 2012, Joint Statement of the United States-Philippines Ministerial 
Dialogue; Clinton, Apr. 30, 2012). Washington officials also showed frustration towards 
the provocative way that Manila handled the Huangyan/Scarborough standoff. 
Starting from late May, Manila began to seek ease of the situation, probably partially 
due to China’s economic pressure on Filipino exports, such as banana, pineapples and 
papaya. With a typhoon approaching, Philippine left the disputed island/shoal on June 15, 
leaving China de facto control of the island/shoal.17 Manila unwillingly admitted China’s 
de facto control, though not giving up tackling the issue by other means such as 
international arbitration. 
 
17 Manila accused China of violation of promise of mutual, simultaneous withdraw, which was 
refuted by Beijing, see Foreign Ministry of China, June 18, 2012, http://www.gov.cn/xwfb/2012-
06/18/content_2163968.htm. 
 
  542 
Those encouraged by Washington’s Pivot were not only secondary players such as 
Philippine and Vietnam, conservative Japanese politicians wasted no time in taking 
advantage of the opportunity. In 2010, the first ever severe confrontation between China 
and Japan around Senkaku/Diaoyu Island as a Chinese trawler collided with Japanese 
patrol boats from Japanese Coast Guard. Afterwards, Beijing had routinely dispatched 
coast guard vessels around the island group to assert sovereignty claims, which was 
regarded as aggressive by Tokyo. In mid-April 2012, right-wing Tokyo governor Shintaro 
Ishihara announced the intention to purchase the island groups from Kurihara family during 
a speech in Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C.. Allegedly, to avoid Ishihara’s further 
disruption of Sino-Japanese relations, Japanese central government announced decision of 
nationalization of the island groups in July. The nationalization of the island group was met 
with an eruption of anti-Japanese feeling in China, which led to national-wide 
demonstrations (some led to small riots) and boycott of Japanese goods. Beijing felt forced 
to react given its frustration that Japan had broken the tacit agreement of shelving the 
disputes which was made in 1972 when the bilateral relations was normalized. Accordingly, 
Beijing increased the frequency of dispatch of paramilitary vessels to patrol into the Japan-
claimed contiguous zone or territorial sea near Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Since Japan’s 
“nationalization”, China had normalized such patrol to sustain its claims of sovereignty. 
Such patrol was quite rare before the incident. In response, Japan had also deployed half 
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of its coastguards in the area. The tension of bilateral relations had not been relatively 
relieved until 2014.  
During the crisis, despite the displeasure of Tokyo’s handling of the crisis, especially 
its underestimation of Beijing’s reaction of the nationalization of the island groups despite 
the warn of Washington (Oshima, 2014, cite in Green et al., 2017: 141) and Washington’s 
insistence that it did not take side regarding to the question of sovereignty, Washington 
gave substantial support to Japan’s stance in this dispute. Senior U.S. officials, such as 
Clinton, and Secretary of Defense, Leon E. Panetta, had reaffirmed that the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were covered by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 
on different occasions. Obama, reaffirming the same policy in April 2014, became the first 
sitting president to do so (Joint Press Conference with President Obama and Prime Minister 
Abe of Japan, Apr. 24, 2014). 
However, compared with the SCS disputes, the East China Sea (ECS) disputes were 
less explosive, since both sides remained restrained despite their symbolic patrols. 
Moreover, Washington’s intervention in SCS was much more direct, which renders the 
situation more complex and combustible. 
America’s close-in reconnaissance had been a major issue since 1989. After U.S. 
increased the intensity of such operation in late 2000, China level-up its disruption efforts, 
which led to the EP-3 Incident in 2001. With the increase of tension in the bilateral relations 
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since Washington’s strategic pivot and the booming of Chinese military capability, Beijing 
had become less tolerant of Washington’s air and naval close-in surveillance and 
reconnaissance operations along Chinese coast, especially in SCS. Despite Beijing’s 
complaint and warning, Washington insisted on its right of such operations, on excuse of 
protection of FON. Strategically, such operations were essential for Washington’s strategy 
of access, which is essential for the maintenance of America’s global predominance. The 
result is the increase of air and maritime encounters of the two powers in the SCS. Before 
America’s formal announcement of Pivot, such encounters were relatively few. The most 
famous ones were 2001 EP-3 Incident and 2009 Impeccable Incident. However, the 
frequency of encounters of such kind had rapidly grown after America’s Pivot. Between 
2014 and 2018, there were 18 times of such encounters, among these encounters, the most 
serious maritime encounters took place in 2014 and 2016.  
On August 19, 2014, a PLA J-11B fighter conducted a “top gun style” maneuver over 
a U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon anti-submarine warfare patrol plane, which was conduction 
close-in reconnaissance operation 135 miles east of Hainan Island, in an attempt to 
intercept it, which brought the fighter within 45 feet of the P-8 plane. Moreover, the J-11B 
also exposed the weapons loaded on its belly in a nose-passing maneuver at a 90-degree 
angle in front of the P-8 (see Washington Post, Aug. 23, 2014). Washington lodged a 
diplomatic protest. China, on the other hand, urged the United States to reduce and finally 
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stop close-in reconnaissance in China’s proximity (Xinhua, Aug. 27, 2014). Despite the 
public mutual accusation, the two sides had promptly set up dialogues since early 
September, and agreements on air and maritime encounters was reached in November 2014 
and September 2015. 
However, these agreements did not prevent dangerous encounters in the following 
years. On December 15, 2016, PLAN seized an unmanned underwater glider deployed by 
USNS Bowditch- an oceanographic surveillance ship, whose operations had been protested 
by Indian, South Korea and Chinese government in early 2000’s. Bowditch was regarded 
by Beijing as a spying ship collecting intelligence of submarine activities of China, and 
had several encounters with Chinese forces from 2001 to 2003 (in 2003, it was bumped 
and damaged by a Chinese fishing boat, see Smith, 2014: 166). On December 15, the 
Bowditch-deployed drone was conducting surveillance operation about 60 miles off the 
southeast of Huangyan Islands (50 miles northeast of the Subic Bay), a sensitive area where 
U.S. frequently conducted close-in reconnaissance operations, when a small Type 922 
rescue and salvage ship from the PLAN seized the drone blatantly in front of the soldiers 
on Bowditch, despite their radio request of return (The Guardian, Dec. 16, 2016). Beijing’s 
unprecedented activity was highly assertive and provocative, to which Washington 
delivered strong protests. However, Washington did not escalate the situation before 
Beijing returned the drone.  
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However, the most severe confrontation between the Washington and Beijing in SCS 
took place in June and July 2016. 
To show support for Philippine’s case and as a coercive message against Beijing ahead 
of Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague's ruling on territorial disputes in SCS, the 
United States, “in a rare move” (Washington Post, Jun. 20, 2016), deployed two carrier 
strike groups (CSG)-USS John C. Stennis and USS Ronald Reagan-to conduct military 
training and drill in Philippine Sea in the proximity of SCS at such a sensitive time (such 
operations were conducted in 2012 and 2014, however, the time chosen in these two years 
was less sensitive). Although USS John C. Stennis left the area in late June, USS Ronald 
Reagan stayed around Philippines until early July 20’s. Beijing displayed no diffidence to 
Washington’s muscle-flexing. From July 5 to 11 (one day before the ruling on July 12), 
China conducted a campaign-level counter-drill in the waters of Nansha Islands (Spratly 
Islands) in SCS with hundreds of warships, among which were China’s most advanced 
warships from all the three naval fleets. Beijing’s move showed Beijing’s resolve to 
confront Washington in SCS (Global Times, July 10, 2016). During China’s military 
exercise, USS Ronald Reagan had been patrolling in the Philippine Sea, while left two 
destroyers in the SCS (see Southfront, Jul. 8, 15, 22, 2016). It was reported by China 
Central Television (CCTV) that tens of ballistic missiles were deployed in readiness for 
launch (Sina News, 2017, some sources revealed that these missiles included anti-ship 
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ballistic missile DF-21D and intermediate ballistic missile). Thus, the two sides was 
involved in a dangerous de facto military confrontation.  
However, after Hague ruling against China’s claims, the situation surprisingly de-
escalated. The newly elected Philippine President, Rodrigo Duterte, eagerly sought to ease 
the tensions with China upon taking office on June 30. Duterte said that he would not “taunt 
or flaunt” the Chinese over the ruling victory and he was ready for talk (NYT, Jul. 15, 2016: 
A3). U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson paid visited to China starting 
from July 17. Although little agreement and compromise was reached, Richardson visited 
North Sea Fleet, Chinese Navy’s submarine academy and toured the aircraft carrier 
Liaoning, which was a show of confidence building and ease of the tension in SCS (USNI 
News, July 18, 2016). At about the same time, China conducted another military exercise 
for three days from July 19 to 21, the second time in one month, to show its opposition of 
the Hague ruling. However, compared with the former one, the three-day exercise of this 
time was of a much lower scale, much shorter and much more restrained. With USS Ronald 
Reagan returning to its home port at Yokosuka, Japan on July 26, the confrontation came 
to an end. 
Other interregional Disputes in this Period 
Apart from Taiwan, SCS and ECS, another regional hot spot that has potential to 
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involve the two powers is North Korea. However, compared with the Cold War era, the 
possibility of the two powers fight for North Korea has become much lower. 
Although North Korea tested nuclear weapons several times (once in 2006, 2009, 
2013 and 2017, and twice in 2016), and tested long and short ranged missiles frequently in 
this period, which had been severely destabilizing, its threat to the United States and its 
allies in the region had declined over time since the end of the Cold War. Scholars and 
observers tend to reach consensus on that despite Pyongyang’s rhetoric, it had little 
interests in launch a unification offensive on the south, whose military expenditure 
exceeded the amount of North Korea’s entire GDP (Abrahamian, 2017), and that North 
Korea leaders are rational actors thus they are deterrable (Ibid, see also Cha and Kang, 
2003, passim). On the other hand, Beijing is irritated and frustrated by Pyongyang’s 
destabilizing activities in the region, and tried to restrain Pyongyang by exerting pressures, 
cooperation with other regional actors and Washington (for an overview of the bilateral 
relations, see Kim, 2017). Although Washington and Beijing have major disagreements 
regarding to how to keep Pyongyang in line, they share the basic objectives such as 
denuclearization and stability on the Peninsula. 
To sum up, despite the severe tensions, crisis and increasingly fierce contest for 
regional influence in East Asia between the two powers, all crises have been handled in 
peaceful and cooperative manner, all the face-to-face confrontations have been short-living, 
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and the bilateral relations have generally remained stable in this period. 
Existing Explanations of the Absence of Severe Bilateral Conflict in this Period 
The existing explanations for the absence of severe conflict includes liberal theories 
such as interdependence and integration though international regime and realist theories 
such as unipolarity and soft-balancing. 
Liberal theories argue that as China become entangled in the global trade and 
economic system, it become economically dependent with the United States, and vice versa. 
The two economies are also engines of global economy. The high level of interdependence 
between the two powers makes a show-down between the two powers prohibitively costly. 
The very fact that two powers are in a state of mutual assured economic destruction makes 
even a severe confrontation between the two highly disastrous not only for them but also 
for the world in a whole (Dobbins et al., 2011: 8-9). China has also become the one of the 
top holders of American treasury securities, and most of its foreign reserves are U.S. dollars, 
which also makes each one the hostage of the other in financial terms. In addition, the 
liberal and open global order gives China an opportunity to fulfill its ambition within the 
system, rather than overturn it (Ikenberry, 2008). China has become more integrated into 
the global system through taking part in a wide range of international regimes. China has 
strong status quo orientations in general despite its revisionist ambitions regarding Taiwan 
(Johnston, 2003) and SCS. China’s new assertiveness has been overestimated due to 
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narrowing of public discourse and discursive bandwagoning (Johnston, 2013). Even a 
power transition takes place between the United States and China, China’s status quo 
inclinations might reduce the possibility of a disastrous war. 
Realist theorists, however, argued that China’s material capability still lags far behind 
that of the United States, that the world was still more of a unipolar character one rather 
than a multipolar one, which gives China little interest and wherewithal to challenge or 
balance against the United States (Zhu, 2008; Ikenberry, et al., 2009; Beckley, 2011). 
Particularly, in terms of innovative power, which is essential in contemporary international 
contest, China is still far behind from the United States (Rapkin and Thompson, 2013: 65). 
When the two powers find their interests diverge, China would opt for “soft balancing” 
rather than hard balancing and avoid provoke the United States (Pape, 2005). When China 
sought to assert its right with regard to Taiwan and SCS, it would also be cautious and 
avoid crossing the red line of the United States. In addition, China’s security threat to the 
United States is limited in continental East Asia. Even it becomes the hegemon in that 
region, it will not tip the balance of power and pose a geopolitical threat equivalent to that 
pose by Soviet Union, which stands in the center of Eurasia. In this sense, the bilateral 
relations is likely to keep a peaceful track (Art, 2008: 271-3).  
Apart from these explanations, a more instinctive explanations of why the bilateral 
relations will not escalate to a firing war is the fact that the two powers are both nuclear 
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powers and wars of nuclear powers are rare (only two took place: the Sino-Soviet border 
clash of 1969, when China’s nuclear power was still at a fledgling stage, and the 1999 
Indian-Pakistani clash of Kargil), and there have never been large scale wars of nuclear 
powers. With the modernization of Chinese nuclear retaliation capability since mid 1990’s, 
China has developed (or decision makers on both sides believe that China has developed) 
capability of assured retaliation against the United States (see, for example, Kristensen and 
Norris, 2015), together with its limited ambiguity on no-first-use, China makes it possible 
to increase crisis instability to deter the United States from escalating crisis arise between 
the two powers on stakes not high enough to consider nuclear options (Cunningham and 
Fravel, 2015: 35-7). 
The alternative explanation offered in this chapter is that in interregional crisis, 
regional and interregional balance of power, and geographical distance matter. In 
interregional crises between the PRC and the United States, the PRC, as an Asian power, 
was generally more willing and resolved to assert its interests in the region than the other 
outside power. However, with the gap between PRC’s material capability and that of other 
East Asian states widened, it feels that its security faces no vital threat in the region, despite 
the fact that its security environment had worsened gradually in this period. As a result, 
although PRC had become more assertive as a response to other regional actors’ 
opportunist behavior encouraged by American policies, and is trying to turn the military 
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balance vis-à-vis the United States to its favor, it has little incentive to push it too hard (a 
strategy of “limited predation”, see Shifrinson, 2019: 73-4). On the other hand, with the 
material capability between the two powers becoming more balanced (in relative terms, the 
United States has a large margin over PRC regarding to material capabilities), the less 
concerned party-the United States-also had little interests to be involved in a dangerous 
confrontation with a more determined power in East Asia. This was especially true when 
Washington was preoccupied with the precarious and complicated situations in other part 
of the world such as the Middle East. Although local states tried to entangle the United 
States into their conflicts with China, the United States did not intend to push too hard on 
China for the interests of these states. 
Regional and Interregional Power Balance 
In this period, the power gap between China and the United States had narrowed. As 
a result, the topic of Sino-American power shift or power transition has been a hot topic 
ever since the start of the new century. Despite the fact that the power gap between the two 
powers is still large even in 2020, China has become the only power that has the potential 
of overtaking the United States in material capabilities in the near future. And compared 
with the material capability of China during the Cold War, China’s material capability in 
this period is of a different scale and magnitude. China’s rise is quite meteoric that even 
within this period, the material capability of China in 2016 is of a different scale compared 
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with that in 1995. 
 On the other side, the gap between material capability of China and that of other 
regional actors in East Asia has widened in this period. China has not only widened the gap 
with secondary regional actors such as Vietnam and Philippines, but also with other major 
powers in the region, such as Russia and Japan. Of course, China still lags behind Japan in 
terms of innovative power and soft power, while lags behind Russia in terms of military 
power. However, there is little doubt that in terms of overall material capability, China has 
widened the gap between itself and both the two major powers in this period. 
United States global advantage and China’s rapidly increasing material capability 
make the power distribution of U.S.-East Asia a bilateral balanced one. 
 
Figure 5: NMC Indicators of the United States, China, Japan, USSR/Russia, and tavip18 
countries, 1955-2012 
 
18 Tavip in Figure 5 refers to a the initials of group of states and regions in East Asia which have 
territorial disputes or strategic issues with mainland China, including Taiwan region, Australia, 
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According to COW data, the year 1995 was a dividing line, since in this year, the 
Comprehensive Index of National Capability (CINC) score of China has already surpassed 
that of the United States, and the gap has been widening for the whole period, except for 
the year 2002. The CINC gap between China and Japan and Russia has also widened in 
this period. Moreover, China’s CINC is still growing in considerable speed, while that of 
the other three powers are slowly declining. 
The COW data, though has its advantage in assessing CINC score of powers in the 
19th and early 20th Century (except for pre-modern states with large population), is not quite 
reliable to assess post-WWII era, when science and technology had rendered population, 
iron and steel production less relevant to material capability of a state. But it still offers a 
clue of the rapid development of Chinese material capability. 
However, other data also indicate that the material capability gap between the United 
States and China has become more balanced in this period, while that between China and 
other regional players in East Asia has widened. 
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Figure 6: Real GDP (1995-2011) and Nominal GDP ( 2000-2015) of main players in East Asia,19 
in millions of dollars  
Figure 6 portraits real and nominal GDP change among the four powers. In real terms, 
China’s GDP has surpassed that of Japan in as early as mid 1990’s, and the gap between 
the United States and China has been shrinking substantially over the period. This means 
the industrial production power of China has grown substantially during this period, 
narrowing the gap with the United States and widening the gap with other major regional 
players such as Japan and Russia. In terms of real GDP, the year 1995 was also a cutpoint: 
in this year China’s real GDP surpassed that of Japan and became the leading economy in 
East Asia. China’s real GDP as a percent of that of the United States grew from 13 percent 
in 1961, to 19 percent in 1977, to 39 percent in 1995, and to 82 percent in 2011. The sum 
of real GDP of other potential regional foes of mainland China (Tavip countries) as a 
percent of real GDP of China declined from 107 percent of that of China in 1961, to 79 
percent in 1977, to 56 percent in 1995, and to 29 percent in 2011. The disassembly of Soviet 
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Union had substantially boosted the relative strength of China in the region. The sum of 
real GDP of Russia, Japan and tavip countries as a percent of real GDP of China declined 
from 470 percent in 1977, to 204 percent in 1995 to 107 in 2008 and 88 percent in 2011. 
The gap is still widening. The figures of GDP in PPP terms is similar to figures in real GDP. 
In form of GDP PPP data, China’s GDP in 1995 is 29 percent of that of the United States, 
that figure rose to 51 percent in 2005, 82 percent in 2010 and 100 percent in 2016 (World 
Bank, 2019). Even in terms of nominal GDP, which relatively underestimated the economic 
shift due to price difference between China and the United States, China’s GDP as a 
percentage of that the United States still increased from 12 percent in 2000 to 61 percent 
in 2015. 
 
Figure 7: Military Expenditures of Main Regional Players, 1955-2016 (in thousands of dollars)20 
 
20 For data of 1955-2012, see COW data, version 5.0, for data of 2013-2016, see SIPRI 2020. Data 
of Vietnam from 1955-1960, 1974-1983, 1986 are approximated from COW data, that of 2013-
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As of military capability, the gradual shift from 1955 to 2016 is similar with that in 
economic terms. China’s regional military posture has been enhancing substantially since 
the end of Cold War, especially since the turn of century. Again, the disassembly of Soviet 
Union played an important role in this process. In the era of Cold War, given the poor 
economic strength of China, China’s military expenditure had not seen major difference 
from that of Japan, a military castrated country and tavip states, which were secondary 
players. The military expenditure of other regional players, including Russia, Japan and 
tavip states as a percent of China was 573 percent in 1961, the figure was reduced to 495 
percent in 1977. Since the 1980’s, due to China’s cut of military expenditure, the figure 
had increased again to a startling 6200 percent in 1988. In 1988 and 1989 in particular, 
China’s military expenditure was only a quarter of that of Japan. However, since 1990, 
Chinese military expenditure increased steadily. The figure was reduced to 487 in 1995, 
315 in 2005 and 80 in 2016. In 2013, China’s military expenditure has already surpassed 
the sum of Russia, Japan and tivap states. In this period, the military expenditure gap 
between China and the United States also shrank. China’s military expenditure as a share 
of the military expenditure of the United States was just 17 percent in 1961, 2 percent in 
1987. That figure increased to 25 percent in 2013 and 34 percent in 2016. The gap is still 
shrinking. And given China’s increasing economic strength and low percentage of military 
expenditure in GDP, it could raise its military expenditure rapidly if it need. 
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Figure 8: Approximate Displacement of Selected Launched Naval Vessels, 2000-201721  
Sources from: IISS, 2017, p. 26 
China has rapidly upgraded its naval vessels and equipment since 2000. Although 
there seemed to be no major change in total number of Chinese naval vessels, China had 
displaced its outdated and light warships by newer, heavier and more advanced generations 
of warships in substantial quantity. Figure 8 reveals how China’s speed of warship building 
has gradually surpassed that of the United States in the period at study. Although Chinese 
navy is still several decades behind that of the United States, Chinese warship building in 
this period has tipped the naval balance between the two powers at least in the waters close 
to China’s coasts. The balance is further tilted in China’s advantage given American navy’s 
global distraction and China’s regional focus. On the other hand, China’s warship 
production has outstripped that of other regional actors in this period, which has improved 
China’s naval strength vis-à-vis other regional players. Due to want of attention in naval 
 
21 Source from The Military Balance 2018, p. 26, IISS report.  
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forces, China’s naval strength had been lagged behind other regional actors, especially 
Japan. Thanks to China’s rapid naval build-up, this situation has been altering in China’s 
favor in this period. 
China has enhanced its Anti-Access and Area-Denial capabilities during this period 
by strengthen its anti-ship missile capability and naval strength. Improvements to the range 
and capability of Chinese cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, new generations of aircrafts 
and submarines, and over-the-horizon intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(OTHISR) capabilities have dramatically endangered the survivability of U.S. forward air 
bases and aircraft carrier operations within at least 1,000 miles from China’s coast. Chinese 
cyber capability which has been in development has put U.S. logistical efficiency in danger. 
China has increased the survivability of its nuclear weapons and thus its deterrence power 
against the United States (see Heginbotham et al., 2015: xix–xxxii, 21). The military 
balance has gradually shifted from U.S. superiority to a more balanced scorecard in East 
Asia. By the end of the period, the military balance has turned against the United States in 
East Asia in many fields. 
There is little doubt that in terms of sophistication and advancement of weapon 
systems, China was still at least several decades behind the United States. And in terms of 
key technology, China was still far behind the United States. Nevertheless, in this period, 
the material capability gap between China the United States has been substantially reduced 
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that the material capability between the two powers has never been so balanced since the 
late 19th Century, and the gap between China’s material capability and that of other major 
powers, and with other main regional players (Russia, Japan, and tivap states) has never 
been so wide since about the same time. 
Chinese Decision Making: Assertive but Cautious 
Chinese behavior during crisis in this period has been growing assertive gradually 
over time in this period, as all rising powers assuming regional advantage and gaining 
interregional balance vis-à-vis a major concerned outside power. However, such 
assertiveness was always in response to assertive behaviors of other regional actors. 
Relying on United States military presence in East Asia, a few local actors have been 
attempting to assert their interests at the cost of China. With growing capability of 
protecting its national interests, China no longer restrain itself from reacting assertively to 
these provocations, which led to crises that raised United States’ concerns and triggered its 
reactions, turning regional crises into interregional ones. However, to avoid showdown 
with the United States, which remained global predominant position, China’s reactions has 
still been relatively restrained. China avoided direct use of military forces against its 
neighbors during the interregional crisis in this period, despite occasional show of force. 
China’s crisis behavior in the period could be termed restrained reactive assertiveness, 
which contributed to the avoidance to war. 
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Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1995–6 
The Taiwan question is the single most sensitive in the bilateral relations. Cornell 
University’s reception of Lee and Lee’s speech was considered by Beijing of having 
crossed the red line and their behavior must be met with counter-measures. 
Beijing’s resolve to prevent Taipei from official separation can never be 
underestimated. Taiwan’s geographical proximity, strategical importance and its historical 
relations with the mainland all make its unification to the mainland enormously important 
to Beijing. Washington’s deployment of the 7th Fleet was one of the reasons that Beijing 
decided to partake in the Korea War. Most of the bilateral crisis during the Cold War were 
related to Taiwan. Ultimate national unification was one of the most important goals on 
which the Party’s legitimacy to some extent rests. Strategically, Taiwan’s close relations 
with potential adversaries of China was a big threat to the mainland given its proximity to 
the mainland. Taiwan was also an essential part on the first island chain, the waters within 
which the PLA had striven to exert control.  
Chinese leaders made it clear that it would not give up military means of unification 
to deter the splittists, that the splittists and meddling foreign forces threatened the peace, 
stability and development of Asia-Pacific region, which implicated that military means 
might be used if the splittists and foreign forces were to cross the red line (Jiang’s “Eight 
Point” remark, Jan. 30, 1995, in Jiang, 2006, Vol. I: 420-422). Premier Li Peng warned on 
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January 30, 1996 that “our struggle against separatism and Taiwan splittism would never 
cease as long as Taiwan authorities perpetrate splittism. And some leaders of Taiwan 
authorities who perpetrate splittism are to bear all the consequences”. On the next day, the 
PLA Daily published an editorial that stated the PLA was capable of the “sacred task” 
conferred by the Party and the people of preserving national unity (cited from Tang, 2000: 
415-6). PLA Daily and People’s Daily also published a joint editorial later, repeating Li’s 
warnings and asserting that “we are reluctant to say that the consequence of Lee Teng-hui’s 
attempt to perpetrate splittism was clear”, that “we will spare no efforts in preserving 
national unity and we means our words ” (People’s Daily, Mar. 9, 1996: A1).  
Chinese decision makers, civilian as well as military, had reached a consensus that a 
hardline policy should be taken against Taipei and Washington by mid 1995 (Scobell, 2000: 
322-4). Chinese decision makings in 1990’s followed a rule of collective decision making 
through CPC Political Bureau, as in 1950. In early 1990’s, Jiang and Qian led a relative 
soft attitude with regard to Taiwan authorities. China reacted mildly to American arms sales 
to Taiwan in 1992. And Jiang’s “Eight Point” speech was wildly regarded as a soft policy 
which made many senior CCP leaders, especially PLA leaders, disgruntled (Garver, 1997: 
53-62). With Lee’s visit to Cornell, Jiang and Qian’s Taiwan policy was regarded as a 
failure and they were bitterly criticized by other leaders in the Political Bureau in 1996. 
During the Beidaihe Meeting in July 1995, PLA leaders, such as Chi Haotian, Liu Huaqing, 
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Zhang Zhen and Zhang Wannian, had persuaded Jiang and Qian that a hardline approach 
of “literal attack and military deterrence” (wengong wushe see Chen, 2000: 113-4), 
including missile tests to warn Taipei, need to be taken. 
Chinese decision makers talked hard and acted assertively towards Americans, which 
showed their unswerving resolve regarding Taiwan. It was reported by Charles Freeman 
that in October 1995, in a talk with Chinese Central Military Commission officials led by 
Xiong Guangkai, one Chinese official said that the strategic leverage of the United States 
in the 1950’s and 1960’s over the Taiwan question has declined since “we have nuclear 
weapons, too. In the event of a real confrontation we don’t think that the Americans are 
going to ‘give up’ Los Angeles in exchange for Taiwan” (Tucker, 2001: 484). In May and 
August 1995, China conduced two nuclear tests, which might be a signal of resolve to both 
Taipei and Washington. Another two nuclear tests were conducted in June and July 1996. 
Such frequency was rare in over a decade. During a negotiation at the beginning of China’s 
coercive show of force in March 1996, Liu Huaqiu, Deputy Foreign Minister and Director 
of State Department’s Office of the Foreign Affairs, asserted that Taiwan was a part of 
China, that the resolution of the problem “brooks no foreign interference,” and the military 
exercises posed no threat to the United States and was a normal reaction to Lee’s separatist 
activities (Suettinger, 2003: 254). Before the first wave of exercises in 1996, Chinese MFA 
warned against foreign interventions. Li Peng also warned during 1996 exercise that 
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“Chinese government and people will never accept the practice of imposing one country's 
will upon another. History has already proven that there will be no beneficial results by 
threatening use of force against China” (Li’s remarks on Sino-U.S. relations and the Taiwan 
Question during the Press Conference of “Two meetings”, March 16, 1996, People's Daily 
Overseas Edition: A2). The Hong Kong based pro-mainland newspaper, Da Gong Bao, 
echoing Li, reminded Washington of the lessons in Korea and Vietnam (Garver, 1997, 102-
7).  
Beijing’s assertive war games seemed to be correspondent to its hard talks. The 
military exercises and missile tests in 1995 and 1996 was unprecedented in many years in 
terms of the number of forces mobilized, the level of military modernization and the 
sophistication of cooperation between the land, maritime and air forces (Zhang, 2003, Vol. 
II: 395). In the 2006 missile tests, the target areas were twenty-two miles from Taiwan’s 
northeastern coast and thirty-two miles from its southern coast (Garver, 1997: 100-1). The 
two target areas were close to Keelung and Kaohsiung, two most important trading ports 
that were responsible for the seventy percent of total imports and exports of Taiwan. The 
target areas technically bracketed Taiwan, which was highly symbolic and a clear warning. 
The two target areas also reflected risk accepting characteristics of these war games since 
it contains probabilities of misfire and hit on Taiwan. China also acted assertively against 
U.S. intervention. After USS Independence approached the near waters of Taiwan, Jiang 
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made the decision that the missile tests should proceed (Kuhn, 2005: 226-227).22 Thus, 
Beijing proceeded with a second wave of exercises from March 12 until 20 and a third 
wave from 18 to 25, ignoring Washington’s coercive message that USS Independence and 
its battle group was deployed in international waters a few hundred miles of Taiwan on 
March 8 and the deployment of second carrier battle group of USS Nimitz on March 11, as 
well as a inclement weather during the third wave exercises. 
In late June 1950, Truman sent the 7th Fleet to Taiwan, which obstructed China’s 
reunification and irritated Mao and Chinese decision makers. At that time, China had no 
means to counter the United States’ provocative and hostile policy, which severely 
frustrated Chinese decision makers. In making up their mind of intervention of the Korean 
War, the Taiwan problem was a major factor. Some Chinese scholars contended that Mao 
had made up his mind to struggle with the United States since Truman announced the 
deployment of 7th Fleet to Taiwan. However, since there were no other means to punish the 
United States, and the United States had been eating their promise and keeping pushing on 
on the Korean Peninsula, Mao finally decided that Korean, where China enjoyed many 
 
22 Perry and Tyler argued that it was the presence of USS Independence that restrained China’s 
activities. Tyler argues that Beijing had fired fewer than half of missile it had ready to fire. However, 
the USS Independence arrived in the near waters of Taiwan on March 11-12, while the PLA 
continued missile tests for another day or two, and announced completion of missile tests on 15 as 
planned. Besides, Chinese live-fire land-maritime drill started off on the same day, which lasted ten 
days. These facts seem to contradict with their arguments. See Perry and Carter, 1999, p. 99; Tyler, 
2000, p.35. 
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advantages against the United States, was the battlefield to revenge Taiwan, and he 
persuaded other CPC leaders in accepting intervention on the Peninsula. 
In 1995 and 1996, however, with China’s increasing material capability, China had 
already developed military means, such as air and missile strike, to deter Taiwan authorities 
and the United States from over-provocative policies in its near waters , although such 
capability was still limited at that time. Chinese leaders calculated that a show of force and 
determination could deter Taipei and Washington from crossing the red-line. 
Chinese intense military exercises and missile tests, together with hard talks 
demonstrated mainland China’s resolve to halt any hint of Taiwan separation and to resist 
America’s intervention over the Taiwan question, even at the cost of war. Beijing also 
reminded Washington that compared with more than forty years ago, the cost of 
confrontation or conflict with China in 1996 would be prohibitively high even for a 
superpower as the United States, as a result of China’s growth in material capability and 
reduced American power edge over China. 
On the other hand, although Beijing felt Lee’s visit to be provocative and need to react 
assertively to both Taipei and Washington, it by no means regarded it as a major threat to 
the survival of the regime, and given China’s rapid growth in material capability by that 
time, there was no danger of Washington’s further escalation, not to mention if it had any 
intention of attacking Chinese mainland. Chinese decision makers also considered it 
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unreasonable and unnecessary to push too hard on Taiwan authorities. As a result, its 
reactions to Lee’s visit was assertive but cautious. 
China’s objective in the assertive policy was quite limited. One important reason was 
that despite China’s military incompetence vis-a-vis the United States, and the high costs 
of military attacks against Taiwan, with the growth of Chinese material power, Chinese 
decision makers were generally satisfied with Chinese security environment, and were 
confident that the environment would further improved over time. Compared with the 
situation in 1950, China was in a much improved international environment. The 
Communist regime was safe and booming with no major threat. As a result, there was no 
need to over-react (for example, to use real force) to counter unfriendly activities from the 
United States. The central goal of China was no longer regime survival as of 1950, which 
called for resisting imperialism, but economic development, which calls for a peaceful 
environment. Chinese decision makers calculated that many favorable factors in the 
international environment existed, such as a relatively stable neighboring environment, 
China’s growing economic strength, China’s role as permanent member of UNSC and one 
of the five nuclear powers, that for China in 1996, “numbers of opportunities exceeds that 
of challenges”, the China’s international environment was “looser”, and maneuvering room 
larger (Liu, 2006: 7-8). With the favorable international environment, Jiang remarked that 
he was confident that the unification of China would be ultimately realized (Jiang’s remark, 
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Jan. 30, 1995, in Jiang, 2006, Vol. I: 423).  
Apart from such considerations, Chinese decision makers also realized that China was 
still incapable of a unification war, and its military capability was still inferior to the United 
States. This also prevented Chinese decision makers from any risky escalations during the 
crisis. 
With increasing confidence and respect of America’s material capability, especially 
military capability, decision makers in Beijing deemed that apart from warning and 
deterrence activities, over-provocative actions would not pay off and would be unnecessary. 
They adopted a strategy of limited crisis escalation (Chen, 2010: 163). The aim of Chinese 
punishing reaction to Lee’s visit by military drills and missile tests were to remind Taiwan 
and the United States of its resolve over the Taiwan question and halt its perceived trend 
of Washington’s changing Taiwan policy and its inclination of supporting of Taiwan’s final 
separation after the Cold War. For decision makers, Taipei’s separatism and Washington’s 
hegemonism were two sides of the same coin, the former provided an opportunity for the 
latter to utilize and intervene, while the latter encouraged and abetted the former (Garver, 
1997: 14). Beijing also feared that Washington’s approval of Lee’s visit would set a 
precedence for other states such as European states and Japan, and such trend must be 
halted (Wang, 1997: 296–8; Ross, 2006: 92–3, 104). Such concerns was affirmed in autumn 
1995, when Taipei eagerly sought for invitation from Tokyo for Lee to attend the upcoming 
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APEC meeting in Osaka (Ross, 2006: 101).  
Beijing did not have further expansive objectives, such as military attack upon or 
invasion of Taipei. Jiang had made it clear earlier that Beijing would strive for peaceful 
unification, that Chinese people should not fight against Chinese people, that the target of 
mainland’s rejection to giving up the use of force in dealing with Taiwan was to deter 
foreign intervention and separatist forces from Taiwan, rather than the Taiwan people 
(Jiang’s remark, Jan. 30, 1995, in Jiang, 2006, Vol. I: 422). A Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson reiterated this message in August 1, 1995 that what Beijing was going to do 
was just to “make the U.S. realize the importance of U.S.-China relations to prompt it to 
take the right track” (Ross, 2006: 9) and to deter Taipei from further separation activities. 
On January 30, 1996, Premier Li Peng repeated such message (Tang, 2000: 415–6). Even 
hawkish military leaders endorse no intention of an attack or invasion of Taiwan. Their 
logic to adopt military coercion against Taipei was that: “(1) China would have to wage a 
war against Taiwan if the latter declares independence; so (2) military threats would reduce 
the likelihood of a declaration of independence; and finally (3) military threats would make 
a war less likely” (Ji, 1997: 300). To both civilian and military leaders, the war game was 
strictly deterrence in character. 
Accordingly, China’s coercion as a reaction to Lee’s separatist activities and the 
United States’ conniving of it was restrained. During the crisis, the limited deployment of 
 
  570 
mainland forces made it quite clear that the mainland had no intention of attacking or 
invading Taiwan, Quemoy, Matsu or Pescadores. And Chinese decision makers used all 
possible channels to convey the message to American decision makers (Chen, 2010: 164; 
Christopher, 1998: 427). International observers were also aware that China’s coercion was 
more of a political meaning rather than military meaning (Tang, 2000: 447). Given the 
limited objectives, Chinese officials were frustrated to learn later that Washington sent two 
carriers as a coercive signal to Beijing. 
In addition, Beijing became more confident on its deterrence capability than it was in 
1950, and Beijing deemed that no real use of force was needed since both Taipei and 
Washington could be deterred from further hostile activities with a show of Beijing’s 
resolve. Even the violence level of 1954 or 1958 was unnecessary. 
In 1950, Mao attempted to mobilize in Northeastern China to deter U.S. intervention 
the Korean War, and later attempted to deter the U.S. forces from crossing the 38th parallel. 
However, with barely any capable air force, China’s means of deterrence was quite limited, 
and the Washington paid limited attentions to China’s warning signals, given China’s 
negligible military capability at that time. The story was different in 1995 and 1996. In mid 
1990’s, Beijing was still not as capable as Taipei in many fields, not to mention Washington. 
However, China’s large air and submarine forces (though of low quality), missile 
capabilities, nuclear capabilities, together with its moderate amphibious capability, had 
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increased the confidence of Chinese leaders that they could effectively deter Washington 
and Taipei from further splittist activities.  
Beijing’s confidence of its deterrence effectiveness partially came from Taiwan’s 
proximity to mainland China and its distance from the United States. Most Chinese leaders 
in 1995 and 1996 believed that the United States would not risk a showdown with China 
for the sake of Taiwan, which was thousands of miles away from the United States. 
American watchers in China deemed if cross-strait war broke out, Washington would only 
provide indirect support to Taiwan while abstain from direct intervention (Garver, 1997: 
112-4). Despite mainland’s incompetence of subjecting Taiwan and of fighting the United 
States even in its adjacent waters, Taiwan’s proximity to the mainland still gave the 
mainland some advantage. Mainland forces could wreak great havoc to Taiwan in real 
fighting, and it could also coerce Taipei by temporary cutting off its foreign trade, as the 
military exercises did in 1996 (the exercise cut Taiwan off its free navigation through the 
strait for two weeks, see Kuhn, 2005: 226-27). 
With the mainland further strengthened its relative material capability, especially 
military capability, vis-a-vis the United States and Taiwan, the advantage of proximity was 
further enhanced. Development of China’s ballistic and cruise missile capability, air 
defense capability (through development of new surface-to-air missiles, or SAM, systems), 
ISR (intelligence, Surveillance and reconnaissance) capability, and its replacement of its 
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outmoded second- and third-generation aircraft with fourth-generation fighters put U.S. 
bases and surface operation in grave danger in the proximity of mainland China, which 
enormously increased United States’ costs of intervention in a Taiwan Strait scenario 
(Heginbotham et al., 2015: 334-8). 
In addition, Chinese decision makers calculated that the United States would be 
reluctant to fight for Taiwan against China (Garver, 1998: ) and that it was safe to take the 
risk of warning both Taipei and Washington. 
Of course, in 1995 and 1996, mainland China’s military inferiority was also an 
essential factor for its circumspection. While the mainland was capable of deterring both 
Taipei and Washington, it was also deterred by Taiwan’s considerable military capability 
and the overwhelming military capability of the United States. At that time, the military 
system of mainland was largely outmoded. The United States maintained absolute air 
superiority. With poor ISR capability, Beijing was not even capable of targeting American 
vessels beyond visual range (Heginbotham et al., 2015: 333). That’s one of the fundamental 
reasons why the mainland refrained from a more aggressive policy against Taipei and 
Washington’s challenge, such as a war of unification or directly bombardment on Quemoy 
and Matsu like the case of 1958. In 1995 and 1996, despite severe warning, strove to ensure 
that the crisis would be in control. As a result, Beijing intentionally kept air force 
participation in the military exercises in a low level, and amassed military vessels far less 
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than enough to amount a real assault, so as to signal that it had no intention to amount a 
real attack on Taipei (Garver, 1997: 109).  
Relying upon its growing material capability and deterrence effectiveness, Beijing’s 
assertive policies against Taiwan splittism in this period did have a major persuading 
impact on both Washington and Taipei. Despite Washington’s signal of resolve in 
protecting Taiwan region by sending two carriers, China’s assertive warnings and show of 
resolve did affect Washington’s reconsideration of its Taiwan policy. Beijing coerced Taipei 
and Washington into a changing course regarding to their attitude of Taiwan’s separation 
efforts (Ross, 2006). The crisis rang an alert bell to American decision makers of the 
sensitiveness of Taiwan issue and the extremely high cost of a potential mishandling of a 
crisis over the Taiwan question. Consequently, Washington had changed its Taiwan policy 
in the direction of publicly recognizing One China policy and opposing Taiwan Splittism 
for the rest of the period under study. In many respects, China’s cautiously assertive 
behavior and the “stable crisis” (Garver, 1999: 162) in 1995 and 1996 is responsible for the 
relatively stability of the next two decades. 
The South China Sea Disputes, 2010’s 
The South China Sea Disputes in the 2010’s was the latest territorial disputes involved 
essential national interests of both China and the United States. It not only directly involved 
China and U.S. allies in East Asia, but also put the control of Sea Lines of Communication 
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(SLOC) at stake. China showed its resolve regarding its territorial claims and acted more 
assertively against challenges from Philippines and Vietnam in the 2010’s. However, 
Beijing also attempted to keep crisis in control and cautiously avoid further escalation, 
which might get the United States involved in the disputes. The result of these 
considerations was China’s “small stick” diplomacy and reactive assertiveness in dealing 
with SCS territorial disputes. 
China, with its rapidly increasing material capability, started to enhance its naval 
capability, which had been incommensurate with its overall material capability. CPC 
leaders decided that China should build its own “Blue Water Navy”. In 2013, Xi talked on 
several occasions to build a powerful maritime state (Xi, 2013, People’s Daily: A1). 
Western scholars surmised that China started to making efforts to make SCS China’s 
Caribbean (Kaplan, 2014, Chapter II). Chinese decision makers decided to take small risks 
in Scarborough Shoal out of both its resolve to obtain territory that it claims, and its 
confidence that the international backlash would be limited.  
Similar to the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995 and 1996, China was confident of its 
capability of secure national interests and deterrence effectiveness to both the United States 
and other regional actors. A show of force and resolve, rather than direct use of military 
power in a armed conflict, is enough to deter other regional actors from further 
provocations. Although relations with Washington will be strained, the latter’s reaction is 
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expected to be restrained. China’s confidence came from the growth of material capability, 
especially its military, and the consequently narrowing power gap vis-a-vis the United 
States, and the widening gap vis-a-vis other regional actors. Chinese leaders calculate that 
as long as crisis in SCS is kept in control, it is highly unlike that the United States will take 
risks to intervene militarily directly for an issue not important enough. 
For geographical reasons, Chinese leaders calculated that U.S. willingness to confront 
China in the SCS was limited. Beijing had an edge with Washington regarding balance of 
resolve due to its proximity to the disputed features (White, May 22, 2014, the Interpreter). 
After all, the United States “is in Asia, but not of Asia”, it had the option in the future of 
packing up and leaving the area. In addition, the SCS had not been the central strategic 
element in the overall U.S.-China relationship (McDevitt, 2015: 28). The United States 
needs Chinese cooperation in fields such as trade, investment, economic growth, global 
governance, and denuclearization of Iran and North Korea. Although SCS was essential to 
America’s control of global SLOC, its willingness to pick up a fight against a increasingly 
powerful China that was narrowing power gap with the United States for a remote area is 
relatively limited.  
On the other hand, also for geographical reasons, Chinese leaders calculated that 
regional actors would avoid pushing China to hard on the SCS issue. After all, while the 
United- States might withdraw in the future, they will always have to deal with China, a 
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permanent resident power in Asia whose military capability was superior in the region. The 
regional actors, apart from being afraid of China’s superior military capability, with their 
economy heavily and asymmetrically dependent on China, they were also aware of the 
consequences of over-provoking China on the issue of SCS. Although Obama’s 
Pivot/Rebalancing strategy provided regional powers an opportunity to play off the two 
powers against each other, they do not want to choose between the United States and China 
because of their power gap with China and their economic dependence on China (Medeiros, 
2008).  
With these calculations, Chinese policy makers had decided to assert its national 
interests in the SCS disputes in the 2010’s. Chinese decision makers believed that the crisis 
triggered by their assertive activities would not escalate to dangerous level as long as they 
restrained themselves from over-provocative reactions. 
Between 2004 and 2012, counter policies of mainland China regarding SCS had been 
mild and resembled that of Philippines and Vietnam, which included approval of exploring 
oil and gas on the continental shelf of northern SCS, establishing communication stations, 
administrative units and civilian infrastructures on some of the islands, and military 
exercises (see Li, 2017: 224-5). 
However, with the United States announcing its pivot to Asia, regional actors, such as 
Vietnam, Philippines and Japan, uplifted by the signal, were encouraged to further push on 
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their claims in SCS and ECS. Given the proximity of SCS and ECS to Chinese mainland, 
Chinese decision makers were alarmed by the potential threat of U.S. interference in these 
areas. U.S. interference in SCS and ECS will undermine the security of Chinese trade lane, 
as well as Chinese territorial claims. Chinese policy makers decided to warn and deter both 
Washington and other claimants of SCS, especially Philippines and Vietnam. The result 
was China’s assertive reactions to provocations from other regional actors and the United 
States, which led to the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff between China and Philippines, 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island crisis between China and Japan, the 2014 981 crisis between 
China and Vietnam, and the maritime confrontations between China and the United States 
in 2014 and 2016, as discussed in the former sections. Since 2014, China reclaimed more 
than 2000 acres on the features it occupied, much more than the total of other claimants 
had reclaimed (Testimony of David Shear, May 13, 2015). 
The most typical case of Chinese assertiveness in this period is the Huangyan Island 
standoff between China and Philippines in 2012. Seizure of fishermen and properties of 
other claimants in SCS was relatively common, and reactions to such seizure had also been 
relatively mild. During the Huangyan Island standoff, however, authorities dispatched 
paramilitary CMS armed boats to confront Philippine navy directly and seized the feature 
altogether later, the first time that China conducted similar activities in nearly 20 years. 
Chinese Central government authorized the seizure of the feature days later. On April 23, 
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a nuclear submarine was dispatched to SCS. Chinese Minister of Defence, Liang Guanglie 
said the Guangzhou military zone was preparing for an important task (Qi, Apr. 11, 2020, 
Chinatimes). China imposed economic sanctions on Philippine fruits, affecting the 
livelihood of 200,000 Philippine banana farmers and ancillary workers (de Castro, 2016: 
171), to coerce it into submission in early May. At about the same time, several Chinese 
state media also threatened war with Philippines (May 10, 2012, BBC News Chinese). 
Chinese General Luo Yuan commented in a warning tone that “If Manila can’t rein in these 
kids, let’s do the job for them”, suggesting a naval battle with Philippines (Lam, Jul. 1, Wall 
Street Journal). Philippines, failing in courting America’s assistance in pulling its chestnut 
of fire and in courting ASEAN’s support, withdrew from the area on the excuse of the 
approaching of a typhoon (Manila claimed Beijing agreed to leave, which was denied by 
Beijing). Manila reluctantly acknowledged that Beijing was in de facto control of 
Huangyan Island. 
In this period, China was also more proactive to challenge the United States’ close-in 
renaissance and intercept American aircraft and monitor or encircled American warships 
conducting such operations. Although these activities triggered crisis in earlier times, the 
interactions became more professional over time. And the two powers were getting used to 
the others’ actions.  
Generally speaking, China’s reactions in 2010’s were quite assertive compared with 
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its previous actions regarding the SCS disputes. They marked the end of an old era in which 
China had been neglecting its southern neighbor’s encroaching on SCS territories that 
China also claims, and the start of a new era in which Chinese decision makers, with 
growing confidence of Chinese maritime capability, decided to stop conniving its 
neighbors’ provocations, and to openly face up the United States in SCS. Such decision 
was unprecedented, for China, commonly viewed as a land power, started to challenge the 
dominant maritime power in its near seas.  
On the other hand, it was also out of China’s confidence in securing its national 
interests and effectiveness of its deterrence capability, China restrained itself from over-
provoking activities in SCS. As a result, despite the fact that China had become more 
proactive in asserting its interests in SCS, its policy was termed as “reactive assertiveness”, 
“small-stick diplomacy” or “salami-slicing” strategy by scholars or observers, all indicates 
that Chinese decision makers had endorsed low level risk-taking in SCS in this period. 
Since China faced no immediate foreign threat and the trend of power shift favors 
China, Chinese decision makers feel no immediate necessity to solve the SCS disputes with 
opportunist and dramatic measures. With interregional and regional power balance shift in 
China’s favor, Chinese decision makers calculate that in the future, China can solve the 
SCS in a way favorable to China at lower costs. In addition, Chinese decision makers also 
calculated that other regional actors, especially other claimant states around SCS, similarly 
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aware of such interregional and regional trend of power shift, would adopt opportunist 
policies and provoke China and entangle the United States into the disputes before the trend 
turn further unfavorable to them (see for example, Shao, 2011). However, they would also 
avoid direct military clash with China. To deal with the situation, Chinese policy makers 
decided that China need to keep “strategic patience” and avoid over provocative policies. 
When faced with the challenges of other claimant states of SCS, China should warn and 
coerce them and avoid military clash (President Xi Jinping’s word for “strategic patience” 
is “zhanlve dingli”, or strategic concentration, see Xi’s remark, Jan. 28, 2013, Xi, 2018, 
Vol. I: 247). 
Beijing had remained low-key in the SCS disputes for quite a long period since the 
founding of PRC. Apart from two small conflict with Saigon in 1974 and Hanoi in 1988, 
Beijing had shelved policy of armed coercion in SCS until 2012 standoff with Philippines. 
This was largely due to Beijing’s maritime incapability of coercing regional actors. The 
result of Beijing’s inaction was that Southeast Asian states had technically divided up the 
Spratly Islands by the turn of century. In 2000’s Philippine and Vietnamese authorities 
constantly harassed fishermen from mainland China in SCS. In 2000, Philippine authorities 
shot and murdered a Chinese captain in a harassing operation. Manila and Hanoi also 
stepped up their claims of sovereignty by measure such as official visits, installing 
communication systems, establishing administrative units and oil drilling platforms on 
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their occupied islands. Hanoi also attempted to challenge China’s sovereignty over Paracels 
(see Li, 2017: 222; Zhao, 2019: 82). In addition, up to 2015, Vietnam had established 48 
military outposts in SCS. Between 2009 and 2014, Vietnam had reclaimed approximately 
60 acres on its occupied features, making it the most active claimant in terms of both 
outpost upgrades and land reclamation (Testimony of David Shear, May 13, 2015). They 
also tried to internationalize the SCS disputes by drawing the United States, Japan, India 
and Russia in. 
In the 2010’s, China started to pursue a “Blue Water” strategy and assert its territorial 
claims as discussed above. However, the tactic that China adopted in this period was to 
expand its interests to counter disproportionately each of other claimants’ provocations (or 
to “exploit perceived provocations in disputed areas by other countries to take strong 
countermeasures to change the status quo in its favour”. This tactic is termed as “reactive 
assertiveness”, see International Crisis Group, Apr. 8, 2013), deploying paramilitary or 
policing forces rather than military forces to counter other claimants’ provocations 23 
(“small stick diplomacy”, see Holmes, May 21, 2012, the Diplomat; Yoshihara and Holmes, 
2018, Chapter 5), calibrating each such expansion to be too small to amount to a casus belli 
(“salami-slicing tactic”, see Haddick, 2014: 81-2). In addition, Chinese assertiveness also 
showed a risk-aversion characteristics (Haass, 2017) in that when it was met with strong 
 
23 On many occasions, such provocations were provoked by Chinese fishermen’s activities. 
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reactions of other actors, especially the United States, it would retreat. Small stick, salami 
slicing and opportunism ensured that the crisis was kept within limits, while reactive 
assertiveness, if used in proper ways, might have a deterrence effect. All these tactics, while 
promoting Chinese national interests in SCS, contributed to avoid severe military conflicts.  
China’s most assertive activities since Washington’s announcement of Pivot were its 
occupation of Scarborough Shoal, its confrontations with U.S. close reconnaissance, its 
reclamation operations, its building-up of runways, and its deployment of missiles on 
features it occupied in Spratly Islands. However, all these activities could be regarded as 
assertive match-ups, and reactions to Washington’s provocations, or to other claimants’ 
activities but on a much larger scale. 
During the Scarborough Crisis, Beijing’s activities was to counter Manila’s forcible 
capture of Chinese fisherman and civilian vessels by its largest naval warship. In fact, 
Manila’s provocations in the near waters of Scarborough started from late December 2011, 
when it captured five Chinese fishermen. Manila’s provocative activities might have been 
encouraged by United States’ official announcement of Pivot to Asia Pacific in November 
2011 (Clinton, 2011). Vietnam built runways on Spratly Island/Nanwei Island in 1976 and 
Southwest Clay/Nanzi Island in 1993, and Philippines on Thitu/Zhongye Island in 1978 
(Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, cited as AMTI hereinafter, July 29, 2015). The 
latter upgraded its runways on Spratly Island/Nanwei Island in 2007 and 2008, and further 
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expanded its reclamation on the island in 2014 and 2015, one aim of which was apparently 
to extend the runway. China’s speeding up its reclamation efforts since 2014 and 
constructions of runway starting from late 2014 (Ibid) could be regarded as a match to other 
claimants’ build-ups or a counter measure to other claimants’ provocations, such as 
Vietnam’s reclamation of its features from 2009 to 2014, though China’s reclamation 
operations was of its own scale compared with other actors. China’s installation of anti-
aircraft guns and probable close-in weapons systems in late 2016 and anti-ship cruise 
missiles and anti-air missiles on the Spratly Islands in 2018 (AMTI, Dec. 13, 2016; Macia, 
May 2, 2018, CNBC) could be regarded as a counter measure to Vietnam’s installation of 
rocket launchers capable of striking China’s runways and military installations in the 
Spratly Islands in summer 2016. Vietnam installed the Israeli imported EXTRA rocket 
artillery systems to five bases on the SCS features that it occupied. An observer argued that 
“when Vietnam acquired the EXTRA system, it was always thought that it would be 
deployed on the Spratlys...it is the perfect weapon for that” (Torode, Aug. 10, 2016, 
Reuters).24 
Chinese reactive assertiveness in SCS was to warn other claimants that their 
provocative move in SCS would be met by China’s assertive measures and the result would 
 
24 It was alleged that the United States spotted a pair of artillery vehicles on one of China’s 
occupied features in late April 2015. However, it was only spotted once. They might been hidden 
or removed. See Rosenberg, May 27, 2015, NYT. China’s activity was different from Vietnam’s 
systematical basing rocket artillery system in 2016. 
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be even more unfavorable to them. China’s interception of America’s close-in renaissance 
operations, on the other hand, might be Chinese decision makers’ warning to the American 
policy makers of the potential danger of direct confrontations if the United States get 
further involved in SCS disputes. These assertive reactions were both a warn to local actors 
against their internationalizing the disputes as well as further expansion in SCS, and a warn 
to the United States against its attempt of intervention of the disputes.  
China also eschewed over-aggressive activities to avoid escalation of crisis to higher 
levels. Apart from Scarborough Shoal, Beijing did not forcibly acquire other SCS features 
from other claimants. Beijing also avoided officially announced SCS as a “core interests” 
(see Johnston, 2013,17-20). After 2012, Beijing’s policy had largely been to maintain the 
territory status quo in SCS. China had not announced Air Defense Identification Zone in 
SCS, as it did in ECS. China adhered to its small-stick, salami-slicing tactics so as to ensure 
that confrontations could be managed, and to leave room for further coercion if other 
claimants took further steps of escalation. Nor had Beijing flied bombers or fighters on the 
features in Spratly Islands. Chinese President Xi Jinping and President Obama stated in a 
joint press statement in 2015 that “We're committed to respecting and upholding the 
freedom of navigation and overflight that countries enjoy according to international law. 
Relevant construction activities that China are undertaking in the island of South — Nansha 
Islands do not target or impact any country, and China does not intend to pursue 
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militarization” (Sept. 25, 2015, Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the 
People's Republic of China in Joint Press Conference).  
In specific crisis, Beijing also showed restraints on many occasions. During the 
Huangyan Island standoff in 2012, Beijing made efforts to de-escalate the situation by 
withdrawing two out of three armed vessels from the spot and Chinese media publicized 
these news (Green et al., 2017: 107-8). However, such gestures were not reciprocated by 
Manila, which led to the return of one of the withdrawn vessels on 18 and the prolonging 
of the standoff. In the 981 crisis of 2014, China also took initiatives to withdraw its oil rigs 
to avoid further escalation with Vietnam. 
China’s policies in the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and SCS Crisis in 2010’s can 
be termed as restrained reactive assertiveness. With China’s growing material capabilities, 
it was more willing to assert its national interests against weaker regional actors and the 
outside superpowers with which China was narrowing the power gap through escalating 
the situation to a crisis level. On the other hand, Beijing’s assertive activities were reactive 
and deterrent in character, and decision makers tried to keep the crisis from escalating to 
dangerous levels. 
Decision Making of the United States: Assertiveness and Cautions 
The United States’ reactions to the development in East Asia and China’s restrained 
reactive assertiveness during the time period under study had been assertive and cautious 
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in general.  
Although Washington’s China policy was in constant change between 1995 and 2016 
due to the developments in other parts of the world, the general objective was to counter a 
rising peer competitor that had the potential of challenging United States’ global primacy. 
However, with the bilateral material power balance becoming more balanced and the costs 
of directly confronting Beijing increasingly prohibitive, Washington had been cautious in 
avoiding direct confrontation with Beijing. While China poses a longtime strategic threat, 
it poses no direct threat to the United States, given its geographical distance (at least 
mentally) to the United States. With the rising cost of confrontation and China’s indirect 
threat, domestic support for a military confrontation, especially military confrontation with 
China had been relatively low in this period. As a result, Washington’s assertive reaction 
to China’s restrained reactive assertiveness in the crisis in this period had been largely 
signal, and its general strategy was to assist and encourage regional actors to counter and 
challenge China’s influence in East Asia, while increase United States’ presence to deter 
China from over-provocative activities. On the other hand, Washington also restrained its 
regional allies and security partners from over-provocative activities against Beijing in 
order to avoid major regional conflicts that might entangle the United States to confront 
Beijing directly and militarily. This strategy had contributed to the managements of major 
crisis in this period. 
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Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1995-1996 
Unlike other cases where interregional were settled peacefully. In 1995 and 1996, 
American decision makers showed major interests to the security of Taiwan, despite its 
geographical remoteness to the United States. This might be a result of Washington’s sense 
of invincibility of democracy and enthusiasm of democracy promotion after the end of 
Cold War and the collapse of Soviet Union on December 26, 1991. This might also be 
attributed to the fact that in 1995 and 1996, the power gap between the Mainland and the 
United States was still enormous despite China’s increase in national strength, and that the 
Mainland was still not strong enough to overtake Taiwan, which rendered the odds of a 
cross-strait military conflict less likely.  
With Taipei’s democratization process, conservative Republican forces dominated the 
Congress and pushed to improve relations with Taiwan. One piece of Congress’ pro-Taiwan 
policies was to exert pressure to Clinton Administration by passing a nonbinding resolution 
supporting Lee’s visa request. 
The State Department, however, were antipathetic to Congressional pressure. Senior 
officials in State Department did not see it worth the while to sacrifice the relations with 
the Mainland because of Taiwan and Lee’s visit. On April 17, 1995, Christopher told Qian 
that Lee’s visit would be denied, and the furthest Washington would go was to issue Lee a 
transit visa (Qian, 2003: 305). Although he implied that the State Department’s view might 
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not prevail in Washington, Qian failed to pick up the subtle implications (Garver, 1997: 69-
70).  
Nevertheless, Clinton himself was positive in granting Lee with visa (Mann, 1998: 
323). For fear of the direct confrontation between Congress and the Administration, of 
Congress passing new acts regarding to Taiwan which might further undermine the 
Administration’s maneuvering room regarding to the relations with the Mainland as well 
as with Taiwan, and of the negative impact to the election the next year, Clinton, together 
with Christopher and Secretary of Defense William Perry, finally decided to issue visa to 
Lee Teng-hui on May 17 (Suettinger, 2003: 215), despite the opposition of senior State 
Department officials.  
Chinese officials were irritated by the new development when the message was 
conveyed to Beijing on May 20. Washington was eager to patch up relations with Beijing 
to offset the impact of Lee’s visit. Before Lee’s visit, Christopher wrote a letter to Qian, 
promising that Lee’s visit would be strictly private, Lee would not meet high-level 
administrative officials, and any kind of political activities would be avoided (Qian, 2003: 
309). Similar message was conveyed to Taipei (Mann, 1998: 325). 
However, Lee would never forgo any opportunities to strain the relations between 
Washington and Beijing. In international politics, smaller international actors are always 
eager to drive wedges between great powers having diverged interests to widen their 
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maneuvering rooms. Lee was determined to play Washington off against Beijing and the 
visit offered a precious opportunity. To State Department’s aversion, Lee’s remarks in 
Cornell, which stated Taipei’s objectives of enlarging its international influence, turned out 
to be highly political.  
Beijing, infuriated by Lee’s visit and speech, and annoyed by the cumulative impact 
of the provocative Taiwan policies of Washington since 1992, reacted by announcing 
military exercises on July 18. Washington continued its patching-up efforts. Senior officials 
in the administration reiterated their adherence to “One China” policy on many occasions. 
On August 3, Clinton wrote to Jiang that the United States “respects” China’s position of 
the “One China” policy. This was the first time that U.S. government used the word 
“respects” rather than vague verbiage such as “acknowledge” or “not challenge” (Garver, 
1997: 79-80). 
However, it seemed that China’s 1995 military exercises failed in impressing 
Washington. USS Nimitz passed through Taiwan Strait on December 19, 1995. And 
Washington granted Taiwan’s “Vice President” Li Yuan-zu three time in January 1996. 
These sequences seemed to be routine in normal times. However, in a sensitive time as in 
late 1995 and 1996-only several months before the Taiwan “Presidential” campaign- it 
carried different message, at least to Chinese decision makers. The message conveyed 
seemed to be more mischievous to Beijing given Taipei’s frequent military exercises in 
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early 1996. Accordingly, Beijing announced military exercises and missile tests on March 
5. 
As Mainland China conducted missile tests and military exercise to deter Taiwan 
authorities from further activities of splittism, the American decision makers again showed 
their concerns to Taiwan. The Republicans in the Congress lashed acrimonious critics of 
Beijing and warned “the Communist government in Beijing” that they “must harbor no 
doubt that the United States will not tolerate the PRC’s use of military force against Taiwan 
or interference with her air or sea access. To this end, the United States must stand ready 
to join Taiwan in her defense against any resort to force or other forms of coercion that 
would jeopardize her security” (Suettinger, 2003: 252). Clinton administration also 
sounded warnings to Chinese policy makers. During Liu’s visit to Washington on March 7, 
Perry warned Vice Minister Liu Huaqiu of U.S. concerns of the symbolism of Mainland’s 
missile bracketing Taiwan, which rightly took place before the talk and the possibility of 
hitting Taiwan due to missile guidance system misfunction. He also intimidated that “the 
United States has more than enough military capability to protect its vital national security 
interests in the region, and is prepared to demonstrate that” (Carter and Perry, 1999: 96). 
With Beijing’s resolve of warning Taipei, these warnings and intimidation fell on deaf ears 
and another round of missile test was conducted two days later. 
American decision makers calculated that the Mainland was not likely to use force 
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against Taiwan, and its objectives was just psychological and political intimidation. 
However, there was a 5 or 10 percent change that the judgment was wrong and accident 
such as misfire would take place. In addition, the United States need to demonstrate to its 
regional allies and partners, including Taipei, that it was a reliable partner (Lord remembers, 
Tucker, 2001: 485). 
To show Washington’s seriousness to the situation, Perry and Shalikashvili agreed to 
send two CBGs, Independence which was based in Japan, and Nimitz which was deployed 
in the Persian Gulf, rather than one to patrol off Taiwan. Christopher, Lord and Lake 
consented to their decision, and so was Clinton. Since the United States routinely kept one 
CBG at that area and the message was not clear enough if only one CBG was sent. Perry 
put the objective of sending two CBGs as a reminder to Beijing that “while they are a great 
military power, the premier—the strongest—military power in the Western Pacific is the 
United States. America has the best damned navy in the world, and no one should ever 
forget that” (Sief, Mar. 20, 1996, Washington Times: A1). 
However, Washington was also eager to avoid being too provocative, and the policy 
makers decided that the two CBGs should avoid the area where PLA was conducting the 
exercises (Ibid: 97-8). As a result, Perry’s suggestion of sending the two CBGs to Taiwan 
Strait was rejected as Shalikashvili was horrified by the chances of accidents and further 
escalation. To avoid accidental escalation, the two CBGs avoided the Taiwan Strait out of 
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considerations of “restricted airspace and territorial waters” and Beijing’s boundary of 
“exclusive zones” was respected (Suettinger, 2003: 255-7; Tyler, 2000: 34). During PLA 
military exercises, the CBGs avoided Taiwan Strait and patrolled 100 nautical miles off the 
east of the island (Su, 1998: 750). It was also alleged that the CBGs further retreated an 
additional 100 nautical miles after detected that the fourteen Chinese nuclear submarines 
all left their home harbors (Ibid, however, Robert Ross argued that this report was at best 
unreliable, see Ross, 2006: 119). 
The 1996 Taiwan Crisis immensely alarmed the Washington policy makers. On the 
one hand, the United States started to prepare a future confrontation with Mainland China 
in the Strait. Washington also increased arms sales to Taipei to enhance the latter’s 
defensive capability against mainland. 
On the other hand, however, aware of the prohibitive cost of a confrontation with 
China for the sake of Taiwan, Washington strove to moderate relations with Beijing and 
restrain Taipei from further provocative splittist activities, so as to avoid similar crisis in 
Taiwan Strait. Clinton was frightened by the possibility of a armed conflict with China. He 
was disgruntled by the prospect of “risk taking United States to war every time the 
president of Taiwan wanted to attend his class reunion in upstate New York or play golf in 
Hawaii”, and he told his subordinates to tell Lee to back off (Tyler, 2000: 22). During 
Jiang’s official visit to the United States 1997, Clinton assured his opposition for Taiwan 
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“independence”. And during Clinton’s official visit in China, he announced the “Three Nos” 
principle regarding Taiwan, that “the U.S. does not support ‘independence’ for Taiwan, or 
‘one China, one Taiwan’, or ‘two Chinas’, or its membership in any international bodies 
whose members are sovereign states”. This was the first time that an American president 
publicly made such promises (see Qian, 2003: 315). 
After 2001, the United States, as a distracted outside power from East Asia, started to 
limit its presence in East Asia. With the United States being entangled in the Great Middle 
East War, East Asia became a secondary consideration for George W. Bush administration, 
despite his rhetoric of regarding China as a “strategic competitor” and alluding to China as 
“military competitor” in Quadrennial Defense Review Report before and shortly after he 
assumed office (Rice, 2000: 56; Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Sept. 30, 2001: 
4). In the 2000’s, Mainland China’s military disadvantage vis-a-vis the United States in the 
Taiwan Strait reduced dramatically, and its advantage vis-a-vis Taiwan increased rapidly 
(Heginbotham, et al.: 2015: 334-6). Bush, preoccupied with anti-terrorist wars and 
reluctant in provoking China at this juncture, was inpatient with the new Taiwanese 
“President” Chen Shui-bian’s splittist policies. He warned Chen publicly of Washington’s 
opposition of his splittist policies on many occasions. Chinese Mainland, satisfied with 
Washington’s attitude, felt no urgency to react vigorously to Chen’s provocations. 
Consequently, crisis over the Taiwan Strait was absent during Bush’s presidency.  
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Although Bush started to adopt a strategy of offshore balancing (Pang, 2019) against 
China’s influence in East Asia, with the United States entangled in Middle East and 
widening material power gap with China, other regional players avoided provoking China 
in their disputes with China and major crisis, except for on Korean nuclear crisis, had never 
taken place in East Asia in the first decade of the 21st century. 
Barack Obama, unlike Bush administration, adopted proactive policies in East Asia 
with the Pivot/Rebalancing Strategy. However, it inherited Clinton’s Taiwan policy. 
Although the Pivot/Strategic Rebalancing policy disrupted the peace and stability in East 
Asia, Kuomintang government maintained cooperative relations with the mainland, and 
cross-strait crisis had been absent during Obama’s presidency. Despite arms sales on many 
occasions, for at least two decades after the crisis, Bush and Obama administrations have 
been treading cautiously with regard to the Taiwan question and publicly promised their 
insistence and support for the “One China” policy. They had also become more cautious in 
issuing transit visa to high level Taiwan officials and strove to make sure that no official 
meetings were held during such transits. Even though Trump adopted provocative policy 
to China regarding Taiwan, the Taiwan “President” was not allowed to visit the United 
States. 
Beijing and Washington had been in severe confrontations with each other on the 
question of Taiwan for four times since 1949: 1950, 1954, 1958 and 1996. From the First 
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Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954) on, China’s material capability had strengthened each time 
compared with the earlier crisis. And the United States had become more cautious each 
time than the last one. The first time the United States abruptly intervened on behalf of 
Taipei, which contributed to Beijing’s decision to confront the United States and finally to 
China’s involvement in the Korean War. In the 1954 crisis, the Congress passed the 
Formosa Act, which gave the President “blank check” in dealing with crisis in the strait. 
America’s Seventh Fleet also assisted Taipei in retreating from the Da Chen Island. It was 
also authorized to attack the airspace and territorial water of Mainland if the Mainland 
launched large scale attack U.S. armed forces or Taiwan (Memorandum for the President, 
Jan. 29, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. II, pp. 164-5). In the 1958 crisis, Washington 
amassed five carriers for the Seventh Fleet (Tao, 2004, Vol.II: 167), Dulles and the Joint 
Chiefs advocated for use of nuclear weapon (Memorandum of Conversation, Sept. 2, 1958, 
FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XIX: 118-22). Washington’s reaction in 1996 was much more 
restrained.  
U.S. Decision Making during the SCS Disputes, 2010’s 
Starting from George W. Bush administration, the United States attempted to back up 
China’s regional rivals, such as Japan, India, Vietnam and Indonesia, to counterbalance 
China’s influence in Asia. Initiating the Pivot/Rebalance strategy, Obama inherited and 
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furthered Bush’s strategy (Pang, 2019). Regional actors, especially Japan, Vietnam and 
Philippines, grasped the opportunity of Obama’s new policy initiative to provoke China on 
the SCS issues and the issue immediately became the flashpoint in the previously peaceful 
Asia-Pacific region. With the SCS issue becoming the litmus test for the new policy 
initiative, Obama had to eat his own bitter fruit. China’s reactive assertiveness and its 
growing awareness of maritime capability, on the other hand, threatened U.S. control of 
SLOCs and its predominance of the sea. The bilateral relations became more and more 
confrontational. Nevertheless, the United States, while being assertive against China 
regarding to the SCS disputes, also made efforts to avoid escalation of major crisis in this 
period. 
The 2012 China-Philippines standoff over the Huangyan Island/Scarborough Shoal 
was substantially alarming to the United States since it was a standoff between its main 
rival in the Western Pacific and one of its treaty allies. According to the U.S.-Philippines 
Mutual Defense Treaty (UPMDT), the two parties would “act to meet the common dangers 
in accordance with its constitutional processes” when the “armed forces, public vessels or 
aircraft in the Pacific” of either party is attacked (UPMDT, Official Gazette, 1951). In the 
standoff, such risks were substantially high.  
Manila might have intentionally chosen the timing of provoking China near 
Huangyan/Scarborough (April 10) and then stood firm right before the time of annual U.S.-
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Philippine “Balikatan” naval exercise on April 14, which would be held in Palawan, 
approximately 250 miles south of the site of the standoff (Hsiung, 2018: 11). The time and 
site of the exercise had been planned months before.  
Washington was alarmed by the development and feared a direct confrontation with 
Beijing. Although the bilateral naval exercise proceeded, both Manila and Washington 
dismissed any connection of the bilateral exercise and the Huangyan/Scarborough standoff 
(Lo, Apr. 27, 2012, CBS News). It was alleged that Washington intended to forgo some of 
the exercises and imposed media ban on reporting on live-fire air and ground maneuvers 
and oil-rig takeover drill to avoid irritating Beijing in order to avert escalation of the crisis 
(Anda, April. 29, 2012, Inquirer). Washington also reiterated that it took no stance on 
sovereignty of SCS features.  
American decision makers were annoyed by Manila’s provoking behaviors and told 
Manila that such stupid things should be stopped. Apart from denying of the connection of 
the bilateral military drill and the standoff, Duane Thiessen, Commander of the US Marines 
in the Pacific Lieutenant General, gave the strongest comments during the crisis. However, 
his remarks were ambiguous at bests. He reaffirmed that the mutual defense treaty 
“guarantees that we get involved in each other's defense and that is self explanatory”. 
However, he made no elaborations of the word “involvement” at all (Lavallee, Apr. 22, 
2012, Rappler). Other American officials, on the other hand, were more clear that they 
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preferred avoiding getting embroiled in the dispute by saying that “neither side was likely 
to invoke the treaty (UPMDT, Official Gazette, 1951) in this case because Manila’s 
confrontation with Beijing is over disputed territory”. Washington’s frustration with Manila 
was reflected by complains of experts, such as Jeffrey Bader, special assistant to Obama 
for national security affairs relating to Asia at the NSC. They deemed it was Manila to 
blame for provoking the standoff despite the legitimacy of its claims on the feature. Bader 
said that “The Filipinos did not contribute to solving the long-term problem by falling into 
a short-term confrontation with the Chinese, in a bid to quickly resolve an unresolvable 
territorial issue” (Landler, Jun. 8, 2012, NTY). 
With Washington’s tepid support and Beijing’s economic and military pressure, 
Manila opted for compromise. Washington brokered a negotiation between Beijing and 
Manila. With Beijing’s promise of de-escalation of the situation, and US Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell’s belief that he had got 
his interlocutor, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying agree of his suggestion of 
simultaneous withdrawal, the United States imposed a lot of pressure on Manila to step 
back (for a review of different account of Fu’s reply to Campbell, see Green et al., 2017: 
118-9).  
Finally, the crisis ended up with Manila’s withdrawal and Beijing’s control of the 
Huangyan Island/Scarborough Shoal. The United States seemed to acquiesce, or at least 
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kept quiet on the result. After all, the United States was reluctant and unwilling to rile and 
confront a rising and powerful China for some remote rocks. Manila, on the other hand, 
felt being betrayed by Washington. 
Although Washington was unwilling to confront Beijing directly in SCS, it was 
willing to balance Chinese influence through enhancing military prowess of other SCS 
claimants and increase its military presence in East Asia. Obama inherited Bush’s policy 
of recruiting East Asian states to balance China, while add to it America’s increased 
military presence in East Asia, as America’s pressure in Middle East declined. During the 
crisis, for example, Washington and Manila held 2+2 meeting in early May, during which 
Washington promised to help Manila to establish a “minimum defense posture” and to 
provide Manila with more “real time information” in the SCS (Lavallee, Apr. 22, 2012, 
Rappler). The United States also agreed to provide Philippines with legal assistance to help 
it to sound its claim through international arbitrary process. In 2014, the two states further 
signed Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which was ratified by 
Philippines in 2016. The EDCA allowed the United States to rotate troops into the agreed 
locations in Philippines for extended stays and to construct and operate facilities on 
Philippine bases with the consent of Philippines (Official Gazette, Apr. 28, 2015).  
Although the United States reiterated that it would take no position in SCS disputes, 
it had launched diplomatic and propaganda machines against China’s claim, as it has 
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zoomed in on China as the next threat of its global dominance. Daniel Russel, Assistant 
Secretary of Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said that “Any use of the ‘nine dash 
line’ by China to claim maritime rights not based on claimed land features would be 
inconsistent with international law” in his testimony before the House on February 5, 2012 
(Russel, 2014). Encouraged by Washington’s policy of balancing China’s influence, 
Philippine filed case and sued China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration on March 30, 
2014, which foreboded the Sino-American face-off in the summer of 2016, when the court 
was about to ruling in favor of Manila. 
The Sino-America 2016 face-off in the SCS might be the most dangerous one since 
1996. Chinese policy makers decided to show its determination to protect its rights in SCS 
and its defy of the rule of the Permanent Court with military exercises. The American 
decision makers, on the other hand, decided show of force to show its resolve to support 
Philippines and other SCS claimants against China. 
Nevertheless, Washington still showed restraint to avoid military clash with China. 
During Chinese military exercises in early July. Although the United States left two 
destroyers in east SCS, they were well off the site of Chinese military exercises. It also 
kept the carrier in the Philippine Sea rather than SCS. 
In general, Washington’s strategy in SCS was still to show support to regional actors 
and leave them to confront China, rather than to confront China face to face. By finding 
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and supporting regional agents against China, it could worsen China’s regional security 
environment and balance China’s regional influence without pay huge costs (Zhao, 2019: 
115) 
However, the United States’ behavior in Spratly had been less restrained by mid 
2010’s. It had been constantly sending naval vessels and aircraft to Spratly Island to 
challenge China’s sovereignty since 2012. Although the crisis in the Spratly was less 
intensive than the Crisis of Scarborough of 2012 and 2016, low level crisis was frequent. 
And there is chances that such crisis could reach to a simmering point. Although the 
possibility of a bilateral clash over SCS would be generally low, the odds of a bilateral 
armed conflict over the Spratly is higher than over the Xisha/Paracels or 
Huangyan/Scarborough. 
United States’ assertive interventions in the Spratly disputes might be a result of the 
geographic location of disputes. Unlike Taiwan and Huangyan/Scarborough which were 
not quite far from Chinese mainland, Nansha/Spratly features were far off. The distance 
between Chinese mainland and Nansha/Spratly would severely compromise the 
effectiveness of China’s power-projection capabilities, such as satellite support, long-range 
heavy bomber and aerial tankers (Heginbotham et al., 2015: 339). Although the distance 
between United States bases in Northeast Asia and the Nansha/Spratly could also 
compromise the United States military capability, with its superior power projection 
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capability, the United States had large margin of military advantage against China in this 
area. That might be one reason why the United States acted more assertively against China 
in Nansha/Spratly than it did in Taiwan in the 2000’s and Huangyan/Scarborough in 2012 
(see Zhao, 2019: 124). 
Conclusions 
To some extent, the study of Sino-American relations in the period of 1996-2016 is 
different than the study of other cases. Because of the recentness of this period, documents 
and memoirs of decision making process is relatively limited. The comparison of the 
bilateral relations of 1950 and 1996-2016 is also different from other comparisons. After 
all, the bilateral relations in 1996-2016 was much more complicated than it was in 1950. 
However, these weaknesses do not mean that the comparison was meaningless. The 
different pattern of policy making of these two periods still provided information of how 
the change of interregional power balance affect crisis decision making and how it affect 
the result of crisis. 
Compared with 1950’s, the material capability gap between China and the United 
States shrank considerably in the period of 1996–2015 and the bilateral material capability 
became more balanced. In 1950, the CCP regime prioritized regime survival, while in the 
current period of study, regime survival was no longer a concern, despite the shock of 
political turmoil on Tiananmen square in the summer of 1989. Economic development, 
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improvement of people’s living standard and enhancing of the comprehensive national 
power became the new priority. During the crisis of 1995-1996 and 2010’s, with advantage 
of proximity, determination and more balanced material capability, the local advantageous 
power-China-acted assertively. However, with confidence of the future advantage vis-a-vis 
the United States and other regional actors, it also strove to ensure that its assertive behavior 
not to be excessive and will not risk real armed clash with the United States. The 
predominant outside power-the United States, on the other hand, tried to show its resolve 
to protect its interests and to balance China’s influence in East Asia. To achieve these 
objectives, it always flex its muscles against China. However, aware of China’s ascendance, 
it also tried to avoid military clash with it. Many experts and scholars argue that the United 
States has disadvantage in terms of “balance of will” in disputes with China in East Asia. 
During this period, regional players, such as Taipei, Manila and Hanoi, taking advantage 
of Sino-American conflict of interests in East Asia and Washington’s intention of balancing 
against Beijing’s influence in East Asia, had been trying to entangle the Washington in their 
disputes against Beijing. However, each time when their disputes with Beijing reached 
severe crisis level, they tended to backpedal for fear of a military clash with Beijing in 
which they would pay prohibitive costs. The decision making pattern of China, the United 
States and other regional players all contributed to the peaceful resolution of crisis in this 
period. 
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The most stable period of the bilateral relations in this period is the 2000’s, when the 
United States was engaged in the Great Middle East War. The North Korea nuclear crisis 
in early 1990’s and Ukraine Crisis in 2014 might also have distracted the United State and 
thus might contributed to prevent the escalation of the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996 
and the SCS crisis in the summer of 2016. 
These findings are in general consistence with Hypothesis4. However, the revelation 
of detailed decision making process in the crisis still awaits further disclosure of related 
documents and memoirs. 
The findings of this chapter partially disproved Hypothesis4’. Although China was 
willing to assert its interests regarding to Taiwan and SCS in this period, its activities was 
relatively restrained. The rough balance of power did not lead to different predictions of 
the result of a potential war and did not prevent both side from compromise. However, the 
predictions of consequence of such a war was different from other peaceful resolution cases 
in that it was not a prediction of which side would prevail, but all sides would suffer 
prohibitive loss. 
In comparison with Hypothesis4, the explanatory power of other alternative 
explanations, though not without merits, are also relatively weak. 
The unipolarity stability seems to explain well for this period. However, although the 
United States had large edge of material power advantage over other major powers in the 
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first decades after the Cold War. It was doubtful whether it was a unipole according to the 
definition of the power percentage it needs to have to be a unipole. In addition, Beijing’s 
assertive behaviors to challenge the United States on Taiwan and SCS and Washington’s 
reluctance in confronting Beijing by military means seemed to contradict the hypothesis of 
unipolar stability theorists. 
The power transition theory foresees the crisis-ridden bilateral relations between the 
two powers as China approaches the material capability of the United States. At least in the 
period under study war did not take place. Since the two powers is still under transition, 
the history of the next several decades would be good test between power transition history 
and the theory put forward by this research. Currently, the likelihood of a war between the 
two powers, though increased, is still low. 
Although comprehensive interdependence seems to increase incentives of bilateral 
cooperation in this period, the previous cases of Anglo-American relations between 1805-
1812, U.S.-Japanese relations of 1938-1941, and other historical cases such as Anglo-
Germany war in 1914 proves that in major crisis economic interdependence could not 
prevent showdown between major powers, especially in situations when the 
interdependence is unbalanced, with one actors enjoys the advantage of less vulnerability 
and sensitivity than the other, just like the situation in the Sino-American interdependence 
where the United States is less vulnerable than PRC, as Trump’s trade war revealed. 
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Geographical proximity still matters in this period. One factor of Beijing’s decision 
of coercion over Taipei was that Taiwan was within the sphere of the mainland’s missile 
range, and the United States would be reluctant in having a military confrontation with the 
mainland for sake of Taiwan. United States’ different policy with regard to Scarborough 
and Spratly in this period also reflected the importance of geographical proximity. The 
advantage of geographical proximity increases as the local power became more powerful. 
If the theory put forward by this project works well, ceteris paribus, with the development 
of China’s A2/AD capability, the United States’ policy relating to Taiwan and SCS will 
change into a less provocative one over time. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusions 
In general, the hypotheses of the project stand the tests of large-N tests and the six 
case studies. Compared with other alternative hypotheses and alternative explanations, they 
also seem to have more explanatory power. 
This project adopts both a large-N test and three within-case longitudinal analyses to 
analyze the causal relations between interregional power distribution (including IV1: local 
power distribution and IV2: dyadic power distribution between major local power and 
strategic regional power, or outside power, which are involved in a major interregional 
conflict) and the result of a major interregional crisis (DV: peaceful settlement or escalation 
to war). In particular, the three within-case studies, having IV1 controlled, reveal the causal 
mechanism between the variation of IV2 and the variation of DV. Each longitudinal analysis 
contained periods of interaction between dyads of great powers (one local power and the 
other was geographically an outsider of the region) that were strategic competitors to allow 
the probability that bilateral crises have the potential to escalate to wars. 
Apart from the power distribution variable, the selected cases also allow other 
variables to vary to observe their effect on the dependent variable. For example, the Anglo-
American dyad was a liberal dyad, while the Sino-American and Japanese-American dyads 
were liberal-authoritarian dyads. The Sino-American dyad is a maritime-continental dyad, 
while the other two are maritime-maritime dyads. Power transition took place in one period 
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of the Sino-American and Anglo-American dyads, but not the other. The interdependence 
level was high in Anglo-American dyads in 1895-1905 and Sino-American dyads in 1995-
2016, while dependence was more one-sided in Anglo-American dyads in 1805-1812 and 
Japanese-American relations in 1931-1942. These variations are not all selected 
intentionally since international relations are complicated and neat cases for comparative 
analysis could hardly be found. 
There are many limitations of the tests of the theory in this project. 
The case study in this project aimed to investigate the causal mechanism between IV2 
and the DV while holding IV1 constant. This requires selecting cases where local powers 
had preponderances to other local actors to hold the regional power balance in control. 
However, the local distribution of power in these cases also varies from one another. 
Although all the major local powers in the study had relatively clear advantages over their 
potential regional rivals, the level of local preponderance was different. The United States’ 
regional dominance in 1895-1905 was complete, while its local preponderance in the 
period of 1805-1812 was not as clear. China’s local preponderance in East Asia over other 
actors in 1995-2016 increased over time and was also relatively considerable. Compared 
with these two cases, the level of local preponderance of Japan in 1931-1937 was relatively 
weak, although its advantage in that period was still larger than that in 1937-1942. 
Although Japan still held a generally advantageous position vis-a-vis China and the Soviet 
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Union in 1937-1941, its advantage was declining, and its local preponderance was quite 
precarious. In this period, the local distribution in East Asia hung in the balance between 
preponderance and nonpreponderance, making the interregional situation one between 
Situation I and the top left box. 
China’s situation in 1950 was different from all other cases. Strictly speaking, it was 
the Soviet Union, or Soviet-Chinese bloc, that held local preponderance in East Asia in 
1950. It was because the Soviet Union and China made an agreement on a division of labor 
regarding the world revolutionary movement in August 1949 and China was to take charge 
of the movement in East Asia with Soviet assistance, and the two communist powers close 
cooperation in Korea that this project regarded China as the preponderant local power in 
East Asia in 1950. 
Similarly, in each within-case analysis, the interregional dyadic power distribution 
changed over time, and a change in the DV was observed as the interregional dyadic power 
distribution changed. However, in the three relatively balanced interregional material 
capability cases, the level of balance varies. Compared with the Anglo-American power 
distribution of 1895-1905 and the Sino-American power distribution of 1995-2016, the 
Japanese-American balance in 1931-1937 was more precarious. Japan was far less 
materially capable vis-a-vis its outside rival in relative terms than the local powers were in 
the other two cases. 
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Although the DV of this project is a binary variable of peaceful settlement/escalation 
to war in major crises, it should be noted that wars are different from wars. The intensities 
of the resulting wars in the three imbalanced cases were different. The intensity of the 
Pacific War, a total war, was much higher than that of the Korean War and the 1812 War, 
which were relatively limited. 
Defining Russia’s position has never been an easy job in interregional analysis, given 
Russia’s sprawling territory across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. However, Russia 
was primarily a European state, given its long entanglements in European affairs. Not until 
the early 19th century did it actively participate in the Middle East, when its Great Game 
with Britain began over imperial disputes regarding Afghanistan and Persia mid and not 
until the late 19th Century did Russia get involved in Asian politics when it started to 
encroach upon the Qing Empire. Despite its involvement in these two regions, its strategic 
priority was still Europe. Apart from the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, its 
involvement in Asian wars was relatively limited. It was somewhere in between being a 
local power and a strategic regional power in East Asia. 
In addition, the scope condition: major crisis also varied from case to case. It was very 
difficult to find crises of similar severity. One might argue that the crises between Britain 
and the United States in 1895-1905 were less severe than those in 1805-1812, and the crises 
between the United States and China in 1995-2016 were less severe than those in 1950. 
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However, all these crises contained the threat of use of force and show of force, and the 
two parties in each case were known to be rivalries, if not adversaries. Almost all cases 
were included in the MIDs datasets. 
Main Findings of This Project 
Despite all the above difficulties and shortcomings, using a large-N test and the 
within-case longitudinal process-tracing method, this project tests the hypotheses put 
forward in the first chapter together with other alternative hypotheses and alternative 
explanations. Particularly, it elaborates how the change of IV2 affects decision making in 
both the major local power and the outside power differently, which generates different DV 
values in times of major crises. 
The general findings are: 
1. In regional or local systems, the preponderant power distribution is associated with 
the peaceful resolution of major crises and nonpreponderant wars. In this sense, the 
unipolar stability theory put forward by scholars such as William Wohlforth (1999) seems 
to work on the regional level. It also partially confirms the theories and findings of Geoffrey 
Blainey (1973) and other scholars that dyadic preponderance contributes to the avoidance 
of war, at least on the regional level. 
2. When a major interregional crisis breaks out, the situations where a. the local power 
distribution is featured by preponderance, and the dyadic power distribution is featured by 
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balanced distribution (Situation II), b. the local power distribution is featured by 
preponderance, and the dyadic power distribution is featured by local superiority (bottom 
right box), and c. the local power distribution is featured by nonpreponderance, and the 
dyadic power distribution is featured by local superiority (top right box) are less likely to 
end up in war. While situations where d. the local power distribution is featured by 
preponderance, and the dyadic power distribution is featured by outside superiority 
(Situation I), e. the local power distribution is featured by nonpreponderance, and the 
dyadic power distribution is featured by outside superiority (top left box) and f. the local 
power distribution is featured by nonpreponderance. The dyadic power distribution is 
featured by balanced distribution (top middle box) and is more likely to end up in war. 
These findings partially support Hypothesis1, and partially disprove Hypothesis1’. 
3. When a severe crisis breaks out between a much weaker locally advantageous 
major power and a much stronger outside power (Situation I), the likelihood of war sharply 
increases, as the Anglo-American relations in 1805-1812, the Japanese-American relations 
in mid-1937 to 1941, and the Sino-American relations in 1950 show. This was exactly what 
Hypothesis2 of this project predicts. Similar historical events, such as Sino-British relations 
in the late 1830s and Russo-American relations in the late 1910s and early 1920s, were 
also in conformity with this finding. 
Findings 2 and 3 are more nuanced than the existing structural realist and dyadic 
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balance theories. Unipolar stability theory matters where the unipole is located. In general, 
outside the unipole contributes to war, while the local unipole contributes to peaceful 
resolution in major interregional crises. When the local distribution is a preponderance 
distribution, a local-outside bipolar balance interregional distribution is the most stable 
during a major crisis. These findings partially echo the theories of Inis Claude (1962), 
Kenneth Waltz (1979), and John Mearsheimer (2001). 
4. This project places more emphasis on the causal chain between the dyadic 
interregional power balance and the result of interregional crises. Thus, in the case studies, 
it attempts to control the local distribution. By doing so, in Situation I, featuring outside 
superiority and outside unipolarity in the interregional system, this project finds the 
following: 
A. The weaker local power, diffidence of its material capability inferiority, tended 
not to confront the stronger outside power and tried to reach some compromise with the 
outside power by adopting cautious coercion or deterrence policies. The latter, however, 
tended not to make compromises and take further assertive policies against the local power. 
With other means of coercion or deterrence exhausted and their very national interests in 
their region at stake, local power decision-makers grew desperate. When the outside power 
was distracted by other affairs in other regions, the decision-makers of local power tended 
to be led by opportunism and make up mind to initiate a war against the outside power to 
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coerce them into compromise. The outside power still did not tend to budge, and the result 
was usually a prolonged war. Notably, all these bilateral wars were initiated by weaker 
local power. 
Before the War of 1812, Washington complained about British impressment, 
Orders in Council, seizure of American assets, naval skirmishes, and commerce policy 
since 1805. Britain, given its superior material capability over the United States, refused 
maker concessions. In contrast to its national capability, American decision-makers, 
although determined to protect their sovereign rights, made no resolute policy in the early 
days. In 1807, Jefferson adopted economic coercion against Britain. Washington adopted 
a more assertive policy of naval clash initiation to coerce the British, exemplified by the 
President-Belt Incident of 1811. However, London was not moved by this coercion. British 
Canadian authorities also started to woo the Indians against the United States, leading to 
the battle of Tippecanoe in late 1811. At the same time, Napoleon decided to invade Russia, 
which brought a major change to the European situation. American decision-makers, 
calculating that Britain would be preoccupied in Europe, depending on their perceived local 
advantage against Britain, were determined to assert American sovereign rights and took 
the opportunity and initiated the war against Britain on June 1 to coerce it into concession. 
Britain, contemptuous of America’s material capability, refused to back off, and the 1812 
war broke out. 
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Similar things took place before the Pacific War. In the negotiations of 1941, 
Tokyo was eager to make some compromise with the United States. For example, it 
attempted to ease its entanglement in the China quagmire through Washington’s mediation. 
However, the United States, arrogant on its material superiority over Japan, refused to make 
concessions and constantly introduce new requirements. During the negotiation, Japan 
advanced to South Indochina as a coercion method, only to be met with America’s freezing 
of Japanese assets and oil embargo. In the summer of 1941, Nazi Germany invaded the 
U.S.S.R., and the United States became preoccupied with European affairs. Japanese 
decision-makers, led by opportunism, calculating that relying on Japanese soldiers’ high 
fighting morale, Japan’s local advantage over the United States and other Western powers 
helped establish a self-sufficient empire and sustain an attrition war. The United States’ 
willingness to fight would be worn off in an attrition war. With these calculations, Pearl 
Harbor finally decided to wage war with the United States by war. The United States 
refused to back off and declared war on Japan. 
In 1950, aware of the material capability gap, Chinese decision-makers were 
cautious in deciding whether to fight the United States on the Korean Peninsula after 
America’s intervention. They were first infuriated by Truman’s decision to send the 
Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait on June 27. China organized the Northeast Frontier 
Defense Force as a deterrence to the United States in future contingencies. After the U.S. 
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landing in Inchon, Chinese policymakers warned Washington not to cross the 38 parallel 
through different channels. However, given the United States’ arrogance and its contempt 
for China and even the Soviet Union’s capability, these warnings fell on deaf ears in 
Washington, and United Nations forces crossed the parallel on the night of November 30 
and October 1. China’s deterrence efforts failed. Mao and Zhou, determined to fight and 
secure China’s immediate national security, persuaded other Chinese decision-makers to 
wage wars against the United States. Chinese decision-makers, relying on Chinese soldiers’ 
high morale, China’s local advantages, and the United States' global distraction, ultimately 
consented to Mao’s decision and reached a consensus to fight the United States in Korea. 
B. For the much-powerful outside powers, relying on their superior material 
capability was arrogant and contemptuous to their local adversary’s warning, deterrence, 
and coercion. They calculated that its adversary would be silly to pick a fight with them 
given the enormous power gap. Even they did so, they would be defeated swiftly. As a 
result, they refused to make major concessions to the local powers. 
In 1805-1812, British decision-makers, boasting of their naval supremacy in the 
world, disdained American protests on issues such as imprisonment, seizure, Orders in 
Council, and close-in naval surveillance. They were not quite impressed by Washington’s 
economic coercion measures and assertive behavior in the President-Belt incident. They 
were also confident that American coasts would be extremely vulnerable to British 
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blockade and attack. They thought the United States would not take the risk of waging war 
with them, and there was no necessity of making compromises regarding the lists of issues. 
Before the Pacific War, many American decision-makers and the public believed 
that Japan would recoil and compromise after America’s economic pressure given their 
resource scarcity and high level of dependence on America. America’s air, maritime and 
material capability supremacy would deter Japan from taking risks and picking a fight with 
the United States. Even if Japan were to take military adventures, it was unlikely that Japan 
would attack the United States directly. Even if a war with Japan broke out, the United 
States could prevail easily and swiftly. This helps to explain Washington’s tepidity in the 
1941 negotiations. 
Washington’s assessment of China’s possible reaction if it crossed the 38 parallel 
was more typical. By September 1950, being preoccupied with liberating Tibet and dealing 
with the bandit and spy problem, China had not accomplished national unification. It did 
not even have a mechanized army and an air force. Even the U.S.S.R. was still recuperating 
from WWII, and its nuclear forces still need years before it could threaten America. Most 
intelligence services of both the United States and its close allies did not believe that China 
would fight the American and U.N. forces for Pyongyang. Thus, despite Beijing’s warning, 
38 parallel rivers crossed, as did the Yalu River. 
C. The local powers decided to fight the much stronger outside power not only 
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out of their belief of they could no longer retreat when other means of coercion or 
deterrence were exhausted, and their very national interests in their region were at stake 
but also out of their belief of the local advantage against the outside power, in terms of 
strategic concentration, willingness and resolve to fight, the local balance of military power 
and logistical advantage. Although decision-makers of local power tended to be diffident 
due to their material inferiority to the outside power, taking the opportunity of the outside 
power’s strategic distraction or preoccupation with the development of other regions, they 
ultimately decided to fight the outside power. 
Before they initiated the 1812 War, American decision-makers calculated that the 
Peninsula war and Napoleon’s expedition upcoming invasion of Russia offered a good 
opportunity for the United States to attack Canada since the British had to concentrate fully 
in Europe and was both incapable and unwilling to fight a war in America across the 
Atlantic. Given America’s large military advantage over Canada, the British’s distance 
from America, and its dependence on Halifax for replenishment and logistics, many 
American decision-makers believed that America would be capable of swift occupation of 
Canada and Halifax, which would rob the British of replenishment and logistics, give it a 
fait accompli and coerce it into accommodation of American requests. 
       Before Pearl Harbor, Japanese decision-makers made similar calculations. They 
believed that while Japan concentrated in East Asia, the United States prioritized the 
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situation in Europe, especially after Hitler took an offensive against the Soviet Union in 
the summer of 1941. With the United States preoccupied with the development of Europe, 
Japan could have a period of at least half a year to take advantage of their local military 
advantage vis-a-vis the United States and other Asian states to create an “impregnable 
sphere” in Asia, which would allow it time to build a self-sufficient Empire that would be 
capable of fighting an attrition war with the United States. Within this period, Japan would 
also be able to deprive the United States of local bases of supply and replenishment. The 
United States, with limited interests in East Asia, would be unwilling to fight such a war 
and finally accommodate Japan’s demands. 
       Before intervention in the Korean War, CPC leaders argued that the long battle 
line from Berlin to Korea would spread American forces thin in Asia. The United States 
would also be distracted by developments in Europe and the Middle East. They also 
stressed the high resolve and morale of Chinese people to protect their country from 
American “greedy wolves” compared to the low morale of American soldiers who fought 
a war across the ocean. They also believed that Chinese forces fighting on the back of their 
own country would have the advantage of logistics, while the United States had to go back 
and forth across the Pacific. China also had a local military advantage, especially when 
assistance from U.S.S.R. was taken into consideration. In a war of attrition, the United 
States would recoil from difficulties. 
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       However, many of these calculations proved to be delusive wishful thinking, 
especially the logistic advantage assessment. However, given the geography of the wars, 
these calculations were not illogical or unreasonable. 
D. Apart from these three findings, in Situation I, third-party factors also play a 
role in the final war outbreak. 
       Although British Canadian authorities tried to prevent Indians from attacking the 
United States, encouraged by the former’s instigation, supply of weapons, and economic 
assistance, the Indians initiated attacks on American forces in the battle of Tippecanoe, 
which increased Americans hatred towards the British. To some extent, the United States 
intervened in the Korean War to reassure its other allies in Asia, especially Japan. The third-
party factor was more essential before the Pacific War. 
       The precarious material capability advantage of Japan vis-à-vis other regional 
actors increased Tokyo’s concern over Washington’s assistance and support of its regional 
rivals, especially China, as well as the weight of these states in Washington’s calculation, 
for their active and resolved resistance against Japan’s aggression and expansion would 
give Washington large leverage against Japan in East Asia. China and Britain took special 
credit in reinforcing Washington’s stubbornness towards Japan during the 1941 
negotiations. 
Hypothesis3 captures the findings of B, C, D in Situation I that the most important 
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factors leading to the outbreak of war include the outside’s complacency of its material 
capability, its arrogance, and its refusal to make major concessions, together with the local 
power’s perception of local advantage, its determination to have its way, the opportunity 
offered by the outside power’s distraction or preoccupation by the development of other 
regions, and its perception that the outside power’s willingness to fight would wear down 
in an attrition war. 
However, Hypothesis3 does not capture some findings of A in that it fails to 
capture the fact that the local powers were cautious in the early days of the crises. They 
only decided to initiate war against the much more powerful outside power when all other 
means of deterrence and coercion failed and when the development in other regions 
distracts the outside power and offers a good opportunity to fight the outside power. 
Apart from these cases investigated in the current project, other interregional 
major power rivalry wars as the results of major crisis, such as the Anglo-China clash in 
1840-1842, Anglo-China and French-China clash in 1856-1860, French-China clash in 
1884-1885, United States’ military intervention of Russian Civil War in 1917-1922 seem 
to follow similar logic. 
These findings contradict the unipolar stability and dyadic preponderance stability 
theories. In major interregional crises, outside unipoles tend to be complacent and 
entangled by allies. These findings also echo T.V. Paul’s (1994) theory that under certain 
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circumstances, weaker power takes the offensive against much more powerful adversaries. 
Geographical distance has a major role in affecting the relationship between power balance 
and the results of major interregional crises. 
5. When a major crisis breaks out between a locally preponderant major power and a 
strategic regional major power, or a major outside power, and when the material capability 
of the two was relatively balanced (Situation II), the likelihood of war is relatively low, as 
the Anglo-American relations in 1895-1905, the Japanese-American relations in 1931-
1937 and the Sino-American relations in 1995-2016 show. Similar cases, such as Russo-
American relations during the Cold War, also conform with such findings. 
For the casual chain of this type of interregional power distribution and the result of a 
severe crisis in Situation II, this project finds the following: 
A. In the early days of the crisis, the local preponderant power often takes the 
initiative to escalate the crisis since such power is more willing and determined to assert 
its national interests against strategic regional power. However, it also tends to restrain 
itself from ensuring that the crisis does not get out of control. While making some gestures 
to protest the local power, the outside power tends to avoid showdown by calibrating their 
gesture in a nonoverprovoking way. In this way, confrontation is avoided. Often, the 
outside power makes more compromises. 
Between 1895 and 1905, the United States initiated the Venezuela Crisis of 1895 
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and challenged the status quo of Isthmian, and it was American miner’s penetrating that 
made Canadian authorities anxious in the Alaska boundary disputes. Salisbury reacted 
assertively in the Venezuela Crisis of 1895; however, London rapidly moderated its tone 
on the dispute and agreed to negotiate. In other disputes, London backed down much more 
hastily and completely. After British concessions, the United States was also cooperative. 
For example, in the Venezuela border dispute negotiation, Washington showed favor for 
London’s claim at the cost of Caracas. 
Between 1931 and 1937, Japan’s constant and brazen aggression and invasion of 
China and its flagrant defiance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact triggered the Far East crisis. 
However, the United States, apart from presenting diplomatic protests, announcing the 
Stimson Doctrine of nonrecognition, sending a few warships to Shanghai as deterrence in 
1932, had barely taken other substantial steps to counter Japan’s invasion. Japan, on the 
other hand, also refrained from a total invasion of China. Instead, it tended to encroach 
upon Chinese territory and was willing to negotiate with Nanjing for temporary 
arrangements. 
Between 1995 and 2016, China initiated the Taiwan Strait Crisis and Scarborough 
Crisis in reaction to other regional actors’ provocations when Chinese decision-makers felt 
their national interests were at stake. The United States sent aircraft carriers east of Taiwan 
in the first case and reiterated its alliance with Manila in the latter case. However, it avoided 
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overly-provocative activities, and the aircraft carriers were well off PLA’s test area. China, 
on the other hand, also avoided overly-provocative activities. It refrained from attacking 
Taiwanese or Philippine assets and informed Washington that it had no intention of attack 
through all possible channels to avoid miscalculation. 
B. Strategic regional power, or outside power, remained restrained and attentive 
to the local powers' demands. It was apprehensive for and unwilling to be entangled in a 
costly war with a powerful adversary that enjoyed roughly balanced material capability in 
a distant region. The local advantage of logistics and military power of the local power 
makes war with it especially difficult. In addition, outside power is often maritime power 
with widespread interest in other regions, which might bog it down. Entanglement in a 
distant region also jeopardizes its positions in other regions, especially its own region. 
Between 1895 and 1905, the overstretched Britain was entangled in South Africa, 
confronted by Russia in the Near East and by France in Africa. The precarious situation in 
Europe was also a significant concern for Britain. In comparison to these interests, Britain 
had secondary interests in North America—a distant continent where neither Britain nor 
its major European powers had vital security interests. British policymakers conceded that 
with the increase in American power and British global overstretch, it was no longer 
possible for a distant Britain to beat the United States in North America, where the latter 
enjoyed the advantage of home fleet and superior local resources. Britain had no choice 
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but left the United States dominant in the West Hemisphere. American dominance in that 
hemisphere is inevitable, and Britain should withdraw from that hemisphere altogether. 
Between 1931 and 1937, the priority of the United States was to restore the 
domestic economy in the aftermath of the Great Depression. With a reduction in 
expenditure, its naval prowess was also crippled by depression. Washington also only had 
limited security interests in Asia, which was oceans away. On the other hand, Japan’s 
military power increased steadily. Decision-makers calculated that it would take the United 
States four to six years to defeat Japan in a costly war since American naval resources in 
other areas significantly reduced America's effectiveness in fighting Japan in its waters. In 
addition, given the proximity of Japan, its Asian colonies (such as Taiwan) to the 
Philippines, in a war with Taiwan, U.S. Asian assets would suffer colossal damage. Hoover 
felt no obligation to pull China’s chestnuts and Hornbeck even though Japan’s dominance 
in Asia was inevitable. 
For more than half the time between 1995 and 2016, the United States bogged 
down in the Middle East. Its rivalry with Russia also intensified. However, compared with 
the other two cases, Washington’s attitude towards the preponderant local power, China, 
was tougher. Nevertheless, it tried to avoid military conflict with it. A war against China, a 
thermal nuclear power with a thriving economy, was scary even to think of. Scholars 
contend that China as a local power had an advantage regarding balancing will against the 
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United States in East Asia. In addition, given mainland China’s geographical proximity to 
Taiwan, the Paracels, and Scarborough, it has an advantage in a conflict in these areas, and 
as its rapidly growing capability, its advantage grows larger. In 1996, except for a cautious 
display of strength and resolution, Washington was unwilling to provoke Beijing further. 
Since the early 2000s, Washington adopted an offshore balancing strategy against China, 
which was to woo China’s neighbors against it while avoiding direct confrontation with it. 
In the 2012 and 2016 standoffs, Washington was also cautious when confronting China. 
C. The locally preponderant power, confident of its increased power balance vis-
a-vis the outside power, and taking advantage of the outside power’s shrinking advantage 
or strategic distraction, became more assertive in testing the outside powers’ resolve or 
more active in pushing the outside power’s influence out of its region. However, it was out 
of the same confidence that the local advantageous power avoided overprovocation of the 
outside power due to its confidence in dealing with the outside power and inclination to 
avoid risks. In addition, the local preponderant power still respects the material capability 
of the outside power, which was often still more powerful than itself. 
Between 1895 and 1905, Washington took the initiation of provoking London in 
the West Hemisphere due to its calculation of London’s preoccupation with South African 
and European affairs. However, it was because of its growing advantage vis-a-vis London 
and its confidence that Washington was willing to make concessions to London during the 
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negotiations in the Venezuela Crisis of 1895 at the cost of Caracas and to acquiesce to 
London and Berlin’s military coercion of Venezuela in 1902. Washington also tried to avoid 
overprovoking London, which was still more powerful regarding military prowess than 
itself. 
Between 1931 and 1937, Tokyo took advantage of Washington’s economic and 
financial meltdown and launched brazen aggression and invasion in China in northeastern 
China, northern China, and Shanghai. Sensing Washington’s reluctance to become 
involved directly, Tokyo’s encroachment on China was not deterred by Washington’s 
unsubstantial warnings. However, Tokyo was also cautious enough not to overprovoke 
Washington when the latter announced the Stimson Doctrine and sent vessels to Shanghai 
in 1932. Unlike the period of 1938-1942, Tokyo’s aim in this period was relatively limited, 
which was to coerce Nanking into recognition of Manchuria separation. 
Between 1995 and 2016, Beijing was more willing to assert its interests when its 
national interests were at conflict with U.S. allies and partners in East Asia, as the cases in 
Taiwan Strait and SCS showed. However, it was also confident of its future advantage over 
both Washington and its neighbors, given its growing material capability balance with the 
earlier and material capability gap with the latter. As a result, it restrained itself from 
invading Taipei and adopted strategies of a small stick, reactive assertiveness, and salami-
slicing regarding SCS disputes. It also tried to avoid direct confrontation with Washington, 
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which was still more powerful than itself. 
D. Third parties still matter in cases of relatively balanced interregional material 
capability distribution. In all cases, the outside power was still more powerful than the local 
power, and the third state tried to tip the outside power off against the local advantageous 
power. Nanking tried to get Washington to pull its chestnut out of Japanese fire, Canadian 
authorities tried to get British support in the Alaska boundary disputes, Taipei, Hanoi, and 
Manila tried to entangle Washington into their disputes with Beijing. However, with the 
outside power showing reluctance to become involved, the secondary local players also 
recoiled from challenging the local advantageous powers. 
Generally, Hypothesis4 predicts the causal relations between relatively balanced 
dyadic interregional material capability and peaceful resolution of severe interregional 
crises well. It does a good job in predicting A, B C, and D. 
Apart from the cases investigated in the current project, other peaceful resolutions 
of severe interregional major power rivalry crises, such as U.S.-French peace in the late 
18th century and early 19th century, U.S.-Russian long and cold peace during the Cold War, 
and French concessions in East Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, may also follow similar 
courses. 
The findings of Situation II echo the theories of Claude, Waltz, Mearsheimer, 
Christensen, and Snyder (1990). In such situations, the local and outside powers are 
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cautious. The outside power refused to be dragged into the conflict by the secondary local 
actors. However, these projects find that the local advantage of the local power has a major 
role in deciding the results of the major interregional crisis, which is seldom covered by 
the existing literature. 
6. Although the impact of geographic locations declines over time, its influence is still 
considerable in decision-making on both sides, even during the crisis between the United 
States and China in 1995-2016. In the decision-making of war cases, geographical factors 
were a major basis upon which local policy makers decided to wage wars. They believed 
that outside power, projecting power from overseas, would suffer from disadvantages of 
logistics and morale and short-term local military balance. They could give the outside a 
fait accompli by depriving the outside power of local resources, including their local 
colonies, allies, partners, and bases. When the outside power faced the fait accompli and 
calculated the high cost of reversing it, they would back down. Even a war breaks out; the 
outside power gives in if they could fight it into attrition. It was upon these calculations 
that they risked initiating wars against much powerful outside powers. These calculations 
are shown in Finding C in Situation I. On the other hand, in the peaceful resolution cases, 
geographical factors were taken into calculations when decision-makers of outside power 
decided to back down. These calculations are shown in Finding B in Situation II. 
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Interregional Balance Stability Theory vs. Alternative Theories 
Compared with other alternative analyses and alternative explanations, the theory of 
this project seems to have better explanatory power in explaining the results of major 
interregional crises. 
The large N analysis partially disproves Hypothesis1’ and disproves Hypothesis2’, 
while case studies disprove Hypothesis3’ and Hypothesis4’. Contrary to the predictions of 
Hypothesis3’, in all situations that resemble Situation I, strategic regional power’s 
superiority did not deter the local preponderant power from fighting. The local power 
calculated that it had local advantages over strategic regional power, despite the enormous 
power projection capability of the latter. The local power calculated that strategic regional 
power was unwilling to fight a costly war despite its national interests and credibility 
concerns. Contrary to the predictions of Hypothesis4’, in all situations that resembled 
Situation II, the local powers were assertive but also restrained in pushing their national 
interests. The balance of power between strategic regional power and local preponderant 
power did not generate disagreement regarding the results of a potential conflict. The 
outside powers were unwilling to pull the third states’ chestnuts out of the fire, and the third 
states avoided overprovocation of the local preponderant power. 
As of the alternative explanations, for the realist school, imbalance stability or 
hegemonic peace theory seems to explain regional systems well but relatively weakly in 
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explaining interregional cases. As the project shows, outside superiority is associated with 
the likelihood of escalation to war in interregional crises. 
Power transition/Thucydides trap theory is also a bad fit in accounting for 
interregional crises. Contrary to the predictions of power transition theory, this project finds 
that when the rising power’s material capability becomes roughly balanced with that of the 
outside power (usual power in relative decline), interregional crises are more likely to be 
peacefully resolved. On the other hand, an imbalanced dyadic power balance in 
interregional crises is more likely to end up in war. However, if the threshold of power 
transition wars is much lowered, e.g., from a power ratio of 80 percent to lower than 50 
percent, it could perhaps obtain more explanatory power in accounting for interregional 
crises. 
The scope of liberal peace theory is too narrow. It does not explain why authoritarian 
dyads and democratic-authoritarian dyads fight each other some times and not in others. 
Its causal chain theory of liberal peace is also doubtful. Although Britain could not be 
regarded as a democracy in the period of 1805-1812, it was an exemplar of states with 
liberal traditions together with the United States. However, this did not prevent the two 
parties from going to war in 1812. 
Interdependency between the United States and Great Britain in the early 19th Century 
did not prevent the two powers from going to war in 1812, nor did it prevent Japan and the 
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United States from the war in 1941. Even in the decision-making of peaceful resolution of 
Anglo-American relations in 1895-1905 and Japanese-American relations in 1937-1942, 
trade was not the main consideration. On the other hand, this project does find that lopsided 
dependence contributes to crisis escalation and outbreak of war, especially when the power 
enjoyed less dependence on the other is much more power than the latter, for decision-
makers of such power tend not to compromise and to impose economic pressures to coerce 
the more dependent power into capitulation. At the same time, it often shows little concern 
when the latter impose similar pressures, as shown by the 1812 and 1941 cases. 
Apart from the above alternative explanations, shared cultural, language, racial and 
historical linkages eased Anglo-American relations in the late 1890s and early 1900s. 
Notably, unlike the alternative hypothesis, these alternative explanations have merits 
in explaining specific situations. However, the explanatory power in accounting for the 
results of major interregional major power rivalries is weaker than the theory proposed by 
this project. From the table below, it seems that apart from the interregional balance 
stability theory that this project put forward, the bipolar balance stability theory, which is 
put forward by scholars such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, seems to have more 
explanatory power than other theories. When the material capability is relatively balanced 
between the outside power and the locally advantageous power, the outside power tends to 
compromise the locally advantageous power at the cost of its local allies and partners, 
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which increases system flexibility. The relationship of the outside power-locally 
advantageous power dyad dominates the interregional system and makes the system 
relatively simple to manage. The project also finds that imbalanced dyadic interregional 
power distribution contributes to crisis escalation since the superior power tends to refuse 
to compromise before the weaker power’s cautious coercion. These findings all echo the 
bipolar stability theorists. This is true since the cases of this project include only severe 
interregional crises. For regional systems, it seems that imbalance stability theory has better 
explanatory power than balance stability theories. In this project, the less advantage the 
local preponderance power has over its regional adversaries, the more likely the crisis is to 
escalate, since its local adversaries are more willing to resist and challenge it, especially 
when outside assistance is given. This is the case before the outbreak of the Pacific War. 
  
 
  644 


















√ ×   ×  
America-Britain 
1895-1903 
√  √ × √ √ 
Japan-America 
1931-1937 
√  √    
Japan-America 
1938-1942 
√ ×     
China-America 
1950 
√ ×     
China-America 
1995-2016 
√  √ ×  √ 
This project finds that although the impact of geography in international politics has 
declined, it still matters. Modern technology and forward deployment ease difficulties of 
power projection overseas. However, local powers still have a great moral advantage. If 
the weapon system of the local power does not lag enormously behind that of the outside 
power, it has a large local military advantage over the outsider, and the latter’s forward 
deployment tends to be vulnerable. 
Like the liberal peace theory, nuclear stability theory suffers from a narrow scope. The 
Korean War case shows that although possessing nuclear powers tends to prevent nuclear 
powers from fighting each other, it does not prevent their agents or allies, sometimes also 
major powers, from fighting. However, all-out wars are less likely in these cases. Although 
it is important to dissect how the nuclear age is different from the previous ages, it is also 
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important to find commonalities. 
The theory put forward by this project has close relations with the existing literature. 
It has the closest relations with the structural realism theories. It tries to analyze 
whether correlations exist between interregional power distribution and the result of a 
severe interregional crisis. Like Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, William Wohlforth, 
and other structural realists, it hypothesizes that international structure puts pressure on 
international actors and restricts their options. It finds that international structure has a 
major role in deciding international stability at the regional level and interregional level, 
especially the results of international crises. In addition, this project does not treat 
international actors as strict unitary actors. It investigates how international structure exerts 
pressures on decision-makers in major powers and how decisions were made in major 
interregional crises. In this way, the project focuses more on the causal relations between 
structure and international crisis results. This project avoids polarity languages since the 
definition of polarity is often difficult. On the other hand, it is easier to determine whether 
a state is more powerful than the combined capability of all other local actors in a region 
and whether a state is more powerful than another in terms of material capabilities. 
The project also adds scope conditions to structural realism theories. It concentrates 
on interregional major power relations to reduce the cases for study to ensure the feasibility 
for a Ph.D. dissertation. The idea of studying interregional structure and its relations with 
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system stability was triggered by Barry Buzan, who argues that polarity theories usually 
work nicely only in “relatively compact geopolitical spaces” (Buzan, 2004: 64-5). Inspired 
by Benjamin Miller’s argument that local actors enjoy an advantage in terms of “balance 
of interests and motivations”, Hugh White’s argument of China has an advantage in terms 
of Balance of Will against the United States and Martin Van Creveld’s study of military 
logistics (Miller, 2007; White, 2013; Van Creveld, 2004). This project investigates how 
geography affects the decision-makers of both local and outside power’s calculation of 
their advantage and how this affects interregional crisis developments. 
In addition, this project only analyses the relations between interregional structure and 
interregional stability in times of major crisis between major powers rivalries. The study 
of peace and war in the absence of a major crisis is hardly meaningful, as is the study 
regarding powers that have minor conflicts of interest with each other. This project only 
concentrates on severe crises between major rival powers, not just for feasibility reasons 
but also to ensure that there is a chance and possibility that the major powers under study 
may opt for armed clashes. This scope condition follows the tradition of Paul Diehl and 
Gary Goertz (Diehl and Goertz, 2000). 
This project also improves the explanatory power of structural realism by adding 
geography, especially geographical distance, as an intervening variable into the picture and 
finds that geographical distance significantly intermediates the relationship between power 
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distribution and the results of major interregional crises between major power rivalries. In 
this regard, it echoes Øystein Tunsjø’s (2018) academic efforts, although it focuses on 
different factors of geography than Tunsjø. 
These projects cover cases over a long period, from the early 19th century to the early 
21st century. Such a selection of cases ensures that the cases selected do not have a cluster 
problem and are not contaminated by historical trends. It also allows for the observation of 
whether and how the effect of geography changes over time. 
This interregional balance stability theory could also be a complementary theory of 
power transition/preventive war/Thucydides trap theory developed by A.F.K. Organski, 
Jecek Kugler, Ronald Tammen, Dale Copeland, Graham Allison, and so on. Power 
transition theory seems to have good explanatory power in regional systems. In the 
transitional cases in this study, the transition also led to increasing numbers of crises. 
However, the war had been avoided. This project offers a better explanation for why war 
is avoided in interregional power transitions without introducing mercurial concepts such 
as status quo and revisionist states. 
Although the project follows a structural realism tradition, it is also related to liberal 
theories. In the case studies, the project finds that in a major crisis between interregional 
major power rivalries, economic interdependence is usually not the primary consideration 
to be considered by decision-makers. On the other hand, this project finds that lopsided 
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dependence usually contributes to crisis escalation. As Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye 
have observed, different sensitivity and vulnerability levels between mutually dependent 
parties generate power. Parties with lower sensitivity and vulnerability levels in mutually 
dependent relations have additional power than other parties (Keohane and Nye, 1977). 
This finding also echoes Edward Carr that “economic weapon is pre-eminently the weapon 
of strong Powers” (Carr, 1946: 132). 
Implications on Current International Relations 
The findings of this project imply that the theory that it is American supremacy that 
keeps international stability is problematic. 
Many scholars and policymakers in the United States, from promoting or promote or 
believe the idea that the U.S. leadership and primacy is the cornerstone of world peace and 
stability. The United States believes that it is the “unparalleled strength of the United States 
armed forces and their forward presence” that has “maintained the peace in some of the 
world’s most strategically vital regions” (The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America, 2002: 29). The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report claims that 
“America’s political, diplomatic, and economic leadership contributes directly to global 
peace, freedom, and prosperity” (Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2001:1). In a world 
of unipolarity, “doing too little is a greater danger than doing too much"; thus, U.S. 
interventionalism is understandable, and involvement is demand-driven (Wohlforth, 1999: 
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39). Many scholars and researchers are obsessed with “promoting singular US leadership” 
(America’s National Interest, 2000: 5). 
The findings of this project, however, indicate the other way. The rough balance 
between major regional preponderant powers, such as China (in East Asia), Russia (in 
central Asia and Eastern Europe), and the United States, secured the peaceful settlement of 
crises in these regions. On the other hand, Iraq and the whole Middle East region, given 
their material capability imbalance vis-a-vis the United States, were less fortunate. 
This project also implies that a certain type of mutual recognition of the Monroe 
Doctrine, or sphere of influence among great powers operating in different geographical 
regions, contributes to the peaceful resolution of major interregional crises and 
interregional stability. Such recognition could range from strict recognition, such as 
European powers’ recognition of the Monroe Doctrine since the late 1890s, to tacit 
recognition during the Cold War. However, a nonrecognition situation could also be 
roughly stable, as long as the local distribution of power is a preponderant one, and the 
dyadic power distribution between the local preponderant power and the strategic regional 
power is featured by rough balance. Sino-American relations between 1995 and 2010 are 
a relevant case of such a situation. However, such situations usually feature constant crises, 
although these crises do not tend to escalate into military clashes or wars. 
Currently, the trend of China-American relations in East Asia, especially how their 
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disputes regarding Taipei and the SCS develop in the next few decades, provides 
opportunities for falsification of the interregional balance stability theory that these projects 
put forward. This project predicts that although the process of power transitions between 
major local powers and stronger outside power is laden with crises and difficulties, as the 
power gap between the two becomes narrow and the material capability balance becomes 
more balanced, these crises are resolved without war. Currently, with the material 
capability gap between China and the United States narrowing, the likelihood of their 
entangling in a war in East Asia decreases. Although ideological, cultural, economic, and 
technological competitions between the two powers might continue for decades, economic 
and technological sanctions might be employed by the United States, the United States 
continue to contain China through tightening relations with its Asian allies and partners, 
trade and technology war, vilifying China and cultivating domestic conflict in China and 
China continue to neutralize the United States in that region, although militarized disputes 
are still a possibility, the two powers would not engage in fighting wars even if major crises 
take place in the future. The power transition/Thucydides trap theory, on the other hand, 
predicts that such a transition is not going to be peaceful if China is discontent with the 
status quo of the current international system. Mearsheimer (2001, 2014) also contends 
that China cannot rise peacefully since the United States will not allow a dominant force 
in Asia to emerge as its peer competitor. The theory put forward by this project could be 
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falsified. China will continue to neutralize and undermine American influence in East Asia. 
Driven by nationalism, the Chinese mainland might also use military forces to unify Taiwan 
or solve SCS territorial disputes. On the other hand, the United States, driven by political 
radicalism, might fight a diversionary war with China to divert domestic discontent and 
reunify polarized and antagonized domestic constituencies. Although this project predicts 
the reverse, these developments might take place. Even though war is avoided, new 
development might still require adjustment of the thesis of this project. It might also call 
for revision of the thesis of these projects when more historical material or resources are 
included or disclosed. 
According to the theory of this project, compared with U.S.-China face-offs in East 
Asia, a major crisis between Iran and a much more powerful the United States in the 
multipolar Middle East in the future is more likely to cause wars. 
The shortcomings of this project might infer the directions of future research. Failing 
in the holding level of interregional balance, the intensity of war, and the regional power 
distribution in control might have some advantages. It seems that preponderant regional 
power distribution and balanced interregional power distribution contribute to avoiding 
war in severe interregional crisis. There might also be a negative correlation between the 
level of imbalanced regional imbalance and the interregional balance level, and the 
intensity of regional or interregional wars. It seems that the more imbalanced the 
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interregional power distribution is, the more intense the war will be if the interregional 
crisis escalates into war. Japan’s weaker regional advantage and higher material power 
imbalance vis-a-vis the United States was correlated with a more intense war than the other 
two war cases. This might be a topic for future research. 
In addition, in future research, cases of other situations in Table 1 (the upper boxes 
and the bottom right box) might also be investigated. A full theory of power distribution 
and the result of a major international crisis will be completed if that is done. Moreover, if 
the outside power does not opt for war as the power gap between it and the local power 
narrows, does it only have the option of withdrawal? Britain clearly adopted a withdrawal 
policy in the first two decades of the 1900s. Contrarily, U.S. containment policy against 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War is another option. Its policies against China after 
1996 are also different. Is there a general rule of how outside powers in general decline 
deal with rising local power? This might be a good topic for future research. 
The theory of this project, rooting out of the influence of the development of science 
and technology over time, is relatively static. The development of intercontinental missiles, 
space capabilities, and cyber capabilities might increase the cost of waging war with a 
major power in a distant region for strategic regional power, since the cost might be 
devastation of its homeland, which is a prohibitively high cost. This might contribute to 
reducing the likelihood of interregional war between major powers. 
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This project also does not investigate other geopolitical features apart from distance, 
such as terrain, geographical surroundings, and the difference of strategic logic of a land 
power from a maritime. These factors might also affect interregional interactions. However, 
the theory is still self-consistent without taking into account these factors. Investigating 
how these factors mediate the relationship between power distribution and international or 
interregional stability in future studies might make the theory more dynamic and 
sophisticated. By including these factors, the explanatory power of the current theory might 
also be enhanced. 
In future research, the relation between local distribution, local dyadic balance, and 
local crisis results might also be investigated, so the role of geographical distance, and 
other geopolitical factors in mediating the relationship. 
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